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Abstract
This dissertation explores the ethnic and religious dimensions of the northern
Nigeria conflict, in which gruesome killings have intermittently occurred, to determine
whether there are genocidal inclinations to the episodic killings. The literature review
provides the contextual framework for examining the conflict parties and causation
factors to address the research questions: Are there genocidal inclinations to the ethnoreligious conflict in northern Nigeria? To what extent does the interplay between
ethnicity and religion help to foment and escalate the conflict in northern Nigeria?
The study employs a mixed content analysis and grounded theory methodology
based on the Strauss and Corbin (1990) approach. Data sourcing was from 197
newspaper articles on the conflict over the study period spanning from the 1966 northern
Nigeria massacres of thousands of Ibos up to present, ongoing killings between extremist
Muslims and Christians or non-Muslims in the region. Available texts of the conflict
cases over the research period were content-analyzed using Nvivo qualitative data
analysis software involving processes of categorizing, coding, and evaluation of the
textual themes. The study structures a theoretical model for determining proclivity to
genocide, and finds that there are genocidal inclinations to the northern Nigeria conflict,
involving the specific intent to ‘cleanse’ the north through the exclusionary ideology of
imposition of the Sharia law through enforced assimilation or extermination of Christians
and other non-Muslims who do not assimilate or adopt the Muslim ideology. The study
also suggests that there is latency in the recognition of these genocidal manifestations due
to their episodic nature and intermittency of occurrence.

xv

The study provides further understanding of factors underlying and sustaining the
violent conflict between extremist Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria. It
contributes new perspectives and a theoretical model for determining genocidal proclivity
to the field of conflict analysis and resolution, and proffers alternative strategies for
relationship building and peaceful coexistence among different religious groups. The
findings will guide recommendations on policy formulations for eliminating religious
intolerance in northern Nigeria. The study creates further awareness on the need for
global intervention on the region’s sporadic killings to avert full blown Rwandan type
genocide in Nigeria.

xvi

Chapter 1: Introduction
Nigeria as a nation-state has encountered a myriad of complex problems
involving different variables and stakeholders, as a result of which it has experienced
economic downturn, political upheavals, coups d’état, civil war, and a deluge of ethnoreligious conflicts (Williams, 2011). As a regional giant inundated with political
instability, organized and pervasive crime influences, prodigious corruption, and a
climate of entrenched ethno-religious violence (Chalk, 2004), Nigeria’s internal religious
politics could affect its West African region’s neighboring states (Chalk, 2004). Most of
the conflicts have predominated northern Nigeria, with the Middle Belt region, primarily
Jos in Plateau state (Ostien, 2009) as the major conflict zone, and such other cities as
Kano in Kano state (John, Mohammed, Pinto, & Nkanta, 2007), Kaduna in Kaduna state
(Aliyu, 2009; Kazah-Toure & Human Rights Monitor, 2003), and Maiduguri in Borno
state (Aliyu, 2009), where mass killings and exterminations have remained sporadic and
have persisted for decades, primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians or nonMuslims.
Several studies have linked the prevalence of conflicts in northern Nigeria to a
myriad of factors including, economic factors (including resource allocation inequity)
and indigene-settler issues (Gberie, 2006; Harnischfeger, 2004; Omeje, 2004; Osaghae,
1995; Ostien, 2009), and political factors and unbridled power tussle (Ukiwo, 2003).
Some of these studies have also identified religious factors and politicization of religion
(Ibrahim, 1989, 1991; Osaghae, 1998a; Suberu, 2009; Williams, 2011), ethnicity factors
and colonialism’s amalgamating of various ethnic groups (Aguwa, 1997), as leading to
Nigeria’s high ethnocentric politics (Anthony, 2002; Osaghae, 1998a), as well as Islamic
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fundamentalism (Chalk, 2004; Harnischfeger, 2004). Kukah and Falola (1996) present
Islam’s political impact in Nigeria as causal factor, primarily in northern Nigeria in which
Islam predominates, which, based on the North’s vast Muslim population, the Muslim
world perceives Nigeria as a key member, with Islam’s politicization impact further
compounded by its ideology of non-separation of religion from politics. Harnischfeger
(2004) presents an Islamists redefinition of the demos entitled to rule with the
enforcement of Sharia law which is based on the Muslims’ exclusionary ideology in
Sharia operational states against non-Muslims (p. 431).
Thus, gruesome killings have continued to take place in northern Nigeria, and
according to Ibrahim (1989), an incursion has occurred between Christians and Muslims
with extensive loss of life and destruction of property for which researchers have
identified several causation factors. However, while a confluence of causes may be
underlying the conflict in northern Nigeria, there is no significant understanding of
whether there are genocidal inclinations to the conflict, and the extent to which the
interplay of religion and ethnicity helps to foment and escalate the conflict.
Underlying Factors Influencing the Study
The episodic gruesome killings in northern Nigeria have persisted and remained
unabated up to present. The non-abating nature of these atrocious killings has framed the
researcher’s thoughts namely, that there are other underpinning factors to them. The
motivation for this study is rooted in a dire need to raise awareness on the gruesomeness
of the ongoing carnages, with an unflinching desire for efforts to be mobilized towards
putting an end to such intermittent atrocities. This desire derives from personal family
experiences encountered during the 1966 pogrom which was directed primarily against
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the Igbos in northern Nigeria. Many personal relations were killed in the pogrom. The
researcher’s parents, then living in Malumfashi, Katsina State in the North, lost all of
their wealth through looting and arson, only narrowly escaping with their lives. Such
carnages have continued unabated since then even though sporadic. This history of
systematically targeting a victim group(s), who more often than not are Christians or nonMuslims by the perpetrator group(s) who usually are extremist Muslims, continues to be
played out in northern Nigeria today (Chalk, 2004; Harnischfeger, 2004; Ibrahim 1989,
1991; Ostien, 2009). These insights have birthed the desire to investigate the northern
Nigeria conflict, involving an in-depth analysis of conflict cases in northern Nigeria
spanning from the 1966 crisis to the present in order to explore the plausibility of
genocidal inclinations to the conflict.
Context of Study
Situate in the sub-Saharan, West African region, Nigeria at independence in 1960
was made up of four regions, Northern, Western, Eastern, and Midwestern Regions (see
Map I in Appendix A), a structure that was changed in 1967 with the creation of twelve
new states which replaced the regions (see Map II in Appendix A). Prior to the 1967 new
states creation, northern Nigeria, which is the focus of this study, spanned more than half
of the country extending up to the area now known as the Middle Belt including Abuja
and Jos, and covering the whole of the former Northern Region under the colonial powers
(see Map delineating the Old Northern Region up to its southern part in Appendix A).
The resulting breakup of the country led to the division of the Northern Region into six
states out of 12 states nationally in 1967, and these were subsequently further broken up
into 19 northern states out of 36 states nationally in 1996.
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Furthermore, Nigeria is politically zoned into six “geo-political zones” which
include “the north west; north east; north central; south west; south east; and south
south,” the grouping of which, while not referring to administrative entities, form the
country’s geo-political zoning for its federal employment allocation (International Crisis
Group [ICG], 2010, p. 1). The expansion of the country’s federal administrative units to
36 states by 1996 altered the relationship between majority and minority groupings,
particularly fracturing and eroding the major ethnic groups’ dominance over minority
groups. While this majority eroding process in the far north did not lead to a shift to the
minority overtaking the majority holding in any state, it undercut the Hausa-Fulani vision
of regional unity, and in Kaduna particularly, it reduced the power of the Hausa-Fulani
dominance over the minority population (ICG, 2010). Nigeria is, thus, roughly split
between a mostly Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south, with a Middle Belt
or central region that has a near Christian and Muslim balancing, with each of the regions
incorporating some minority traditionalists (Osaghae, 1998a).
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is to explore the ethnic and religious dimensions of the
continuing northern Nigeria gruesome killings to determine whether there are genocidal
inclinations to the episodic killings. It is recognized, for instance, that “between 1966 and
1970, a genocide-in-part occurred in Nigeria, following the U.N. definition” (Melson
1996, p. 163). As defined by the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide, the crime of genocide constitutes such acts in which patterns of
religious, racial, or ethnic massacres have a solid indication of genocidal intent (Hinton,
2002; Jones, 2006). In analyzing the commonalities between the partial genocide that
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occurred in Bosnia and the Armenian genocide, for instance, it is observed that the
Serbian nationalists just as the Young Turks, and the Croat to some extent, are also
imagining a large state which would comprise their people while excluding other national
and ethnic groups. Thus, the Bosnian Muslims, like the Armenians as an ethno-religious
community with claims to land, are being driven out and massacred by Croatian and
Serbian nationalist movements seeking to destroy their culture, to “cleanse” their
presence from the area, and to appropriate their lands (Melson, 1996, p. 166). Hence, the
Nigerian derivative that is being played out in northern Nigeria today involves extremist
Muslims intent to ‘cleanse’ the north of Christians and other non-Muslims through the
‘exclusionary ideology’ of imposition of the Sharia Law (Harnischfeger, 2004) to ‘force
assimilation’ or ‘extermination’ (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 30; Harnischfeger, 2004)
through massacres and genocidal killings of those who refuse to assimilate or adopt the
Muslim ideology (Harnischfeger, 2004; Melson, 1996; Stuijt, 2009).
This study presents that there are genocidal inclinations to the northern Nigeria
conflict which also have latency or covertness as a result of the episodic and
intermittency of killings that have been going on for decades in the conflict. The study
aims to establish similarity of genocidal patterns to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious
conflict by examining genocidal occurrences and massacres in history, particularly the
20th century deluge to contemporary genocides, for an understanding of genocide, how it
presents, and the forms it takes. It will examine the underlying causes of genocide,
explore some examples and types of genocide, and also investigate measures to forestall
and prevent further escalation of the conflict.
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Research Problem
Previous studies on the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria have identified
a multiplicity of causation to the conflict which has persisted intermittently for decades.
A review of such studies reveals, however, that there is no significant study to investigate
the existence of genocidal undertones to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict.
This mixed qualitative content analysis and grounded theory study seeks to examine the
parties to the conflict, the mechanisms involved, and the conditions that led to their
outcome, to inquire whether there are genocidal inclinations to the conflict. The
phenomenon is presented as ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria involving
Muslims and Christians or non-Muslims (Creswell, 2007, p. 101). The fundamental
issues explored involve determining the parties in the varying conflict cases, examining
conflict causation, and investigating whether there are genocidal inclinations to the
conflict.
Outline of the Study
The dissertation has six chapters. Chapter one is the introduction for the study.
Chapter two covers an extensive literature review on the northern Nigeria ethno-religious
conflict, providing a historical background to the conflict in two sections: Northern
Nigeria – Pre-Colonial and Colonial to Independence, and the North at Independence to
Present. The chapter also reviews the conceptual framework of genocide, covering its
definitions and origins, causes, typology and examples of genocide, alternative
methodological approaches in Genocide studies, as well as the prevention and
punishment of genocide. Lastly, the chapter examines different theoretical perspectives
for proffering an understanding of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. Chapter
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three presents the study’s research design and the rationale for the mixed qualitative
content analytic and grounded theory methodology used for the study. The chapter also
presents the procedures for data collection and data analysis for the study.
Chapter four presents the data analysis results delineated from content analyzing
and coding of newspaper articles of cases of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict,
focusing on causation and intentionality to inquire on genocidal inclinations to the
conflict. The chapter also presents the grounded theory model for determining proclivity
to genocide in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, deriving from the
consistency of the emerging patterns (Stake, 1995) of the Nvivo coding and data analysis
of the five study phases. The model derives from the theoretical framework of Strauss
and Corbin (1990) and is developed from this study. The presentation of the study’s
findings indicates that the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict has genocidal
undertones to the conflict. Chapter five discusses the findings addressing the study’s
research questions, presents a summary of the findings, and proffers recommendations
for conflict resolution, as well as genocide prevention and intervention for aversion of
further escalations of the conflict. Chapter six discusses the implications of the study and
provides a conclusion to the study. The next chapter covers the literature review for the
study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter covering the literature review on the ethno-religious conflict in
northern Nigeria consists of three sections. The first section examines the ethno-religious
conflict in northern Nigeria, exploring its background and significance. The second
section examines the conceptual framework of genocide. To foreground an investigation
of the plausibility of genocidal inclinations to the ethno-religious conflict in northern
Nigeria, it is essential to understand the contextual meaning of genocide, its conceptual
framing and causal factors, as well as the forms and typology of genocide. This involves
examining and distinguishing genocidal concepts from other forms of exterminations
such as massacres and ethnic cleansing, as well as exploring the underlying and
contributory causes of genocide. To address these issues, the focus of this second section
of the literature review has been organized into five parts. The first part explores the
origins and definitions of genocide, and the second covers the causes of genocide. The
third part investigates the types of genocide, and the fourth presents some examples of
genocide. A fifth part looks at alternative methodological approaches in genocide studies,
and explores some preventative and intervention measures to stop genocide. The third
and last section of the literature review presents the theoretical framework to explain the
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict and its genocidal framing.
Significance of Study
Nigeria is “a ‘regional giant’ whose internal religious politics could affect
neighboring states in the West African region” (Chalk, 2004, p. 414). Nigeria has, since
its 1960 independence, been inundated by a myriad of socio-political, socio-economic,
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and socio-religious crises which have manifested in coups, countercoups, political
assassinations, and mass killings involving national, regional, or intergroup ethnic and
religious based conflicts. The prevalence of these conflicts has been in northern Nigeria,
primarily in the Middle Belt region, where sporadic mass killings and exterminations
have persisted for decades between Muslims and Christians (Ibrahim, 1989, 1991;
Osaghae, 1998a; Ostien, 2009). Other northern states of intense conflict conflagration
include, Kano in Kano state (John et al., 2007), Kaduna in Kaduna state (Aliyu, 2009;
Kazah-Toure & Human Rights Monitor, 2003), Maiduguri in Borno state (Aliyu, 2009),
and Bauchi in Bauchi state, etc., where mass killings and exterminations have also
remained sporadic and persisting for decades, primarily between Muslims and Christians
or non-Muslims. While different perspectives including economic factors such as
resource allocation inequity and indigene-settler issues (Harnischfeger, 2004; Osaghae,
1995; Ostien, 2009); political factors such as unbridled power tussle (Ukiwo, 2003); and
cultural, ethnic, and religious factors among others have been used to explain the conflict,
it is noted that, following the Sharia law institution as penal code in 12 out of the 19
northern states since 1999, more than 50,000 people have been killed in religious
violence in northern Nigeria (Christian Solidarity Worldwide [CSW], n.d., para. 1).
Several studies have linked the prevalence of conflicts in these areas of northern
Nigeria to factors such as poverty, retarded development, and political factors. Some of
these studies have identified religious and ethnicity factors as undergirding the waves of
killings in northern Nigeria. In its article, Northern Nigeria: Background to the Conflict,
the International Crisis Group (ICG) observes that a myriad of complex and inter-locking
factors undergirds the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria, “including a volatile
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mix of historical grievances, political manipulation and ethnic and religious rivalries”
(ICG, 2010, p. 1). The ICG report though focused on the twelve states of the north that
have adopted the Sharia law (see Map VI in Appendix A) on the basis of their uniqueness
in some aspects of the conflict and their similarity in other aspects, such as the Muslim
Christian tensions or the skirmishes involving land use which applies to all Nigerian
states, it is, thus, applicable to the entire northern states on which this study is focused.
According to the ICG (2010), while the Sharia adopted region may have
historically shown ample capacity for peaceful coexistence between its religious and
ethnic communities, local conflicts are primarily taken by outside observers as
representative of the northern Nigerian society as a whole which is contrary to the case.
However, conflicts between Muslims and Christians have been predominant in the entire
northern states. And while both religions adherents might have generally coexisted
peacefully in various areas of the north, there is the aggravation of long existing tensions
particularly between Islamic groups and Christian groups with the Sharia’s
reintroduction, as a result of which, hundreds or even thousands were killed in Kaduna in
February/March 2000 (Angerbrandt, 2011; p. 15; ICG, 2010, p. 1), for instance. There are
also other dimensions of conflicts between disparate Islamic sects, between Islamic
groups which are anti-establishment and security forces or the Nigerian state, and lately,
between long established indigenous communities and the settler group. Framed by the
competition for communally based distribution of public resources, such conflicts are
widespread in the country. Hence, the ICG observes that:
Many factors fuelling these conflicts are common across Nigeria: in particular, the
political manipulation of religion and ethnicity and disputes between supposed
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local groups and “settlers” over distribution of public resources. The failure of the
state to assure public order… Economic decline and absence of employment
opportunities, especially as inequality grows, likewise drives conflict. As
elsewhere in Nigeria, the north suffers from a potent mix of economic malaise and
contentious, community-based distribution of public resources.
But there is also a specifically northern element. A thread of rejectionist
thinking runs through northern Nigerian history, according to which collaboration
with secular authorities is illegitimate….calls for an “Islamic state” in
Nigeria…demonstrate that many in the far north express political and social
dissatisfaction through greater adherence to Islam and increasingly look to the
religious canon for solutions to multiple problems in their lives. (2010, pp. i-ii)
However, while a confluence of causes may be underlying the conflict in northern
Nigeria, there is no significant understanding of whether there are genocidal inclinations
to the conflict, and, the extent to which the interplay of religion and ethnicity help to
foment and escalate the conflict, which are the thrusts of this study.
Background to the Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious Conflict
To examine the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria, it is essential to
understand the historical background of the region’s ethnic and religious societies. It is
also essential to understand the North’s Sokoto Caliphate “center-periphery” model,
which has profoundly impacted community relations and discussions on religion’s
position in the politics of the region (ICG, 2010, p. 2). This section is organized into two
parts. The first covers the pre-colonial and colonial northern Nigeria to Independence,
and the second outlines the North from independence to present.
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Northern Nigeria: Pre-Colonial and Colonial to Independence. Home to
several ethnic and religious communities, the northern Nigeria is primarily rural, while
also including historically, such key urban centers as Sokoto, Kano, Kaduna, Zaria and
Maiduguri which for centuries have been eminent Islamic world centers of learning (ICG,
2010, p. 2). The Hausa, Fulani, and the Kanuri are the predominant groups in the region,
all three of which are primarily Muslim, in addition to other smaller groups of about 160
in number, many of which are Christians or animists. There are Muslim majority in most
of the far northern states which in such states as Sokoto and Borno are overwhelming and
in other states such as Kaduna and Jos being more mixed. The delineations crystallized
into majority and minority groupings since the early 1900s British colonization, with its
complexity further compounded by the substantial mainly Christian southern migrants to
the region. Other than the north east which is dominated by the Kanuri, the Hausa and
Fulani predominate across most of the region and is reflective of its political and
numerical hegemony. It is observed, however, that:
Neither the Hausa nor the Fulani is a rigid lineage group – one can become Hausa
by adoption or conversion to Islam, although in doing so one enters at the bottom
rung of a highly stratified society. As large Islamized ethnic groups closely
associated with the nineteenth-century Sokoto Caliphate, the Hausa and Fulani are
often seen as dominant in the region and grouped together as a single HausaFulani group. This is encouraged by Nigeria’s politics of communal rivalry and to
some degree reflects their own political strategies. However, Hausa and Fulani are
distinguishable in terms of names and languages and consider themselves distinct.
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While nearly all Fulani in the region speak Hausa, the region’s lingua franca, not
all Hausa speak Fulani. (ICG, 2010, p. 2)
The region’s earliest peoples comprised several smaller groupings organized in
community based or autonomous polities, most with state structures which are merely
rudimentary with neither imperial rulers nor expansionist ambitions (ICG, 2010, p. 2).
The Hausa, a self-identifying group formed partly in-situ as well as from migrations
emerged in the twelfth century, and in the absence of forming a unified empire due to
internal rivalries, “established seven major city-states and seven other associated-states –
collectively now known as Hausaland” which extend into present-day Niger Republic
(ICG, 2010, p. 2). These states had by the thirteenth century gained much control over the
region and incorporated different smaller groups into Hausa-speaking multi-ethnic
polities (Falola & Heaton, 2008; ICG, 2010) and by the seventeenth century the Hausa
Empire flourished, significantly controlling the trans-Saharan trade in slaves, gold, and
salt. It is observed that the Hausa had in this pre-colonial era established commercial and
social linkages in the presently known northern Nigeria, up to the Senegal valley far west,
and as far east as the Arabian Peninsula far east (Falola & Heaton, 2008).
The Kanuri who originated, on the other hand, from the Kanem Empire emerged
in the ninth century in south-west, present-day Chad, and migrated towards Lake Chad,
subdued the locals, and by the eleventh century established the Borno Kingdom separate
from the Hausa states, becoming in the north-east the largest ethnic group through intermarriage and assimilation of the locals. The Fulani migrated in the thirteenth century
from present-day Senegal through the empires of Mali and Songhai to Hausaland and in
the fifteenth century to Borno mainly as nomadic herdsmen with their scholars gradually
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gaining influences with the Hausa nobles through appointments in Hausa royal
households as scribes, advisers, tax collectors, and judges (ICG, 2010). Both the Hausa as
well as the Borno kingdoms were equally prominently engaged in the trans-Saharan
trade, as people and goods traversed the north-south desert routes, linking societies of
sub-Saharan Africa with North Africa as well as Europe, with the fourteenth to the
sixteenth centuries observed as the trans-Saharan trade “golden age” during which period,
slaves and gold were mostly traded (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 245). Relationships were
established between the Borno and Kannem-Borno kingdoms and the Hausa states, with
Borno and the north Africa Maghrib states having long-drawn commercial ties through
their trans-Saharan trade engagement, with the back and forth movement of people and
goods creating mutual commercial exchanges and relationships. Islam was, thus, brought
to both Hausa and Borno states between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries through
these trade routes (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 246).
The spread of Islam, commerce, slavery, and war shaped the initial interactions
besides the early settlements and migrations, with many states waging wars for expansion
of territorial claims and acquiring slaves for export to North Africa or to work the feudal
plantations. The major interactions that occurred through the spread of Islam took place
in two phases—its peaceful introduction by Arab and North African merchants and
clerics through West Africa from the eleventh to the seventeenth century. The Borno
Empire rulers converted first in the eleventh century and were followed by the Hausa
kings from the fourteenth to the fifteenth centuries through interactions of Mali scholars
and traders across Songhai Empire, with Mali Muslim scholars already occupying key
administrative positions in Hausa city-states by the fourteenth century (ICG, 2010).
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Islam’s second spread phase was the early nineteenth century Shehu Usman dan Fodio, a
Fulani preacher’s led revivalist revolution jihad to purify the region’s Islamic practices
and subsequently install righteous leadership. The missionary activities benefited Dan
Fodio who drew large discipleship crowds, and criticizing the state, he swayed many
towards identifying with his new societal vision by emphasizing the maltreatment of the
poor by the Hausa kings who were pagans and lived grandiosely without practicing the
Islamic law. Constituting an alternate center of power, Dan Fodio’s jihad which started in
1804 proved successful, with a resultant emergence of a Fulani aristocracy that presided
over a caliphate and which was a federation spanning many emirates (Kukah & Falola,
1996). The jihad invaded and subdued the fourteen Hausa city-states from 1804 to 1808
aided by Fulani nomads and Hausa peasants dissatisfied with their kings’ corruption and
nepotism, and installed Fulani emirs to replace their chiefs. Though partially conquered
by the new regime from 1808-1812, only Borno was not fully subdued by the Sokoto
Caliphate (ICG, 2010).
Thus, formed between 1804-1808, the Sokoto Caliphate “is a reference point for
many in the region…[and] a source of great pride” (ICG, 2010, p. i). Deriving cohesion
from Islam, its empire comprised autonomous emirates with separate emirs and
administration, and the Sokoto-based caliph at the head doubling up as spiritual guide and
political leader. Retaining the feudal pre-jihad system, the caliphate had the Hausa
aristocracy replaced with Fulani royal families, with tithes paid to the emirs by the
communities and tribute paid to the caliph by the emirs. Islamic practices and values
were entrenched in the region by the Fulani rulers (Pierce as cited in ICG, 2010) though
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with the populace’s passive resistance at times, in order to foster an ethnicity
transcending common culture to hold the caliphate together. It is, thus, observed that:
Sharia was applied “more widely, and in some respects more rigidly ... than
anywhere else outside Saudi Arabia,” and indigenous religious practices, such as
traditional Hausa ceremonies (Bori), were suppressed, or at least became less
visible. However, the Fulani rulers also assimilated many elements of Hausa
culture, thus creating the basis for what some see as a progressively homogeneous
Hausa-Fulani identity…[T]he caliphate also promoted a culture of “knowledge
and intellectualism”, such that “education became the yardstick for all
opportunities in the state and knowledge a ladder for climbing heights of respect
and dignity.” (ICG, 2010, p. 3)
Under this Shari’a recognition, a relationship developed between the emirs and
the sultan. The caliphate in its first formation, however, was not like the jihadists
anticipated, being plagued by such disturbing features as slave raiding, unjust practices
including the corruption of the judiciary, and power rivalry (Kukah & Falola, 1996). It
was, thus, far from ideal as a kingdom as “Resistance to Fulani rule, including resistance
from Fulani nobles who felt excluded from emerging power structures, and more general
insecurity, especially along its periphery, continued throughout the nineteenth century”
(ICG, 2010, p. 3). Hence, while Islam aided the consolidation of political rule, it
simultaneously inspired revolts especially among those suffering intensive taxation, with
several communities devastated by the nineteenth century ending by revolts arising from
grievances on economic and religious doctrinal differences. Still haunting relations
between the smaller plundered groups and the Fulani, are the memories of the emirates

17
warriors’ raids and looting of such periphery regions then considered heathen territory, to
capture slaves for the caliphate’s plantation. The caliphate’s late years witnessed rising
tensions between the Sufi two major brotherhoods (Tariqa)—the Tijaniyya and the
Qadiriyya—which presenting from the fifteenth century in the region, became the
caliphate’s dominant/official order. The Tijaniyya, with its bureaucratic and rich traders
social base, grew more popular in the nineteenth century and in time was linked with
resistance to the region’s ruling aristocracies, and in particular, to Sokoto (Loimeier as
cited in ICG, 2010).
With the advent of colonization in the late nineteenth century, the Europeans were
recognized to have arbitrarily drawn Nigeria’s present day borders in the 1884/85 Berlin
Conference in line with the United Kingdom mutual agreements with Germany and
France, as part of the colonization process for West Africa (Falola & Heaton, 2008).
These borders were not linked to any pre-existing ecological, geographical, or social
boundaries as people, as well as goods, had in the pre-colonial days freely moved across
those borders, forming historical and commercial linkages with other African societies.
As the twentieth century approached, however, there had been a decline in the transSaharan trade to negligible levels due to the growing Atlantic coast trade with the
Europeans which started in the sixteenth century, and which diminished the trans-Saharan
routes significance. With colonialism and the delineation of Nigeria’s official boundaries,
therefore, there was an even greater difficulty in sustaining the trans-Saharan trade which
had served to transfer people and goods across Nigerian territories (Falola & Heaton,
2008).
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Colonialism ushered in the establishment of the protectorate of Southern Nigeria
and the Lagos colony by the British government in the late nineteenth century, and this
was followed by a northward extension in 1900 which also established the Northern
Nigeria protectorate. Slowly negotiating for the acceptance of colonial rule with the
northern emirs, Frederick Lugard, appointed as the Northern Nigeria High
Commissioner, got cooperation from most kingdoms with internal dissent having
weakened them already with the ending of the profiteering slave trade, while also
defeating those that resisted, including Sokoto in 1903 (ICG, 2010). Thus, it is observed
that “The killing of the fleeing Caliph Attahiru I, in July 1903, marked the end of the
caliphate as a sovereign political formation” (ICG, 2010, p. 4). However, there was a
continued prominence of the caliphate in both political and religious structures of the
region on which the ICG observes that:
The Sokoto Caliphate occupies an important, but ambivalent, position in the
consciousness of Muslims in northern Nigeria. Its history is a source of pride, and
its legacy gives a sense of community and cohesion…It has also left behind a
structure of traditional governance, centered on the caliphate emirs and their
inheritors…
The fact that the caliphate continued to exist under British sovereignty for
nearly 60 years has given its heritage much ambivalence. Equally, attitudes to the
caliphate and its heritage differ greatly in different locations, following the centerperiphery structure of the entity itself. Over the decades, it has become, in the
eyes of many, the locus of a northern Muslim “establishment” that is vulnerable to
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accusations of selling out to non-Muslim outside powers and, more generally, of
moral or material corruption. (2010, p. 4)
Thus, while the caliphate was put to an end by Europeans through colonization
with most of it becoming a portion of the colonial Nigeria, the Fulani aristocracy adopted
a civil strategy in relating with the British, without adopting their Christian religion, and
although some powers of the aristocracy were lost, its Islamic law system remained
(Kukah & Falola, 1996). The British colonial administration governed Nigeria by indirect
rule from its 1900 proclamation to the country’s 1960 independence, thus, controlling the
populace and raising revenue using local rulers under supervision of British officials.
This involved reorganizing traditional local authorities and creating a local compliant
power base to further British interests, while deposing resisting office holders. British
indirect rule allowed traditional authorities, mostly the Sultan of Sokoto, to expand
though with such power subject to the British, and while colonial rule aimed to avert
disrupting social structures in the region, its religion, and culture, it introduced crucial
cultural, judicial, and political changes. The caliph’s defeat and the establishment of a
new capital for the region in Kaduna diminished the sultan’s influence and authority,
partially transferring the aristocratic power to an emergent political class, but retaining
the sultan’s spiritual leadership of the region’s Muslims (ICG, 2010). Shortly prior to
independence, fifty years later, concerns were turned towards the reformation of the legal
system that would accommodate migrants and the interests of foreign investors, with the
power transfer to Nigeria at the end of World War II finally providing the opportunity of
using the caliphate’s legacy “to build a strong political party based on Islam and
ethnicity” (Kukah & Falola, 1996, p. 3).
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Hence, although curtailing the emirs powers through indirect rule, they were in
contradistinction relied on by colonial power for indirect rule, with significant
consequences, as it worked effectively in emirates already relatively well-established
administratively but not in those without effective administrative systems mainly due to
minority group resistance (ICG, 2010). And, with indirect rule somewhat reinforcing
emirate administration, several minority sectors became increasingly subordinate to the
power of the emirate with no concern for their distinctive identities. Converting to
Christianity was common with the minority or the non-Hausa-Fulani groups, frequently
in response to their perception of the emirate administration’s power. It is observed, for
instance, that:
These smaller groups expressed fears of domination in a post-colonial Nigeria,
but a 1958 commission largely dismissed their concerns. Nevertheless, colonial
rule facilitated the domination of Hausa and Fulani elites, especially in areas that
minority groups had historically considered their exclusive domains, and sowed
the seeds for conflicting claims to political space, economic rights and societal
values. (ICG, 2010, p. 5)
Although the Islamic law that the caliphate established was retained by the
British, it was in time restricted to civil cases, while the applications of punishments such
as lashings were also restricted, and subsequently, the Sharia’s jurisdictional enforcement
was scaled down to the native courts at the local-level. The colonial period saw an
imprecise labor division for Islamic judges referred to as the alkalis, presiding over
family matters, and the legal councils of the emirates who applied principles of common
law to such issues as commercial property. There was a frequent application of the
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“Islamic principles of compensation for violence and murder” ICG, 2010, p. 5). Sharia
content was, however, expunged by the British in 1959 towards the end of colonial rule
on the basis “that some of its provisions were incompatible with the rights of all citizens
in a religiously plural society” (ICG, 2010, p. 5). In the context of the alkalis’ increasing
political role against the emerging pro-independence parties and following the colonial
government’s mounted up pressure (Bello as cited in ICG, 2010), the region's
government in compromise accepted the Penal Code which established a Sharia appeal
court applying solely to Muslim personal law in its jurisdiction. Several Muslim leaders
in the region saw such changes as Christian jurisprudence being elevated over their
Islamic legal heritage (Crisis Group Interview as cited in ICG, 2010).
Western innovations were largely discouraged by the colonial administration,
with Christian missionaries along with their schools only permitted in the defunct
caliphate’s non-Muslim fringes. By replacing the ajami with the Roman script for Hausa
language writing and establishing together with the Islamic system a European system of
education, pre-existing scholarship was much jeopardized with the cleric’s status and that
of the English unlettered diminished (Aliyu as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 5). There was, in
time, a further sharpening of existing cleavages between the Hausa-Fulani Muslim and
the smaller groups. More so, while most northern parts were shielded from missionary
activities, education, and other Western influences by a pact signed between the Laggard
administration and the northern emirs, a free rein of these Western influences were
allowed in the south, which gave the southerners a head start in education as well as in
political development (Osaghae, 1998b).
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Furthermore, the demography and economy of the region was also altered by
colonial developments. There was an influx of southern migrants in response to the
emergent economic opportunities in Zaria, Kaduna, and Kano with the railway lines
construction from Lagos to Kano from 1898 to 1912, and the 1914 Southern and
Northern Nigeria protectorates amalgamation. The North’s Ibo presence has its origins
with their thousands of rail lines workers from the 1910s to 1920s, increasing and
becoming more permanent as British activities increased in the North based on “push”
and “pull” migration factors (Elegalam as cited in Anthony, 2002, p. 35). Such factors
include an unprecedented pressure on the agricultural resource base in Igbo land with the
increasing population, the need for cash to cope with the demands of a changing
economy and colonial taxation, and the incapacity of the mainly agricultural economy of
the Eastern region to absorb the increasing mission-educated Ibos. The culminating effect
of these led to the Ibos’ migration, initially to Lagos, the country’s colonial capital, and in
time increasingly to the North with opportunities for skilled employment and trading
“pulling” them to Northern Nigeria (Anthony, 2002, p. 35). There was also reluctance by
the British to introduce mission schools in the far North’s emirates as their structure of
Islamic authority worked smoothly with the British indirect rule system, thus,
occasioning a phenomenal imbalance in western education between the south and the
north. And, additionally compounding the far North’s problem was the imbalance
resulting from increasing educated students and teachers in the Northern Region coming
from the Middle Belt with a limited Islam presence and a large Christian presence that
rapidly expanded within the colonial period. These factors, therefore, created the
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opportunities for public service and private enterprise for southerner’s disposition to
migrate to the north (Anthony, 2002).
However, though positively contributory in some respects (such as the railway
boosting of agriculture particularly that of cash crops), migration did not entirely produce
interethnic integration. Partly undergirding this was the territorial nature of the ruling
caliphate era and the originated aristocracies’ unwillingness to allow “strangers” within
their areas, which while also partly undergirding it, was the British policy of preserving
the Islamic identity of the North to potentially deter inter-group tensions. Hence, ICG
observes that:
…the British discouraged the movement of non-Muslim migrants into the core
Muslim areas of some of the region’s cities, pushing them instead into the
sabongari (strangers’ quarters). Over time, the distinction between locals
(“indigenes”) and strangers emerged as a key feature of Nigerian social and
political life. (2010, p. 5)
It is recognized that such multiple communal and overlapping identification
mechanisms referred to as “associational ethnicity,” offer particularly important social
networks to new immigrants (Nwaka as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 5). In combination with
segregation, however, ethno-religious identities have become sharpened by them, in
addition to reinforcing discriminatory practices which have continued to influence the
Hausa and Fulani relationships with the other city dwellers. The beginning occurrences of
major inter-ethnic violence manifested in the period leading up to the independence,
particularly in 1953 when the southern parties’ efforts to hold pro-independence rallies
resulted in a clash between the Hausas and the Igbo migrants in Kano, with about 36
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deaths recorded in the riot, out of which 21 were Igbos and over 200 injured (ICG, 2010,
p. 6). The riot is observed as reflecting the opposition of the northern politicians to
independence based on their fear of being dominated by the more advanced south
(Feinstein as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 6), while also indicative of the resentment felt locally
against the economic domination of the Igbos as in trading, for instance (ICG, 2010).
Thus, in fear that the southerners’ head start educationally and politically will
advantageously place them in political dominance after independence, northern
nationalists in 1953 objected to self-government. Rather, they capitalized on the
preponderance in northern size and population and insisted on counter-measures that
would nullify their fears while also paving the way for northern dominance as basic
conditions for remaining in the country and agreeing to eventual self-government
(Osaghae, 1998b). These measures included the allocation of 50% center House of
Representatives; the allocation of national revenue resource on the basis of population;
the non-granting of the demands of the Yoruba in the northern areas of Ilorin and Kabba
to be joined to the Western region; and the introduction of ministerial responsibility only
at the instance of the North’s readiness for it. There were also the demands for regional
autonomy which northern delegates presented in the 1953 Constitutional Conference in
London following their threat to pull out from the colonial union, which the granting of
all these demands “conferred political advantages on the Northern region in the
federation which emerged, and underlay the problem of Northern domination which was
a major source of the country’s political problems after independence’ (Osaghae, 1998b,
p. 6).
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Furthermore, religious tensions and conflicts that marked the colonial period
include “Madhism,” an anti-colonial, Muslim oriented, trans-Saharan movement which
posed a major threat to the authorities (ICG, 2010, p. 6). Professing a doctrine of the
return of a messianic Mahdi at each century’s turn that would lead to the triumph of
justice and strengthening Islam, the movement drew an enormous following, and as an
anti-colonial influence (ICG, 2010, p. 6), instigated clashes with the British officials.
Tensions also intensified between the Muslim Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods
towards the end of the colonial period, with the Sokoto ruling aristocracy (mainly
Qadiriyya) aligning with colonial authorities, increasingly indicted with charges of
amassing wealth and power, as well as collaborating and condoning Western decadent
influences. In consequence, the region’s different section leaders began aligning with
Tijaniyya given its obvious anti-Western and anti-colonial posture. Hence, while tensions
between the two orders were initially restricted to political elites and scholars, by the
early 1940s under the ruling of prominent Tijaniyya leaders, the order transformed into a
mass movement with much influence, possessing extensive economic and political
networks as the conflict between them grew into direct confrontation (ICG, 2010, p. 6).
Both orders’ political importance increased greatly with the election in 1951 and
competition for their allegiance by the then, two northern based political parties, the
Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the Northern People’s Congress
(NPC). In consequence, having religious authority started being connoted with political
implications as both orders’ bargaining power grew, and by the mid-1950s there were
several clashes between the two orders in Sokoto with the challenge posed to the
Qadiriyya by the Tijaniyya’s aggressive presence. The influence of the caliphate,
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however, remained strong notwithstanding these developments, and by the independence
run-up, the primary political party was the NPC, which was a Hausa-Fulani
predominantly elite group controlled by the caliphate or Sultan also called the Sarduana
of Sokoto (Alhaji Ahmadu Bello) and an Usman dan Fodio descendant (Paden as cited in
ICG, 2010, p. 6). While a break-away of the party’s more radical younger elements
formed NEPU on the grounds of “seeking to free the talakawa (commoners) from the
oppressive hold of the sarauta (aristocracy),” the region was NPC led at the country’s
independence in 1960 (p. 6). Thus, while occasioning new economic opportunities, new
cities and population movements, colonial rule stimulated new identities and reinforced
existing ones, thus setting in some cases, the stage for violent, long-lasting identity
conflicts. There was a strong reinforcement of wider Islamic community links, hence, it is
recognized that:
In the far north, with its tradition of religiously informed public authority, there
remains a strong feeling that colonial rule was an alien domination that disrupted
or eroded the region’s legal, political and cultural values.
…ambivalent views among Muslims concerning public authority in the far
north – mistrusted in its relations with secular or Christian “others” (external
powers, neighbors or compatriots) - continued after independence. (ICG, 2010, p.
6)
And, equally ambivalent and varied was the non-Muslims’ experience under
colonial rule among both the Christian indigenous groups and the southern immigrants,
with some taking advantage of the opportunities for education, to their Muslim
counterparts’ chagrin on occasions, and others suffering from their perceived Sokoto
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establishment reinforced powers (ICG, 2010). Such state of ambivalence, thus, existed
among the North’s varied ethno-religious groups up to the country’s independence in
1960.
The North at Independence to Present. At independence, the Sarduana Ahmadu
Bello led NPC governed the Northern Region out of the country’s three regions - the
others, Eastern, and Western Regions, and was the power dominating the Nigerian
federation-run coalition, with its position nationally reinforced by the fact of the British
leaving behind a more populous and larger northern region than the combination of the
two other regions. Intense regional competition and squabbling characterized this first
republic (Falola & Heaton as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 7). The Northerners had two primary
aspirations: “to enhance their influence relative to the more developed south and [to]
preserve their religious and cultural identity, inherited from the caliphate era but
disrupted by colonial rule” (p. 7). In consequence, the NPC and Sarduana aimed at
unifying the northerners as one bloc that would continue to wield dominant power
nationally, as well as restore the region’s cultural identity and religious heritage (Ostien
as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 7). Hence, it is observed that:
Proclaiming a principle of “One North, One Destiny,” Ahmadu Bello pursued a
“northernization” policy favoring northerners (of all religious persuasions) in
employment in regional and local administrations. This policy, which dated back
to 1954, was informed by fears that migrants from the south, with the advantage
of their Western education, would continue to establish themselves in the
administration and the economy. (ICG, 2010, p. 7)

28
The northernization policy served for the replacement of provincial and regional,
non-northern civil services employees with northerners. Observing the goals of the policy
as going further than public administration, the Sarduana is stated to have articulated
(Kurfi as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 7) that:
…the Northernization policy does not only apply to clerks, administrative
officers, doctors and others. We do not want to go to Lake Chad and meet
strangers [i.e., southern Nigerians] catching our fish in the water, and taking them
away to leave us with nothing. We do not want to go to Sokoto and find a
carpenter who is a stranger nailing our houses. (ICG, 2010, p. 7)
In order to realize this goal, crash programs were introduced by the Sarduana to train and
equip civil servants of northern origin with adequate qualifications for assumption of
greater governmental control both at regional, as well as federal levels. Aimed at
fostering solidarity of all peoples in the region, the policy widely benefitted the minority,
predominantly Christian groups given their missionary school and high educational level
making them feel belonged. The 1960s is seen by many as an era of much northern unity
with minimized religious differences. No major reforms were, however, undertaken
administratively by the Sarduana to address the region’s minorities’ age-old fears and
their local autonomy demands to be excised from the rule of the emirate.
The suppression of the minority groups’ rallying point opposition parties
undermined, to the contrary the regional unity which the aristocracies and the ruling party
sought to sustain. While the efforts to boost the “House of Islam” or the dar al-Islam
drew strong Muslim majority support, this campaign, in addition to the Sarduana’s
election in 1963 as the World Muslim League vice president, raised an alarm of Islamic
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hegemony among the North’s non-Muslim minorities and the South’s Christian migrants
(ICG, 2010, p. 7). Community relations became affected with such fears, and contributed
to the first military coup in January 1966 against the northern region led federal
government (ICG, 2010). Furthermore, with the Sarduana and the northern leaders’
second priority of promoting Islam “as a unifying instrument,” to ensure the preservation
of cultural identity of the region, Bello established an umbrella body, “Jama’atu Nasril
Islam (JNI, ‘Victory for Islam’)” in 1962 to unite Muslim sects, propagate Islam, and
provide the NPC with an ideological base (ICG, 2010, p. 7). However, the Sarduana’s
efforts to forge Muslim unity achieved minimal results, as violent confrontations
continued among rival Sufi orders’ adherents, while the state-resource-supported
campaigns of minority “pagan” groups’ conversion to Islam were more successful (p. 7).
Hence, in reaction to the religious and political tension prevailing in the country,
the mostly Ibo officers-led coup of January 1966 in which many prominent northern
leaders including Ahmadu Bello and senior military officers were killed, “was partly a
revolt against the perceived religious and political agenda of the ruling NPC” (Gumi as
cited in ICG, 2010, p. 8). However, the initially mixed reactions the coup elicited in the
region: 1) to the northern elites, there was a clear setback with the abrupt termination of
Sarduana’s efforts at forging greater northern cohesion and of restoring the caliphate’s
heritage in the region, and 2) to the non-Muslims, there was the partial relief of a seeming
liberation from the stronghold of the NPC, but which soon turned into outrage with the
realization of the killing of their high-ranking military officers as well. The January
killings further worsened the perception of northerners of the southern ploy to control the
center, with many northern leaders such as Sheikh Abubakar Gumi viewing the coup as
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having exposed “the deep-seated hostility held by people in the south against the north”
(Gumi as cited in ICG, 2010, p. 8).
Shortly following the first coup, Ibos in the north witnesses the first onslaught in
May 1966 in which hundreds were killed by Hausa mobs (Garrison, 1966d, para. 11), and
this preceded the July 1966 counter-coup staged by mainly Hausa-Fulani and some
minority northern ethnic groups in “a rare closing of ranks” (ICG, 2010, p. 8). In this
ensuing second coup coming six months after the first, Maj. Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi was
killed along with over 200 Ibo army officers and men (Garrison, 1968a, p. 38). In part
compromise “to retain the solidarity of the non-Muslim minorities in a united Northern
Region,” Muslim leaders installed as head of state, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon
who is from the Middle Belt region of the north and a Christian (ICG, 2010, p. 8),
without unanimity on his accession to office within the military, however (Osaghae,
1998b, p. 61).
After the July counter-coup, the spate of Ibo killings in the north intensified with
episodes of massacres and pogrom occurring in July and September which were of
greater magnitude than the May, 1966 killings. The fall of 1966 witnessed “the organized
killing of up to 50,000 Ibo civilians in the North” massacred by northern mobs and troops
which set in motion the flight of about two million Ibos from all parts of the country, to
the safety of their region (Garrison, 1968a, p. 38). Osaghae (1998b) further observes that,
“Between May and September 1966, an estimated 80-100,000 Easterners were killed and
several thousands more wounded in different parts of the North” (p. 63), (see also Falola
& Heaton, 2008, p. 174). The massacres triggered revenge killings of some northerners
living in the Eastern region, even as Ojukwu fearing the non-safety of easterners outside
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their region urged them to return home, and the non-easterners to leave the region. In
reaction to these killings and the returning refugees to the Ibo-dominated Eastern region,
the region seceded from Nigeria to declare a sovereign state of Biafra on May 30, 1967,
under the leadership of Colonel Ojukwu, “on the grounds that easterners were no longer
safe in Nigeria” (Falola &d Heaton, 2008, p. 174). This was after the Aburi Ghana accord
reached in the negotiations between Ojukwu and Gowon failed (Falola & Heaton, 2008).
A three-year civil war ensued from 1967 to 1970 as the Federal Military Government
(FMG) moved in to forestall the secession which ended in the collapse of Biafra and
surrender on January 12, 1970 (De St. Jorre as cited in Falola & Heaton, 2008), with
about one million lives lost in the war, mainly through starvation (Garrison, 1968b;
GlobalSecurity.org., n.d., para. 16).
At the start of the war in 1967, the structure of the country became altered by the
Nigerian government with the creation of 12 states nationally from the four regions, of
which the Northern region had six states (see Map II in Appendix A). Subsequent states
creations led to the North’s present nineteen states in 1996 out of the country’s present 36
states, the process of which has altered the nations’ majority-minority relations by
fracturing and eroding the regional platform and dominance over minority groupings.
This majority eroding process, while undercutting the Hausa-Fulani regional vision of
northern unity, particularly in Kaduna where it reduced the power of the Hausa-Fulani
dominance over the minority, resulted in no minority shift and overtaking of majority
grouping in the region. However, in some states new elites emerged from both the
minority and majority groupings with the breakup. The north turned to military power as
a route to power and influence. The federal government was northern dominated for most
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of the military rule period, as the North’s “historic strength in the army was seen
as…compensating for their disadvantages in Western education” (ICG, 2010, p. 8).
However, with mostly Middle Belt soldiers predominating the force in the wake
of Gowon’s emergence as leader following the July 1966 counter coup, “The HausaFulani oligarchy had to deal with their southern competitors and the upstarts in power,
their ‘former slaves’ from central Nigeria” (Kukah & Falola, 1996, p. 56). The oligarchy,
thus, adopted the strategy of focusing on “one north” regardless of religion or ethnicity,
so as to defend the northern region, and some politicians vigorously worked to retain the
old unity (p. 57). Islam was once again brought to the fore through the transformation of
Jamaatu Nasril Islam (JNI) into “a quasi political association” to work for attaining
Northern objectives, and “with all Emirs and powerful Malams as members, the JNI met
to discuss politics and how to defend the interests of the North” (p. 57). The use of Islam
as a political strategy has thus, remained basically the same since the First Republic
(Kukah & Falola, 1996).
Furthermore, Nigeria experienced a continuous rule by military governments
starting from 1966 through 1999, interlaced by a brief unstable civilian rule between
1979 and 1983 which was cut short by General Buhari’s coup. While each of these
military governments promised a speedy reversion to democracy, their transitions were
on occasions either cut short or thwarted. However, after the dictatorial rule of northern
General Sani Abacha from 1993 to 1998, returning to democracy started to be viewed as
a way for the north to find political and moral renewal, and more so, for many, the
traditional structure had also become tarnished by secular power’s corrupting influence
(ICG, 2010).
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The return to democracy by the nation in 1999 was celebrated across the country
but far less in the north, as “For the first time since 1979…the region had lost control of
political power at the center and was faced with the challenge of designing new strategies
for regional self-assertion in the federation” (ICG, 2010, p. 9). It was, thus, in this context
that the Sharia restoration campaign was initiated by the Zamfara state government, and
between 1999 and 2002, twelve northern states adopted the Sharia law. While Muslims,
as well as some Christians, were said to have lost faith in secular leadership and were
supportive of a religious government idea, the concept of implementing Sharia
exacerbated conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the region, and stimulated
democratic debates over law imperatives. The controversy over the constitutionality and
compatibility of Sharia with standards of international human rights, as well as
Christians’ positions in its operative states, became equally intense (ICG, 2010).
Furthermore, there were other transforming effects of the country’s return to
democracy in the region with the emergence of the nation’s new generation political
elites and more commanding substantial financial resources in the region. Thus, with the
region’s authority figures increasing, although having less allegiance than the religious
leaders and traditional rulers did, the political elites had control over funds which
challenged the traditional authorities. With the access to resources conferred by state
apparatus, additional tensions were created between religious and ethnic groups, as
youths increasingly perceived politics as a crucial means for social upward mobility. At
the same time, coupled with the unity of the north having been fractured with the states
creation in the 1990s, the Hausa-Fulani grouping saw growing, more assertive minorities.
Tensions also mounted between the Christians and Muslims amidst cynicism created by
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economic problems, increasing government corruption, social institutions’ decline and
perversion, and a rise in criminal activity (ICG, 2010).
A long history of religious and ethnic differences between the Muslim-dominated
northerners and Christian-dominated southern immigrants has undergirded the nation
since its birth, which, however, has a stronger northern entry on politics given the more
substantial number of Nigerian leaders from the north. Violence manifesting mainly as
urban riots has, for decades, continued to periodically flare up in northern Nigeria, mostly
pitting Muslims against Christians. Tensions in the region have also involved
confrontations between different Islamic sects, which have particularly intensified since
the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s, resulting in a predominance of violent conflicts in the
north. More so, since the past decade there have been gruesome killings involving the
Boko Haram radical sect in Yobe, Kano, Kaduna, Borno, and Bauchi states to name a
few, especially from 2009 up to present, and has been predicative of more violence
flaring up any moment (Akaeze, 2009). And, while seen as a “growing Islamic radicalism
in the region” by some people in the West, the problem is recognized as being more
complex with roots in Nigeria’s history, as well as its contemporary politics (ICG, 2010,
p. i).
Conceptual Framework of Genocide
Definition and Origins of Genocide. Genocide is recognized as one of
humanity’s most fundamental scourges, “the processes by which hundreds of millions of
people met brutal ends,” with the understanding and challenging of it seen as a
purposeful and needful energy exertion (Jones, 2006, p. xviii). Many scholars understand
genocide as a global phenomenon which has been known through history, even where
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fragmentary (e.g. Jones, 2006; Scherrer, 2002). Tracing genocide’s origins and evolutions
has involved broaching a historical and legal analytical framework and exploring
boundary cases in testing the genocidal framework, as well as examining various
genocidal perspectives and cases around the globe (Jones, 2006). Presently, there is the
recognition that virtually every identifiable human group which go by genocide’s legal
definition, such as religious, racial, ethnic, national, and others, have been genocide
victims, and today, are vulnerable in such contexts. Supporting this postulation, is the
notion that, “humanity has always nurtured conceptions of social difference that generate
a primordial sense of in-group versus out-group, as well as hierarchies of good and evil,
superior and inferior, desirable and undesirable” (Jones, 2006, p. 4).
Conceptually, the coinage of the word genocide was by jurist Raphael Lemkin of
Polish-Jewish descent in 1944, prior to which time genocide as a phenomenon had no
name up until WWII. Lemkin coined the word from a neologism derived from the Greek
root word “genos,” connoting tribe or race, and Latin root word “cide,” connoting killing
(Jones, 2006; Scherrer, 2002; Totten & Parsons, 2009). Genocide basically connotes “the
intentional destruction of national groups on the basis of their collective identity” (Jones,
2006, p. 10; Lebor, 2006; Totten & Parsons, 2009). In addition to the usage of Lemkin’s
“new term and new conception for the destruction of nations” in his genocide coinage, he
also proposed to incorporate “the whole conception of what is state organized mass
murder, terrorism, vandalism and barbarity,” as well as detail proposals for the
international community’s dealing with it (Lemkin as cited in Scherrer, 2002, p. 2). The
Nazi occupation and analytical, law breaches work of Lemkin was the first work
containing the word genocide (Lebor, 2006). Shortly after its coinage, genocide became
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included in the indictments of Nuremberg’s Nazi war criminals, and in 1948 it was
adopted as an international crime with the General Assembly’s “Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (CPPCG) (Jones, 2006, p. 12).
Hence, Lemkin instrumented the formulation and adoption of the Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the United Nations in 1948
(Lemkin as cited in Lebor, 2006; Gellately & Kiernan, 2003; Heidenrich, 2001; Jones,
2006; Sells, 1998; Waller, 2002).
An outline of Articles I to III of the Convention (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003;
Heidenrich, 2001; Jones, 2006, p. 12; Totten & Parsons, 2009; Webster, 2007) follows:
Article I. The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in
time of peace or war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to
prevent or to punish.
Article II. In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, or racial
or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
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(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
It is argued that scholarly discourse has since focused on the issue of mass killing
defining or not defining genocide and the stressing of national and ethnic groups, such
victims of which predominated, as well as preceded the era of Lemkin’s work (Jones,
2006). It is noted that political groups have, however, been seen as taking virtually
dominant position as destruction targets since the 1940s and the 1950s of the Stalinist era.
Hence, the onus of an operation having genocidal inclination lay on whether or not it
ensued under policy rubric irrespective of its resulting or not in any or all of the group
members’ physical destruction (Jones, 2006).
More so, the Convention explicitly defines genocide as “acts committed with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,” with
such acts perpetrated “by killing members of the group, causing them serious bodily or
mental harm, creating conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction,
preventing births, or forcibly transferring children to another group” (Waller, 2002, pp.
xi-xii). The Convention is observed to condemn specifically, such measures as “the
prevention of births so that a people would die out and forcible transfer of a group’s
children to another group” (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003, p. 3).
In essence, genocide as a crime, fundamentally involves “a wide range of actions
[which] are subordinated to the criminal intent to destroy or to cripple permanently a
human group,” inclusive of “deprivation of life,” as well as “devices considerably
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endangering life and health,” and it is argued that, “the acts are directed against groups as
such, and individuals are selected for destruction only because they belong to these
groups” (Lemkin as cited in Heidenrich, 2001, p. 3). It is further argued generally that,
“genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when
accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation” (2001, p. 3). It is, however,
also observed that contrary to Lemkin’s definition of the term, genocide is now
frequently defined “as the organized extermination of a nation, people, or ethnic group,”
as in the Rwandan 1994 Tutsis exterminations by Hutu, and the Nazi Holocaust (Lebor,
2006, p. 11).
It is recognized by many scholars (e.g. Heidenrich, 2001, p. 3; Lebor, 2006, p. 11;
Totten & Parsons, 2009, p. 3) that, while such mass killings of a nation’s entire members
or implementing plans of intent for mass killings constitute genocide, Lemkin’s definition
of genocide has a broader meaning which connotes:
the coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political
and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the
economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal
security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to
such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the
actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity,
but as members of the national group. (Lemkin as cited in Totten & Parsons,
2009, p. 3)
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Hence, it has been observed that, “the careful use of the term ‘genocide’
represents a fragile yet critical strand in the fabric of internationally shared and legally
recognized values…a term that can be manipulated and misused…a name for something
that seems to elude naming” (Sells, 1998, p. 10). It is argued that the Convention’s
genocide definition is both “extremely broad and extremely narrow” (Totten & Parsons,
2009, p. 3), with many scholars (e.g. Charny, Fein, and Horowitz as cited in Totten &
Parsons, 2009) proposing alternative definitions in the absence of a generally accepted
definition. Such definitive dilemma poses serious problems primarily for genocide
prevention and intervention measures, as well as for prosecuting genocidal-like cases. It
also compounds scholarly works in examining genocide’s preconditions, processes, and
ramifications (Jonassohn; Charny; Dadrian; Fein; Kuper; and Schabas as cited in Totten
& Parsons, 2009, p. 3). Furthermore, it is considered that an extensive listing of
genocides as in Diamond’s exhaustive list of genocide cases through history to current
stands the risk of expanding the concept’s frame to include most or all mass killing
occurrences which retrospectively are considered to have been genocides (Diamond as
cited in Webster, 2007).
Additionally, it is argued that the Convention’s legal definition of genocide which
came into effect only in 1948 limited the term to specified actions, events, intentions, and
aims, and so, retrospectively designating various mass killing instances as ‘genocide’
loses the specificity of its meaning, primarily as a racial crime. For instance, Webster
(2007) citing Morrison’s enumeration of “20 ‘major genocidal acts’ committed between
1885 (Belgians victimizing Congolese) and 1994 (Hutu victimizing Tutsi in Rwanda),”
observes that the United Nations have retrospectively recognized as genocides, nine out
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of such lists (p. 171). Of paramount importance is the need for clarity on what genocide
constitutes without narrowing its legal definition, given that, not having an internationally
accepted definitive understanding of what specifically constitutes the crime of genocide
poses the risk of using the term for political means, rather than for such humanitarian
issues of protection, prevention, and punishment of genocide (Webster, 2007).
It is further recognized that other definitive issues are omitted from the
Convention’s definition of genocide, such as a totalitarian state’s destruction of its
‘political’ opponents (Horowitz; and Overy as cited in Webster, 2007, p. 172). Also of
essence is the importance of recognizing the Convention’s implied distinction “between
direct (killing) and indirect means (preventing births through sterilization), both aimed at
the biological destruction of the group,” with the first being illegal universally, and the
second legal in a number of jurisdictions (Webster, 2007, p. 172). An instance of this is
the Nazi’s forced sterilization and ‘euthanasia’ programs, which constitute the Nazi
genocide integral aspects (Fein as cited in Webster, 2007, p. 172). Subsequent
sociological and historical understandings can, therefore, be added to the Convention’s
legal definition of genocide as argued by Webster:
Genocide is a process that involves staged escalation; involves the biological
destruction of a group (usually, but not always, racially or ethnically defined by
the perpetrators); and is nearly always perpetrated by, encouraged or condoned by
a state (and only the state can prevent it). (2007, p. 172)
While also recognizing genocide to be legally defined as “the most serious
crime…considered an “aggravated” crime against humanity,” it is argued that the
Convention requires the perpetrator’s proven intent to destroy a people group—“the
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intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such” (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003, pp. 14-15). Such proof of intent is not required of
“other crimes against humanity and war crimes,” other than the mere criminal action of
itself, as in the case of mass murder (2003, p. 15). Additionally recognized as genocidal
is “the targeting of people for destruction on the basis of what are…inherited, perhaps
genetic, shared group characteristics that the victims cannot divest…irrespective of their
intentions or actions” (2003, p. 17). Further establishing a legal distinction between
genocide and war, it is argued that:
Wars are…fought only between armed forces. Genocide is inflicted upon the
largely defenseless. In war, to preserve at least some civilized conduct, there is the
concept of the noncombatant: infants, children, expectant mothers and women
generally, the elderly, the infirm, civilians in general, and even some military
personnel, including military physicians, medics, and prisoners. International law
declares that anyone who wages war must actively try to avoid harm to
noncombatants. Genocide, by contrast, is utterly contrary to international law,
because its victims—no matter how innocent—are targeted intentionally. War
perpetrates killing. Genocide perpetrates murder. (Heidenrich, 2001, p. 1)
Moreover, a differentiation of ethnic conflict from genocide has been recognized
on the basis of two distinctions, each focusing on genocide’s definition of the victim
target group, the perpetrators, and intentionality. The first distinction is that in principle,
ethnic conflict may sometimes not be more than just a clash of armed ethnic forces,
without necessarily being genocidal and may not target civilians, but often does,
however, as in the 1999 Kosovo case (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003). The second distinction
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is that ethnic conflict presumably entails a popular mass movement with widespread
participation or acquiescence. Genocide on the other hand, may not of necessity entail
that, although it may sometimes take the form of mass participation as in the 1994
Rwandan case (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003). Thus, genocide decision, plan, and order can
be carried out, even secretly sometimes, by only a few perpetrators, with genocide, by
definition, however, often claiming many victims, a crucial imbalance that is not
paramount in ethnic conflict. In resolving genocide’s definitional dilemmas by
distinguishing it from ethnic conflict, it is argued that, “genocide could be considered a
subcategory of ethnic conflict, if all we need to define is a specific form that targets
civilians for destruction,” but not where broadly defined as a social phenomenon, in
which case, “genocide, with its essential feature of perpetrator intent, need only be a
political operation” (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003, p. 20).
Additionally, it is argued that “ethnic cleansing” in principle also involves
territory “purification” essentially, not of a population, which entails an ethnic group
deportation from a territory, and may typically be threatening without necessarily being
violent (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003, p. 20). It has been observed that, “Ethnic cleansing
requires either a protected reservation within a state or a free exit for the victims to
escape; genocide precludes both protection and exit” (Fein as cited in Gellately & Kierna,
2003, p. 20). It is considered, therefore, that in practice genocide is usually preceded
and/or accompanied by ethnic cleansing though not always, as in the 1975-79 Khmer
Rouge case of the Vietnamese minority annihilation in Cambodia; or the LonNol earlier
regime’s massacres that expelled from Cambodia, 300,000 Vietnamese in 1970 (2003, p.
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20). Thus, it is observed that ethnic cleansing could be a mere precedent or a burgeoning
genocidal phase, but one which occurs separately (2003).
Moreover, recognizing genocide’s coinage as referring to ethnic or national
groups murdering, it is noted that genocide was directed at human groups that “shared
racial characteristics” rather than against national groups, as “heredity determined the
selection of the victims” (Friedlander, 1995, xii). There is, therefore, an argument for a
redefinition of the Nazi genocide from its understanding “as the mass murder of human
beings because they belonged to a biologically defined group” on the basis that, the
“Jews were not the only biologically selected target” (Friedlander, 1995, p. xii). Hence, it
is observed that:
Alongside Jews, the Nazis murdered the European Gypsies. Defined as a
“darkskinned” racial group, Gypsy men, women, and children could not escape
their fate as victims of Nazi genocide. Biology also determined the fate of the
handicapped, which, just as Jews and Gypsies, could not change their condition to
escape death. The Nazis killed handicapped infants in hospital wards as well as
elderly men and women in nursing homes…the Nazi regime systematically
murdered only three groups of human beings: the handicapped, Jews, and
Gypsies. (Friedlander, 1995, pp. xii-xiii)
It is also contemporarily observed that “the word genocide is used so frequently to
express hyperbole…[hence] the word’s international legal definition is controversial”
(Heidenrich, 2001, p. 2). It is argued that the Convention’s genocide definition as a
deliberate destruction primarily involving mass murder of “the targeted groups - national,
ethnic, racial, and religious,” excludes socioeconomic and political groups, which groups
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were seen as legally indefinable and imprecise by the various delegate negotiators of the
definition in 1948 (p. 2). Hence, it is argued that, “whenever a government has committed
mass murder without discriminating according to nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion,
that government has not committed ‘genocide’ as international law defines the crime,
even if its victims number in the millions” (p. 2). An instance of this is Cambodian
Khmer Rouge Pol Pot followers in 1975-1979 who murdered eyeglasses-wearing people
for “political” reasons with the intent to eliminate the bourgeois intellectuals, on
assumption they wore glasses; and in attempt to socially reconstitute the Cambodian
society by terrorizing and killing, had about 1.7 million Cambodians murdered out of the
country’s seven million population. Thus, while Cambodia suffered in per capital terms a
most awful mass murder inflicted by a government on its populace, in international legal
terms, most of the victims were not “genocide” victims having been killed on purely
political rather than racial criteria, with the only exceptions being the Cambodian ethnic
minorities (Heidenrich, 2001, p. 2). Therefore, the argument has been made for the
inclusion of social and political groups in the genocide definition by various scholars (see
Drost; Whitaker; and Totten all as cited in Totten & Parsons, 2009, p. 3).
It is further recognized that the issue of number was inconclusively left open by
the Convention delegates with no agreement reached on what number of exterminations
to constitute genocide (Heidenrich, 2001). Hence, the killing of a person by a thug gang
simply on account of that person’s belonging to a specific race, ethnicity, nationality, or
religion, such singular murder, legally speaking constitutes a genocidal act. It is,
therefore, observed that as a result of the rather restrictive genocide definition by the
Convention, some scholars today use the word politicide to connote politically based
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mass murder, and democide to connote any deliberately caused mass deaths such as
forced labor, direct massacre, avoidable famine, or willful neglect (Heidenrich, 2001, p.
3). Furthermore, there is the recognition of genocide as implying “actions carried out by a
state or ruler with the intention of systematically killing the members of a particular
community or social collectivity and thus partially or totally destroying the target group”
(Scherrer, 2002, p. 2). This raises the crucial issue of how the victim group is defined,
with the argument made that any such definition should conform broadly with the
Convention’s wording even though the Convention omitted some categorizations of
victims (Scherrer, 2002).
It is, therefore, argued that while the Convention in some areas is exceeding the
current minimal consensus as in such gray areas of genocide’s indirect measures and
practices, and in other areas such as in “the killings of members of a particular ethnic or
cultural group (ethnocide), a particular political group (politicide), or a particular social
group (democide)” they are not adequately covered (Scherrer, 2002, p. 3). Consequently,
it is argued that:
Genocide is state organized mass murder and the perpetration of crimes against
humanity with the intention of exterminating individuals because of their
affiliation to a particular national, ethnic, religious, or “racial” group. It is a
premeditated mass crime that has been systematically planned, prepared, and
executed. (Scherrer 2002, p. 3)
It is also observed that two terms—mass murder and genocide—are used by
scholars in classifying collective violence which stems from terrorism that is statedirected, and providing a conceptual distinction between them, it is argued that mass
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killing is “killing members of a group without the intention to eliminate the whole group
or killing large numbers of people without a precise definition of group membership”
(Waller, 2002, p. xi). On the other hand, “collective violence becomes genocide when a
specific group is systematically and intentionally targeted for destruction” (p. xi).
Genocide is also recognized as “the state-sponsored systematic mass murder of innocent
and helpless men, women, and children denoted by a particular ethno-religious identity,
having the purpose of eradicating this group from a particular territory,” thus, recognizing
genocide as “mass murder short of eradicating the entire group, but including a
significant subset of that group in the killing” (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 10).
Furthermore, from an anthropological perspective, it is understood that genocide
can be distinguished through an “othering” process in which an imagined community’s
boundaries are reshaped with a group “included” previously being recast ideologically
and usually, in dehumanizing narrative, as not existing within the community, and as a
dangerous and threatening “other” to be annihilated, whether political, economic, racial,
ethnic, or religious (Hinton, 2002, p. 6). To establish a distinction between genocide and
other violence forms, the definition of violence in its present usage is recognized as the
“exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage to, persons or
property,” while generally it refers to any form of structural, physical, psychological, or
symbolic force exerted against a person, group, or thing (Hinton, 2002, p. 6). Thus, it is
argued that political violence is a violence subset which broadly encompasses covert
forms, or “overt state-sponsored or tolerated violence” including “actions taken or not
taken by the state or its agents with the express intent of realizing certain social, ethnic,
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economic, and political goals in the realm of public affairs, especially affairs of the state
or even of social life in general” (Nagengast as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 6).
It is, therefore, understood that political violence subsumes conceivably various
overlapping phenomena comprising war, ethnic conflict, terrorism, oppression, torture,
and genocide (Hinton, 2002). Genocide is distinguished from other political violence
forms by the perpetrators’ unrelenting and determined effort to destroy a people group.
Thus, it is observed that Fein’s “sociological definition of genocide” as “a sustained
purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or
indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group
members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim”
(Fein as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 64) advantageously includes “the sustained destruction
of nonviolent political groups and social classes” (Hinton, 2002, p. 64). Hence,
definitively:
while genocide may involve terrorism (or acts intended to intimidate or subjugate
others by the fear they inspire), ethnic conflict (or violence perpetrated against
another ethnic group), torture (or the infliction of severe physical pain and
psychological anguish to punish or coerce others), oppression (or the use of
authority to forcibly subjugate others), and war (or a state of armed conflict
between two or more nations, states, or factions), it differs from them
conceptually insofar as genocide is characterized by the intention to annihilate
“the other.” (Hinton, 2002, p. 6)
While recognizing the blending into each other of the boundaries of such different
political violence forms, it is understood that as a conceptual category, genocide is also
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undergirded by given presuppositions that are susceptible to discourse and challenge.
Hence, delineating “an anthropology of genocide” domain is understood “as
encompassing those cases in which a perpetrator group attempts, intentionally and over a
sustained period of time, to annihilate another social or political community from the face
of the earth” (Hinton, 2002, p. 6).
Moreover, genocide is understood as an organized attempt aimed at
systematically destroying an ethnic or politically defined group (Wood, 2001). From a
geographic perspective, it is understood that to comparatively appraise genocidal
orchestrations and consequences in its twentieth century recurrence and its international
law formulation is undergirded by such geography-linked notions as territorial
nationalism, Lebensraum, ethnic cleansing, and forced migration (Wood, 2001). In
exploring the Bosnian 1992-95 and the Rwandan 1994 eruptions to understand the
genocidal intentions involved, the processes, and the genocides’ effects, it is observed
that genocidal actions involving planned and purposeful targeting of specific areas and
groups are implemented methodically through murder and expulsion, and politically
interweaved with territorial nationalism aspirations. Hence, it is argued that:
Genocidal intentions are signaled through rhetoric and actions of political leaders
that express an exclusionary and highly territorial form of nationalism. The
mechanics of genocide are revealed through patterns of mass murder, destruction,
and forced expulsion. The legacy of genocide is most apparent in the accounts of
survivors, but is also seen in devastated landscapes and inadequate responses by
the international community. (Wood, 2001, p. 57)
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Still, on the conceptual explication of genocide, it is further recognized that
genocide constitutes a “dispassionate,” controlled or instrumental violence which serves a
political purpose, while massacres which though based on orders, usually involve
“overkill” (Dutton & Kerry as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 22) or excessive violence beyond
the military purposes intended, including torture, mutilation, rape, killing of civilians, and
infants. However, mixes of genocide and massacre do occur, as in Rwanda where the
government’s genocidal policy involved sequences of pogroms or massacres or pogroms
representing two methods of political killings. It is recognized that in the case of
genocide, sociopolitical reasons may be sufficient in explaining the selection of a target
group as well as the group induction to kill. In the case of massacres, however, regardless
of the training level, the military actions become violent and cruel, with restraint only, of
the human imagination. Both massacres and genocide involve complicity of the
international community which involves a deliberate decision to ignore the slaughter and
to not regard what is going on (Dutton, 2007).
Further on the definitional debate, genocide is understood as basically involving
the entire processes through which specific “humans beings are both willed and
empowered to deprive and deny other human beings, both individually and as part of
broader familial and communal groupings, of their basic human dignity” (Levene, 2005a,
p. 1). Thus, it is recognized that further exploring the definitions of genocide entails
addressing such genocidal issues of “agents, victims, goals, scale, strategies, and intent”
(Jones, 2006, p. 19). On varying perspectives regarding agency, it is observed that,
among agents, there is a clear focus on state and official authorities, as in Dadrian’s
“dominant group, vested with formal authority”; Horowitz’s “state bureaucratic
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apparatus”; and Porter’s “government or its agents” (Dadrian; Horowitz; and Porter as
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 19). Still, on the issue of agency, however, it is observed that the
state-centric perspective is abjured by some scholars (e.g. Chalk & Jonassohn; Fein; and
Thompson & Quets as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 19), with the Convention also citing as
possible agents “constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals” (Article IV). Hence, it is recognized that most scholars of genocide in
practice “continue to emphasize the role of the state, while accepting that in some cases –
as with settler colonialism…– non-state actors may play a prominent or dominant role”
(Jones, 2006, p. 19).
On the issue of genocidal intent, it is acknowledged that legal theorists and most
scholars see intent as defining genocide (Jones, 2006). Establishing a distinction between
intent and motive, it is argued that a revolution or conquest which “causes total or partial
destruction of a group legally qualifies as intentional and therefore as genocide whatever
the goal or motive, so long as the acts of destruction were pursued intentionally”
(Gellately & Kiernan as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 21). It is, therefore, recognized as being
increasingly favored by legal opinion, the notion that “regardless of the claimed objective
of the actions in question, they are intentional if they are perpetrated with the knowledge
or reasonable expectation that they will destroy a human group in whole or in part”
(Jones, 2006, p. 21). Accordingly, the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court is seen as reflecting a reasonably broad meaning of intent such that “a person has
intent where…in relation to conduct, that person means to cause that consequence or is
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events” (Greenawalt as cited in Jones,
2006, p. 21). Similarly, the Rwandan International Criminal Tribunal in its 1998 Akayesu
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judgment declares that “the offender is culpable because he knew or should have known
that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group” (Schabbas as cited in
Jones, 2006, p. 21).
Hence, there is an understanding that the concept of genocidal intent combines in
one hand, the notion of specific intent, with that of constructive intent in another (Jones,
2006). It is considered, however, that specific intent is being inferred in instances “where
actions with predictable results are taken over an extended period of time and the
consequences of these actions regularly confirm their outcome” (Jones, 2006, p. 21).
Constructive intent, on the other hand, included “cases in which the perpetrators did not
intend to harm others but should have realized or known that the behavior made the harm
likely… [and] clearly results in the destruction of that group of people, even if that result
is neither intended nor desired” (Alvarez as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 22). Instances of this
include, systematic trailing and killing of a group’s members, forcible removal of
members of a group to reservations while also withholding medication and food, and
kidnapping a group’s children for enslavement outside of their culture.
Further on genocide’s delineation, it is argued that the Armenian Genocide, the
Jewish and Gypsy Holocaust, and the Rwandan Genocide are the only real genocides in
contemporary history from a legal perspective (Schabas, 2000). It is also observed that
genocide as a term is not to be applied to every atrocious mass killing situations; thus,
legally such cases as Stalin’s Ukraine carnages, the Holodomor, and Nazi occupied
Soviet citizens and Slav killings are not considered genocide (Schabas, 2000).
Furthermore, the Bosnian massacres is presented as ethnic cleansing rather than genocide
on the basis that the 1970s Cambodian Khmer Rouge did not have an ethnic dimension
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and therefore, lacked a port essence of genocide, hence, deploring the United Nations
categorizing of ethnic cleansing as genocide. Furthermore, it is argued that in the Darfur
atrocities, genocidal intent is not established even though it involves the non-Arabs’
summary execution, and so it does not constitute genocide (Schabas, 2000).
Causes of Genocide. A multiplicity of factors has been identified by genocide
scholars as underlying genocidal orchestrations and processes. For instance, in an
extensive investigation of genocidal dynamism involving an in-depth analysis of
genocidal intent, dynamism and the contingency of its processes, the role of imperialism,
state-building, social revolution ,and war in fueling genocide are identified (Jones, 2006,
p. 4). Furthermore, there is recognition of the need and the process of directly addressing
and understanding genocide, deriving from the combinations of widely present actions
and influences in today’s world (Newbury, 1998). For instance, exploring the Rwandan
genocide history identifies such broader issues of the genocide involving the dangers of
associating genocide only with the world’s remote area. Thus, in setting out the
genocide’s background, there is recognition of four conceptual frameworks including
ethnicity, gender issues, outside influences, and ecological issues, with an
acknowledgement of their importance in understanding genocide, as well as how these
issues are illuminated by an understanding of genocide (Newbury, 1998). Accordingly, it
is observed that, with the commonality rather than peculiarity of such issues to the
Rwandan genocide, the tendency exists of presenting genocide as a remote phenomenon
in spite of its widespread occurrence in North America, Asia, Europe, and Africa
(Newbury, 1998). Further discourse on the genocide causation also, while arguing that
primarily approaching genocide as a twentieth century occurrence, fails to grasp
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genocide’s true origins; it is noted that genocide evolved fundamentally from the Western
experiences of modernity and the struggle for the nation-state, which emanated from the
Europeanist fifteenth to nineteenth centuries’ hemispheric expansion which provided the
primary stimulus to genocide’s pre-1914 manifestations (Levene, 2005b). This section
reviews such diverse views on genocidal causation factors as identified by various
scholars.
Imperialism, Colonialism, and Modernity. A theoretical conceptualizing of
genocide account in history presents an understanding that underlying genocide in the
modern world are such broad preconditions and interlinked elements often regarded as
the normative underpinnings of ‘international society,’ which are, the ‘rise of the West,’
‘modernity,’ and ‘the nation-state’ (Levene, 2005a, pp. 10-11). It is observed that “the
rise of the West” involved “massive expansion of European interference with nonEuropean societies and the forging of wholly new forms of dependency worldwide”
(Bayly as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 11). Such expansion was done initially through
mercantilist outreach and then followed by extensions of overtly capitalist core West
European economies into the far-reaching ends of the globe, beginning in the later
fifteenth century, and which were accomplished either by conquest or military coercion.
This led to extensive or even total disruption, displacement, or destabilization of existing
economic and social relationship patterns with their forcible reorientation towards
aligning with the metropolitan new ‘core’ hegemonic interests, with previous world
empires becoming subservient to the emergent world economy (Levene, 2005a, p. 11).
While this shift accorded resource base and global market near-monopolization
which advantaged the dominant elites and eventually the core metropolitan masses, it
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created

an

inherent

process

for

structural

violence

for

‘peripheralized’

or

‘semiperipheralized’ societies at the receiving end, while also galvanizing previously
independent-of-West

societies,

or

later,

imperial-bondage-released

societies—to

reformulate themselves to be able to compete and possibly evade the dominating
dispensation. Hence, it is argued that:
While the rise of the West was accompanied by no overarching political agenda
for the annihilation of foreign peoples, it did create a broader cultural discourse in
which such annihilation was considered perfectly conceivable; in which exactly
such annihilations sometimes took place, not to mention further multitudinous
interactions, tensions and fractures between, and within, extra-Western polities
and societies which, in the long run, also carried an almost incalculable potential
for extreme, exterminatory violence. (Levene, 2005a, p. 12)
It is further argued, however, that the rise of the West intermeshes closely with
Western epistemologies and thought systems, or essentially its worldview, which
primarily refers to modernity—genocide’s underlying second factor. Thus, seen as a
principle for organizing for rational awareness and a scientifically informed world,
modernity was founded on the Enlightenment’s obsession for categorizing and
classification (Levene, 2005a, p. 12). Hence, it is noted that, “in order to respond
and…regulate the planet in the most efficacious and utilitarian manner” (Said as cited in
Levene, 2005a, p. 12) “modernity became a quest to ‘divide, deploy, schematize,
tabulate, index and record everything in sight (and out of sight) and…make out of every
observable detail a generalization and out of every generalization an immutable law’”
(Sengoopta as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 12). Furthermore, modernity posits the

55
knowableness and possibility of all things, as well as the applicableness to humans, of
things applicable to things, “thus, just like other living species, human beings too can be
‘apprehended, classified and theorized’” (Hinton as cited in Levene, 2005a, pp. 12-13).
It is also argued that the use of “the fingerprint as the perfect identifying mark of
individual difference” from the 19th century British colony, Bengal, (Sengoopta as cited
in Levene, 2005a, p. 13) was also deployed by the Nazis based on “the same utilitarian
premise” for “categorizing and hierarchizing whole groups of Eastern European peoples,
on the basis of their ‘biosocial attributes’” (Schafft as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 13).
Hence, describing such tendencies, variously, is understood “as the reifying,
essentialising, biologising and manufacturing of difference” (Hinton as cited in Levene,
2005a, p. 13). However, with these tendencies now generally recognized relative to
Nazism, as throwing more light on modernity’s dark side, it is further argued that such
tendencies,

paradoxically,

are

equally

founding

“those

basic

self-referential

Enlightenment wisdoms by which the world at large is…made a better, healthier, more
productive and… more efficient place” (Hinton as cited in Levene, 2005, p. 13).
Therefore, it is understood that progress as the positivist meta-narrative of modernity
which links logically to a Western world order’s economic requirements, also implicitly
carries the assumptions that non-conforming individuals or groups who, presumably, are
unfit or insufficient to the order’s demands, are surplus to that ordering’s requirements
(Levene, 2005a).
Furthermore, modernity aggregates humans into single, static, invariable, and
irreducible categories, with people normatively labeled members of particular races,
tribes, religions, nations, etc. This shows on one end, its complex phenomenal
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simplification and reduction capability, inclusive of humans, ‘into a more manageable
and schematized form’ (Wallerstein as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 13), as well as its
refusal or failure to envision humans’ potential for having multi-layered loyalties and
identities. Hence, it is observed as historicized in the Armenian genocide that:
analysis revolving around conflicts over irreducible categories such as race and
religion turn history into a field where, instead of human beings interacting,
abstract concepts do battle. It is as if hordes of individuals think and act as
prescribed by ideologies of nationalism, religion, or race. Terminology then
comes to reconfirm the view imposed by the genocide that, ultimately, one need
not account for real Armenians leading real lives whose disappearance from their
homes and from history must be accounted for; one is comforted by the thought
that Armenians can be reduced to a corollary of a concept. (Levene, 2005a, p. 13)
Additionally, it is argued that the indigenous peoples’ genocidal and inhumane
treatment was frequently framed in modernity metanarratives, especially the conception
of “progress” (Hinton, 2002, p. 10). For instance, the Tasmanians annihilation was
legitimized as an endeavor to “bring them to civilization,” while the United States
westward expansionism was justified by Theodore Roosevelt’s argument to not have the
land remain “a game preserve for squalid savages” (Maybury-lewis as cited in Hinton,
2002, p. 10). Also similarly noted is General Roca’s ill-famed “Conquest of the Desert”
attack on indigenous Indians and his despicable voicing to fellow Argentineans that:
our self-respect as a virile people obliges us to put down as soon as possible, by
reason or by force, this handful of savages who destroy our wealth and prevent us
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from definitively occupying, in the name of law, progress and our own security,
the richest and most fertile lands of the Republic. (Hinton, 2002, p. 10)
It is further observed that the massacre of the Herero thousands equally had such
similar arguments legitimizing the killings, with an emphasis on the astounding cruelty
and greed of the perpetrators, which is often described as “sickening” (Hinton, p. 10). It
is noted that in this Herero example, the indigenous’ land was reason for their
displacement and killings, while in other cases it was the need to terrorize them to
perform slave labor. Additionally, it is noted that South American and Congolese rubberplantation owners as having been exceptionally brutal, and were seen as holding hostages
of workers relatives, raping women, torturing and maiming the recalcitrant, and abusing
and killing, sometimes for sheer amusement (Hinton, 2002, p. 10). In contemporary
times, another modernity’s metanarrative imbued with developmental need discourses
has become emblematic of the devastation trappings for indigenous peoples. Thus, it is
further argued that “the “development” of Nigeria’s oil resources (through the
collaboration of the government and multinational companies such as Shell), for
example, has led to massive environmental damage and the enormous suffering of the
Ogoni who reside in oil-rich areas” (Maybury-Lewis; and Totten, Parsons, & Hitchcock
as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 10). Hence, a summation of contributory factors of
indigenous peoples’ genocide is plausibly presented as their indigenous’ land resources,
political weakness and marginality, extreme dehumanization, and modernity’s
metanarratives, with their plight improving in the globalization era, as nation states
reorganize increasingly on greater pluralist lines (Maybury-Lewis as cited in Hinton,
2002, p. 10).
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Furthermore, it is argued that indigenous peoples’ sufferings and death are often
depicted by multinational corporations, companies, agencies, and governments as
“progress” and “development” or a “necessary by-product” which are manifested in
forms of mineral extraction, oil fields, logging, hydroelectric projects, and resource-rich
zone land grabs (Hinton, 2002, pp. 11-12). There is an acknowledgement of the resulting
displacement, extensive environmental damage, and indigenous peoples’ frequent deaths
that emanate from such projects, as evidenced in the Ogoni case in Nigeria (Totten,
Parsons, & Hitchcock as cited in Hinton, 2002). Hence, it is observed that:
the very need for such harmful “development” projects is linked to other
dimensions of modernity, the colonial endeavor and the creation of nation states.
As European imperialists set out to conquer new territories, they laid claim to
large swaths of land throughout the world. Colonial boundaries were “rationally”
demarcated in terms of major landmarks and the claims of competing powers.
This pattern of “rational planning,” establishing territorial borders, and ordering
from above is one of the hallmarks of modernity. (Hinton, 2002, p, 12)
Moreover, it is understood that, for creating a centrally manipulated or controlled
grid/map, complex phenomena are simplified and reduced by the modern state into a
schematized more manageable form, often with disastrous results, however, especially
with disregard to local knowledge (Hinton, 2002, p. 12). As the colonial powers paid
minimal attention to the indigenous understandings of sociopolitical differences in the
mapping of new political frontiers, upon their withdrawal, newly emerged independent
countries were found controlling minority as well as some majority population groups.
These were inclusive of indigenous peoples, some of which clamored for more power,
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greater autonomy, or the right for outright secession (Hinton, 2002). Furthermore, given
the colonial powers’ economic exploitative tendencies, trained personnel and basic
infrastructure were lacking in many of these nations, while also being poverty plagued
with high population growth rates. Emphasizing colonization as a fundamental cause for
the indigenous peoples’ destruction, particularly in their “conquest” and “pacification,” it
is, however, observed that “[s]ome of the annihilations of indigenous peoples arose…in
the course of…a genocidal process: massacres, appropriation of land, introduction of
diseases, and arduous conditions of labor” (Kuper as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 65). Hence,
colonialism is understood to have laid the foundation undergirding most of the suffering
and violent conflict plaguing the contemporary world, as exemplified recently in the
Rwandan genocide (Hinton, 2002). Also recognizing colonialism’s effect on the
development on intra-societal violence in Rwanda and Burundi that framed the Rwandan
genocide, it is observed that:
It was the rapidly increasing strength of ethnicization and polarization fostered by
the colonialists and by the postcolonial policies of the ethnopolitical power elites
on either side that led to the demonization and dehumanization of the respective
opposing group. In both countries there were repeated massacres that made any
peaceful political solution difficult and ultimately impossible. (Scherrer, 2002, p.
28)
The Nigerian case has seen colonialism’s amalgamation of various ethnic groups as
instrumenting Nigeria’s high ethnocentric politics, which is a fundamental factor
undergirding the waves of killings in northern Nigeria (Anyanwu, 1982; Osaghae,
1998b).
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The Nation-state. The nation-state is recognized as the spatial arena in which
such “selective reality” and “tunnel vision tendencies” are manifested (Scott; and Bayly
as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 13). As an element of genocidal orchestration, the nationstate is connected to the political organizational normative framework in the modern age,
which notion provides our identities and assures freedom from threat of violence to our
persons (Levene, 2005a). Citing Nobert Elias, Levene (2005a) observes that the nationstate proffers the linked, two-fold benefits of reining in human tendencies for aggression
through demands for greater self-control and non-violent social encounters, as well as
provides legitimized universally recognized authorities monopolistic powers for ensuring
social peace and instituting punitive measures against offenders. It is noted accordingly,
that “the consequent retreat of daily intrusions against our safety… powerfully enhanced
the potential for a civilizing process” (Elias as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 14).
While some historical sociologists have observed that in particular states’
modernizing trajectories, transition significant break-points have led to periods of
extreme violence (Moore as cited in Levene, 2005a, pp. 14-15), such monopolization of
violence, which was a primary outcome of the formation process of the nation-state, has
only recently been questioned. The nation-state formation process was problematic in
itself, except in “those most obvious cases where recognizably anti-democratic and
overtly violent groups seized the apparatus” (Levene, 2005a, p. 15). The modern nation
state’s general characteristics and broader implications, however, presuppose an
absolutely uniform and unmediated authority for its policing, military, legal,
administrative, and fiscal functions within its internationally recognized bounded territory
and sovereign domain, entailing the entire land and all its appurtenances. This is
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described as the aspiration of the modern state to make a ‘society legible’ for control and
manipulation in its own interests (Scott; and Holquist as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 15).
Hence, applications to cadastral surveys should plausibly apply also to humans through
such administrative procedures as birth, marriage, and death registrations, and censuses.
However, with some of the procedures preceding the dawn of modernity in some
traditional systems of states, the tendency of ascribing equal cross-referencing statistical
numbering to every registered individual for purposes of the administrative, fiscal, and
military purposes, as well as for ascribing presumably equal uniform responsibilities and
rights was essentially unique and revolutionary (Levene, 2005a). The individual
citizenship concept that presupposes “an equality before the law,” is an extension of the
universal suffrage notion which is generally accepted as the human condition’s
fundamental benefit, as affirmed by the UN’s 1948 Declaration of Human Rights
(Levene, 2005a, p. 15).
It is contended, however, that three-fold danger inherency exists in the
presumably liberating features of these new political state formulations. Firstly, Levene
argues that:
by defining each human being as an individual citizen, the state effectively
subordinates all previous, traditional, and often multi-layered loyalties – whether
to extended family, clan, tribe, community, sect, estate, or whatever – to itself,
repudiating in the process the authority of these bodies to act as meaningful
mediators or negotiators vis-à-vis the state, on behalf of those who otherwise
might have understood themselves as component elements of exactly such social
organisms. (2005a, pp. 15-16)
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Levene (2005a) presents that while such bodies are not culturally, economically, or
socially rendered redundant, they are politically done so, since only atomized citizens
would be subsequently recognized as valid body-politic members, excepting where
specific interventions are made for such ‘group rights’ bodies to be allowed by the state
itself or other states in an international domain (Levene, 2005a, p. 16). Also significant is
that in any temporal contending jurisdiction, while religious authority would be
automatically overridden by the primacy of modern nation-state even with the polity’s
former traditional organization having fundamentally been on religion, the affinity of the
nation-state to the “omniscience and omnicompetence” principle of modernity infers that
any spiritually emanating challenge to the political authority of the state would be
inacceptable technically, such as any emanating from other dissenting voice, ethnic,
social, or other voice. Hence, it is observed that:
While, thus, there is no intrinsic reason why the nation-state has to be a secular
one, the general point holds: the modern state’s primacy is absolute, regardless of
religious authority or sanction, and hence to challenge it, whatever the manner or
source of that opposition, is potentially to expose oneself to its monopoly of
violence in whatever form the state might choose to respond. (Levene, 2005a, p.
16)
Secondly, the inevitable drive of the modern state to development bounds and
amplifies this situation’s inherent dangers, being envisaged through its ongoing venture
to achieve a more healthy, productive, and better society, with the modern state assumed
as based on an upward continuing trajectory which confirms its fundamental
indebtedness to modernity. Even with this as its raison d’être, it also carries a plausibly
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implicit, or even explicit, human, technological, fiscal, and extractive resource organizing
mandate for pursuing such terrestrially firmed goals (Levene, 2005a, p. 16). This does
not, however, undermine its basic interest of mobilizing resources, human resources
inclusive, for competing with other modernizing nation-states within the universal frame.
Hence, it is argued that:
the modern polity provides itself with a totalizing capacity largely undreamt of in
the pre-modern world, the resulting options available to its subjects being of a
zero-sum nature. As a group, or an individual, one can either be enthusiastic,
obeisant or acquiescent in response to the state’s mobilizing demands, or, if one
dissents or demurs, one ultimately, again, has to reckon with its monopoly of
violence. (Levene, 2005a, p. 17)
Thirdly, is the dominant mode of the modern polity, which refers mainly to the
“homogeneous state-society” rather than the nation-state as such, given that the modern
states have not all automatically maintained a legitimated existence based on the
conceptualization of nationhood (Levene, 2005a, p. 17). Thus, ethnic monoculture
grounding should not be assumed even where the case has been such. While the United
States and Britain and such “Avant-garde nation-states” have, in their national features,
been notably hybrid, most others that are diversely ethnic such as Brazil, are virtually
color-blind (Levene, 2005a, p. 17). Thus, in actual genocidal cases, in which conflict
issues of race and ethnicity are seemingly turned on, the social coherence premium of the
modern state is rather the underlying concern of the modern polities larger problem of
sustainability among other competing nation-states in the international system.
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Hence, both external, as well as, internal pressures serve as primary drivers
towards the notions of uniformity and unity. There is, however, an unequivocal outcome
to this, for which it is argued that:
polities intent on long term sustainability in the modern, international political
economy are those which, as a matter of necessity, demand that their citizens, or
subjects, accommodate and/or assimilate themselves to a set of social, cultural,
economic and often linguistic norms, as determined by the state. This usually
means… recognizing oneself as a member of the national – or some other state
defined notion of collective and unified - community. (Levene, 2005a, p. 17)
It is observed that this recognition will result in the non-further acceptance of
living on the state’s geographical or emotional borders as a way to avoid compliance,
with such tactical means of avoidance becoming more unlikely as the economic
imperatives of the modern state ensues (Levene, 2005a). In such circumstances, those
that are unwilling to assimilate voluntarily will likely be encapsulated forcibly, through
‘national’ value inculcation in state schooling universal programs among others, which is
noted as another critical underlying indicator of the advent of the modern nation-state
(Levene, 2005a, p. 17). The others that might be claiming exemption for reasons of say,
religious non-conformism, will probably find their maneuvering scope profoundly
confined. Also, recourse to the status of a minority group possibly by negotiating with
authorities, could be a possible bolt-hole, but such that would only confirm a status of
fixity, subordination, and subservience in relation to the state. It is observed that “any
group which thus holds out against these norms is likely to find itself branded as pariahs,
outsiders, troublemakers, or where simply individuals are concerned, as insane”
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(Foucault as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 18). Furthermore, even in clearly multi-ethnic
states with elitist exclusively manipulative behavior to ensure its own group’s ethnic
dominance over the other(s), the unified nation’s rhetoric provides the most apparent
apparatus for marginalizing its competitors (Human Rights Watch as cited in Levene,
2005a).
Additionally, it is argued that genocidal possibilities are not evidently manifest in
all of such situations as can be seen, for instance, where the national state community
embarks on the extrusion of a group for reason of its assumed “irreconcilable
‘otherness’” or where, being unable to embrace the nation-state’s set down existence
arrangements for the group, the group actively seeks to secede from the state (Heraclides
as cited in Levene, 2005a, p. 18). Rather, it is observed that “danger from the nationstate’s monopoly of violence is implicit in all its fundamental arrangements (Levene,
2005a, p. 18). This does not, however, present any particular thing as leading to genocide
inevitably, nor that all nation-states are identical, but rather, that genocide occurrence can
result only from an assemblage of a milieu of often special ingredients which are
contingent mostly under crisis conditions. This also does not present the potentiality of
genocide as exempt automatically from some states as a result of their supposedly being
more attuned to development. Hence, it is argued that:
Few states especially liberal democracies, typically or openly exercise their power
over their constituency through unmediated violence, though it is always held in
reserve. Rather they try to ensure conformity to a set of images that create the
illusion of unity, the illusion of consensus about what is and what is not
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legitimate, what should and should not be suppressed. (Nagengast as cited in
Levene, 2005a, p. 18)
Thus, it is recognized that “the refusal of multiplicity, the dread of difference … is
the very essence of the state” (Clastres quoted by Nagengast as cited in Levene, 2005a, p.
18). In essence, the analytical combination of the emergent nation-state, the rise of the
West, and modernity, shows “that the fundamental reconfiguration of human society
which these developments inaugurated was the harbinger of universal conditions in
which genocide, as we understand it, became possible” (Levene, 2005a, p. 18).
Moreover, in examining why genocide, ethnic cleansing, and forced displacement
constitute part of the enduring features of the state system, it is observed that humans
accept as morally justifiable, the “systematic mistreatment of other human beings” (Rae,
2002, p. x). It is recognized that “pathological homogenization,” which involves “forced
assimilation, expulsion, and genocide,” are practiced in the state-building process, with
political elites frequently utilizing cultural resources for the redefinition of politically
bounded communities as morally exclusive communities, with outsiders to be expelled
from that exclusivity (Rae, 2002, p. x). It is argued that the international state system has
through history been “replete with examples of states turning on their own citizens,” with
no exception for the twentieth century, which rather witnessed increasing toll on citizens
to unprecedented levels as states acquired greater military and bureaucratic capabilities
(2002, p. 1). This is notwithstanding the international relation’s known scholarship of the
state’s cardinal responsibility for “providing security for its citizens in an anarchical
international environment” with norms of state’s legitimate behavior to its citizens
developed by the international community since WWII ended (2002, p. 1). Hence, the
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world has witnessed in the twentieth century’s last decade, an astounding level of
brutality and targeting of population segments for expulsions and exterminations.
The Human Agency and Collective Evil. Still on genocide causation, it is argued
that people who commit extraordinary evil are ordinary individuals contrary to the
common belief that extraordinary human evil perpetrators have historically mostly been
extraordinary monsters, psychopaths, and sadists (Waller, 2002). Investigating why
ordinary people commit evil extraordinarily, Waller (2002) presents that most
perpetrators of genocide and mass killings, who are extraordinary by their acts rather than
by their personalities which are ordinary and without identification as killers, mentally
deranged, or sadists, in consequence elude demographical categorization. It is understood
that most extraordinary evil perpetrators are not distinguishable by personality,
background, past political affiliation, or behaviors portraying them as men and women
who are not likely or unfit to be genocide executioners, such that “a purely evil person is
just as much an artificial construct as a person who is purely good” (Waller, 2002, p. 18).
Thus, extraordinary evil perpetrators are not to be considered so atavistic or irrational and
beyond comprehension, but focus should be in understanding the factors that lead
ordinary individuals into committing extraordinary evil. Extraordinary evil is connoted
with extra capitalizing of human, with the deliberate harm being perpetrated on one
another under social, political, or religious groups’ sanctions. Hence, it is recognized that
the greatest atrocities are orchestrated with boundary dissolution between criminal
conduct and the military; between barbarity and civility; and when social, political, or
religious groups embark on collective violence as warfare or progress, towards a
vulnerable victim group, such human evil acts of which writ large. In essence, “the
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extraordinary human evil perpetrated in times of collective social unrest, war, mass
killings, and genocide…the deliberate harm inflicted against a defenseless and helpless
group targeted by a legitimating political, social, or religious authority - human evil in
extremis” (Waller, 2002, p. 13).
Additionally, the notion of doing evil is understood as the intentionality of
inflicting pain on another against the person’s will and causing foreseeable and serious
harm (Vetlesen, 2005). Investigating the reasons and circumstances underlying such
desires, its exploitation, or the manner of its channeling on to collective evildoing, it is
argued that such form of evildoing that pits entire groups against themselves derives from
a fusion of social structure, situation, and character (Vetlesen, 2005). Further analyzing
collective evil responses, there is recognition of the varying bystander types,
differentiated on the basis of a pre-existing relationship with either victim or perpetrator,
and the immediacy of the evildoing (Vetlesen, 2005). It is observed that a bystander who
is aware of the atrocities being perpetrated, and has the capability to intervene but fails to
do so, becomes the same as a perpetrator. Hence, it is argued that:
there is often but a thin line between the stance of bystanders and that of
perpetrators: in denying human plurality (Arendt) and hence in denying
uniqueness. Perpetrators targeting a ‘Them’ and bystanders deciding to remain
indifferent (inactive) in the face of those victimized commit the same destruction
of the moral foundation of the other by means of substituting the unique other
with reifying categories of the It, making all others appear predictable and alike.
(Tester as cited in Vetlesen, 2005, p. 231)
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Moreover, reexamining some fundamental studies of conformity including the
notable investigations of Milgram, Zimbardo, and Ash, there is recognition of the factors
of emotional development and identity as contributing to genocide (Milgram, Zimbardo,
& Ash as cited in Baum, 2008). Presenting a three personality type model of perpetrators,
bystanders, and rescuers, Baum argued that the actions of people during genocide
inevitably mirror their everyday behavior in daily living, with perpetrators prone to
destruction, and rescuers prone to helping, while bystanders are the onlookers that remain
uninvolved, and positioned between both extremes. By analytically combing eyewitness
accounts and correlating these personality types with social-psychological factors, it is
observed that similar emotional and mental traits are identified among all three
personality types, with the divisions accounted for by conflict between the social and
personal identity (Baum, 2008).
Manipulation and Loyalty to Authority. Still on genocide causation factors, it is
understood that undergirding the psychological inclinations motivating such violence
extremities as prison riots, lynching, military massacres, and genocide are the issues of
the means by which individuals are indoctrinated for military or political reasons into
committing ghastly acts by leaders (Dutton, 2007). It is recognized that the group mind
deriving from the crowd yearns for obedience and leadership. It is further observed that
such crowd creates dangerous fanatical leaders with attachment only to self, as well as
bounded followers to such leaders as representing an ideal self-type, who are, in turn,
bounded to other followers through their idealized leader’s common connection—called
the “common ego ideal” (Freud as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 24). This ideal holds the
group together and allows freedom from social anxiety which directs normative rule of
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everyday life behavior, with such freedom inhibiting in-group aggression. Ensuing from
this will be violence regression referred to as the “primal horde,” a notional group
depicted as slaying the father-figure and erecting totems in its stead (Freud as cited in
Dutton, 2007, p. 24). Hence, there is an understanding of “the followers as slavishly
presenting to the leader” with a yearning to obey which makes the synergy of the leaderfollower combination bidirectional and natural (Freud as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 24).
Additionally, it is noted that a stronger motivation for the leader-followership relationship
other than social anxiety freedom, which binds self to the group served, provides an
emblematic panacea for avoiding the fear of death (Becker as cited in Dutton, 2007, p.
24).
Furthermore, by tracing recurrences of massive human violence to determine
causal factors for people’s willingness to kill others throughout history, it is
acknowledged that politically contrived memory manipulation is fundamental in the
unleashing of primal genocidal passions (Hirsch, 1995). Detailing the ways cultural
memory becomes created to generate an understanding of the causes and ways mass
murder episodes occur, it is observed that leaders are often invoking or creating past
fictitious or real memories of injustices to instigate their cohorts to kill for politics or
other motives, with generational accounts of happenings handed over as history. It is
therefore, argued that politics is linked to psychology and culture, and people’s view of
political systems and politics, as well as their learned manners of interaction with
authority, are linked to issues they learned growing up (Hirsch, 2007). In consequence,
cultural and political myths learned through the political socialization process present as a
framework on which adult worldviews and behaviors are based (Hirsch, 2007).
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Additionally, obedience reinforcing cues are directed by important culturally, socially,
and politically positioned persons, and so where obedience is framed on a national
mythology, such mythological link can be manipulated by leaders to plausibly sway
participants’ views on the justification for mass destruction. Thus, where leadership
spreads dehumanizing symbolizations of other people groups, they convey a justification
message of the appropriateness of aggressively acting against such groups, based on the
fact that peoples’ hostile impulses are often willingly acted out where reinforced by
leadership. Hence, it is observed that:
During the Holocaust, the continued description of Jews as vermin and bacilli was
a prime example of dehumanizing symbolization. Anti-Semitism was also
reinforced by the lack of opposition to the extermination of the Jews. The fact that
political and religious leaders did not object seemed to confirm the legitimacy of
the destruction…Leaders, consequently, may prepare a population for genocide in
this fashion. (Hirsch, 1995, pp. 131-132)
Moreover, Sells (1998) identified the role of Kosovo mythology manipulation in
instigating and justifying the Bosnian atrocities. The Bosnian genocide is observed to
have occurred with Western governments’ acquiescence in violation of the 1948
Genocide Convention of the UN, as the genocide “has been motivated and justified in
large part by religious nationalism, fueled financially and militarily from Serbia and
Croatia, and grounded in religious symbols” (Sells, 1998, p. xxi). Thus, it is argued that
the main victims are Bosnian Muslims who have been targeted for destruction as a result
of their religion, with the Bosnian genocide being justified by “Balkanism” which
connotes a particular historical abuse portending Balkans as fated genetically or
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historically to kill each other (Sells, 1998, p. xxii). Furthermore, in examining the
recurrences of massive human violence to determine causal factors for people’s
willingness to kill others throughout history, and Hirsch (1995) presents politically
contrived memory manipulation as fundamental in the unleashing of primal genocidal
passions. While also exploring recent genocidal developments necessary for
understanding the perpetrators, as well as other human behavioral aspects during the
Holocaust, the issue of behavior shaping through obedience to authority and role
conformity is identified as genocide causation factors (Newman & Erber, 2002).
Additionally, it is generally observed that in examining genocidal causation, some
genocide experts adopt “a top-down approach,” for instance, by examining authoritarian
or utopian regimes, in contrast to “a bottom-up” approach to genocide which explores the
average person’s thought and action frames with an absence or change of rules (Baum,
2008, p. 6). Genocide theorists adopting the top-down approach are recognized as
viewing manipulative elites as orchestrating genocide from a ‘get-go’ perspective, a
notion that is supported by the apparent leading of genocides by demagogues, both
charismatic and uncharismatic, including “Stalin (Russia), Mao/Chiang Kai-shek
(China/Taiwan), Tojo (Japan), Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan (East Pakistan now
Bangladesh), Pol Pot (Cambodia), Milosevic (Yugoslavia), Hitler (Germany)” (Baum,
2008, p. 6). With the bottom-up approach, on the other hand, it is understood that the
appearance of a demagogue only serves to echo the minds of the populace. For instance:
Hitler and his ilk said nothing new, nothing that the volk hadn’t heard before. For
years, people had retained all the social myths about Jews in the back of their
minds. Such myths were reflected in fairy tales (the Grimms’ Jew in the Bush),
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children’s rhymes, state-sponsored statues (such as the Judensau) and churchsanctioned pilgrimage sites that honored sainthood for children martyred by “The
Jews.” Like a good populist, Hitler echoed what everyone “knew.” It was as if
God had read their minds. (Baum, 2008, p. 6)
It is, therefore, argued that while there will always be manipulative leaders, they
will not succeed without followership support, since without the masses’ support, the
diatribe of a demagogue will only be regarded as a madman’s ranting (Baum, 2008).
Thus, it is noted that “What really matters…is that the seductive quality of hate appeals to
the average person’s irrational fears, their vanities, their greed and their blood lust”
(Burma as cited in Baum, 2008, p. 7).
Groupthink, Hate Processes and Dehumanization of ‘Other’. Moreover, on
genocide causation factors, psychological forces have been identified as underlying
massacres and atrocious massive killings in narration of dreadful occurrences which
marked the 20th century as eliciting the highest level of systemic human slaughters in
history (Dutton, 2007). There is an understanding that such psychological factors
undergird the process of Groupthink through which individuals are transformed into
committing massive brutal murders with no compunctions. This is identified as the “B
process dominance,” the mechanism of indoctrinating individuals to habituated brutality
with the conviction to commit such hideous acts, which is often initially preceded by
tortuous guilt, followed by dehumanization and belief of the target victim’s virus-like and
unjust status which needs to be destroyed to avoid its destruction of the populace (2007,
p. 153). It is argued that “the “groupthink” aspects drive the military decision outcome
inevitably towards annihilation of the target group” (2007, p. 20). Also exploring the
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human condition in analyzing violence generating situations and people’s responses to
them, it is observed, citing Gustave Le Bon’s description of the French revolution, that
the revolutionary mobs’ behavior is indicative of the “group mind,” which is a collective
unconscious form all men share, even the civilized (2007, pp. 23-24). Thus, in
“psychological groups” or crowds with everyone having the same goal, men’s behavior
descends down the ladder of evolution several steps, to the place of “primitive people”
(2007, p. 24). Hence, it is understood that:
by the very fact that he forms part of an organized group, a man descends several
rungs down the ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual,
in a crowd, he is a barbarian - that is, a creature acting by instinct. In this group
situation, the individual gains “a sentiment of invincible power which allows him
to yield to instincts, which, had he been alone, he would have kept under
constraint. (Le Bon as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 24)
Moreover, such occurrence results from “anonymity and consequent loss of
personal responsibility in crowds,” along with a tainting, in which usually proscribed acts
are imitated and endorsed (Le Bon as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 24). The individual’s
susceptibility in the crowd enables the group mind to control him or her, and is a racial
consciousness form, which makes the individual perform acts contrary to his or her moral
beliefs. Likened to primeval people, the group mind is presented as unconsciously driven,
orchestrating impulsive acts, irritability and changeability, while also longing for
obedience and strong leadership, such that, “the crowd…acted on “image-like ideas” visual impressions lacking reason (Le Bon as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. 24).
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Additionally, examining various notions of hate, such as psychopathology,
ideological attraction, and group processes, it is observed that such prior conditions are
inadequate in explaining hate processes (Waller, 2002). Framed on several scholars’
works since WWII, Waller presents a four-pronged context model for explaining how
people that are ordinary become involved in mass killings. The first two prongs are actorrelated factors of “ancestral shadow” involving, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and social
dominance need; and perpetrators’ identities issues of cultural beliefs, moral
disengagement, and self-interest; the third is the action’s social context or the “culture of
cruelty” factors involving socialization, group binding factors, and person/role merger;
and the fourth is response to authority based on “social death of victims” including
dehumanization, us-them thinking, and victims blaming which legitimizes them as the
enemy (Waller, 2002, p. 20). Hate is also recognized as “one of the most powerful
forces…underlying mass killings…hate that is carefully nurtured and shaped to
accomplish ends that are mindfully, planfully, and systematically conceived” (Sternberg,
2003, p. 304). It is observed that “hate applies to whatever one calls the killings, from
terrorism to massacres, genocides, and ethnic cleansing,” many of which are partly
instigated by “fires of hatred” (Naimark as cited in Sternberg, 2003, p. 304). In his
Duplex Theory of Hate, Sternberg’s (2003) triangular components of hate, namely,
“negation of intimacy, passion, and commitment,” composed as derivative to his “triangle
of love” (Sternberg as cited in Sternberg, 2003, p. 306), were used in combination with
propaganda to incite hatred of the Jews. It is recognized that disgust was whipped up in
several ways for instance, on the basis of which, Sternberg argues that:
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The negation of intimacy was fostered by condensing the Jews into a single
disgusting entity, as in references to the Jewish bacillus and smelly Jews. Jews
were depicted as power crazed, greedy, and so forth, and Germans were depicted
as handsome or beautiful, as pure, as saviors of the Aryan race, and even as
Godlike. Passion was incited by Hitler’s rousing addresses to the masses, by mass
demonstrations and parades, by use of films…by depictions of Jews in
propaganda as defilers and rapists of Aryan women, and by depictions of Jews as
evil (e.g., as Christ killers, devils, or purveyors of death). Finally, devaluation and
diminution were fomented by youth organizations, control and censorship of the
media and cultural artifacts, by demands for active but delimited active
participation in persecution, by pressure to turn in Jews, and by the demand from
the government for absolute obedience to hate-based government policies, on pain
of death (e.g., if one harbored Jews). (2003, p. 307)
Furthermore, hate remains an underlying factor not only in the Rwandan
genocide, but also undergirds several of the world’s intricate problems. In the Rwandan
1994 genocide, over 500,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates were killed within a few months
(Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008, p. 2), with a majority of the Hutu population noted to have
actively participated in the genocide, basically using such primitive weaponries as
machetes, axes, knives, or guns. While humans’ capability for such violence predicates
the workings of several psychological processes, hatred presents as a major facilitator for
such mass killings. According to Sternberg & Sternberg (2008) such hate is not natural,
in the sense of an inability of the individuals to act differently; on the contrary, it is
“cynically fomented by individuals in power so as to maintain their power or by
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individuals not in power, so as to gain it” (p. 2). Furthermore, in Rwanda, the radio
station’s (RTML) broadcasts incited Hutus to slaughter their neighboring Tutsis, a
strategy which was ultimately aimed at securing Hutu power in Rwanda. By the same
token, just as in Rwanda, the Nazis cultivated hate and exclusionary feelings against the
Jews, the Roma or Gypsies, the Communists, and other groups that were marginalized so
as to increase and maintain power. Through the education and propaganda ministry
established shortly after Hitler took over in March 1933, and the ensuing tight regulation
of the media, literature, theater, art, and music, the radio became an essential means of
disseminating socialist nationalist slogans that were aimed at manipulating the masses
(Diller as cited in Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008).
The Rwandan genocide resonates in several ways with the World War II events of
Nazi atrocities against the Jews, Communists, Roma or Gypsies, and other supposedly
inferior race groups, who were seen as obstructing the Nazis’ establishment of an
economically independent nation and an exclusive reign of a seemingly purer race which
would be stronger, healthier, and smarter than all other peoples on the globe. In this too,
there was some power struggle with the Nazis aiming “to enlarge their sphere of
influence to create the superior living conditions for Aryans at the cost of other people
who were ‘unfit’ for the new nation” (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008, p. 2). Genocide and
massacres are still continuing since the WWII Nazi genocide against the Jews, which are
observed not as random killings or a mob’s spontaneous irrationality bursts, but are rather
“carefully planned and orchestrated killings” with efficiency levels that on occasions
nearly paralleled those of the Nazi’s death machine (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008, p. 2).
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Furthermore, the intense hatred which accompanied the Rwandan genocide is not
considered to be especially uncommon, as it also manifested in the genocide which
occurred in west Darfur in Sudan where African groups in Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa
inhabiting the region were being attacked by government forces and the “Janjaweed”
Arab militias. The conflict which is noted as involving “territorial power struggles”
intensified in February 2003, with the demand made by two African rebel groups for
power-sharing and cessation of economic sidelining and marginalization (Sternberg &
Sternberg, 2008, p. 3). Aided by Sudanese soldiers, the Janjaweed burned the African
villages, poisoned their wells, raped the women, killed children, women, and men, and
forced mass migrations of these African indigenes off the region for the occupation by
Arabs (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008).
Moreover, exploring such issues as stage setting for intergroup violent conflicts
caused by difficulties in life conditions and crisis, the genocidal tendency of scapegoating
some groups more than others is identified (Newman & Erber, 2002). It is further argued
that a strong psychological projection element resides in mortals, the basis on which
genocidal designs are imputed to perceived enemies with justifying of such designs
(Jones, 2006). Hence, identified enemies such as the Jews, Bolsheviks, Croatians, and
Tutsis “must be killed because they harbor intentions to kill us,” and without
preventing/stopping/annihilating them, they will proceed to do so (Jones, 2006, p. 267).
Before being killed, they are debased, brutalized, and dehumanized by which vein they
are made to resemble “animals” or “subhumans” to justify their extermination.
Additionally, projection also serves to displace blame and guilt from the perpetrators of
genocide to their victims (Hatzfeld as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 267).
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Narcissism. Narcissism is also one of the psychological factors motivating
génocidaires (Jones, 2006). It is observed that humans have a “propensity for hubristic
self-love,” in account for which Narcissus, the legendary Greek god so enraptured and in
love with the pool’s reflection of him, without finding consolation died in sorrow by the
pool (Freud as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 262). Accordingly, groups which are seemingly
geographically, linguistically, and/or religiously close, such as the Tutsis and Hutus,
Croatians and Serbians, and the Protestants and Catholics, accede to vicious intercommunal conflict (Jones, 2006). It is recognized that “the communal feeling of groups
requires, in order to complete it, hostility towards some extraneous minority” (Freud as
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 262). Hence, it is argued that “the psychological dynamic by
which the ‘Self’ and the ‘We’ are defined against the ‘Other’ is fundamental to genocide”
(Jones, 2006, p. 262).
Also recognized is the “malignant or pathological narcissism,” which refers to a
state of idolized self with others only existing to magnify and fortify the self (Fein as
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 262), and is informed by fear that, in absence of others’
validation, the self faces being annihilated or undermined, and derives from anxiety,
unease, and profound insecurity (Kressel as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 262). It is noted as
vanishing however, with malignant narcissism extremities of real psychopathy, and is “a
murderous egotism, incapable of empathy with others, that considers human destruction
inconsequential where it increases personal power and glory” (p. 262). Thus,
psychopathy and malignant narcissism have been identified in contemporary history as a
common feature among génocidaires. For example:
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Consider Adolf Hitler, whose stunted, injured ego found transcendence in
holocaust. (How Hitler, the failed artist and rootless ex-soldier, must have reveled
in the version of the Lord’s Prayer devised by the League of German Girls:
“Adolf Hitler, you are our great Leader. Thy name makes the enemy tremble. Thy
Third Reich comes, thy will alone is law upon earth…”!). Consider as well Joseph
Stalin and Mao Zedong, “fanatics, poets, paranoiacs, peasants risen to rule
empires whose history obsessed them, careless killers of millions” or the Hutu
Power extremists of Rwanda, convinced that their crushing of Tutsi
“cockroaches” would enshrine their version of manifest destiny. (Jones, 2006, p.
262)
It is additionally recognized that “collective pathological narcissism” is also a
genocide causal factor, with the diagnostic and analytic level shifting from individual to
collective, a state in which a nation’s dominant minority or majority of its citizens hold
sway to their country’s innate superiority, their God’s giftedness or destined, their
limitless capability, or their being sole truth bearers (Jones, 2006, pp. 262-263). The
conditions underlying narcissist collective pathology include all such factors which
occasion cover-ups, antisocial behavior, and large scale criminal activities, a summation
of which includes the group’s grandiose feeling and self-importance; obsession with their
fantasies of indomitability, omnipotence, power, fame, unequalled brilliance, allconquering ideals, or all-surpassing political theories with firm conviction of the group’s
uniqueness; requiring adulation, affirmation, and excessive admiration; wishing to be
revered, feared, or seen as notorious; and devoid of empathy, unwilling to accommodate
other groups needs or feelings, exhibiting haughtiness and rage when confronted or
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frustrated (Vaknin as cited in Jones, 2006, pp. 262- 263). Examples of such narcissist
countries include Great Britain, which in the 19th and 20th centuries was “the world leader
in collective pathological narcissism,” as well as “three totalitarian states - Nazi Germany
(1933–45), Stalinist Russia (1928–53), and Maoist China (1949–76) - and, since 1945, a
democratic one, the United States” in the past century (Jones, 2006, p. 263).
In-group and Out-group Identity. Still on genocide causation, it is recognized
that most people have the capability of visiting gruesome violence on others, particularly
in social settings where there is the “us versus them” stratification as defined by their ingroup and out-group dichotomy, by which the in-group perceives the out-group as a
dangerous threat to their world requiring extermination (Dutton, 2007). It is argued that,
“the drive to kill is fueled by a societal sense of power and destiny - a sense of
entitlement called narcissism in an individual but nationalism in a country” (Dutton,
2007, p. x). While there may be individual aggressive differences in various societies,
extreme cruelty capability may not be specific to any given culture. Rather, the capability
may be stronger in any culture when the conditions for a “perfect storm” descend,
entailing a transcultural reasoning that links extreme violence with humans’ predator,
inherited, and vestigial remnant past of the complex “pain-blood-death” associated with
ancient hunting success (Nell as cited in Dutton, 2007, p. x). It is further argued, “That
the most powerful human motive by far is the striving for attachment to loved ones in
perpetuity. Humans will do anything for this, including blowing themselves (and others)
to pieces…tribalism is universal” (Dutton, 2007, p. xii). Starting with the human instinct
for attachment, it is furthered by the in-group/out-group division which establishes “our
capability for symbolism,” thus, humanity’s survival requires our awareness “of
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humanity as a tribe and of humanity’s potential for radical violence” which, if ignored,
dooms us to repeating past mistakes with devastating and more powerful weapons
(Dutton, 2007, p. xii).
Ideological Influences. Additionally, ideological influences comprising factors
such as beliefs and specific cultural values underlie genocide facilitation (Newman &
Erber, 2002). Detailing a social psychology of individually absolving meaning frame,
there are insights drawn in understanding the formation of human beliefs and behavior
shaping which are crucial to an understanding of genocide. For instance, in various
contexts that were differentially constrained, the Khmer Rouge aimed at motivating its
minions “to kill by invoking ideological discourses that played upon Cambodian cultural
models related to revenge, power, patronage, status, face, and honor” (Hinton, 2005, p.
31). Due to cultural knowledge’s dialectical duality, however, the understanding and
motivational force of such Khmer Rouge instituted models varied for individual
perpetrators. Thus, in varying combinations and differing contexts, the Khmer Rouge
cultural models have been a crucial aspect of the genocidal framing for many of the
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) perpetrators, effectively motivating the perpetrators to kill.
It is recognized that “Cultural models theory as inflected by practice theory, then,
provides a strong theoretical basis for viewing perpetrators as meaning-making genocidal
bricoleurs” (Hinton, 2005, p. 31). Framed in this ‘distributive view of culture’ approach,
perpetrator motivation is noted as accounting for the intricate local understandings which
influence people’s actions, even while such understandings are linked to and are
impacted by macro level practices. Hence, it is argued that by observing perpetrator’s
motivation to genocidal orchestration:
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in a more complex manner, one that weaves macro level and micro level analysis
to comprehend local motivation and the cultural patterning of mass violence…By
regarding perpetrators as bricoleurs and not passive ideological automatons, we
can gain a better understanding of their motivations for committing genocidal
atrocities. Even if perpetrators are highly constrained in some circumstances, they
remain active subjects who construct meaning and assert their self-identity
through their violent practices. (Hinton, 2005, p. 31)
Furthermore, religious violence resurgence has become prevalent in the post-cold
war era, from Tokyo subways to the Indian mosque ruins, the World Trade center, the
Oklahoma City federal building, and the Israeli prime minister’s rally in Jerusalem, with
religious militants transgressing civil societal boundaries to pursue their goals (Sells,
1998). Indeed, Bosnians have encountered the most vicious religious violence meted out
in the cold war aftermath, with assaulting forces not of the “age old antagonisms”
associated with the Balkans, however, but of “the same myth of the Christ killer that was
exploited in the past to instigate attacks on Jews” (Sells, 1998, p. xxiii). In consequence,
genocide perpetrators have been rewarded and the victims punished by Western
policymakers. There is an acknowledgement of the assault destruction throughout
Herzegovina, cultures, and communities that are non-Catholic particularly in the region
of Mostar where the ancient bridge which symbolized the diverse peoples, cultures, and
religions in Bosnia through the ages was destroyed.
In essence, Islam and Christendom have been bridged by the Bosnian society’s
multi-religious character, symbolized by the Mostar ancient bridge, now-destroyed, with
the bridge also practically connoting five centuries of a society’s ability to flourish as a
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culturally pluralistic entity amidst tensions between the diverse religious groups (Sells,
1998). Observing the preservation of the Bosnian society in its multi-religious existence
as crucially significant to the world at large, it is opined that “For those who choose a
pluralistic society where different religions coexist - whether in Banja Luka, London, or
Los Angeles - the struggle to rebuild that bridge is not something occurring over there
and far away, but something frighteningly close to home” (Sells, 1998, p. xxiii).
Also acknowledging that anthropologists have been involved as participants and
contributors in different genocidal cases, there is an understanding that they have played
a vanguard role in forging and deploying the idea of annihilating difference in humans,
the basis on which genocide thrives, particularly in contemporary history (Hinton, 2002).
Recognizing anthropologists’ duplicity in failing to utilize their vantage point for making
more valuable contributions to genocidal projects, there is an establishment of genocide’s
inextricable link with modernity, given modernity’s society re-ordering scope based on
goals/rational principles. Thus, by anthropologically exploring genocide’s origins,
genocide is plausible as in the cases of Rwanda, Burundi, and Cambodia. For instance,
focusing on the Cambodian 1975 to 1979 devastation under the Khmer Rouge in
exploring the causation for mass murder and perpetrators motivation to kill, it is argued
that the Cambodian genocidal policies resulted in over 1.7 million deaths out of the
country’s 7.9 million populace (Kiernan; and Chandler as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 23)
killed through malnutrition, starvation, illness, overwork, and execution (Ebihara as cited
in Hinton, 2002, p. 23). Further analyzing the dynamics of this violence, there is
recognition of causal factors of manufacturing difference, involving meaning and identity
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construction, and the combination of emotionally charged cultural knowledge into
genocidal ideologies (Hinton, 2002).
In the Armenian genocide whose primary perpetrators were the central committee
and leaders of the “Committee of Union and Progress” (CUP) which was the Ottoman
government’s ruling faction, “The CUP was formed out of the heterogeneous opposition
groups collectively known as the Young Turks that developed in the late nineteenth
century” (Bloxham, 2005, p. 4). The orchestrated Armenian murder accepted as a given
is, thus, observed as a starting discourse point rather than the end, contrary to the
‘Armenian’ profound historiography which is keen, mainly as a denial response of
enforcing the usual interpretation line of the genocide’s inadequate debating scope, on the
“specific relationship between intention and contingency in the development of the
CUP’s destruction policy in 1914–15” (Bloxham, 2005, p. 20). It is argued, however, that
such debate, while being emblematic of mature historiography, also touches crucial
sensitive issues for both Armenians and Turks. It is essentially noted that the Ottoman’s
1914-15 policies on the Armenians were significantly shaped by the nationalist activism
of the Armenians, also impacting the run-up to the massacres in 1894-96 (Bloxham,
2005, p. 20). Yet, while identifying the policies influencing contingencies without any
inexorable determinism in force, the alternative courses available for the Ottoman main
actors should constantly be borne in mind, while also remembering the role that prejudice
and ideology played in their conclusions, as well as the visceral hatred. Hence, while
allowing:
the Marxian caveat that choices are inevitably conditioned by circumstance, that
‘man’ makes history, but not just as ‘he’ would like, Armenians were killed
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because of choices made by players who were in the strict sense of the word
responsible. …the Armenian genocide was one ideological response to the very
real, related external and internal structural stresses that had accumulated on the
Ottoman Empire by 1915. (Bloxham, 2005, p. 21)
Threat and Vulnerability. Further on genocide causation, a comparative
analytical study of twentieth century mass genocides, ethnic cleansings, and politicides
show genocide’s occurrence and magnitude, focusing on threat and vulnerability which
are two vital conditions for genocide to occur (Midlarsky, 2005). Conditions for this
causation require a perception of the targeted population as threatening or as having some
tenuous connections to external agents that are threatening irrespective of that
perception’s reality, and there must be the vulnerability of the targeted population to mass
murder (Midlarsky, 2005). Similarly, the potential genocide perpetrators must also
experience vulnerability for generating fantasized or real images of the civilian
population that are threatening. Any threat increasing process to the state, which
simultaneously also increases the state’s vulnerability, as well as, the targeted civilian
population’s vulnerability, also increases genocide’s probability of occurrence
(Midlarsky, 2005). Hence, examining two theoretical foci of loss and realpolitik, the
state’s threat management is recognized as a critical realpolitik function, while loss most
often signals the state’s vulnerability or probable civilian targets (Midlarsky, 2005).
Fear. Moreover, it is argued that fear is a powerful psychological factor that
motivates genocide and quoting Edmund Burke, it is noted that “No power so effectively
robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear” (Burke quoted by Green
in Hinton as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). There is a distinction made between “mortal
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terror” which is the “fear of a threat to physical being and integrity,” and “existential
dread” which “revolves around our sense of personal identity, destiny, and social place,”
and is evoking or threatening to evoke the feelings of humiliation, dishonor, and shame
(Jones, 2006, p. 265). Mortal fear, also referred to as “animal fear,” which while not
easily distinguishable in form from simple reflex, is a commonality across species, and
particularly attains an intensity pitch in humans who are presumably the only species able
to foresee death (Piven as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). Accordingly, such “death
anxiety” is acknowledged by some philosophers and scholars as the worm in the psychic
apple of humanity and a fundamental genocidal factor (Jones, 2006, p. 265).
Hence, it is noted that “Driven by nameless, overwhelming fears…men turn to the
primitive tools of self-protection, including the belief that they may spare themselves the
terrible fate of death by sacrificing another instead of themselves” (Charny quoted by
Kuper as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). This animal fear is seen in predatory animals, with
the phenomena recognized as disparately traced from infants’ separation anxiety,
religious rituals including human sacrifice and other religious rituals, as well as intercommunal warfare, to prehumans’ and primitive humans’ terrifying encounters with
predator animals (Ehrenreich as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). This predator is observed as
having been the primary “Other,” which transformed into predator out-group as humans
gained dominance in the animal kingdom, with this human “Other” then bounding and
delineating the in-group, such as ethnic group, tribe, or clan, in which support,
sustenance, and communal self-defense can be found (Staub as cited in Jones, 2006, p.
265). In this case, evolutionary psychologists are deploying such connections and arguing
that “human behavior in the present is generated by universal reasoning circuits that exist
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because they solved adaptive problems in the past” (Waller as cited in Jones, 2006, p.
265).
On the other hand, social psychologists present that people who believe they will
be attacked by others respond more aggressively than they would towards targets
believed to be benign (Jones, 2006). Presenting such phenomena as intricately linked to
genocide and inter-communal violence, it is argued that:
Fear of the immediate or more distant future is a pivotal element in a number of
approaches to ethnic warfare…Fear induces people to support even very costly
violence, because the choice seems to be between becoming a victim or becoming
a participant…According to this approach, a high degree of affect is expressed
when the stakes are large (genocide involves large stakes), and so emotion
follows a rational assessment by ordinary people of their situation. The
improbability of genocide is not decisive, for the stakes are too high to chance it.
(Horowitz as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 266)
Furthermore, when manipulated and intensified by architects of genocide, mortal
terror is a common feature of genocide, with notable examples such as the 1990s
Rwandan genocide and the Balkan genocide (Jones, 2006).

Likewise, genocidal

atrocities perpetrated against the Serbs by the Ustasha fascist regime during WWII,
which were part of their prominent historical memories, along with the Ustasha-style
symbolism revival and the Croatian nationalist, Franjo Tudjman’s rhetoric, caused deep
anxieties that became further heightened when the discrimination against Serb
professionals/officials in Croatia started (Jones, 2006). Similarly, the Rwandan 1994
holocaust ensued in the aftermath of the Burundian massive bloodletting in which about
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50,000 to 100,000 mainly Hutu civilians were exterminated by a Tutsi-dominant military,
following a foiled coup (Jones, 2006, p. 266). As a result, about 350,000 Hutu refugees
on fleeing to Rwanda, brought firsthand reports of the atrocities, among which “were
some of the most unrestrained genocidal killers of Tutsis in 1994,” as the slaughter only
further revived memories of the 1972 even worse Hutu killings involving an “eliticidal”
attempt at exterminating virtually all professional or educated Hutus, primarily, its adult
males (Jones, 2006, p. 266). It is observed that, along with the 1990 Rwandan invasion by
the Tutsi-led rebels, the “image of the Tutsi as the embodiment of a mortal
danger…[was] hauntingly evident” (Lemarchand as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 266).
Causing further complexity for the Rwandan Hutu males was their leaders’ mortal
retribution threat should they fail in participating in the mass murder; indeed, “Many
Hutu were driven to kill their Tutsi neighbors because they knew they had no other
option; refusal to comply meant that they themselves would be killed the next day”
(Lemarchand as cited in Jones, 2006, pp. 266-267).
Moreover, even in a genocide prototypical case involving an objectively nonthreatening and entirely defenseless group, as in the Jewish Holocaust, mortal terror may
have also featured presumably in a greatly hystericized form (Jones, 2006). Thus, it is
observed that, “the Germans drew a picture of an international Jewry ruling the world and
plotting the destruction of Germany and German life” (Hilberg as cited in Jones, 2006, p.
267). While the depiction of Jewish elderly, women, and children as a “threat” to the
Germans may have appeared preposterous, it was easier to present the Jewish adult males
in this manner. Hence, this demographic group’s demonization in both Germany and
Eastern Europe’s Nazi-occupied territories, in the generated propaganda guide for the
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genocide, as well as the first directive for physical extermination and incarceration
against the group. Furthermore, close linkage of the Jews with the Bolshevik/communist
presented a fear-evoking element to the Nazi mindset, with Slavic civilization and Soviet
Russia portending as logically threatening to the German essence. Such notions conveyed
in a propaganda handout were circulated to German troops stating:
Anyone who has ever looked at the face of a red commissar knows what the
Bolsheviks are like. Here there is no need for theoretical expressions. We would
insult the animals if we described these mostly Jewish men as beasts. They are the
embodiment of the Satanic and insane hatred against the whole of noble
humanity…The masses, whom they have sent to their deaths by making use of all
means at their disposal such as ice-cold terror and insane incitement, would have
brought an end to all meaningful life, had this eruption not been dammed at the
last moment. (Bartov as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 267)
It is also argued that the notions of psychological or physical dispossession and
displacement underlie existential dread, and that “desperation…runs through a great deal
of ethnic violence” with many groups convinced of their impending inundation, control,
dispossession, or possibly even extinction by their neighbors (Horowitz as cited in Jones,
2006, pp. 267-268). With the individual’s physical annihilation not imminent, existential
dread may wrongly be viewed as subordinating mortal terror, but given a group identity’s
supreme value, many individuals will sacrifice their lives defending it. Also, people will
often rather opt for physical death than face existential dishonor, shame, and “respect” or
status loss in the presence of one’s peers (Des Pres as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 268), with
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examples of such respect or honor including sexual fidelity/female virginity, masculine
honor, and warrior-hood time-honored codes.
Demographic Factors, Resource Scarcity, and Greed. Further on genocide
causation, it is recognized that demographical factors and resource constraints also
contribute to genocide orchestration. The surge in genocide in the twentieth century is
attributed to the two underlying factors of exploding population growth and resource
scarcity (Waller, 2002). A further psychological factor which motivates genocidaires is
greed. Presenting the “Nazi ‘Aryanization’ of Jewish properties” as an epitome of greed,
it is observed that most Germans saw the dispossession as an “once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity, and made the most of it” (Jones, 2006, p. 264). The Nazis encouraged the
exploitation of the Jews’ plight by the “Aryan” Germans, as well as fully took advantage
of it themselves. Even close to the peak of the Holocaust in 1941-42, Hitler was
“sanctioning opportunities to extort foreign currency in return for ransoming very rich
Jews” (Burleigh as cited in Jones, 2006, p, 264). Furthermore, “in the Nazi death camps,
Jews were robbed not only of their few remaining possessions, but of their hair, which
was sold for mattress stuffing – and (after death) of the gold fillings in their teeth, melted
down for bullion” (Jones, 2006, p. 264).
It is acknowledged that as a dominant subject in human affairs (Marchak as cited
in Jones, 2006) greed is a primary motivating factor for genocide perpetrators, as well as
bystanders. The opportunity of stripping victims’ property and wealth, either by outright
looting or desperation-priced purchasing, and occupation of forcefully vacated dwellings,
frequent genocidal accounts. Hence, it is argued that at the climax of the Soviet Union
Stalin’s purges, the Soviets had “frequent house-moving because every execution created
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a vacant apartment and dacha which were eagerly occupied by survivors and their
aspirational Party housewives, ambitious for grander accommodation” (Montefiore as
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 264). Similarly, in 1994 Rwanda, opportunity for the land and
cows owned by rural Tutsi victims had to be taken over by someone upon death of the
owners served as significant incentive amidst the country’s poor and rising
overpopulation (Prunier as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 264).
Presenting greed as exceeding a desiring of material goods over and above
survival necessities, there is an understanding of its close connection to the lust for
power, prestige, and dominance. Hence, it is argued that “Man does not strive for power
only in order to enrich himself economically…Power, including economic power, may be
valued ‘for its own sake.’ Very frequently the striving for power is also conditioned by
the social ‘honor’ it entails” (Weber quoted by Gerth & Mills as cited in Jones, 2006, p.
265). Accordingly, Jewish Holocaust “Functionalist” analysts stressed the underlings’
eagerness in implementing the grand plans of Hitler with such dynamo that was
tantamount an independence of direct orders (Burleigh as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265).
Hence, Simon Sebag Montefiore’s notion of “Terror entrepreneurialism” is observed as
reigning in Stalinist Russia, with a stream of Stalin’s enemies’ ambitious torturers only
too eager to please and kill for him (as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). While such
individuals were often marked for execution next, there usually were ambitiously
inspiring men and women substitutes waiting (Mandelstam as cited in Jones, 2006, p.
265). Furthermore, the génocidaires can be adequately motivated even by a momentary
sun, as in the Rwandan genocide’s vengeful targeting of Tutsis by “street boys, ragpickers, [and] car-washers” (Prunier as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 265). Hence:
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Greed reflects objective material circumstances, but also, like narcissism, the core
strivings of ego. Greed is never satiated; but when it is fed, one feels validated,
successful – even omnipotent. Perhaps the only force that can truly match it as a
motivator for genocide is fear. (Jones, 2006, p. 265)
Power Politics and Genocide Denial. Still on genocide causation, in examining
the origins of the Armenian genocide, its development, and consequences from a broadbased perspective of reappraising all the involved major parties’ secondary and primary
sources, genocide’s underlying causation is attributed to the interplay of power politics
(Bloxham, 2005). This power politics interplay involves the Ottoman Empire’s
interactions within the decades of its final decline, the European imperial power’s selfinterested policies, and some Armenian nationalists’ agenda within the Ottoman territory
and beyond. Of special emphasis is the international context’s ethnic polarization process
which culminated with the 1912-23 massive destruction and particularly the Armenian
community obliteration in 1915-16 (Bloxham, 2005). An interconnectedness is, thus,
observed in the relationship between the ‘eastern question’ power politics from 1774, the
‘Armenian question’ narrower politics from mid-nineteenth century, and the internal
questions of the Ottoman Empire’s ethnic and social order reforms which were under
intense external pressure (Bloxham, 2005, p. 1).
Furthermore, in an in-depth investigative study on imperial Germany’s role in
WWI and the genocide, different conclusions emerge from prevailing notions on their
complicity (Bloxham, 2005). In examining the Entente wartime and Anglo-French
postwar axis to contextually place the various related genocide politics and denial themes
into perspective, the interwar phase political interest of America in the Middle East which
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framed the policy refusing to recognize the genocide is identified. It is, therefore, argued,
that the Armenian question’s historical frame is undergirded by the genocide’s continuing
international denial due to several similar relationship concerns that are still underlying
interactions between America, Europe, and Turkey as were in operation prior to WWI
(Bloxham, 2005). Hence, it is observed that, “great power involvement in Ottoman
internal affairs was a key element in exacerbating the Ottoman–Armenian dynamic
towards genocide while Turkish sensitivity about external intervention on behalf of the
Armenians - whether directed towards reforms before 1914 or independence after 1918 was a vital contributory factor to the emergence of denial” (Bloxham, 2005, p. 5).
Moreover, perpetrators’ self-deception and denial of acts committed are genocide
orchestrating factors, the understanding of which is essential for eliciting insights on
forestalling and preventing genocide (Newman & Erber, 2002). There is the recognition
of various governments’ attempts to minimize or cover up genocidal acts with such
governments’ efforts at rationalizing mass killings exposed, in addition to an observation
of the external governments’ compromises and excusing of their deterrence to intervene
to stop or prevent the perpetration of genocide (Totten & Parsons, 2009). Also addressing
denial is the holocaust’s ongoing cultural hegemony against which contending advocates
of other human devastations clamor to present genocide as also applying to their cases,
some of which emanated centrally from European power. It is noted, however, that
whether the events are occurring in urban or distant peripheries—colonial, post, or neo—
the underlying assumption for understanding them, lies in using the same reference
frame, which has its beginnings rooted in Western development’s initial power bases and
that power’s extrusion into the world at large (Levene, 2005a, p. 4).
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It is further argued that the inadequacy of the terms, ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’
in explaining interactions between state and groups that occasion genocide, presents an
erroneous notion of the existence of only two absolute human types worldwide—the
perpetual wrongdoer and the other perpetually at the receiving end, such notions of which
“legitimize and, thus, perpetuate cycles of violence, including genocide” (Levene, 2005,
p. 5). Paradoxically, genocidal perpetrators usually claim to be the victims, while
similarly, where the actual victimized group has the ‘international community’ validate
its victimhood, such validation status can be used to absolve itself or justify its own
heinous acts in generations to come. Thus, Western contemporary culture’s accordance of
celebrity to ‘victimhood,’ and the tendency of valorizing and even making sacred one’s
own memory of genocide or catastrophe, undermines the ability to break away from such
transmissions (Levene, 2005a, p. 6).
Humiliation. Still on genocide causation, it is acknowledged that the notion of
humiliation is a crucial genocidal factor, a phenomenon the fear of which greatly
underlies existential dread (Jones, 2006). It is observed in world affairs, citing Thomas
Friedman, a columnist with The New York Times, that “The single most underappreciated
force in international relations is humiliation” (Jones, 2006, p. 268). This phenomenon
has also been explored at the individual level by others including psychologists. Defined
as “the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or
strips away their pride, honor or dignity” by Evelin Lindner, humiliation is increasingly
acknowledged as a key human behavioral motivating factor, especially violent behavior
(Jones, 2006, p. 268). Furthermore, “humiliated fury” plays a crucial role “in escalating
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conflict between individuals and nations” (Retzinger & Scheff in Lindner as cited in
Jones, 2006, p. 268). In addition:
Humiliation involves feelings of shame and disgrace, as well as helplessness in
the face of abuse at the hands of a stronger party. These are among the most
painful and indelible of human emotions. He who has known extreme shame and
humiliation may forever struggle to recover a sense of agency and self-respect.
(Lifton as cited in Jones, 2006, p, 268)
In a study of US hardened prisoners, psychologist James Gilligan observed that
“the basic psychological motive, or cause, of violent behavior is the wish to ward off or
eliminate the feeling of shame and humiliation – a feeling that is painful and can even be
intolerable and overwhelming – and replace it with its opposite, the feeling of pride”
(Gilligan as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 268). Moreover, humiliation predominantly features
in human’s most extreme expressions of aggression such as war, murder, and genocide,
and serves as a principal motivating force in virtually every genocidal case in history or
contemporary (Horowitz as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 268), for instance, as in the Armenian
genocide, the Young Turkish authorities’ humiliation in Constantinople as a result of the
1909-13 military defeats they sustained in northern Africa and the Balkans, as well as by
the imperial territories’ secessions inclusive of Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia. It is argued
that:
They were humiliated by the presence of a religious and ethnic minority in their
midst (Christian Armenians) that included a prosperous “middleman” sector, and
was supposedly assisting Russian designs on Turkey at a time of imperial
vulnerability (the First World War). (Jones, 2006, p. 268)
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Accordingly, this feeling of humiliation is further extended to current Turkish authorities
and contemporary commentators, were they to acknowledge the Armenian genocide and
proffer apologies. Hence, humiliation is noted as a primary genocide denial underpinning
factor (Jones, 2006).
Moreover, it is argued that the Nazi Germans attained prominence through the
exploitation of national humiliation by transforming it into hatred and vengefulness
against their perceived tormentors. Stunned by the collapse of their army at the western
front in 1918 following four years fighting in WWI, there was a resultant formation of the
extreme right-wing core groups out of the withdrawn, defeated forces astride the Rhine.
Proliferating in early 1920s, one of these groups thrived round Adolf Hitler who had
declarations and writings replete with trepidation on the humiliation of Germany (Lifton
as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 269). The penal Versailles 1919 Treaty imposition, having
been met with humiliation and outrage, further aggravated revanchist and extremist
movements. Thus, seeking a scapegoating outlet for their humiliation, the Nazis
presented the Jews as having treacherously delivered a “stab in the back” of Germany, to
have them prostrated before Bolshevism, Western Allies, and capitalism. As the country
shifted from the 1920s hyperinflation to the end of the decade’s Great Depression,
privation and economic pressures intensified the humiliation feelings, particularly those
of the men, whose “provider” status bounded up their self-image (Jones, 2006, p. 269).
Furthermore, in Belgian colonized Rwanda, Tutsis were indoctrinated as having
descended from the Nile region “civilized” peoples, depicted and in time viewed
themselves as educated, powerful, tall, and attractive, while the Hutus were depicted as
“unrefined bumpkins” and “humiliating antithesis” (Jones, 2006, p. 269). Established
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with the revolution of 1959, the Hutus’ political dominance portended (for the Hutu
masses) a conquering of humiliation on the premise of putting the Tutsis “in their place”
(Jones, 2006, p. 269). However, the Hutu dominance was threatened in 1990 with the
invasion of an exiled Tutsis (from Rwanda) movement. Furthermore, an economic
downturn experienced around the same period meant hundreds of thousands of Hutus
facing humiliating unemployment, again especially affecting the male adults, a vast
number of which were recruited as genocidal agents. Thus, it is observed “That gratuitous
and humiliating cruelties are routinely inflicted upon victims” is understandable “given
the intense humiliation of the génocidaires” (Jones, 2006, p. 269).
Accordingly, humiliation also strongly features in the “genocides by the
oppressed” or subaltern genocide, with virtually every génocidaire considering himself or
herself oppressed by the genocide target, for instance, the “Turks by Armenians,
Germans by Jews, Khmers by Vietnamese” (Jones, 2006, p. 269). It is argued that while
such framings may usually derive from paranoia and myth, in some cases the convictions
may have more objectivity to them, as in the Rwandan Hutus who had experienced
humiliation and social subordination by Tutsis. Similarly, the Kosovo extremists, having
been motivated by the years of Serb suppression and brutalization, launched a campaign
of persecution and plausible genocide against the Serbians in Kosovo (Jones, 2006).
It is further observed that subaltern genocide also manifests in Islamist terrorism,
with its exponents keenly feeling “the humiliation of centuries of conquest and
domination by Western ‘Crusaders’” (Jones, 2006, p. 270). Hence, Osama bin Laden’s
proclamation that “What America is tasting now is only a copy of what we have
tasted…Our Islamic nation has been tasting the same for more than 80 years, of

99
humiliation and disgrace” (Stern quoted by Gilligan as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 270). In
fact, commentators have been amazed that Arabs, who are relatively privileged and even
those exposed directly to and benefiting from Western cosmopolitanism and affluence,
can organize and launch terrorist attacks that could degenerate into genocidal massacre
(Jones, 2006, p. 270). The key to understanding such phenomenon is humiliation, which
is more strongly felt by the privileged and the educated than by the masses (Jones, 2006,
p. 270). Quoting James Scott, it is argued that “The cruelest result of human bondage…is
that it transforms the assertion of personal dignity into a mortal risk,” as well as observed
that revolting against that form of bondage by aiming to subdue humiliation in order to
re-establish self-respect and dignity can involve vicious and genocidal practices (Jones,
2006, p. 270).
Race, Racism, and Crime. Additionally on genocide causation factors, a critical
examination of the controversies and debates on the issues of race, criminal justice, and
crime, focusing on America and Britain, while also taking an international perspective,
identify these factors as underpinning genocide (Webster, 2007). Analyzing the United
States historical lynching legacy case studies, the Nazi state racist crime, and the
Rwandan genocides, a conceptual framework for a better understanding of race, racism,
and crime is recognized. Exploring the historical origins of the association of crime with
racism, it is understood that anxieties and fears concerning crime and race are rooted in
fast-social-change destabilized places. The primary focus is, thus, in understanding the
relationships between and social processes of “‘criminalization’ and ‘racialization’
…which construct and label certain groups and assign them negative attributes such as
‘criminality’ or ‘inferiority’” (Webster, 2007, p. xi). Lone factors such as ethnicity and
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race are capable of significantly explaining the divergent ethnic groups’ patterns of
offending and victimization. Additional insights are drawn from further exploration of
race and the system of criminal justice, particularly the issues and evidences of
differential treatment of visible minorities by the police and the court system, as well as
the crime of a racist state, and genocide primarily—a racist crime that often eludes the
attention of criminologists (Webster, 2007).
Moreover, identifying euthanasia as the beginning of the Nazi genocide—which
derived from the predicament of Jews with handicaps first targeted for murder, it is
argued that these individuals were murdered purely for racial reasons. Hence, “the killers
were motivated by an ideological obsession to create a homogeneous and robust nation
based on race…to purge the handicapped from the national gene pool” (Freidlander,
1995, pp. xi-xii). Thus, drawing from Germany’s increasing eugenics and racist
ideologies, the euthanasia of people with handicaps is identified as providing the ideal for
mass murder, thus, originating the Holocaust (Freidlander, 1995). Furthermore, an
analysis of the African Great Lakes region, focusing on Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo
development with emphasis on Rwandan and Burundian ethno-based conflicts, sporadic
wars, and genocide, presents the conflicts’ negative impacts on the region (Scherrer,
2002). There is recognition of European colonialism and its racism, as well as the
region’s 40-year postcolonial ideology of genocide derived from the colonial history of
German and Belgian’s indirect rule and segregation. Exploring the region’s preindependence history highlights the Rwandan and Burundian colonialism experience,
ethnicization, and state formation processes which transformed the Tutsi and Hutu, who
were initially competing ethnic groups, into irreconcilable opposing castes. Furthermore,
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there is the contemplation of an escalation into another genocidal round in the region,
given the 1994 Rwandan genocide with conceivably one million Tutsis and thousands of
Hutu moderates killed, the Burundian civil war, and genocidal killings since 1993, with
about 200,000 Burundians killed, and the Congolese extremely internationalized war
(Scherrer, 2002).
Types of Genocide. Genocidal orchestrations can be identified with diverse
manifestations, presenting the different typologies of genocide. For instance, Fein
identified genocide typologies comprising four categories, including developmental,
despotic, retributive, and ideological genocides (Hinton, 2002, p. 64). For developmental
genocide, it is observed that the perpetrator harms the victim deliberately with or without
deliberation, due to economic exploitation or colonization. Thus, in this typology of
genocide, intentional as well as unintentional consequences are addressed, contrary to the
United Nations Convention’s focus only on intentional consequences. Additionally, for
despotic genocide, the perpetrator aims to clear from his or her territory, any form of
opposition to his or her reign, whether imagined, potential or real. Also, for retributive
genocide, “the perpetrator responds to a challenge to the structure of domination when
two peoples, nations, ethnic groups, tribes, or religious collectives are locked into an
ethnically stratified order in a plural society” (Fein as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 64). And,
lastly, it is observed that the causes of ideological genocide “are the hegemonic myths
identifying the victims as outside the sanctioned universe of obligation or myths based on
religion [that] exclude the victim from the sanctified universe of salvation and obligation”
(Fein as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 64).
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Additionally, diverse genocidal forms springing from varied roots are observed
among indigenous groups. For instance, seeing genocide as developmental and a war
product, it is noted that the destruction of the Brazilian, Paraguayan, and Peruvian Indians
was done “out of cold calculation of gain, and, in some cases, sadistic pleasure rather
than as the result of a political or economic crisis” (Smith as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 64).
Furthermore, there is a distinction between “domestic genocides,” which arise from a
society’s internal divisions, and genocides occurring in an international warfare context
(Kuper as cited in Hinton, 2002, p. 65).
More so, it is recognized that genocidal typologies evolve through different
phases or stages of genocide. In examining the Nazi program, for instance, there is an
understanding of its evolution from secret extermination of persons with disabilities and
handicaps to systematical destruction of Gypsies and Jews. The Nazi genocide’s
development is trailed with the regime primarily excluding from the general community,
the targeted groups’ members, through escalating persistent persecution, imbibing more
intense exclusionary policies of forced handicapped people’s sterilization, gypsies’
incarceration, and mandatory emigration of Jews. Ultimately, the regime adopted and
implemented a mass murder program for the eradication of the three target groups
(Friedlander, 1995). Additionally, insights can be drawn from the forms of genocidal
violence, which create the plausibility of genocide always occurring given the
multiplicity of symbolic type violence which occurs even in presumably non-genocidal
countries such as the United States. Genocide is also recognized as existing along the
lines not only of everyday type violence, but also as imperceptible genocides as in the
systematic murdering of street-children by the Brazilian police in attempt at street “clean-
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up” (Hinton, 2002). A further distinction is made in genocidal typology between total
cum “genocide in whole,” and partial cum “genocide in part.” For instance, it is observed
that “the Rwandan genocide was a total domestic genocide, what the United Nations
would call a “genocide in whole” over against a “genocide in part,” and as such it was the
African version of the Holocaust” (Scherrer, 2002, p. xi).
Examples of Genocide. A multiplicity of genocidal examples litters and
permeates history up to contemporary times. For instance, many people groups are
identified when examining the psychological patterns of the atrocities committed in
genocides, which in the twentieth century have tragically claimed lives totaling above
262 million, involving Armenians, Jews, Cambodians, Kosovons, Rwandans, and
Darfurians, and many others (Baum, 2008). Further exploring genocide cases of the
twentieth century, there is a recognition of historical genocide cases of the Armenians,
the Holocaust, Stalin’s victims, and that of imperial Japan, as well as more recent
genocidal cases and mass murders in Ethiopia, East Timor, Cambodia, former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Guatemala (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003). Also, identifying
archeology’s role in providing historical material foundation for the creation of the
Nationalist Socialist Party’s notion of a pure German race, as well as anthropologists’
involvement in the Jews and others exterminatory campaigns during the Third Reich, the
Holocaust is additionally acknowledged among others (Hinton, 2002).
One of the critical outcomes of modernity’s turning point is the Vendee
destruction during the French Revolution, with the ‘rise of the West’ destabilizing effects
on such older empires as the Ottoman, Russian, Chinese, and Austrian, having extensive
devastating impacts on such people groups as the East European Jews and the Armenians
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(Levene, 2005b). It is observed that genocide and massive exterminatory deeds
perpetrated against indigenous peoples by these four empires in consequence of the half
century’s hegemonic pressures led up to the 1914 general global catastrophe (Levene,
2005b). Furthermore, with the pathological homogenization factors of expulsion, forced
assimilation, and genocide as are practiced in the process of state-building, and with such
practices understood as predating the nationalism era, genocidal cases spanning prenationalist as well as nationalist era have been identified, including the fifteenth century
Spanish expulsion of the Jews and the Huguenots persecution, both under Louis XIV, and
in the twentieth century, the genocide of the Armenians and former Yugoslavia’s ethnic
cleansing (Rae, 2002). It is argued that such atrocities impelled the development of
international norms to define the states’ legitimate behavior with sovereignty increasingly
streamlined as conditional (Rae, 2002). While also examining the factors that can deter
pathological homogenization processes in state-building, the genocidal cases of
Macedonia and the Czech Republic are recognized (Rae, 2002).
Moreover, the 1780-1782 Upper Peru region’s (of South America) great rebellion
is identified in the context of genocide and millennialism, with insights proffered in
understanding the rebellion, its paradoxes, heterogeneity, and avoidance of any singular
perspective (Robins, 2002). It is argued that while most genocidal cases with the native
peoples have mainly focused on genocide by colonizers, there have been instances in this
region where the perpetrators were Indians and the targets were Spaniards. In fact, the
discourse focusing on the Indians as victims of varying genocidal forms which evolved
over time has obscured “the fact that the native peoples experienced genocide not only as
victims, but also as perpetrators” (Robins, 2002, p. 1). However, the rebellion countered
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such generally held genocidal notions of victims’ lack of weaponry and organization in
confronting their enemies, as the Indian revolutionaries in the rebellion faced the loyalist
army that were more organized and better armed. Furthermore, it is observed that while
leadership structure that is centralized usually characterizes genocidal policies, the
insurgence’s leadership was basically confederate in nature and highly fragmented
(Robins, 2002). Also it is further noted that the rebellion’s further unusual characteristic
of the genocide victims similarly becoming the victors, with the natives—the Indians,
Mestizos, Creoles, and the Spaniards—recognizing explicitly its genocidal nature.
However, it is observed that:
As with almost all genocidal movements, this one was not free of coercion and
internal divisions, and as such was riddled by internal contradictions. Not all
rebels supported the genocidal cause…Other rebels, while supportive of the goal
of eliminating nonIndian culture from the region, were reluctant to embrace
genocide. It was at the field level where the genocidal tendencies and conscription
were strongest, and those who refused to join or to follow orders were subject to
summary execution. In other instances, the rebel leaders tried to deceive people
into participating, presenting their goals and actions as the implementation of
Spanish royal orders. (Robins, 2002, pp. 3-4)
Alternative Methodological Approaches in Genocide Studies. Various
methodological approaches are used by scholars in genocidal studies. For instance,
Dutton (2007) uses the methodology of ethology involving mimicking the animal
behavior naturalistic studies citing Tinbergen, and argues for obtaining “an ethology of
human aggression…from descriptions of violence by perpetrators and eyewitnesses” (p.
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xi). He provides some descriptions in his review of massacres in several countries
including Nanking, Viet Nam, El Salvador, and Rwanda. Another approach used involves
exploring such underlying themes of modernity, ideology, and genocide’s relationship
with the body politic; drawing conclusions across case studies; and presenting a
multidisciplinary approach to understanding current human atrocities (Gellately &
Kiernan, 2003). While also noting that genocide is not a predated twentieth century
notion but a contemporary phenomenon and an inherent human nature product, a
functionalist approach is adopted to examine the preceding and accompanying mass
murder decision-making processes underlying the directives to kill, thus, providing
insights that are not revealed by the conventional top-down, leadership directives focused
approach (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003). There is also an examining of genocide at the
victim level going beyond the state decision-making formal dynamics on the premise of
espousing full understanding of genocide by taking cognizance of survivors’ accounts,
thus, proffering new avenues for understanding and investigation of genocidal policies.
By adopting this approach, such new genocidal forms as rape, which eluded the legalistic
1948 genocide definition, become evident, and hence, deserving of present efforts at
prosecution (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003).
Furthermore, it is recognized that an ad hoc explanation of the Post-Holocaust
sequential, relatively independent aspects that traces the origins of connections to facts of
the genocide and exploring their consequences, will enable a challenge of the Holocaust’s
basic historiographical, theological, philosophical, and moral implications. Underlying
the study’s approach is the understanding of the provocativeness of speaking about the
Holocaust’s interpretations based on the enormity of the event’s systematic genocide,
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given that “the facts speak for themselves…leaving nothing over to interpret, nothing to
ponder or contest,” (Lang, 2005, p. xi). Thus, the dilemma and tension of the term’s
evoked evil and sadism sustain its recasting by scholars and survivors in new and
differing ways that reconfigure its events and impacts (Lang, 2005). It is, therefore,
observed that Post-Holocaust reflection analysis, which is focused in different directions,
is categorized under the four rubrics of “the Archival, Explanatory, Testimonial, and
Representational modes” comprising sets of different reflecting emphasis (Lang, 2005, p.
xii). The “Archival works” aim at recording, recovering, or reconstructing physical or
empirical evidences of plans, actions, and conditions directed at or initiated by anyone
involved during the Holocaust, reflecting teleological concerns for understanding the how
and why certain outcomes occurred historically in sequence; the “Explanatory design”
addresses issues of the relationship between the corporate “mentality” and individual
“decision making” or the causes and reasons; the “Testimonial” involves expressive
forms that extend from monumental or memorials—whether individual, group, or
national—to the testimony; and the “Representational” deals with the descriptive art
works of the Holocaust emphasizing its inception, as well as its reception (Lang, 2005,
pp. xii-xv).
Further proffering a focused examination of genocide contemporarily in a world
history contextual framework, while also broaching genocidal studies’ abstraction issues,
the study addresses genocide definition related core problems, and offers conceptual
understanding of perpetrators and victims within world historical background (Levene,
2005a). This involves examining the patterns and processes linking up earlier modern
century’s genocide up to the present, inclusive of colonial exterminations of the sixteenth
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through the nineteenth centuries, and the more current genocidal eruptions of the
twentieth century (Levene, 2005a). By presenting individual genocides as “part of a
whole” rather than in isolation, connecting threads and comparative grounds are
identified for the genocides (Levene, 2005a, p. 4). The study, in essence, proffers an
understanding of genocide in the modern world, with an analysis of genocide’s meaning
within a broad based world historical context. Following up on this is another study
setting out genocide’s conceptual issues, addressing its fundamental definitional
problems, and proffering an understanding of victims’ and perpetrators’ meaning frames,
as well as placing such meaning frames contextually in world history (Levene, 2005b).
Furthermore, analyzing collective evildoing dynamics, generally, a combination
of Hannah Arendt’s philosophical approach, C. Fred Alford’s psychological approach,
and Zygmunt Bauman’s sociological approach is drawn upon (Arendt; Alford; and
Bauman as cited in Vetlesen, 2005, p. 7). Adopting this hybrid approach, which is
employed in examining the former Yugoslavian ethnic cleansing and the Holocaust, is
theoretically aimed at a “synthesis between functionalist and intentionalist approaches to
collective evil” (Vetlesen, 2005, p. 2). There is an understanding of the closeness of
interactions between victims, perpetrators, and bystanders, as well as the manner of
recognizing, denying, and projecting of human agency aspects by other agents (Vetlesen,
2005). Additionally, an approach of historical comparative case study is adopted, with an
analytical framework that highlights the numerous genocidal underlying factors such as
lack of education, past social traumas, deep-seated poverty, common historical
grievances, economic or political dislocation, colonization, or war (Gellately & Kiernan,
2003). Of paramount importance is the human-agency factor which primarily translates
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such identified underlying conditions into genocidal episodes, derivative of
regimes/political sects, extremist leaders, and criminalist decisions. The analysis offers
insights on myriad genocide causal factors, and also proffers challenges for further
genocidal investigations and averting future genocides (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003). Also
proffering insights on the Holocaust and genocide, it is further noted that social
psychological approaches are employed for understanding mass killing episodes with
such factors as the genocidal inclined personality, and the adaptation to aggression
through violent behavior engagement, identified as genocide causation factors (Newman
& Erber, 2002).
It is further recognized that employing a geographical perspective for analyzing
genocide and its effects provides a vantage point (Wood, 2001). Over the past century,
political geographers have become involved with issues of cultural homelands, ethnic
distribution, natural resource based conflicts, subnational and international political
boundaries, and competing state ‘organisms’ geopolitical struggles, all of which are
pertinent for contextually understanding civil war occurrences (Bowman as cited in
Wood, 2001, p. 57). There is a proposition for the mapping of genocidal patterns across
the areas affected, involving the specific neighborhoods and villages that are targets of
destruction, sites of massacres, particular cultural landmark destruction or defilement,
and mandatory displacements from definite areas (Wood, 2001).
Genocide Prevention and Intervention. An examination of genocide prevention
and intervention measures calls for an understanding of the Genocide Treaty’s primary
provisions, which is a continuing area of disagreement and debate (Schabas, 2000). With
genocide remaining the international efforts’ spur for human rights prevention and
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punishment, the need for a careful crafting of prospective prosecutions into the
Convention is recognized (Schabas, 2000). Thus, tracing the 1948 Genocide Prevention
and Punishment Convention’s drafting and development, in analyzing contemporary
genocides’ international tribunals and the United Nations responses using definitive
portions of the Convention, Schabas (2000) examines the treaty reforms and revisions.
With recognition of the treaty interpretation norms and foreign policy’s interrelationship
with international law, and with the incorporation of a genocide legal literature
bibliography, there is an understanding of the different Genocide Convention
implementation approaches limiting the treaty’s impact. Examples of such limitations
include several states ’omission from genocide definition and various groups’ emergent
crimes, acts, or incitement (Schabas, 2000). Hence, Schabbas recognizes that:
‘The fact of genocide is as old as humanity’. The law, however, is considerably
younger. This dialectic of the ancient fact yet the modern law of genocide follows
from the observation that, historically, genocide has gone unpunished. Hitler's
famous comment, ‘who remembers the Armenians?’, is often cited in this regard.
Yet the Nazis were only among the most recent to rely confidently on the
reasonable presumption that an international culture of impunity would
effectively shelter the most heinous perpetrators of crimes against humanity.
The explanation for this is straightforward: genocide was generally,
although perhaps not exclusively, committed under the direction or, at the very
least, with the benign complicity of the State where it took place. Usually, the
crime was executed as a quite overt facet of State policy, particularly within the
context of war or colonial conquest. Obviously, therefore, domestic prosecution
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was virtually unthinkable, even where the perpetrators did not in a technical sense
benefit from some manner of legal immunity. Only in rare cases where the
genocidal regime collapsed in its criminal frenzy, as in Germany or Rwanda,
could accountability be considered. (2000, p. 1)
It is therefore, observed that the obligation of the international community for
genocide prevention and punishment has contradictorily resulted in the unwillingness of
the Western authorities to invoke the term. This is due to the fact that genocide
recognition presupposes a tenacity of underlying forces that are primordial, and which
negate tenets of universal human rights and democratic principles, while also lending
enormous emotive power to the genocide concept by its close linkage with the Nazi
Holocaust (Schabas, 2000). Through the examination of the Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnic
conflict dynamics and the international involvement dilemmas surrounding it, for
instance, there is the recognition of the war causes and its conduct, and the reasons
behind the failure of the international efforts to resolve the Bosnian conflict for over three
years, as well as why success was finally achieved in late 1995 (Burg & Shoup, 1999).
The 1995 produced Dayton accord with an expectation of its implementation experience
after two years occasioning long-term peace for Bosnia was also reviewed. There is an
observation of the warring Bosnian Muslim, the Croatian, and the Serbian communities’
goal incompatibility, their disinclination to negotiate in good stead, and the international
community’s reluctance to indefinitely enforce negotiated settlement, or to incur the cost
of ending the fight, hence, presenting the dilemmas of intervention (Burg & Shoup,
1999).
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In proffering a detailed analysis of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, there is an
insightful understanding of the ethnic conflict dynamics, which also sheds light on the
developing of strategies for managing, as well as preventing, ethnic conflicts from
disrupting international peace (Burg & Shoup, 1999). Specifically examined are the
actions of the crisis’ major participants including the international community, as well as
the actors in former Yugoslavia, with the study’s first part tracing the conflict origins, the
war years’ major developments including the media role, ethnic cleansing, and genocide,
and the second part providing a detailed analytical description of the international
community’s efforts to resolve the conflict based on the war account background (Burg
& Shoup, 1999).
Further on preventing genocide, in the twentieth century there were no external
party interventions found in nine genocides until the violence exacerbated itself (Dutton,
2007). Such behaviors of willfully ignoring and remaining disconnected from the
occurrences and the obligations to intervene under the international law are recognized as
political decisions (Dutton, 2007). Exploring ways that policymakers, scholars, the
media, and others can contribute towards preventing genocide, the difficulties of
preventing genocide are identified along with a genocide prevention guide proffered for
policymakers, scholars, and others (Heidenrich, 2001). Limitations of imposing trade
sanctions are additionally recognized which usually take upwards of two years to become
effective, and in some cases may only become effective after a decade, with limitations
also on military interventions, covert actions, and the issue of using multinational forces.
The need is also recognized for the United Nations’ mobilization of its own military

113
force, independent of members’ force contributions, to serve as an international volunteer
for emergent peacekeeping situations (Heidenrich, 2001).
Moreover, it is recognized that the relationships between the United Nations (UN)
Security Council, the Secretariat, and the superpowers, are essential in the understanding
of the United Nations in the modern genocide age (Lebor, 2006). It is also observed that
the “symbiotic entwining” of the Security Council’s relationship with the Secretariat,
“has helped shape the United Nations’ failures in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur” (Lebor,
2006, p. 7). More so, there is an understanding of the insider details of the behind-thescenes negotiations and diplomacy which resulted in the Council’s 1993 resolutions
defining the safe areas and the UN’s response limits to attacking them. Observed, for
instance, are the tensions within the Secretariat’s different departments particularly
between the Zagreb based UNPROFOR and the Peacekeeping Operations Department
(DPKO) in New York which prevented a forceful intervention for the Bosnian genocide,
thus providing fresh views and insights on the UN’s inner workings (Lebor, 2006, p. 8).
While also detailing the Srebrenica catastrophe’s causes and consequences, to draw on its
contemporary resonance, a template details is proffered to help understand why the
Darfur genocide has not been stopped by the United Nations. Thus, it is argued that “the
same feeble response mechanisms, inertia, bureaucratic infighting within the Secretariat,
and crucial lack of political will by the Security Council to stop the killing remain
entrenched” (Lebor, 2006, p.8). Additionally, there are further insights and lessons
learned on plausible courses of actions to take for preventing genocide (Lebor, 2006).
Still on the possibility of protection against genocide, the problems involved in
trying to safeguard against genocide are recognized, such as identified in the military and
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diplomatic efforts at achieving a humane and just solution to the crisis in Kosovo
(Reimer, 2000). Observed as hideously persisting and continuing, the problems highlight
the international community’s tragic failure in developing a powerful response to
genocide’s tenacious evil after the Holocaust. While the international community passed
the UN’s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide after
the World War II in 1948, atrocious genocides have continued to occur in Bosnia,
Cambodia, Rwanda, as well as in other parts of the world. The challenge is presently
clear for the international community today, after more than fifty years of adopting the
UN anti-genocide treaty, with the crafting of an effective and judicious response still
needed (Reimer, 2000). In response to the challenge of addressing the central question,
“Can a Global Human Rights Regime to protect against genocide be put into place - or is
this an impossible mission?” four strategic needs are outlined for carrying out such a vital
and particularly difficult mission (Reimer, 2000, p. ix). These strategies include the
strengthening of actors and institutions of a “Global Human Rights Regime”; articulating
of a practical prevention philosophy that is cogent; crafting of prudently targeted
sanctions; and developing of a “just humanitarian intervention” theory and practice that is
judicious (Reimer, 2000, p. ix). Further exploring key follow-up questions relating to
actors, institutions, policies, principles, problems, and practices of the Global Human
Rights Regime, there is recognition of solving the world order problem of genocide by
institutions and norms, as well as the existence of tension between mustering the political
will for eliminating genocide and transcending the enormous obstacles of genocide
prevention (Reimer, 2000).
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Also, through the analysis of both the Burundian and Congolese developments
there is an understanding of the conflicts’ intricate roots and seemingly interminable
sequences of violence, as well as how to contain and transform such conflicts by
employing local cultural mechanisms of dispute resolution systems particularly the
“gachacha and abashingantah” (Scherrer, 2002, p. xiii).

Additionally identified as

dispute resolution mechanisms is the international community’s role on human rights
pursuits, disaster relief, development aid, and peace restoration in order to break the
tragic violence cycle (Scherrer, 2002). While outlining strategies for genocide prevention
and intervention for averting future genocidal occurrences, the need is also identified “to
inform, educate, cajole, prod, and encourage people to break out of their mold of silence,
to collectively reach out to the victims and the voiceless, and to demand that such
atrocities be halted” (Totten & Parsons, 2009, p. 2). For instance, there is an
understanding of politically contrived memory manipulation being fundamental in the
unleashing of primal genocidal passions, based on its framing of people’s willingness to
kill others through history and its resultant recurrences of massive human violence.
Hence, understanding the ways cultural memory becomes created enables an
understanding of the causes and ways mass murder episodes occur, as well as fosters
preventative efforts against their occurrences (Hirsch, 1995).
Furthermore, employing the international community’s actions and inactions in
the Bosnian and Rwandan genocidal there is a demonstration of such bystander covert
responsibility, with an observation of the purported posture of politicians, the military,
and major Western diplomats to the issues of balance and neutrality rather than proffering
their authoritative explicit intervention (Vetlesen, 2005). However, the 1994 Rwandan

116
genocide analysis to explore whether the genocide could have been prevented through a
rapid military intervention with minimal human and financial outlay to the interveners,
had adequate political will been mustered by the international community, is observed as
dispelling the conventional notion that the Rwandan genocide and plausibly others could
have been averted by a small contingent of about 5000 troops (Kuperman, 2001, p. 2).
Enunciating impeding obstacles that would necessarily have been overcome to forestall
the genocide which occurred in such limited timeframe within weeks, there is an
outlining of such impeding factors of historical background, as well as cultural and
geographical settings (Kuperman, 2001). Thus, it is argued that it would have been
virtually impossible both logistically, as well as militarily, to stop the genocide based on
the notion of effective intervention involving the airlifting of troops from the U.S. as this
would have been constrained by time. Discountenancing this on a personal level,
however, the international community’s failure to intervene to stop the Rwandan
genocide is a dearth of political will and apathy, since any other readily available military
contingent could have been deployed, even as an addition to the UNAMIR peacekeeping
force of 2500 and other Belgian and French troops in Rwanda at the time, as observed by
Kuperman (2001, p. 40).
Theoretical Framework
The ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria derives from a variation of socio-political,
socio-economic, as well as cultural and religious factors. In particular, the conflict’s
inherent phenomena of massacres and wanton killings are complex features involving
multiple causes, and therefore, also require multiple theoretical approaches to explicate
the different facets of the conflict. In this section several theories are accordingly
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examined to proffer an understanding in the plausible interpretation of the many varied
dimensions of the conflict. It is noteworthy, however, that while these theories are
discussed singularly as alternate theories, they are essentially complementary, and given
the conflict’s indistinctiveness from its larger contextual framework, the theories
basically provide some insights into the study’s assumptions on the conflict parties’
behavior and actions as are linked to the conflict. The study’s research question is thus,
consequentially grounded from this theoretical construct.
Social Cubism Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious
Conflict. The ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria can be examined using the
social cubism lens. Social cubism is an analytical framework conceptually designed from
a cube’s image of six sides developed by Byrne and Carter (1996), and adopts a holistic
method of examining social conflict using a six-dimensional model of interrelated
historical, religious, demographical, political, economic, and psycho-cultural factors.
These six components of social cubism are seen as working in tandem for a better
understanding of the causal factors or social conditions undergirding the conflict. By
adopting the social cubism approach in the explication of ethno-territorial conflict, Byrne
and Carter (1996) present that an adequate consideration of the combination of all six
elements provides an illuminating image that sheds light on emergent societal or intergroup behavior. Hence, the theory captures the multidimensional complexity of any
particular social conflict.
The social cubism model can, therefore, adequately explain the northern Nigeria
ethno-religious conflict given the multi-dimensional framing of the conflict. And, by
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using the six elements of social cubism to analyze the conflict, its multi-dimensional
composition can be seen.
Historical Factors. Social cubism’s historical perspective draws on past
happenings, traditions, or precedencies that were set in the past. Historically, the northern
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict can be traced from the country’s colonial past and history
of ethnic hostilities. The formation of Nigeria like most other African nation-states
started with the superimposition of diverse nationalities with the coercive machinery of
the state (MacFarlane, 1984). There was no gradual politicization of a nationality to
achieve political autonomy and subsequently transform into a nation-state; rather, Nigeria
and such other African states were created haphazardly by European imperial powers,
and as a result, pre-existing independent ethno-political societies were forcibly
amalgamated into one state (MacFarlane, 1984). In essence, colonization brought
together different ethnic groups inclusive of three majority groups—the Hausas, Ibos and
Yoruba—under one nation state, resulting in Nigeria’s characterization by a high degree
of ethnic divergence, presently with over 250 ethnic groups (Central Intelligence Agency,
2012). The merging of these different ethnic groups into one national government has
continued to frustrate the attempt at creating new political loyalties, as the country’s
political structure is deeply grounded in ethnic and regional loyalty and makes for
unstable governance which, in turn, impacts the ethno-religious conflict in the North.
Hence, the prevalence of conflicts in northern Nigeria can be linked to ethnicity factors
and colonialism’s amalgamating of various ethnic groups leading to Nigeria’s high
ethnocentric politics as undergirding the waves of killings in northern Nigeria (Anthony,
2002; Osaghae, 1998a).
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Furthermore, colonialism brought fundamental changes in Nigeria, primarily in
castigating and de-legitimating of traditional religions, which were from then on referred
to as 'paganism,' and the rapid implanting of Christianity (Ibrahim, 1991). This
transformative process was so rapid that within a few decades, pagan practitioners’
census figures showed a sharp decline from 50% in 1931 to 34% in 1952, and 18.2% in
1963. In contrast, over this same period the census data showed an increase from 44% to
47% for registered Muslims, and a corresponding increase from 6.25 to 34.6% for
Christians (Ibrahim, 1991, p. 116). The colonial authorities were said to put in place a
system that aimed to virtually remove all ‘pagans’ and all ‘sects’ that had forms of ‘nonorthodoxy,’ as these connoted ‘resistance to existing political authority,’ a campaign
which has remained unabated since independence (Ibrahim, 1991, p. 116). And the
justification for imposing Christian and Muslim orthodoxy derives from the strategy to
promote unity in Nigeria, based on the notion of their shared philosophical and
Abrahamic origins. However, the unity and peaceful national co-existence expected to
emerge from the institutionalized religious orthodoxy has yet to materialize, as there is an
evolution of conflict and political tension between the proponents of the two rival
universal religions of Christianity and Islam in Nigeria. There is the tendency of both
religions to delay national integration due to their negative inclinations to generate
competing social orders (Ibrahim, 1991).
Additionally, Kukah and Falola (1996) in tracing the history of Islam’s emergence
in Nigeria, “as a political force,” acknowledge that “the use of Islam to initiate a largescale jihad in the North during the 19th century provided a successful case for the
establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria,” and argue that “the legacy of this continues
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to the present day” (pp. 2-3). It is, thus, recognized that as Islam penetrated the North in
the 11th century, linking the region with North Africa, Western Sudan, and the Middle
East, the social revolution produced by Uthman dan Fodio’s jihad caused the creation of
an Islamic state in the Northern region (Kukah & Falola, 1996). Adebayo observes, for
instance, that:
Boko Haram though a loose albeit a highly effective network of terror is driven
and sustained by a fascist and racist ideology of domination. That is the fact. The
quest of the power establishment in the North led mainly by the Fulanis to always
dominate other Nigerians following the vision of Ahmadu Bello, who considered
the country an "Estate" bequeathed by his grandfather Othman dan Fodio to
Fulanis, is the source of our inability to build a united, democratic and modern
nation since 1960. (2012, para. 17)
Religious Factors. Religion refers to a people group’s article of faith in relation
with both the supernatural as linked to both the physical and the metaphysical world.
Religion helps to preserve and maintain a people’s way of life. On the religious
dimension, there are two major powerful religions in Nigeria, the Islamic religion and
Christianity, but also with some traditionalists following, and while Islam predominates
most of the northern region crossing linguistic and ethnic boundaries as its dominant
religion, Christianity predominates across most of the south, including the Ibos of the east
and the Yorubas of the west, many of whom view Islam as threatening to secular
government (Noble, 1992c, para. 16). Each of the two religions is, thus, trying to assert
its meaning frame, and while one of the religions, Islam, is a political religion that does
not divorce religion from the state, the other religion, Christianity, a non-political
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religion, separates religion from the state. And, tracing both religions’ different
dispositions to violence, for instance, Kukah and Falola observe that:
while Islam’s early propagation by prophet Muhammad and his initial followers
met with violence, they quickly adopted violence in self-defense waged as jihad
which has become institutionalized in Islam. By contrast the propagation of
Christianity as preached by Jesus Christ is to be by love and persuasion rather
than the sword. However, the quest for political and economic power among those
who became Christians in history blurred this injunction for peaceful propagation
as the Crusades showed. (1996, p. 195)
Furthermore, it is recognized that religion appeals to millions as an avenue for
mobilizing sentiments in choosing their role models and mentors from its rank amidst a
public that is alienated from the state, as well as for developing an enduring future hope.
More so, religion is leaned upon by the elite for engaging in political competition on both
intra and inter-regional basis, and for the northern ambitious elites, Islam serves as a
political tool, as the level of corruption notwithstanding, a politician would always “claim
the fear of God as a principle of existence” (Kukah & Falola, 1996, p. 2). Thus, Nigeria
has had an inundation of religious crisis and conflicts which are often orchestrated by the
assertiveness and militancy of the extremist Islamists in the country (Kukah & Falola,
1996). More so, the activities of some Muslim groups, particularly in the northern parts
of Nigeria aimed at Islamizing the country, are the cause of the ongoing violence
(Haberson & Rothschild, 1991). Hence, the recognition of Islam’s revolutionary force, its
tendency to shape national as well as international politics, (Mazrui; Currey; Rubin; and
Pipes as cited in Kukah & Falola, 1996) and its aim to create an Islamic state in Nigeria,
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“is the ultimate evidence of the place of religion in politics” (Kukah & Falola, 1996, p.
2).
Thus, in the final analysis, the effects of this religious politicking are clashes
between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, with religion frequently becoming fertile
eruption grounds for political conflicts through manipulation and intrigues of the
Nigerian Muslim politicians, with the resultant effect being that the country has, since
independence, been in a tug of war concerning its leadership. Religion is an instrumental
factor, with Muslims vying to have a Muslim leader and Christians, in the same vein, also
vying for a Christian leader. On this perennial power tussle in the country’s presidential
race, it is observed, for example, that:
The intense debate following the death of President Yar’Adua in May 2010 over
the informal “zoning” arrangement, wherein presidential power is swapped
between north and south, shows that ethno-regional politics is alive and well at
the national level. The far north is thus still a single unit in the country’s power
politics. (ICG, 2010, p. 9)
Thus, each religious group desires to be in control, with the exploitation of
religious differences further entrenching the ethnic divide, and greatly intensifying
political instability in Nigeria (Haberson & Rothschild, 1991). Hence, religious factors
and its politicization have been identified among the myriad of causal factors
exacerbating the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict (Ibrahim, 1989, 1991;
Osaghae, 1998a; Suberu, 2009; Williams, 2011).
Demographic Factors. Demographics refer to the number and composition of a
population in a given place, as well as such factors as birthrate, gender, age, etc., which
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affect it. With its north-south dichotomy, Nigeria is unevenly divided into a mainly
Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south, with the Middle Belt or central region
which has a near balance of Christians and Muslims, straddling the nation. Each of these
regions also has some minority traditionalists (ICG, 2010, p. 1). Northern Nigeria
comprise the twelve states of Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina,
Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara which adopted the Sharia law from 1999-2002
(see Map VI in Appendix A showing the Sharia adopted states in northern Nigeria), as
well as the other seven non-sharia adopted states of Adamawa, Benue, Kogi, Kwara,
Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba in which there is a large Christian following. Hence,
northern Nigeria as presently constituted, covering all 19 states in the north (see Map III
in Appendix A) spanning the far north key conflict zones of Maiduguri, Bauchi, Kano,
and Yobe, as well as the perennial Middle Belt conflict zones of Jos, Kaduna with
minority ethnic groupings, and a large Christian following. Hence, demographically,
northern Nigeria has a large Muslim majority with a substantial Christian minority who
are either northern indigenes or migrants from the south. To the south are the majority
ethnic groups of the Yoruba, to the West are minority ethnic groups who are a near equal
mix of Christians and Muslims, and to the East are the Ibos, the Ibibios, Efik, and other
minority ethnic groups who are mostly Christianized with minority traditionalists
(Osaghae, 1998a).
It is recognized, however, that ethnicity often does not exist in its pure form, but
rather in combination

with religion, regionalism, class, race, or “other conflict-

generating cleavages” in ways that are mutually reinforcing, as a result of which
managing ethnicity problems have tended to be somewhat complex (Osaghae, 1998a, p.
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3). Furthermore, Osaghae (1998a) observes that, “Ethnic minorities are usually defined in
contradistinction to major groups with whom they coexist in political systems, as groups
which experience systemic discrimination and domination because of numerical
inferiority and a host of historical and sociological factors,” with hegemonic and
dominant minority groups as Nigeria’s Fulani ethnic group, however, excluded from such
minority grouping (p. 3). Thus, minorities in Nigeria are classified relative to the three
major ethnic groups—the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo. However, while southern
minorities in the south are basically ethno-linguistic in form, northern minorities are
additionally and primarily religious minorities, and this presents a more complex ethnic
setting than the south (Osaghae, 1998a).
Similarly, in the north, three levels of minorities are additionally distinguished,
each of which has its political implications as Osaghae delineates:
At the broadest level, the corporatist, cross-ethnic bond of Islam which is built
around the Fulani Sultan of Sokoto who, as Commander of the Faithful, is the
head of the Muslim community, has made predominantly Muslim minorities ...
and Muslims from other minority groups politically powerful, having access to
political privileges at all levels as protégés of the Hausa/Fulani.
At the next level is the dichotomy between the Sokoto (Hausa/ Fulani)
‘axis’ and the Borno (Kanuri) ‘axis’ which is built around the pristine KanemBornu empire-state (and its vassals), and which was and remains a contending
center of Islamic civilization and influence. Relations between the Kanuris, who
are a political minority and the Sokoto axis have been a mix of separatism...,
accommodation ..., and struggles for supremacy.
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At the third level are the non-Muslim minority groups which have since
the jihad fought and resisted Fulani overlordship and islamisation. These groups
are mainly located in the middle-belt, southern Zaria, and Adamawa provinces
which were open to Christian and other Westernising influences at a time the
Muslim areas were quarantined. (1998a, p. 8)
Consequently, the implication of this development is that Christian groups such as
the Zurus of Sokoto in states like Bauchi that are predominantly Hausa/Fulani Muslims,
have become political minorities, with Christianity serving as a primary ‘minority
diacritic’ in such states. Furthermore, in attempt to mobilize northern unity against the
south through the bonds of Islam, Christianity has become a counter-mobilization
ideology for the Hausa/Fulani elites in the region, but also a rallying point for opponents
of their domination (Osaghae, 1998a). Thus, these northern minorities have frontally
opposed Sharia’s introduction at the federal court of appeal in the 1970s/1990s
constitution-making bodies, articulating their interests through the Christian Association
of Nigeria (CAN) as their main channel. In consequence, most Hausa/Fulani, minorityinvolved conflicts in the 1980s/1990s in such areas as Bauchi, Zaria, Kafanchan, ZangonKataf, and Funtua were primarily religious conflicts. These minority groups, though
small and isolated, have continuously demanded freedom from Muslim emirates, for
increased autonomy and own local government, and for a customary court of appeal for
non-Muslims to complement the operative Sharia court of appeal (Osaghae, 1998a).
Additionally, there is the issue of land distribution in Nigeria with the north being
arid and more desert-like (the farther north one goes from the south), while the south is
grassland and swampy with mangrove forests around the coastal regions, and with the
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country’s vast oil deposits found mainly in the southern parts, primarily, in the delta
region. The Muslims want to control the petroleum which is in the south where the
Christians are. The northern extremist Muslims are destroying the churches, killing the
Christians in the north, and encroaching southwards on the Christians as a gradual way of
gaining control and taking over power in the country. Ultimately, the idea is to turn
Nigeria into an Islamic nation (Haberson & Rothchild, 1991; Kukah & Falola, 1996).
Political Factors. Politically, the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict can
also be explained with political factors entailing processes of control, collective decisionmaking which are not indicative of the individual will, and authoritative resource
allocation. There are two very powerful political units in Nigeria, the Muslims and
Christians, each struggling for hegemony with conflicts between the two units
exacerbating the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria. The experience being
played out between these two powerful units is the manipulation of political differences
in regional and national politics with manifest instability and political upheavals in the
region. Thus, the prevalence of conflicts in northern Nigeria has been linked to political
factors and unbridled power tussle as part of the myriad of factors undergirding the
conflict (Ukiwo, 2003). Furthermore, according to Haberson and Rothchild (1991), an
attempted Christian coup against the Northern Muslim leadership foiled in 1990 is said to
have given rise to fears of the imposition of Islam in Africa and accentuated the
differences between countries with Muslim and Christian majorities in Africa. Politically,
the spread of Islam has been through jihadist conquests, and as past warriors, extremist
Muslims want to continue in that rein of warfare, with Islamic assertiveness seen to have
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further exacerbated conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Africa, and Nigeria in
particular (Haberson & Rothchild, 1991).
More so, Kukah and Falola (1996) identify the political impact of Islam in
Nigeria, primarily the Islam predominated northern Nigeria with its vast Muslim
population, the basis on which the Muslim world perceives Nigeria as a key member.
Islam’s politicization impact is even further compounded by its ideological stance of nonseparation of religion from politics, a system which is prevalent and deeply entrenched in
the north, as distinct from the Muslims of Western Nigeria who peacefully coexist with
Christians. Thus, given Islam’s intricate positioning in the nation’s political sphere,
Kukah and Falola argue that:
Islam is both a religion and a political force in modern Nigeria. Like Christianity,
it aims to win more converts. The motive of the Islamic intelligentsia is, however,
more ambitious than just number-counting: in the surface, a tiny but powerful
Islamic elite wants to turn Nigeria into an Islamic country. (1996, p. 2)
Hence, this Islamization stance of political Islam and some of its adherents continues to
significantly undergird and exacerbate the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict
(Kukah & Falola, 1996).
Economic Factors. Economically, the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria
can be traced to a myriad of such factors as resource allocation inequity, indigene-settler
issues, unemployment, poverty etc. The economic factor is seen as playing a crucial role
in exacerbating the conflict. For instance, Anthony (2002) observes that, “in
understanding Northern Nigeria’s 1966 riots, the material and the effective are
inseparable, just as the inward face of ethnicity is inseparable from its political aspects”
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(p. 7). The mobilization of fear and anger for generating and sustaining the anti-Igbo
violence was primarily “to advance the material interests of Northern elites, and those
elites succeeded because ordinary Northerners, driven by their own material concerns,
participated” (Anthony, 2002, p. 7).
Towing an economic perspective, therefore, will involve looking at economic
differences and resource distribution parameters which are commonly found to be
unevenly spread among groups. Economic inequities breed discontent and tensions which
may, in turn, escalate to riots and violent protests. Inequitable resource distribution is
primary conflict causation in the nation, as Nigeria’s vast oil and mineral resource is
highly politicized, and conflicts often arise from issues of resource allocation. With more
than 90 percent of the country’s oil sourced from the Niger Delta region in which most of
the population are minority groups, incessant conflicts occur in the area with protests
against perceived inequities of the federal revenue allocation structure. Furthermore,
given that oil presently accounts for over 90 per cent of the nation’s foreign exchange
earnings and most of its tax revenue (The Economist as cited in Harnischfeger, 2004;
Mitee, 1994), resource distribution involves a lot of power-play and intrigue. This factor
coupled with the immunity of Nigerian politicians from accountability and transparency,
due to lack of effective probity of public officers but sustained by the enormous inflows
of oil revenues for the country, worsens the impoverishment of oil producing areas
through deprivation and marginalization.
Impoverishment has occasioned widespread communal violence and armed
rebellion, especially in the Niger Delta region where incidences of blown up oil pipelines,
as well as kidnapped and sometimes murdered oil workers have created a level of
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anarchy in some parts of the region (Gberie, 2006). Such blatant resource abuse has, by
extension, also left in its wake a phenomenal privation of the country as a whole, and in
particular the northern region which is the focus of this study. Nossiter (2010c) observes
for instance, that in the oil-producing south as in the north, “the restiveness is fueled by
corruption and glaring economic inequality,” and he also notes that states in the northern
region “are the country’s poorest, with over 70 percent of the population living in
poverty, according to the United Nations, while the few rich live in mansions behind high
walls” (para. 6).
Psycho-Cultural Factors. Psycho-cultural factors refer to the psychological
orientation and dispositions of matters, and involve factors such as emotions and tensions
which emerge as a result of conflict and escalate with social change. This dimension
involves how people are feeling and how those feelings are translated into their
understanding. Thus, the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria can be explained by
the psycho-cultural factors undergirding the conflict from a cultural paradigm
perspective. There are two distinctive cultures in the conflict, an Islamic culture and a
Christian culture, each with strong feelings regarding which should survive or which
should be in the center. On the one hand, Muslims believe the Islamic culture will rid
Nigeria of corruption, and psychologically, they see an Islamic culture solving the
problem of corruption and nepotism in the country. Christians, on the other hand, have
strong feelings and believe that the constitution will provide democracy and freedom of
expression to all Nigerians—Muslims, Christians, and traditionalists alike—though the
Nigerian Constitution being secular is neither Christian nor Muslim. On the state of
profligacy for which the Muslims have their bent, Falola observes that:
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religious organizations…rejected the corruption of political (and even religious)
leaders. They characterized the society as decadent and excessively materialistic.
Electoral malpractices and rivalries among the political parties convinced
reformist religious leaders that the secular state was not ideal for the country.
Some began to reject the constitution, calling instead for a theocratic state with
moral leaders. Colonel Ghaddafi of Libya and the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran
provided alternative models of leadership, both widely believed to be strong,
popular, honest, moral, and committed to their people. (1999, pp. 168-169)
Thus, the conflicting perspectives and worldviews of these two religious groups
contribute to the tensions that exacerbate the northern Nigeria conflict. More so,
Haberson and Rothchild (1991) observe that with the spread of the Arabic language,
Islam, and Islamic culture, Islam has become an integral part of African contemporary
experience with the result that Islam’s significance as a political factor in the Nigeria has
considerably increased. On the playing out of such cultural divergences between the two
religious groups, Falola observes, for instance, that:
A major and long-standing source of Christian anger was the belief that Muslims
were trying to turn the new capital of Abuja into an Islamic city. Very quickly
mosques and Id el Fitr praying ground appeared, a National Mosque was built
close to the presidential mansion, and the designs for the city gate and some other
places were Islamic. Using the Hausa language and wearing the Hausa garb and
cap associated with the president became common as a way to attract notice,
while some southern Christian politicians shamelessly converted to Islam for
political advantage. In the contest for re-election in 1983, northern politicians
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demonstrated their commitment to hang on to power and to promote the cause of
Islam. (1999, pp. 169-170)
On this control and manipulation of symbols for political advantage, Kukah and
Falola (1996) observe, for example, the use of a simple, effective strategy of reminding
visitors to Nigeria, as well as citizens, of Islam’s dominance with the North’s main
airports and hotels, for instance, having mosques and prayer grounds attached to them,
with a mosque also pronouncingly sited close to the major airport in Lagos. Kukah and
Falola accordingly, further recognize that:
Nowhere is the use of symbols more effective than at Abuja, the country’s new
capital city. For long, the Northern oligarchy detested Lagos as the federal capital
because it is located among the Yoruba, a rival ethnic group. When Abuja was
chosen as a new site in the 1970s, it provided the Northern ruling class the
opportunity to realize the dream of shifting the economic and political center to
the North…. (1996, pp. 60-61)
Given social cubism’ conception of a generic world view presumably, of all
things being equal (a ceteris paribus scenario), which is far from the case in the northern
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, the elite theory lens will be next employed to examine
the conflict.
Elite Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious Conflict. The
elite theory provides insightful understanding of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious
conflict. Propounded by C. Wright Mills (1956), elite theory focuses on power
relationships in modern society, and argues that a small minority comprising of the
economic, policy making, or political elites’ control power dynamics, which power is
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distinctive of the democratic electoral processes of the state. The theory’s epistemological
framework postulates the existence of a clear divide between the brokers and users of
power, and those at their disposition. The elite theory’s configuration is that the
organization and determination of every political and economic system are for the benefit
of an elite few. Hence, Mills sees society as constantly organized with the elite few
welding overall power over the larger others, and posits that equipping the public with
information regarding the nature of societal power distribution will aid the generation of
an essential social shift that will greatly alter existing class and other social structural
arrangements.
Fundamental causal factors for the intermittent killings in the northern Nigeria
ethno-religious conflict is the phenomena of political manipulation and power tussle
between the political elites in the north and those in the south that was entrenched into
Nigerian political system from the colonial days. According to Osaghae (1998a),
preceding Nigeria’s creation of regions, there were neither minority nor majority
groupings. Using the Native Authority (NA) system, however, the colonial administration
created and ensured the autonomy of the various groups and sub-groups which later
became majority groups. Thus, citing Tseayo (1975) and Yahaya (1980), Osaghae
(1998a) observes that “the adoption of the administrative machinery of the Fulani-run
caliphate and emirates as the NA prototype, and the pact that Lord Lugard made with the
emirs, not only kept pre-colonial relations of domination intact, but also led to the
imposition of Muslim overlords (appointed by the sultan or emirs) on non-Muslim areas
which had successfully resisted Fulani suzerainty before colonization” (p.4). Although
every group constituting an NA unit in the north had enjoyed some autonomy despite
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this, however, everything changed with the creation of regions. This was due to “powerseeking elites” capitalizing on the new regions’ opportunities to unify the various subgroups, the Yoruba, Ibos, and Hausa/Fulani which were previously autonomous under the
NA, into what then became the majority groups (Osaghae, 1998a, p. 4). It is, thus,
recognized that virtually all of Nigeria’s heads of states from independence up to Sani
Abacha’s regime have been Northerners including “Tafawa Balewa, Yakubu Gowon,
Murtala Mohammed, Shehu Shagari, Muhamadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, and Sani
Abacha,” and as each “had the power to distribute power, they did so with their
constituency as their paramount consideration,” to the chagrin of southerners (Kukah &
Falola, 1996, p. 50).
Furthermore, in his seminal works, The Power Elite, Mills (1956) presents an
analytical structure of society as composing of three distinctive groups—the economic,
political, and the military—which completely control the power dynamics. Thus, the
society’s two major groupings of elites and masses have the elites grouping further
broken into competing power brokers of the economic, political, and the military. The
northern elites are recognized as “members of the intermingled ‘patrimonial aristocracy’
(sarauta), mercantile capitalists, and politicians” (Lubeck as cited in Anthony, 2002, p.
20), who broadly constitute the national elite members that are recognized as “a
comprador bourgeoisie in power not because of its control of economic resources, but
rather over political resources, which it uses to channel state resources through ethnicized
channels” (Nnoli as cited in Anthony, 2002, p. 20).
Furthermore, it is recognized that “the dominant Northern Nigerian political elite
manipulates Islam to acquire and consolidate power,” and these northern elites are seen
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by southerners to have “enjoyed a predominant share in the distribution of the national
cake (wealth) and federal power” (Kukah & Falola, 1996, pp. 49-50). Thus, the northern
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict is being fundamentally sustained because of the
economic and political interests of the northern elites that it serves, with such interests
being cloaked over by an ostensible fanatical support for religious values. Ezeibe (2009)
argues that “behind these seeming passion and love for religious values and dogma
shown by religious leaders lies the domination of religious values by religious leader’s
selfish economic benefits,” and there is the need to educate the masses to “appreciate and
identify the voice of a fanatic religious elite who seek to advance his economic interest
through religious mask at the masses’ perils” (para. 43-44).
Additionally, the elite theory is akin to Marxist humanist perspective of social
class, given its focus of aiming to have power structures, and political or government
setups to connect to society, as harm will be brought to people with these entities
disinterest in the society. In essence, Mills aims to show a disjuncture in relationships
among society’s different organs. The elites, as well as their subordinates to which
privileged status are accorded, seek to utilize and control by manipulating social,
economic, and political domains at large. Power contestations are dominated by the elites
who, in Nigeria, are characteristically defined as “the rich and the powerful” (Dudley as
cited in Osaghae, 1998b, p. 25). Expatiating further on the nature of these socio-political
entities, Osaghae observes that:
The elite in Nigeria is factionalized mainly along ethnic, regional, religious and
institutional lines, being product of the uneven development and rivalry which
British colonial administration fostered among the different segments. It has
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accordingly built its support constituencies from communal, ethnic, religious and
regional groups depending on the level of contestation, and has sought to
manipulate and exploit the differences and anxieties arising from unequal size and
population to further its interests. At the macro national level, powerful ethnoregional elite blocs have emerged at various times to forge constitutive interests in
competition with others. (1998b, p. 25)
For instance, the Kaduna mafia were said to have emerged from a “group of
young northern Nigerian intellectuals, civil servants, business tycoons, and military
officers residing or conducting business in the former northern capital city of Kaduna
during the end of the first republic,” and who, prodded by “the loss of many northern
leaders in the January 1966 coup,” rallied round and opposed the new Aguiyi Ironsi
government (Jibo as cited in Osuntokun, 2012, para. 6). Though operating mostly
underground with speculation on its existence and membership, the Kaduna mafia is
solidly politically driven, and manifests as the powers behind the nation’s military and
civilian ruler-ship (Osaghae, 1998b), with the group having powerful and extensive
political connections (Kukah & Falola, 1996). Osaghae (1998b) presents the Kaduna
mafia as comprising “core Northern elites, ‘old brigade’ and ‘newbreed’ alike –
intelligentsia, serving and retired military officers and bureaucrats, and members of the
business and political classes – and its objective is believed to be in defence and
advocacy of Northern interests, the most important of which is to sustain Northern
political domination of the federation” (p. 25). The group is recognized as thriving “on an
elaborate network of power alliances among northern aristocrats and government
sympathizers who favored the groups pro northern and Islamic bent,” and are known for
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their “commitment to the traditional values and socio political interests of northern
Nigeria” (Osuntokun, 2012, para. 7-8). Thus, the North’s emergent elites exist alongside
the region’s traditional power elite without displacing them (Kukah & Falola, 1996), with
both elitists groups bringing their machinations to bear on the northern Nigeria ethnoreligious conflict.
In the 1987 Muslim Christian crisis in Kaduna, for instance, General Babangida
alluded “to the sinister men who instigated the riots,” and promising summary justice
while speaking “against ‘group interest’ and powerful subversives,” threatened not to
recognize or spare “any sacred cow” in reference to the Kaduna Mafia, whose influence
was said to have waned since his seizing of power in 1985 (Kotch, 1987, para. 4, pp. 1113). Babangida’s view was also observed to have collaborated with some northern
Christians’ view “that the rabble of young and uneducated Moslems who attacked them
and their property…were sponsored by unidentified barons seeking conflict” (Kotch,
1987, para. 5).
While recognizing patrimonialism as “getting out of control,” the Kaduna mafia is
derisively cited as an ill-defined organization formed “to acquire power and wealth by
ties with the government officials” starting with the Gowon administration (Falola, 1999,
p. 147). The elite theory’s explication of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict is
manifest in the elitists’ main purpose of exploiting human and material resources. For
instance, Ezeibe quoting Nwachukwu acknowledges, that:
Policies are carried by emotional sentiments rooted in ethnicity or religion,
politics in Nigeria is characterized by religious cleavages. The education religious
and political elites (class) prey upon the masses and use them as satellite to
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achieve their socio-political and economic objectives. This is done through
orientation, indoctrination or violence using the masses on the already conceived
stereotypes against their political and religious opponents. (2009, para. 43)
The elite theory, thus, proffers an understanding of the system of social control
processes of elites, which does not include the rest of the society, with the notion that one
segment of the society controlling the rest of the populace generates conflict levels, the
resolution of which can only occur when such power comptrollers share this resource.
Such form of arrangement may, however, be deemed impossible as social elites see
themselves alone as having the sole philosophies and ideologues capable of engendering
and sustaining society (Okosun, 2012).
Exclusionary Ideology Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria EthnoReligious Conflict. The ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria can also be
examined using an exclusive ideological lens. Exclusionary Ideology is recognized as an
ideology that is specifically aimed at selecting and justifying the extermination of
members of a targeted group (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 18). Exclusionary
Ideologues is sometimes a particularly complex set of ideologies that involves
phenomenal orchestration, extensive systematization levels, planning, and organization.
The system of exclusive ideology is aimed to target. Its whole essence is to select a given
population group for whatever differential criteria (physiological, biological, ethnic, or
religious) and target such selected people on the pre-conceived notion that people with
such defining criteria “are dangerous and dangerous people should be killed” (Campbell,
2010, Video Series 18). On the basis of such selection and valuation, these people are
then targeted for extermination.
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It is observed in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, for instance, that
the adoption of Sharia involves a redefinition of political self-determination in religious
terms based on an exclusionary ideology against the non-Muslim others from
participation, in determining the central aspects of public legislation (Harnischfeger,
2004). Harnischfeger (2004) argues that with the Sharia law in force “Muslims redefine
the demos that is entitled to rule” (p. 431). This exclusion of non-Muslims became
apparent in January 2000 with Sharia’s first adoption in Zamfara state in the north with
its declaration as ‘the unanimous wish of the people’ (Hotline Magazine as cited in
Harnischfeger, 2004, p. 431), and other states following later. Presently, twelve out of
Nigeria’s 36 have adopted the Sharia or Islamic law. While Muslims who are in majority
in the north welcome such revival of Islamic traditions, however, it is observed that some
of the twelve sharia adopted states have sizeable Christian or non-Muslim minorities.
Hence, Christians and some traditionalists in Sharia operative states feel threatened by
state-enforced Islamization, and as noted by Harnischfeger (2004), this religious
campaign has triggered several clashes with loss of lives of five to ten thousand people
(p. 432). It is paramount to note as Adar observes, that:
At the core of Islamization lie the doctrines of Islamic culture and religion…
implementation of…Sharia…cannot be brought about in isolation and without the
concomitant internal political realities. Islamization…is used as a tool for political
power and legitimacy…Sharia, therefore, controls and regulates socio-political
and economic life which form the basis of political authority – “reinforced by the
dogma of the divine guidance of the community.” The incorporation of Sharia
law in a constitution offers the basis for the promotion of Islamic principles.

139
Islamization is therefore an important vehicle for promoting values associated
with Islam and Arabic culture. (2001, pp. 85-86)
It is however, recognized that non-Muslims, primarily Christians, constitute about
half the population of Nigeria, and these non-Muslim populace now fear that the secular
principles which have prevailed since Nigeria became an independent sovereign state are
being eroded. This is notwithstanding the fact that “adopting of any religion as State
Religion” is prohibited in Section 10 of the Nigerian constitution (Harnischfeger, 2004, p.
432). Thus, the Sharia law is seen by Christians as state apparatus for political
maneuverings, control, and dominance; they (Christians) fear that Sharia will apply to
Muslims and non-Muslims alike, in spite of assurances of the sharia-operating state
governments that it will apply strictly to Muslims. Evidently, Sharia’s adoption in the
predominantly Muslim northern states has heightened the already entrenched hostilities
between Muslims and Christians in the country. In the Middle Belt, for instance, the
introduction of Sharia has resulted in violent conflicts, as Islamic laws set up claims over
territories in which Muslim dictates prevail. Hence, parts of the Middle Belt experience
violent conflicts between the mainly Hausa/Fulani migrants from the north, and the
indigenous ethnic groups who are mainly Christians and traditionalists (Harnischfeger,
2004).
Thus, looking at the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict which is ethnoterritorial in nature, it is essential to examine the factors that explain relationship on the
basis of exclusionary ideology on each side of the conflict which, as coined exclusivity,
leads to alienation, and alienation causes tension between groups. Because of exclusivity,
there is mistrust (don’t trust that you can do anything for me), suspicion, and distrust (my
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not allowing you to do anything for me) which is typical of extremist Muslims. There is
exclusionary ideology among extremist Muslims because they want to set themselves out
among others. Essentially, they want to be separate and distinct from others. Thence, on
the basis of these exclusionary tendencies, Christians are being discriminated against,
targeted, and exterminated in northern Nigeria. It is observed, for instance, that:
Islamic zeal is strong in the northern state of Kano. Kano’s governor, Ibrahim
Shekarau, was elected on a radical, hardline, pro- Sharia platform. Christians
suffer intense persecution in Kano, their schools and churches having been closed
and burned. It is compulsory for all public-school girls to wear Islamic hijab, and
as the Christian schools have been closed Christians don’t have much choice. On
the night of Shekarau’s election (21 May 2003), pastor Chikezie (Sunday)
Madumere and his whole family were burned to death in their home in “No Man’s
Land” Kano city, by Muslim mobs celebrating Shekarau’s win. (Kendal, 2004,
para. 17)
What are the circumstances that have created exclusionary tendencies among the
northerners? And, are there also circumstances that are creating exclusionary tendencies
among the southerners? It can be argued that the southerners are not so exclusive because
they have gone to the north to work and mix with the northerners. The Christians are not
exclusive but are rather creating commerce in the north and other places they reside. But
have the northerners of themselves, accepted the southerners and the Christians into their
midst? Is it that the Islamic folks are afraid because the southerners and Christians will
Christianize them? What is the population of Muslims, Christians, and others? According
to the World Factbook data, religious composition estimates for the country is about 50%
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Muslim, 40% Christian, and 10% indigenous beliefs (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).
Is that why the extremist Muslims are angry? To answer that question an examination of
geography assists by observing the distinction between the North’s arid and dry region,
and the south with vast oil resources, and the need to control the country’s oil wealth as
was typified by the Sudan/Darfur conflict (Batruch, 2004) prior to the recent delineation
and independence of southern Sudan.
Looking back from 1966, there is no significant change in population mix, and so
there is no need for the extremist Muslims to get agitated over the issue of being
overtaken by Christians. Thus, if no proof exists that the population mix is changing
adversely for the Muslim population, the exclusion is being created. Why is this
exclusion being created? It can be argued, firstly, that extremist Muslims want to be
different. Secondly, they want to maintain their Islamic tradition. Thirdly, they want to
maintain their own Islamic legal system which is the Sharia. And, fourthly, they want to
be different because they do not want dilution in their religious, social, and political
spheres, or the dilution by Christianity from Western education as the Boko Haram
professes. They are anti-Western philosophy and Western constitutional law, either of
which are part of the secular system. Exclusivity resonates with Islam as defined by
Sharia, and extremist Muslims cannot go beyond that while Christian exclusivity
resonates with secularism. Tension is, therefore, bred with extremist Muslims in negation
of the Christianity that brought in parliament and the secular paradigm.
The question in the ethno-territorial discourse, therefore, is why are these two
religious groups excluding themselves from each other? Exclusivity suggests that the end
of the road is violence “because I don’t want you in my territory, and you are not part of
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my religion,” and this basically is the positioning of extremist Muslims. Thus, in
“Victims of Riots: Their Pains, Woes and Regrets,” Ahiante observes that:
From Kano to Sokoto, Kaduna to Kebbi, Bauchi, Taraba, and Plateau to name a
few, the story is the same. Killings, maiming, and kidnapping. These have been
the lots of the ordinary citizens of the area. Mostly affected are Christians
irrespective of tribe or race. If you are a southerner leaving in the area, the
situation is worse. Even soldiers with all their training are unable to escape the
ravaging youths turned terrorists who take delight in killing their neighbors in the
name of religion. (2004, para. 17)
What is the position of Christians? Do they also adopt this exclusionary
ideological stance? Christians, probably do not. While Christians, as well as Muslims,
proselyte for converts, Christians basically are not involved in exclusionary tendencies
against Muslims on the parameters of their faith as the extremist Muslims do on grounds
of Islam or Sharia practices and implementation. Thus, because the Islamic population
did not open themselves to the Christian group, that is why there is this latent genocide
emanating from such exclusionism. In addition to this framing of the Islamic religious
escapade, there is also the 1966 Nzeogwu assassination of the Sarduana of Sokoto, the
anger over which never left the northerners, and exclusivity is further created as a result.
The caveat, however, is that while exclusivity may explain the northern Nigeria
conflict in terms of one group excluding the other, Post Modernists on the other hand,
may argue that ethno-religious conflict is occurring in the region because the Muslims are
living in the historic past, while Christians are bringing education to the north and they
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are refusing. Thus, the southerners are the post modernists, but the northerners are
refusing to move from their conservative past.
Hate Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious Conflict. The
ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria can further be explicated applying the hate
theory. Hate is recognized as a contributing causal factor of numerous genocidal killings
and massacres (Sternberg, 2003). Although agreement has as yet to be reached among
scholars on the definition of ‘hate’ as a term (Perry as cited in Walters, 2011, p. 315),
with laws on hate crime proliferating the Western world there has primarily been an
increase in legal scholarship on the meaning of hate (Jacobs & Potter as cited in Walter,
2011). It is, however, generally recognized that ‘hate crime’ can be committed without
the need for an offender to actually ‘hate’ the victim, and thus, for most people, ‘hate’ has
been conceptualized to mean ‘prejudice’ (Jacobs & Potter; and Lawrence as cited in
Walters, 2011, p. 315), which further raises the onerous task of defining criminally
under-girded prejudice. Whereas some prejudices such as anti-racist or anti-fascist are
seen as positive, and some as innocuous, e.g. dislike of green color (Jacobs & Potter as
cited in Walters, 2011), such other prejudices as homophobia, anti-religious, and racism
are seen as damaging to societal social cohesiveness and are considered entirely
unacceptable (Walters, 2011). Thus, ‘ethnic prejudice’ is recognized in Gordon Allport’s
The Nature of Prejudice, a seminal contributory work to the conceptualizing of prejudice,
“as ‘an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. [This]…may be felt
or expressed. [And] It may be directed towards a group as a whole or towards an
individual because he is a member of that group’” (Allport as cited in Walters, 2011, p.
315).
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It is thus, observed in the 1966 Igbo massacre, for instance, that though the
January 1966 coup presented as the anti-Igbo hostility pretext, the actual reasons for the
massacres “were more deep rooted and went back several years,” with the coup
extracting “long held prejudices and negative stereotypes about Igbos” (Siollun, 2009, p.
83). Essentially, there must be the feeling or expression of animosity towards a people
group deriving from generalizations made about members of the group, which usually
result from stereotyping, with the perpetuation of such negative stereotyping done
through communication networks primarily between friends and families (Byers et al. as
cited in Walters, 2011), or via the news media and television (Green et al. as cited in
Walters, 2011). While it is also observed that resentment and economic competition can
influence hate crime, other than having a faulty generalization of a people group (Green
et. al. as cited in Walter, 2011), it is also argued that “the economic strain and the ensuing
resentment felt towards some minority groups may well be based on false generalizations
about the perceived economic prosperity and access to state welfare that certain minority
groups supposedly receive” (Ray & Smith as cited in Walter, 2011, p. 315).
For instance, while recognizing the economic or material undertone to the
northern Nigeria 1966 riots and killings of the Ibos, Anthony acknowledges that:
…material interests alone do not explain elite’s success in generating and
sustaining support. Their appeals succeeded because they could also tap into an
established vocabulary of fears and insecurities, emotions that had been imbued
over preceding decades with ethnic overtones. How big a part ethnically framed
fears played depended on a range of factors, many of which – particularly media
representations – elites could control. Since to “illuminate what is ‘our own’
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darkens the shadow of ‘the other,’” the project of vilifying Igbos was
accompanied by appeals to Northern virtue (Lonsdale as cited in Anthony, 2002,
p. 8).
It is, thus, recognized that there is complexity in the way that hate operates, as in
Rwanda where a lot of Hutus and Tutsis came to hating one another (Sternberg, 2003). It
is recognized as essentially challenging for most people, to not hate a group’s members
that are systematically exterminating one’s own group, including one’s family, or are
forcing one to be involved in that extermination (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008). There
may, however, be several other contributing factors as “social pressure to act in certain
ways, emotional reasoning, fear for one’s own life if one disobeys an order from a
powerful other, and false beliefs systematically implanted by cynical leaders,” Sternberg
& Sternberg (2008) observe that hate cannot be understood in a vacuum (p. 2). Thus,
Sternberg (2003) observes that “Not all massacres are perpetrated on the basis of hate,”
(Browning; Arendt; and Milgram as cited in Sternberg, 2003, p. 305) as “Ordinary people
can be propelled by unfortunate circumstances into behaviors in which…they might
[normally] never engage” (p. 305). Hence, in the discourse of hate processes in relation to
terrorism, massacres, and genocides, there is the caveat that “Within a given massacre or
genocide, some people may be propelled by hate and others by factors that are quite
different, such as the desire to advance their careers or to save their own lives”
(Sternberg, 2003, p. 305). It is, thus, essential to recognize that hate can only be
examined in its complex occurring contexts rather than in isolation. On such complexity
of hatred in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, Onishi observes, for instance,
that:
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the conflicts are rooted in all-too-real hatreds and divisions, like the abyss
between Sokoto [Hausas] and Aba [Igbos]. These hatreds and divisions are
staggeringly complex, fueled by the misrule and corruption that has left one of the
world’s top oil producers in poverty. What is more, these rifts have been
encouraged and exploited by the country’s rulers, from the British to the military
governments to the European and American oil companies that pump crude in the
Niger Delta, an area largely abandoned by the federal government. (2000, p. 22)
Furthermore, the role of propaganda in fomenting mass murders is recognized.
Sternberg (2003) links hate to mass killings and observes some hate forms as being more
prone to generating such killings than others, and presents propaganda as systematically
nurturing hate elements to foment mass murders which, in turn, lead in combination to
massacres, terrorism, and genocides. Propaganda is, thus, seen as usually fomenting or
reinforcing hate when directed against the target group, or reinforcing love when directed
towards the perpetrating group (Sternberg, 2003). In the Rwandan genocide, for instance,
a contributing factor to its gravity was the radio propaganda broadcast that incited hatred
feelings, insinuating that Hutus killing of remaining Tutsis would significantly advance
the formation of a better Rwanda (Des Forges as cited in Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008).
Furthermore, the Rwandan genocide is known to have occurred basically in the full glare
of the world, as other nations’ governments failed to intervene where they could have
done so. Similarly, in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict these features are also
seen at work in varying situations of the conflict. For instance, propaganda featured
prominently in the Nigeria-Biafra war to help draw the attention of foreign collaborators
to their side, to the detriment of the opposing side (Osaghae, 1998b). Additionally, while
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the starvation of the million Biafrans in the war occurred in full glare of the world—the
international community watched on as the Nigerian government through economic
blockade had these Biafrans starved to death on the basis that “starvation is a legitimate
weapon of war” (Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1968b, p. 93). Furthermore, the decades of
ongoing mass killings in northern Nigeria which is focused mainly on Muslim-Christian
conflicts have also continued to occur with the international community just watching
(Ahiante, 2004; CSW, 2008a).
Relative Deprivation Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria EthnoReligious Conflict. Relative Deprivation theory can explain the phenomenon of the
ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria. Relative deprivation theory posits that actors
predispose to conflict as a result of a perceived discrepancy between values expected and
values actually derived, with lower value expectations relative to manifest realities of life
conditions causing lower predisposition to feelings of discontentment than higher value
expectations. Hence, relative deprivation theory focuses on “perceptions of deprivation”
(Jeong, 2000, p. 69). Ted Gurr (1971) who is a key proponent of relative deprivation
theory argues in his Why Men Rebel that as social beings humans comparatively evaluate
themselves with other groups, as well as with their perceived image of entitlements on
the basis of which any gap observed provides grounds for discontent and conflict. Gurr
(1971) adopting this psychological approach in explaining political violence as derivative
from collective discontent argues, however, that it is one’s perceived relative deprivation
of achieved welfare with respect to those of others that fans discontent, rather than the
absolute deprivation positioning, thus, linking frustrations of (or perceptions of) being
marginalized with aggressive ness. It is, thus, observed that “Religious violence is also
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frequently an expression of frustration with inequities or perceived marginalization, or
even of poverty” (Falola, 1998, p. 283).
In the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, for instance, as the spate of
killings intensified in the north with reprisals in some southern states following the
adoption of the Sharia by some northern states, it is noted that “Defusing the tension is
extremely difficult for Obasanjo, a Christian southerner who does not want to offend
northern sensibilities after being accused of marginalizing the region that has dominated
politics since independence from Britain in 1960” (Tostevin, 2000, para. 9). Thus, the
perception of marginalization is undergirded by a sense of a perceived gap between
expected and achieved welfare which creates collective discontent. Relative depreciation
theory also applies to groups or individuals who find their own welfare to be inferior to
those of others with whom they compare themselves, as seen in the 1966 massacres of the
Ibos, where the Ibos were perceived as being more educated and dynamic (Garrison,
1968a).
Also, drawing on Walter Runciman’s (1972) work which presents a
“generalization hypothesis” that a group’s relative deprivation derives from the
“experiences of personal relative deprivation,” recent relative deprivation theorists focus
on translating “personal disadvantageous experiences” at the group level (p. 120).
Relative deprivation theory provides insight on groups’ basis for seeing themselves as
marginalized or deprived with such perception precipitating widespread unrest. Thus,
socio-economic factors such as unemployment and lack of education are considered as
contributing to or intensifying the perception of deprivation, for instance, with the
economic downturn in Nigeria increasing unemployment and producing higher poverty
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levels particularly in the north where the educational level among Muslim youths tend to
be lower than those of their Christian counterparts. In the Kaduna 1987 attack of
Christians and their property by the rabble of uneducated Muslim youths, it is observed
that “severe unemployment and a general economic depression were blamed for the
condition of hordes of listless youths receptive to any call to violence” (Kotch, 1987,
para. 8).
Furthermore, increases in the general prices of goods and services and lower
consumer spending caused by the slowing down of economic growth will bring about
rapid societal changes with greater inequitable distribution of wealth occurring. Such
inequities increasingly create feelings of relative deprivation among the teeming
uneducated youths, or almajirai in the north, who mostly roam the streets panhandling
(Falola, 1998). Thus, as the economic downturn persists, inflation and poor economic
performance heighten poverty levels for marginalized groups, and their feelings of
relative deprivation accentuate. Also, relative deprivation theory presents that an
individual or a group’s perception of entitlements rises faster than the potential for its
fulfillment. In essence, the expected ability for the satisfaction of social needs and
material benefits increases disproportionately faster than the society’s ability to deliver
(Gurr, 1971; Runciman, 1972).
Consequently, with the slow economic growth, the potentials of a society for
meeting the expectations of its populace reduce as does the actual delivery of such social
needs and benefits. In May 1992, for instance, there were skirmishes in Lagos and some
other southern cities involving anti-government demonstrators against the authorities,
which were triggered by an austere economic slump in the country, following which a
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Muslim-Christian sectarian violence ensued in Kaduna which lasted for 10 days with
hundreds of people killed. The estimates for the death toll and casualties figures in the
violence were put at between 500-800, and hundreds of others wounded. Low oil prices
were noted to have devastated the nation’s export earning-stream, which as a leading
African oil exporter, oil accounts for over 95 percent of its export earnings (Noble,
1992c, para. 1-4). As the economy floundered, the discontent and frustration grew such
that analysts, both Western and Africans, spoke of “the explosion of discontent” as
threatening the political stability of the country (Noble, 1992c, para. 5).
Hence, the widening gap between expectations and actual fulfillment of a
people’s social needs in a period of economic decline and rising general prices, plus the
actual increasing poverty levels, provides confirmatory basis for a group’s viewing of
themselves as marginalized and relatively deprived with such perception precipitating
widespread unrest.
Social Identity Theory Explication of Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious
Conflict. The ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria can also be examined applying
the framework of social identity theory. Social identity theory is a social psychology
theory which posits that an individual does not have one, but multiple selves which
correspond to the group membership’s widening circles. Social identity theory focuses on
self-conception’s role in group process, membership, and inter-group relationships
(Forsyth, 2010). The key proponents of Social identity theory, Henri Tajfel and John
Turner (1979) emphasize intergroup differentiation based on cognition and motivation,
and present that in different societal contexts, an individual may be triggered to think,
feel, or act based on his family or personal, national or self-level. Social identity theorists
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argue that self-categorization and in-group enhancement is created by group membership
in ways favorable to the in-group at the out-group’s expense (Forsyth, 2010; Hogg,
2006).
Social identity theorists emphasize the existence of a closer in-group bond at the
expense of the out-group. Hence, rather than a perception of deprivation, the in-group’s
identifying with a super-ordinate group, for instance a global community, makes
individuals more prone to showing increased support for policies beneficial to the larger
group even when involving subordinate group sacrifices. For example, Muslim groups by
identifying with the larger Muslim body nationally or even globally will bond in unison
to compete dis-favorably against the out-group. Consequently, the in-group’s struggle
over resources and social benefits will increase against the out-group based on social
identity group’s favoritism stance. The resource scarcity and increased conflict levels will
further exacerbate poverty among the groups, thus, impinging on religious issues more
adversely through divisions between the groups.
Furthermore, it is recognized that underlying social identity are two premises of a
categorical distinctive organizing of individuals’ understanding of their world, such
categorization of which minimizes within-group differences and accentuates the intergroup differences. Also, with individuals being members of certain social groupings and
not of others, categorization portends with it, the in-group and out-group, or the ‘us’ and
‘them’ classification which, due to social categories’ self-relevance, is a superimposed
categorical distinction that has emotional and affective significance (Brewer as cited in
Senholzi, 2008). Thus, social phenomena has for decades been analyzed using social
identity theoretical framework, specifically, with issues such as political violence,
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intergroup relations, discrimination, prejudice, stereotyping, language use, and
negotiation examined through its lens, as in such situations the in-group and out-group
categorizations are more often than not made salient (Senholzi, 2008). The
conceptualization of such social settings produces a schema of: (i) inter-group
accentuation principle, in which in-group boundaries assimilation, and between group
contrast gives the perception of the in-group’s greater similarity to the self than are the
out-group members; (ii) in-group favoritism principle, in which fellow members of the
in-group’s positive affect as trust or like are selectively generalized towards, but not
towards members of the out-group; (iii) social competition principle in which in-group
and out-group inter-group social comparison, negatively associates their perceived
interdependence (Brewer as cited in Senholzi, 2008, pp. 9-10).
In a study of the northern Ireland conflict between the Catholics and Protestants,
for instance, it is observed that centuries old conflict generated hatred which made it
practically impossible for both community groups to trust themselves, and there was ingroup favoritism as well as negative, out-group association as social identity theory
outlines. And, while solidifying the within group boundaries, there is a further ostracizing
of the out-group (Senholzi, 2008). This typifies the northern Nigeria ethno-religious
conflict, where the phenomena of the different ethnic groupings are even further
compounded by differences of religious affiliations, with the Hausa-Fulani Muslim ingroup categorization disfavorably pitted against the out-group, non-Muslim or Christian
other ethnic-groupings based on “in-group favoritism and out-group hostility” (Senholzi,
2008, p. 13).
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Furthermore, the conflict experience between the two groups is predicative of
negative intentions that are accentuated by delineations of in-group identity which
underscores a relationship of antagonism with the out-group (Senholzi, 2008). Religious
categorizations are evidential along majority and minority groupings, which validate the
social identity theory in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, based on an ingroup and out-group dynamics of “us versus them” positioning which is a core
component underlying social identity theory (Senholzi, 2008, p. 14). In consequence,
there are ethnic and religious rivalries which undergird the social identity theory found
replete in the context of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, with a resultant
polarization and religious divide among the opposing groups.
The conflict is polarized mainly along a Muslim-Christian fault line other than on
cases of intra-conflicts between different Muslim sects, while also additionally polarized
along Muslim north and Christian south lines where both northern, as well as southern
Christians are involved on occasions with the Christian Ibos as prime targets (“Muslim
Mobs,” 2004; Lobel, 2012). In the March 2010 killings in Dogo Na Hawa of Jos, Plateau
State axis, for instance, Nossiter observes that:
Sunday’s killings were an especially vicious expression of long-running hostilities
between Christians and Muslims in this divided nation. Jos and the region around
it are on the fault line where the volatile and poor Muslim north and the Christian
south meet. In the past decade, some 3,000 people have been killed in interethnic,
interreligious violence in this fraught zone. The pattern is familiar and was seen as
recently as January: uneasy coexistence suddenly explodes into killing, amplified
for days by retaliation. (2010d, para. 4)
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Furthermore, there are segregated areas in some states as in Kano “Sabon Gari” or
strangers quarters, where Christians or southerners, notably Ibos live (Ehiabhi, 2012c;
Okpi, 2012). Additionally, Kaduna which is said to be “Once a lively urban mélange of
faiths and tribes… [has become] a partitioned city, [with] the Kaduna River cutting a line
through its heart,” with its delineation into two distinctive areas of Kaduna north and
Kaduna south respectively for Muslims and Christians who now live apart in their
separate quarters (Sengupta, 2003, para. 5). Moreover, following years of tensions and
violence, as well as reprisals and revenge which have continued to escalate the conflict,
“Jos became a balkanized city, with Muslims and Christians retreating to separate
neighborhoods” (Polgreen, 2008, para. 11).
More so, there is stereotyping which is shown by the in-group towards the outgroup and usually manifested with discrimination (Senholzi, 2008). As in the northern
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, there is inter-group discrimination against Christians in
northern Nigeria, a factor which further undergirds social identity theory (Senholzi,
2008). Such religious discriminatory practices being meted against Christians in the
region are in diverse areas, including “discrimination in employment,” “discrimination in
access to education,” “the threat of violence in educational establishments,”
“discrimination in access to and provisions to services,” and “discrimination in
construction of churches and the unwarranted seizure of property (CSW, 2008b, pp. 4-8).
It is, thus, recognized that:
In almost every state in northern and central Nigeria non-Muslims, and
particularly Christians, continue to experience discriminatory policies enacted or
tacitly sanctioned at state governmental level. These policies appear designed to
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engineer their social, economic and political marginalization and to severely
impair, if not wholly deny, their federally guaranteed right to practice their
religion without let or hindrance. (CSW, 2008b, p. 4)
An instance of such discriminatory practices against Christians is in the nonallocation of land to build churches, while also, Christians are being discriminated against
in the take-over of their schools and turning them into Muslim schools. Thus, it is
acknowledged that:
There is a pervasive sense among Christians here that the military authorities have
long favored the northern Islamic groups, who make up about half the
country's…people. Nearly all of Nigeria's leaders, in fact, have come from the
north, and nearly all have been Muslims. Under the government of the previous
military leader, Maj. Gen. Mohammed Buhari, many Christian schools were taken
over by the state, and permits to build churches were held up while the
construction of mosques was stepped up. (Noble, 1992c, para. 18)
Summary
To analyze the underlying causation to the conflict, analytical perspectives of
social cubism, elite, exclusionary ideology, hate, relative deprivation, and social identity
theories have been employed. The area of focus has been that of exploring the plausibility
of genocidal inclination to the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria. The analysis
has shown that social cubism theory explains the conflict from a six-dimensional
framework of history (religious, demography, psycho-cultural, political, and economic
factors), all of which intermeshed have been seen to have undergirded the conflict (Byrne
& Carter, 1996). The elite theory has presented the perspective of elitist manipulation,
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power tussle, and the system of social control processes as generating and sustaining
conflict levels in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict (Mills, 1956). The northern
elites are seen as manipulating Islam for power acquisition and consolidation, with the
conflict basically sustained as a result of the elites’ economic and political interests that it
serves, even as such interests are being cloaked over by ostensible religiosity (Ezeibe,
2009; Kukah & Falola, 1996).
The exclusionary ideology perspective views the northern Nigeria ethno-religious
conflict from an ideological framework that specifically aims to select and justify the
extermination of members of a targeted group (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 18). The
adoption of Sharia redefines political self-determination in religious terms through an
exclusionary ideology against non-Muslims’ participation in core public legislative issues
(Harnischfeger, 2004). With the implementation of Sharia “at the core of Islamization”
(Adar, 2001, p. 85), this exclusivity has left Christians and other non-Muslim minorities
in Sharia operative states particularly threatened by state-enforced Islamization, through
sustained religious campaigns and clashes that have claimed thousands of lives in the
conflict (Harnischfeger, 2004).
Hate theory perspective views the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria
with the recognition that hate is a contributing causal factor to the numerous genocidal
killings and massacres (Sternberg, 2003). Hate is, thus, conceptualized as ‘prejudice’
(Jacobs & Potter; and Lawrence as cited in Walters, 2011, p. 315), while ‘ethnic
prejudice’ is seen as an antipathy which derives from a faulty-based generalization that is
directed or expressed towards a group or its member(s) (Allport as cited in Walters, 2011,
p. 315).
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From the relative deprivation theory perspective, the ethno-religious conflict in
northern Nigeria is seen as undergirded by poverty relative to the individual or a group’s
perception of deprivation of social benefits (Gurr, 1971; Runciman, 1972). From the
social identity theory perspective, the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict has been
observed as being framed by intergroup differentiation between Muslims and Christians
through cognition and motivation in different societal contexts (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Thus, while relative deprivation theory focuses on the perceived marginalization of a
people group or individuals, social identity theory looking at self-categorization and ingroup membership enhancement at the out-group’s expense (Forsyth, 2010; Hogg, 2006),
emphasizes in-group favoritism against the out-group as providing the analytical basis for
the discriminatory practices by the Muslim in-group and their motivation to exterminate
the Christian out-group in their midst (Senholzi, 2008).
In conclusion, social cubism, elite, exclusionary ideology, hate, relative
deprivation, and social identity theoretical frameworks have been applied in explaining
the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. However, given the complexity of the
phenomena, involving both regional, national, and to some extent international
dimensions, an eclectic synthesizing of these theoretical perspectives will provide a more
holistic understanding of the underlying causation, its religious overtures, and the
plausibility of genocidal undertone to the conflict. Given this theoretical framework, the
research problem is constructed, and the core research question to address the subject of
this study developed.
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Research Problem
The literature review on the phenomena of ethno-religious conflict in northern
Nigeria shows there has been little or no study to investigate the incidence of genocidal
proclivity to the conflict. The purpose of this study is to examine the plausibility of
genocidal inclinations to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. The phenomenon
is generally defined as ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria (Creswell, 2007, p.
101).
Research Questions
The goal of this study is to explore the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict to
proffer an understanding of the factors which foment violence and escalate the conflict.
The purpose of the research is to examine whether there are genocidal undertones to the
ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. The research will address the questions: Are
there genocidal inclinations to the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria? To what
extent does the interplay between ethnicity and religion help to foment and escalate the
conflict in northern Nigeria?
Chapter Summary
This chapter covers an extensive literature review on the northern Nigeria ethnoreligious conflict, providing a historical background to the conflict, covering northern
Nigeria—pre-colonial and colonial to independence, and, the north at independence to
present. The chapter also reviewed the conceptual framework of genocide, covering its
definitions and origins, causes, typology and examples of genocide, alternative
methodological approaches in Genocide studies, and the prevention and punishment of
genocide. Finally, the chapter examines different theoretical perspectives including social
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cubism theory, elite theory, and relative deprivation theory to proffer an understanding of
the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. The theoretical framework also includes an
examination and application of the exclusionary ideology, hate theory, and social identity
theory, in explication of the genocidal underpinnings of the conflict.

Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction
The type of study is a mixed qualitative method involving content analysis and
grounded theory analytical approach which will be focused to address the core research
questions in order to gain insight on the possibility of genocidal inclinations to the ethnoreligious conflict in northern Nigeria. This section presents the research design and
discusses the rationale for adopting a qualitative methodological approach employing
content analysis for the study on the basis of the method’s apt application on previous
genocidal studies (Winton, 2008). This rationale is foregrounded by a section detailing
the underlying factors influencing the study. The next section presents an overview of
content analysis methodology and examines a number of content analytic studies. For
data analysis, the Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory technique will be used to
interpret and structure a theoretical model for the content analysis findings. The section
also presents the study’s methodological application, examines data sourcing and
collection, and outlines the procedures for data collection and data analysis.
Rationale for Content Analysis Methodology
The study employs a content analysis methodology which will involve analysis of
the texts available for carrying out the research and further, it adopts the grounded theory
analytical approach to present the theoretical framework for the content analysis. Content
analysis is defined as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences
from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004,
p. 18). Content analysis refers to “the manual or automated coding of documents,
transcripts, newspapers, or even of audio of video media to obtain counts of words,

161
phrases, or word-phrase clusters for purposes of statistical analysis” (Garson, 2008). It is
also recognized as the “analysis of the manifest and latent content of a body of
communicated material (as a book or film) through classification, tabulation, and
evaluation of its key symbols and themes in order to ascertain its meaning and probable
effect” (Weber as cited in Krippendorff, 2004, p. xvii). It is noted that content analysis
involves “the analysis of available text, but it applies also to analysis of ongoing
conversations that are part of a conflict-resolving process” (Druckman, 2005, p. 255).
The investigation of genocidal intent of a perpetrator group and establishment of
religious undertones to the northern Nigeria conflict from textual analyses of conflict
cases in newspapers, archives, and web data, places this study in a qualitative research
methodological framework. Genocide scholars have used varying qualitative and
quantitative methodologies for examining genocidal cases, for instance, the use of
ethology (Dutton, 2007); comparative case study (Vetlesen, 2005); social psychological
approaches (Newman & Erber, 2002); geographical mapping (Wood, 2001); also with
Hannah Arendt’s philosophical approach, C. Fred Alford’s psychological approach, and
Zygmunt Bauman’s sociological approach (Arendt; Alford; and Bauman as cited in
Vetlesen, 2005, p. 7). This qualitative study adopts a mixed content analysis methodology
for data analysis, and the Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory analytic technique
for theory development.
The study’s focus on exploring the plausibility of genocidal inclination and
religious undertone to the northern Nigeria conflict by analyzing texts, archives, and web
data on the conflict cases, presents the content analysis method as an analytical approach
that adequately serves the research goals. Using the techniques of content analysis
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enables the systematic organization of the research data and materials either for
comparative or time-series analyses. The content analysis qualitative method of inquiry is
appropriate for the study given its availability of a “wide range of investigative tools”
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 44). The Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory analytic
technique adequately frames the development of theory for the study.
Overview of Content Analysis Methodology
Potentially recognized as “one of the most important research techniques in the
social sciences” (Krippendorff, 2004. p. xiii), content analysis is conceptually a diffused
approach that can be transformed into any specific scope, with virtually all social
scientists seen in a sense as concerned with the analyzing of content. Its varied scope in
application is seen in studying original documents by historians, in analyzing case law
development by legal scholars, in evaluating congressional hearings proceedings by
political scientists, and in folk tales classification by anthropologists. Thus, “Wherever
symbolic behavior is being scrutinized, the analysis of content is involved” (Laswell as
cited in Janowitz, 1968, p. 647). As a research methodology, content analysis is used “for
the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon as
cited in Winton, 2008, p. 613). Its analytic technique enables the systematic organization
of material data for comparative, as well as time-series studies, and applies to the analysis
of texts, as well as ongoing conversations. Based on its flexibility of approach, content
analysis “can be applied to a wide variety of written or oral communications,” thus,
allowing communication content comparison by analysts across varied settings
(Druckman, 2005, p. 257).
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Content analysis as a research method “classifies textual material, reducing it to
more relevant, manageable bits of data” (Lewis-Beck as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 5), and
“uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text” (Stone et al.; and
Krippendorf as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 10). Hence, it therefore involves “any technique
for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified
characteristics of messages” (Holsti as cited in Druckman, 2005, p. 257). Such inferences
relate to the message sender(s), the message being sent, or the message audience, with the
inferential process rules varying based on the investigator’s substantive and theoretical
interests. The rubric of content analysis, however, comprises various approaches ranging
from “simple mechanical word counts to broad-gauged interpretations of themes”
(Druckman, 2005, p. 257). Furthermore, there is a distinction in content analysis
“between text and interaction process analysis,” with texts referring to “written
documents that describe activities that have taken place in the past” for which coding
decisions do not need much urgency as “the text can be read and reread at the
convenience of the analyst” (Druckman, 2005, p. 257). However, process analysis—
which involves “on-the-spot coding of statements made during interactions” and has its
tradition traceable to Bales’ developed coding system for small-group problem-solving
processes, unlike the analysis of text—has time urgency which needs coders’ conjunctive
process decision-making (Bale as cited in Druckman, 2005, p. 257).
Content analysis methodology can be applied with either quantitative or
qualitative data, adopting either a deductive or inductive approach for the purpose of
building “a model to describe the phenomenon in a conceptual form” (Elo & Kyngä,
2008, p. 107). While the deductive content analysis involves operationalizing the analytic
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structure on previous knowledge basis, the inductive approach applies to cases with
fragmented or no prior studies on the phenomenon. Thus, for the inductive content
analysis “the concepts are derived from the data,” while the deductive approach analysis
generally aims “to test a previous theory in a different situation or to compare categories
at different time periods” (Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 107). Both the deductive and inductive
analytic processes involve three core stages of preparation, organization, and reporting,
with a similarity in the preparation stage for both approaches (Elo & Kyngä, 2008).
Examples of studies in which content analysis has been employed in various
research settings abound, including the business ethics empirical studies which usually
rely on data that is self-reported with such reliance subject to criticism. Observing
interviews and questionnaire responses as being predisposed to the participant’s view of
whatever the researcher might be expecting to hear, or by unwillingness to discuss ethical
sensitive issues, as well as by recalling imperfectly, the study uses content analysis to
determine the extent to which business ethics relies on published research on
questionnaires and interviews. It further explores the likelihoods of secondary data usage,
involving newspaper reports and company documents as a source for applied ethics
empirical studies. Thus, employing content analysis, the study examines “the extent to
which the executive virtue of courage was observed or called for in items published in
four international daily newspapers,” as well as explores the papers attributed meaning to
“courage” (Harris, 2001, p. 191). Another study adopting content analysis approach
examines the type and quantity of articles of higher education in Boston’s two
metropolitan newspaper dailies over one month. In the study, articles were assigned and
measured to eight main categories of news, features, sports, columns, editorial pages,
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reviews, cutline photos, and news analysis (Quartararo, 1978, p. 151). The study’s results
showed both newspapers as having greater news spot stories of only few inches length
rather than the features in-depth articles covering current major higher education trends
and issues, while reviews, news articles analysis, columns, and editorials had little
coverage. It also showed well-known, most prestigious universities as receiving the
greatest coverage (Quartararo, 1978, p. 151).
Additionally, content analysis is used in a study to comparatively analyze “the
legislative summaries of three states, Nevada, Minnesota, and South Carolina in 1979,
1982/83, and 1985” (Zimmerman & Owens, 1989, p. 190) to show the marked difference
in substance and quantity of family legislation explicitly enacted by these states.
Differences which seem to mirror the political cultures are mirrored in the differences
identifying the three states: “Nevada, individualistic; Minnesota, moralistic; and South
Carolina, traditionalistic” (Zimmerman & Owens, 1989, p. 190). Given that family
policies enacted by the states are crucial to family professionals’ practice and to families,
such family professionals essentially need to actively ensure that the states they reside
and work in enact family life enhancing, rather than diminishing policies (1989, p. 190).
Another study recognizing more corporations as disclosing their environmental
performance’s information today, in responding to the demands of stakeholder for
environmental accountability and responsibility, explores the information disclosed on
corporate websites by analyzing the environmental management practices and policies of
the world’s largest 200 corporations. Employing content analysis “of environmental
reports of Fortune's Global 200 companies,” the study analyzes the environmental
disclosures content of corporate entities relative to seven areas involving “environmental
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planning considerations, top management support to the institutionalization of
environmental

concerns,

environmental

structures

and

organizing

specifics,

environmental leadership activities, environmental control, external validations or
certifications of environmental programs, and forms of corporate environmental
disclosures” (Jose & Lee, 2007, p. 307).
Also aiming to bridge a gap in methodology between two research traditions of
content analysis of news media and the analytic framework of policy sciences, another
study recognizes that Lasswell, in pioneering both the framework and the method
decades ago, argued their mutual benefits, noting only few researchers as having formally
linked them. Hence, the study uses content analysis of news media to inform analytic
research framework for policy studies, introduces its original categorical content analysis
system, explores the system studying 90 articles of national news on “stratospheric ozone
hole,” and compares the system with other news content examining systems (Howland,
Becker, & Prelli, 2006, p. 205). The study finds that its system using human coders is
adequately suited for mapping and describing social process trends surrounding the
Montreal Protocol development of the ozone treaty during the data sample, encompassed
phases of promotion, and intelligence gathering. It presents other systems of content
analysis as falling short in purpose and structure, and in fulfilling the promise the study
holds for policy scientists (Howland et. al., 2006, p. 205).
Furthermore, content analysis is used in examining a review’s principal assets in
the book entitled Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis
(Smith, et al. as cited in Simonton, 1994). This work involves a particularly
comprehensive treatment of the content analysis and thematic principal methods, and
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provides practice materials and coding manuals to aid researchers in mastering the
techniques. While emphasizing motivational variables, the study also provides strategies
for content analysis in other areas, such as interpersonal and cognitive domains, and
offers an important measurement literature contribution (Simonton, 1994, p. 603). It is
further observed that several content analytic studies which involve temporal data have
some measure of autocorrelation bias, the effect of which deflates or inflates the
significant differences possibly existing among the texts’ different parts being compared.
The proffered solution for this involves removing autocorrelation effects, even where not
significant statistically. It is noted that such statistical procedures as “Crosbie's (1993)
ITSACORR” can, at the least, remove first-order autocorrelation effects, and is usable
with a small sample. The SPSS (1994), AREG procedure, and the SAS (1993)
AUTOREG procedure can be used for detecting and removing first-order
autocorrelations, with the AUTOREG being capable of removing higher-order
correlations as well, with several methods now developed specifically for small samples
(Huitema & McKean as cited in Hogenraad, McKenzie, & Martindale, 1996/97, p. 433)
The study proffers examples of content analytic studies with autocorrelation and without
(Hogenraad et al., 1996/97, p. 433).
A detailed review of content analysis application in research involves a study on
the display of loyalty in China, based on the notion of sycophants’ plausible signaling of
affinity to a given leader to deter their being recruited by factional rivals into alternative
coalitions, thus, bearing the social cost of others despising them (Shih, 2008). It is
observed that in Communist China, top leaders engaged in factional politics encourage
subordinates to pander to them by launching personalist ideological campaigns, which
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provide junior officials with groveling opportunities while allowing senior leaders to
maintain a norm against them (Shih, 2008, p. 1177). Hence, the study hypothesizes that
even with a relatively weak, personality cult opposing norm, junior officials who
unashamedly praise a senior leader, project credible signs of violating such norm while
also incurring a political and social cost as a groveler (Shih, 2008). The study uses the
China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database with full-text searchable
capacity for 350 Chinese newspapers for the period spanning 2000 to 2004. The database
covers most of the provincial newspapers for the period (Shih, 2008, p. 1181). With this
database containing articles after 2000, the study is focused on “Three Represents” (TR)
(sange daibiao), an ideological campaign launched in 2000 by the Party’s Secretary
General (SG) calling for a transformation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCR) from
being a peasants’ and workers’ representative to an “all advanced social productive
forces” representative, including skilled professionals and private entrepreneurs. Content
analyses of the provincial newspapers which are the main mouthpieces of the provincial
party committees, and as such, capture the TR’s widest official activities range, the study
focuses on the SG’s TR campaign, inquiring on provincial faction members’ likely
echoing of their patron’s ideological campaign.
Utilizing the CNKI database, the researcher did an annual counting of the number
of provincial newspapers articles containing the phrase “Sange Daibiao” (Three
Represents), over the campaign period from 2000 to 2004. The count raises two
fundamental issues, firstly, of what this indicator captures, which basically is a given
newspaper’s willingness to publish TR related items, including TR article republication
of national publications, original campaign articles and editorials, provincial publications
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on the campaign policy statements and regulations, national and local coverage of
campaign activities and meetings, and publications of local leaders’ speeches and articles
on the campaign (Shih, 2008, p. 1182). Secondly, it raises an issue with the indicator
count involved, the campaign experiencing periods of ebbing and flowing based on the
highest level actions taken, and the average article number mentioning TR fluctuates
substantially annually. Thus, a 200 articles count, for example, in 2000 connotes a
different meaning from a 2003 same number count of articles. By content analyzing these
provincial newspapers, using “ordinary least squared” (OLS) and “panel-corrected
standard errors” (PCSE) estimations (Shih, 2008, p. 1185), the study examines whether
fiscal dependence, economic development, the provincial leader’s professional expertise,
or factional loyalty signaling need explicates the degree of echoing of the ideological
campaign, by the provincial leaders, and crafts “a measure of such ‘nauseating’ displays
of loyalty” or pandering activities in China (Shih, 2008, p. 1177). The study further
explores whether poor and rich locale faction members were different in their ways of
echoing the campaign. The findings showed the ideological campaigns constituting
radars enabling senior leaders’ discerning of the faction members loyalty. The findings
present economic backwardness, past affiliation with the SG, and propaganda work
experience as the key motivating factors for the provincial officers’ heaping of praises on
the SG’s ideology. Also, the SG’s followers in impoverished regions presented a greater
tendency of using the press in demonstration of their loyalty (Shih, 2008).
Validation of the study involved determining that “credible signaling is one of the
raison d’etre of ideological campaigns in China,” and required the derivation of a
measure for various junior officials’ response to senior leaders’ launched ideological
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campaigns (Shih, 2008, p. 1181). Chinese Communist systems’ features enabling
indicator construction included the interest in only ideological campaigns public
adulation displays for practical and theoretical reasons; the CCP’s ideological campaigns
are usually condensed to key media, widely used short phrases; and, every Chinese
province has one newspaper at least, being controlled by the department of provincial
propaganda directly, with the newspapers’ content monitored closely by the department,
as well as its standing committee members (Wu as cited in Shih, 2008, p. 1181). The
newspapers are also required to report on every official major event, and publish every
official important document, while publishing articles and editorials on a specific
ideological campaign; thus, their content analyzing would cover the provincial party
committee’s entire activities. This involved recording the frequencies of ideological
campaign key phrases in the provincial various newspapers, as indicator for capturing
how each province sought to enthusiastically echo the national campaigns ideology. With
the continuation of China’s authoritarian posture of closely monitoring the provincial
major newspapers’ content, every key phrase mentioning would be supportive of specific
ideological campaign, thus, the technical issue involved feasibly “reading and counting
articles in 30 provincial dailies over the course of 20 years of reform” (Shih, 2008, p.
1181).
An example of a genocide study using content analysis methodology is a study on
the Rwandan genocide analyzing published texts selection which provided interpretations
and quotations of perpetrators’ interviews with perpetrators, on the basis of their
containing information on the perpetrators’ and other actors’ construction and meaning
making of their actions (Berg; Feldman; and Weber as cited in Winton, 2008, p. 611).
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Analyzing the variables on the genocide, the study adopted the data evaluation processes
of “credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability” to measure the study’s
trustworthiness (Shenton; and Lincoln & Guba as cited in Winton, 2008, p. 611).
Creditability issues were addressed “by using accepted content analytic strategies,
searching multiple sources of perpetrator reports, analyzing previous research findings,
looking for negative cases, and presenting the research for peer review,” identifying only
one genocide, qualitative study linked to violentization theory (Rhodes as cited in
Winton, 2008, p. 611), and only the researcher’s genocide, quantitative study linked to
the circumplex model (Winton as cite in Winton, 2008, p. 611), in addition to a Bosnian
study using violentization and the circumplex model (Winton & Unlu as cited in Winton,
2008, p. 611). Presenting specific procedures of data collection, dependability issues
were addressed, while for confirmability, accounts supporting the circumplex model and
violentization were identified. The data were coded using the violentization theory and
circumplex model variables, and using the processes of “directed qualitative content
analysis” which involves developing of prior coding scheme before the analysis, the
study analyzed “how the collected data fit within the two theoretical models” (Hsieh &
Shannon as cited in Winton, 2008, p. 611).
Content Analysis Key Processes (Sourced from Weber, 1990). Textual
analysis for social science purposes is underlined with several problems, with inherent
difficulties fundamental to the content analytic processes involving, measurement,
indication, representation, and interpretation, which issues are examined below (Weber,
1990).
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Measurement. Measurement involves counting the meaning units occurrences
such as themes, phrases, specific words, and content categories (Weber, 1990). There are
two standard practices of measurement, irrespective of whether the coding of text is
manually done or by computers, and these are 1) usage of proportion or percentage
transformation for controlling the length of document (Namenwirth & Weber as cited in
Weber, 1990, pp. 71-72), and 2) counting every word occurrences or other meaning units
equally. Difficulties identified with each practice include, for the Percentage
Transformation, the specific problems of percentages and proportions having limited
range and being asymptotic, with the resultant measurement not being linear, e.g. a 5% to
10% increase not being same as a 60% to 65% increase (Weber, 1990, p. 72). Secondly,
with percentages variance and mean not independent, when used in variance designs
analysis as dependent variable, proportions become subjected to square root arcs in
transformation, a statistical procedure for making the variance and mean independent
(Freeman & Tukey; and Schuessler as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 72). Thirdly, there is an
indication of varied theoretical assumptions with different strategies of measurement. For
instance, a percentage distribution that is inconsistent with a secular concerned
hypothesis than that of sacred themes will linearly increase over time, thus, with farther
future extension, such trend will eventually exceed 100%. Thus, researchers are to take
cognizance of their measurement procedures in order to not conflict unwittingly with
their substantive theories, as well as methodological and epistemological assumptions.
Fourthly, many content analysis statistical procedures have distributional assumptions
which are likely to be violated with percentage distribution. For instance, content
analytical data are not likely to be normal multivariate or univariate. Thus, other than the
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use of proportions or percentages, some personal communication analysts have proffered
modeling content analysis frequency counts which is generated “as a Poisson process”
and basing the procedures of statistical estimation on such distribution (Weber, 1990, p.
72). Hence, most content-analytical studies have relied on curve-fitting, factor analysis,
ANOVA, and additional statistical procedures in combination with validation techniques
of validation based on examination of the original text (Weber, 1990).
For Counting Occurrences Equally, its standard practice of involving equally
counting the occurrence of each semantic unit given creates the problems, firstly, of all
the words classified in a particular category not reflecting the category in the same
magnitude; and secondly, of subsequent mentioning of a topic or category requiring more
effort than its first few mentioning (Weber, 1990, p. 73). Further expounding on this, it is
observed that content analysis measurement procedures “are based on frequency counts
of semantically equivalent textual units such as words, word senses, phrases, issues, or
themes” with the underlying procedures presented as “connotative categorical
equivalence” (Weber, 1990, p. 73). Textual units are recognized as “connotative
categorically equivalent” where they suggest or connote ideas, certain meanings, ideas,
etc., in addition to their primary or explicit meanings, such as, for instance, in a category
scheme with allowance and bonus classified in the WEALTH category because of their
sharing of a common connotation of economic matters (Weber, 1990, p. 73). While each
word classification in a given category should not of necessity equally represent the
content of the category, it is, however, desirable that each entry be counted equally given
a current procedural lack in validly and reliably assigning weights, thus, showing an
unequal category content representation for different entries of a particular category
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(Namenwirth & Weber as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 73). Another problem identified
involves investigators equally counting each occurrence of every entry in a given
category of a document. An example of this is, giving the same importance or weight to
an entry’s 25th occurrence in the AFFECTION category as its 5th or 125th occurrence
(Weber, 1990, p. 73).
Content analysts who primarily assume that a text containing more mentions of a
given category indicate a greater concern for it; however, it is noted that a word’s initial
mentioning requires more energy or effort than its successive mentions (Stone as cited in
Weber, 1990, p. 73). In other words, while it is noted that more effort or energy is
required to raise a new topic than to continue with a previous topic, continuing a topic
after succeeding mentions may up to a point, however, require more effort than less
(Weber, 1990). Reasons for this include stylistic considerations causing pronouns
substitution (Namenwirth & Weber as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 73); redundancy of
continuing category concern, causing a decline in information communicated with the
text continuing; with text length as contextual constraints, continuing focus on a theme,
category, or issue prevents focus on other issues; and where no contextual constraints
exist, text producing resources are finite, thus, text producers will basically allocate such
resources to various themes and issues (Weber, 1990, p. 73). It is also noted that it may
also be wrong to think of zero mentions as requiring no effort, since refraining from
mentioning could also involve much effort given the Freudian notion of urges of
unconscious ego driving and causing us to repress others and ourselves for maintaining
civilization (Weber, 1990).
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Indication. Indication refers to the researcher’s inferences made of some text
latent or unmeasured characteristics using numbers for representing some of the text’s
manifest aspect (Weber, 1990, pp. 73-74). For example, factor analysis, for instance, is
often used for inferring textual theme. Critics are, however, observed as arguing that
indication questions the validity and reliability of every inference on the text’s latent
characteristics, or of that kind of inferences without accompanying detailed semantic and
syntactic information (Weber, 1990). However, two aspects of indication are important
involving, first, “the rationale for analyzing latent characteristics of the text at all; and
second, “the latent characteristics of texts that may not be discernible through detailed
semantic analysis without quantification” (Weber, 1990, p. 74).
Statistical procedures often in use in social science studies—including factor
simple correlations, structural equation models, and factor analysis—assume that latent or
unmeasured variables are existent. As often applicable to content analysis, the entire
document is the unit of analysis in such statistical procedures (Saris-Gallhofer et al. as
cited in Weber, 1990, p. 74). Hence, latent variables specify the entire text’s or other
analytic or coding unit (e.g. document sections, chapters, or paragraphs’ features), with
such latent-variable models raising interesting possibilities and problems seldom found in
social studies (Mohler as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 74). For example, mental states which
validate the results interpretation cannot be observed directly in mental ideas latentindicator models which, given the relational problems between behavior and attitudes,
attitudes cannot be inferred from behavior. However, the relationship between the
original text that is being analyzed and the latent variables can be examined by the
researcher in content analysis. Reasons for quantification concerns on observable texts
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and models of latent-indicator are firstly, that counting generated results enable more
precise textual comparisons; secondly, that it informs on the extent of attention relatively
given to issues; and thirdly, that procedures of quantitative analysis usually reveal
differences and similarities among texts which would otherwise be virtually impossible to
detect. Examining an observable text is essential for improving the validation and
interpretation of its substantial findings (Weber, 1990, p. 74). It is, however, noted that
issues are rarely explicitly stated in documents, but rather are “merely” indicated, thus,
the semantic information’s value in constricted contexts reflect the important fact that
content-analytic procedures restricted to explicitly stated themes would categorically
miss several of such important indications (Weber, 1990, p. 76).
Representation. Representation refers to the analysis of content in which the
researcher “views data as representations…of texts, images, and expressions that are
created to be seen, read, and acted on for their meanings,…and, [to] be analyzed with
such uses in mind” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. xiii). Representation is, thus, a means of
classifying “the meaning of words, phrases, or other textual units…into a set of
categories” (Weber, 1990, p. 77). Critics of this form of text classification raise the issue
of the procedure’s non-utilization of text or language essential semantic features or
syntactic in the analysis, on the basis that the coding procedures of both the computer and
human-based systems “do not encode or represent the richness of language or of specific
texts” (Weber, 1990, p. 77). It is, however, observed that by categorizing meaning units,
not all the nuances or connotations of meaning are pertinent, and this is without insisting
on the more fine-grained, linguistic distinctions other than the categorized distinctions,
thus, having the classification procedures “safely ignore irrelevant distinctions” (Weber,
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1990, p. 77). On the issue of determining what distinction is relevant, however, it is noted
that a differentiation of the various homograph senses can be made by the General
Inquirer’s improved computer system version developed in the 1970s by Stone and
colleagues (Kelly & Stone; and Zuell, Weber, & Mohler as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 77).
An example of this is distinguishing the meaning of state with its varied connotations,
and the word frame as a noun or as a verb. The “disambiguation” (Kelly & Stone as cited
in Weber, 1990, p. 77) of words for its varied meanings is possible, therefore, it is argued
that “not every shade of meaning or nuance, however, will be relevant to a particular
investigation…Convenience and parsimony are important factors in deciding how much
detail to maintain” (Weber, 1990, p. 77).
Interpretation. Interpretation refers to the translation of “one set of linguistic or
linguistically expressed elements into another” (Namenwirth & Weber as cited in Weber,
1990, p. 78), with such “mapping” procedure or translation raising several difficulties
(Weber, 1990, p. 78). For instance, in an analysis of British Throne Speeches from 1689–
1972 (Namenwirth & Weber; and Weber as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 78), each
document’s content analytic procedures produced quantitative processes of issues
assigned to different content categories. A subsequent analysis of such quantitative data
postulated an existence of themes or political issues which periodically recurred in the
texts. Underlying a theme or issue is the interpretation of the text itself, and it is noted
that “the process of interpretation constitutes translation from one language to another
(Namenwirth & Weber as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 78), and mainly involves mapping the
semantic and syntactic structures which the text is comprised of in its first language into
valid structures of the second which convey the first language’s meaning (Weber, 1990).
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Given the difficult process of translation (Steiner as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 78),
however, a validity checking procedure referred to as “back-translation” exists (Weber,
1990, p. 78). This involves translating back the text from the “target language” to the
original language, and comparing the original with this translation, with the first
translation considered valid when the original text and the back-translation are alike.
Such translations are reversible or bidirectional, with the capability of reconstructing the
original text once the text is translated into a second language (Weber, 1990).
However, transformations that are unidirectional or irreversible usually map
textual content into theoretical, more abstract structures, and the specialized language for
the analysis of content is often the social science theory (theories) which the researcher
uses for interpreting the text, as well as for explaining its substantive results. Hence, the
mapping involved is from the text’s many words into fewer and more abstract categories,
and into relations suggested by the theory” with the analyst determining “the principal
theoretical and conceptual frameworks for labeling the common underlying issue”
(Weber, 1990, p. 79). There is, however, no one-to-one theory, and text mapping and the
text-to-theory translation is irreversible. An instance of choosing to interpret a given
phenomenal underlying issue with the notion of Bales and Parsons’ integrative concerns,
which focuses mainly on coordination of the various societal subgroups coordination
(Namenwirth & Weber; Bales; Parsons; and Parsons & Bales as cited in Weber, 1990, p.
79), can enable the generation of an infinite quantity of excerpts with Bales/Parsons’
integrative themes interpretation sense. Thus, the text-to-theory mapping cannot be
validated by the means of the back-translation strategy.
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Given, however, that differing theoretical or even antithetical frameworks can be
adopted for interpreting the texts, it is recognized that there is an availability of diverse
interpretations and the researcher has to choose with the quest to search for “true” or
“valid” interpretation deemed fruitless (Weber, 1990, p. 79). Hence, “it is not the validity
of an interpretation per se that is at issue, but rather the salience of an interpretation given
one or another theory” (Slater as cite in Weber, 1990, pp. 79-80). Furthermore, given the
truth of quantitative data not speaking for themselves, e.g. the radical empiricism doctrine
being false, so is the truth “that texts do not speak for themselves either,” and the
speaking must be done by the analyst using “the language of theory” (Weber, 1990, p.
80).
Methodological Application for the Study
This study involves the content analysis of texts which is done for the purposes of
description or for drawing inferences. Such inferences are made in a research design
context that “ensures that the data gathering, analysis and interpretation are integrated”
(Holsti as cited in Druckman, 2005, p. 258). Content analytical tools can be applied to the
process of conflict analysis and resolution over a time period, with such tools comprising
the methodological decisions to be made in investigating the research problem, and like
every other research methodology, the analysis of content involves technical procedures
that require analytic decisions. First is deciding on the materials to code, and determining
such issues as the availability of sufficient materials for describing the phenomenon, and
to draw inferences on its influencing factors, as well as determine whether other methods
can be used for investigating the phenomenon (Druckman, 2005). Thus, the fundamental
technical analytic issues involve deciding on “the unit of text to be coded, the categories
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to be used, conducting reliability checks, and ways of combining codes for analysis”
(Druckman, 2005, p. 255). A tasks checklist adapted from Druckman’s (2005) Technical
Issues for the Content Analyst is detailed below for organizing the study (p. 256).
Following the checklist is a content analysis performance model for implementation
within a research design context Druckman (2005) to serve as guide for the study.
Content Analysis Checklist. (Adapted from Druckman, 2005, pp. 264-265)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.

Construct a research design as study guide.
Formulate research questions for evaluation by the analysis.
Develop a content analysis system’s conceptual framework.
Define the system’s categories.
Develop the categories coding rules (to be regarded as operational definitions).
Identify the (often verbal) material universe for making inferences (can include original data
collecting).
Design a (random) sampling frame for choosing the coding materials (from the universe).
Decide the unit of analysis – whether on meaning or thematic units.
Conduct reliability analyses of the independent coders on a sampling of the material.
Pretest the rules of coding to assess the simplicity of the application, and its face validity.
Revise coding rules and the categories based on the analysis of reliability and pretests.
Engage coders that are not cognizant of the research propositions or design.
Educate coders on criteria of reliability and confidence.
Prepare forms for final coding and code the material selected.
Aggregate data on basis of relevant categories for analysis.
Conduct sensitivity analyses for comparing results with varied categories aggregations.
Conduct statistical analyses or other qualitative evaluation of the data aggregated.
Correlate the variables coded with other collected study data. Interpret results of the analyses,
determine implications for the research question(s), and make inferences from the sampled
materials to the universe they were drawn from.
Prepare the report to include the research problem as well as the content analysis system’s learned
lessons.

Figure 1. Content Analysis Checklist.
Content Analysis Stages.
Stage I – Categorization. The model’s first two components (checklist steps 1-2)
deal with design issues and formulation of the research question or hypothesis, and are
followed by three aspects (checklist steps 3-5) of content analysis construction system
(Druckman, 2005). Content analysis basically involves classifying the texts many words
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into content categories that are much fewer, with each category plausibly consisting of a
single or several words, and such textual units of words, phrases, etc., classified into a
specific category are recognized as having the same meanings (Weber, 1990). Such
similarity could derive from the words’ precise meaning, for example, synonyms grouped
together, or from words with shared meanings or connotations, for example, several
words that imply concern for a concept are grouped together, as in POWER, or
WEALTH, based on the purpose of study (with categories specified, however, in lower
case) (Weber, 1990, p. 13). The categories of the system are connected with the
theoretical background by a conceptual framework, with the categories recognized as
efforts at operationalizing the concepts, and rules for coding defined in terms of the
categories definitive terms, for example, defining threats as connotative of negative
consequences (Druckman, 2005). It is essential that the classification process be
consistent and reliable in order for valid inferences are made from the text with different
people similarly coding the same text. The classification system is also required to
generate valid variables with a variable regarded as valid to the extent of its measuring or
representing what the researcher intends that it measures (Weber, 1990).
Stage II – Sampling / Data Collection for the Study. The checklist next steps (68) deal with the textual materials that are for coding. A problem also develops with
having too much material for coding based on the resources available, in which case a
sampling strategy will be developed. Thus, with the relevant study material availability
often either insufficient or too voluminous for analysis, the use of random sampling
design is recommended where there is an abundance of materials, such as in memoranda
or transcripts from a multi-year dialogue. For instance, the representation of each strata or
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time period in the analysis can be ensured by use of stratified sampling (Druckman,
2005). When carefully done, sampling produces the confidence “that the coded material
represents the larger extended” phenomenon or issue problem “within which the sampled
material is embedded” (Druckman, 2005, pp. 260-261).
Hence, a fundamental issue in qualitative research is the adequacy of the
evidential data used, or the “extensiveness of the body of evidence used as data (Erickson
as cited in Creswell, 2007, p. 289). Data sourcing for the study involved texts from
newspapers articles on the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria spanning the
period from 1966 to present collected from different databases and various newspapers’
websites. The study uses newspaper articles from different databases with full-text
searchable capacity for Nigeria newspapers including The New York Times (1923Current file); ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009),
LexisNexis, and different newspaper websites including New York Times, British
Broadcasting Corporation, AllAfrica News, and Nigerian newspaper websites, local and
foreign including, Guardian Newspapers, Daily Times of Nigeria, Vanguard Newspapers,
New Nigerian Newspaper, Punch, etc. A comprehensive listing of the Study Data
Sources of the Newspaper Articles Used for the Study is provided after the References
section of the study. The various newspaper websites and databases used for the study
covered most of the newspaper reported cases of the conflict for the study period from
1966 to present. With these databases and the newspaper websites containing articles
with some dating backward from 1850 to present, such as The New York Times archives,
the study is focused on the ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. Utilizing the
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newspaper articles from these databases and newspaper websites, the researcher used
Nvivo software for the content analysis of the data for the study.
Stage III – Unit of Analysis. The next step is deciding on the unit of analysis, and
this involves weighing the benefits and disadvantages of using either smaller or larger
analytical units. The coding unit is the meaning unit undergirding the research purpose,
and involves issues of “the size of the unit and how it will be counted,” and this ranges
“from single words or sentences to large sections of text” (Druckman, 2005, p. 261).
Thus, the analytic unit for content analysis could either be a word(s), sentence, or a
textual chunk (Druckman, 2005), and based on the research question, the unit of analysis
could also be a letter, some pages of text, a number of discussion participants, or
discussion time used (Robson; and Polit & Beck as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 108),
with the choice of contents to analyze also guided by the research question and study aim
(Robson as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 108). Using a meaning unit comprising more
than a sentence and which contains several meanings compounds the analysis process,
making it challenging and difficult (Catanzaro; and Graneheim & Lundman as cited in
Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 108). Also, using a too narrow unit of analysis, such as one word,
may lead to fragmentation (Graneheim & Lundman as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p.
108). Decisions on the size of the unit involve trade-offs between reliability and validity,
and usually “the smaller the unit, the more reliable the coding,” while also “the larger the
unit, the better the chance of capturing connected themes” and the wider context
(Druckman, 2005, p. 261). Validity is, thus, enhanced with the broader frame or context
actually captured, as well as with the coding categories reflecting a range of variations.
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Stage IV – Coding. The checklist next steps (9-14) deal with the process of
coding, and this begins with a sample of the material being independently coded by a
minimum of two coders. The categories’ reliability is contingent on the extent of the
coders’ agreeing on the categories’ assignments, and their assigning of same unit to same
category indicates agreement. Such results will provide the researcher with guidance
regarding basic meanings and simplicity of use. Revisions can be made to the
categories/definitions for improving the coding system, with such new categories also
tested for reliability. The checklist next steps involve engaging and training about two
more coders and also preparing forms for use in the coding final process. Coders’
selection criteria include remoteness from the study and its assumptions, coding
experience, and adequate training result. While coding decisions have no accuracy
criterion and have answers that are neither right nor wrong, coders can, however, indicate
the extent of confidence they have in their coding decisions, as well as discuss the
reasoning behind their decisions, particularly when differences emerge between coders
(Druckman, 2005). When the coding decisions are all made, the data has been prepared
for analysis, and this can be done in various ways ranging from in depth time series to
generally interpretative narrative.
Stage V – Data Analysis. The next technical decision deals with the manner of
using codes in analysis, and involves the issue of “aggregation-disaggregation” whereby
the coding unit emphasizing meaning differs from the analytic unit emphasizing
relationships and patterns (Druckman, 2005, p. 261). For example, threat frequency used
in negotiation is a tough posturing indicator, with others being attacks, accusations,
warnings, commitments, and ultimatums, combining such categories to form a
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“toughness” index, and also, “soft posturing” indicated by acceptances, accommodations,
arguments, and promises, which support the “other’s positions, the combining of their
categories of which forms a “softness” index (Druckman, 2005, p. 261). Thus, the first
decision involves whether or not to combine the coding categories into a bigger unit,
depending on the conceptualization of the research problem, under steps 1-3. For
example, all the different kinds of codes on a concept of interest can be combined into a
single index. The differential coding of the concept’s separate kinds has the advantage of
enabling the distinction among the different kinds of the concept used. Hence,
aggregated, as well as disaggregated, analysis can be done (Druckman, 2005).
Combining categories can be done in several ways, and the implications of the
decisions of different aggregations can be generated by means of sensitivity analysis
involving comparison of results obtained from same analysis carried out using different
aggregations. With the decision on aggregation made and providing for the plausibility of
no categories’ aggregation, the data analysis can begin (Druckman, 2005). If the coding
of the textual data is chronologically ordered, a time-series varied analyses is adequate,
where time is inconsequential, and thematic interpretations or cross-sectional correlations
are then relevant (Druckman, 2005). The analyses are framed within the research
design/assumptions context formulated before constructing the content analytical system
(Druckman, 2005). Efficiency is recognized as one benefit of codes aggregation, with the
analysis focusing on one variable rather than on many. Aggregation is also useful in
comparative analysis. Its methodological critique is the disadvantage of the loss of
distinctions among conceptual types. Both disaggregated and aggregated trends analyses
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can, however, be performed by coding the various components of these concepts’ or
meaning unit’s various components (Druckman, 2005, p. 262).
Hence, while there are different approaches to the rubric of content analysis, this
study utilizes the content analysis approach of thematic coding and “broad-gauged
interpretations of themes” (Druckman, 2005, p. 257). The study employed the use of
NVivo 9 software, which is data analysis software that is designed for the organization
and analysis of unstructured information or data, for drawing inferences, and making
informed decisions. NVivo provides a workspace that enables the researcher keep close
to source data at every stage of the project, from data collection and organizing through
analysis and reporting. The study’s content analytic trail using Nvivo 9 software involves
initial word frequency queries followed by Nvivo coding of the units of analysis into
emerging themes, categorization and aggregation of themes into nodes for observation of
emergent patterns and themes for making inferences. Data analysis for the study involved
examining, categorizing, and coding which, in turn, involved data evidence
recombination for the purpose of addressing the core research question of the genocidal
proclivity. The analysis focused primarily on the key variables of conflict parties, conflict
causation, and intentionality. The analysis of the data content involves in-depth thematic
analysis in which each theme traced back to the research question to ensure that it has
been answered, using a generic thematic analysis, inductive model. The data were taken
apart with meanings given to parts regarded as essential and reducing misconceptions in
the analysis of unfamiliar phenomenon was assured by drawing systematically from past
knowledge (Creswell, 2007).
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Furthermore, the strategy of categorized aggregation strategy was used in finding
meanings to multiple instances, as well as for direct interpreting of meanings, focusing on
particular instances. The meaning findings enabled the searching out of consistency
patterns or “correspondence” for a better understanding of the conflict cases (Stake, 1995,
p. 78). Additionally used is the triangulation of claims and essential data requiring
validation. Lastly, line coding was used to discover categories or strong patterns, which
are followed by organizing the analysis and interpreting the meaning of the examined
conflict cases (Creswell, 2007, p. 75). Thus, this analytic process involves the
researcher’s effort “to make sense of the data and to learn ‘what is going on’” (Morse &
Field as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 109), “and obtain a sense of whole” (Tesch; and
Burnard as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 109). It is crucial to note that “interpretations
of statistical manipulations based on quantified text must be validated by reference to the
text itself” (Weber, 1990, p. 62), as examining the texts provides evidence for or against
the interpretations, while also suggesting the need for revising or discarding of the
factor’s initial interpretation. Hence, upholding the radical empiricism doctrine (the data
or texts speak for themselves) as untrue, it is observed that “the content analyst
contributes factual and theoretical knowledge to the interpretation” (Namenwirth &
Weber as cited in Weber, 1990, p. 62).
Ethics and Reflexivity
This study involves the analysis of textual data on the conflict cases and does not
involve human subjects. The approval of the Nova Southeastern University Research
Institutional Review Board (IRB) for ensuring the protection of human subjects was,
therefore, not required for the research. However, reflexivity has been employed to
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address the issue of trustworthiness and subjectivity of the study. It is essential to
examine trustworthiness for the purpose of ensuring reliability in a qualitative study, as
Golafshani (2003) observes that “reliability and validity are conceptualized as
trustworthiness, rigor and quality in qualitative paradigm” (p. 604). The inferences that are

derived from the coding are crucially important, involving a trade-off between the
accuracy (reliability) of coding and the coding categories’ meaning (validity) (Druckman,
2005, p. 258). This trade-off deals with decisions of either developing original systems
of content analysis or adopting categories that others have used in similar applications.
Original systems are understood to have preference for validity, as does the emic research
design which favors original categories, while the adapted systems stress reliability and
align with the emic tradition which prefers standard categories. Also, in original designs,
the categories are created to capture the phenomenon’s essence, and they are interlinked
with the data, with comparison not being the analytical purpose (Druckman, 2005).
Hence, validity refers to the defined meaning in the single case context, while reliability
is underlined by the required specialized knowledge for coding the case materials. The
etic tradition’s preference for standard categories assumes an independence of the coding
categories from the data, as well as for the purposes of making comparisons and results
generalizability. With no specialized knowledge required for the application of the
categories to process or the textual material, reliability is to that extent strengthened
(Druckman, 2005).
This qualitative content analytic study has ensured reliability and validity by
means of triangulation, which helped address the issue of researcher’s bias, as well as
increase the study’s truthfulness on its propositions. The use of triangulation is essential
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for achieving reliability and validity in research from the perspectives of the qualitative
researcher, and for eliminating bias and increasing truthfulness on proposition(s)
regarding the social phenomenon being examined (Denzin as cited in Golafshani, 2003).
Triangulation procedure used for the study involves searching “for convergence among
multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories” (Creswell &
Miller as cited in Golafshani, 2003, p. 604). Furthermore, the study’s analytic process and
results involved providing adequate detailed descriptions to give “a clear understanding
of how the analysis was carried out and its strengths and limitations” (GAO as cited in
Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 112). This involves dissecting the process of analysis and the
results’ validity, recognizing that while the “elements of validity in content analysis are
universal to any qualitative research design there are additional factors to take into
consideration when reporting the process of analysis and the results” (Elo & Kyngä,
2008, p. 112).
Thus, the study’s results are the categories’ described contents, which are the
categories meaning frames with the description of the categories’ content done through
subcategories (Marshall & Rossman as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008). The categories
created from the study are conceptualized in essence, and grounded empirically (Dey
1993) with the study data analyzed and formed into simplified categorical forms that
reliably reflect the study phenomena (Kyngä & Vanhanen as cited in Elo & Kyngä,
2008). The effectiveness of the categories in covering the data additionally speaks to the
research findings credibility (Graneheim & Lundman as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008),
with the use of defensible inferences making based on reliable and valid data collection
for the study (Weber as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008). Furthermore, the researcher

190
demonstrated links between the data and the results in order to increase the reliability of
the study (Polit & Beck as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008), hence, addressing the need for
detailed description of the analytic process in reporting the findings.
Additionally, the study uses tables and appendices for demonstrating the links
between the results and the data, based on the need of the study’s findings and
“demonstration is needed of the reliability of the findings and interpretations to enable
someone else to follow the process and procedures of the inquiry” (Elo & Kyngä, 2008,
p. 112). Furthermore, the study’s trustworthiness has been increased by means of
authentic citations, while also providing information on the data sourcing or the kinds of
data categories originally formulated (Patton; and Sandelowski as cited in Elo & Kyngä,
2008, p. 112). It is, however, also essential to note that the use of software programs for
analyzing qualitative data can enable a more ordered and manageable content analysis of
the study while also facilitating new analytic levels (Gerbic & Stacey as cited in Elo &
Kyngä, 2008, p. 113). However, too much compression of the qualitative data may lose
the essence of maintaining the narrative materials’ integrity in the analysis phase, and
where “the conclusions are merely summarized without including numerous supporting
excerpts, the richness of the original data disappears” (Elo & Kyngä, 2008, pp. 113-114).
Data Analysis and Presentation of Results
Following the successful completion of data collection and coding, the content
analysis of the study data using Nvivo 9 data analysis software is presented in Chapter 4.
The study utilizes content analysis methodology in analyzing published newspaper texts
on the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria from 1966 to present, which provided
the thematic insights on the actions of the perpetrators, and on occasions, the
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perpetrators’ claiming responsibility for the killings, sometimes with reasons stated for
their actions, the basis on which valid inferences have been drawn using a set of
procedures (Druckman, 2005; Krippendorf, 2004). The study period is classified into five
phases of 1966 to 1976; 1976 to 1987; 1987 to 1996; 1996 to 2005; and 2006 to present,
delineated on the basis of operative regional or states creation structure in the country
over the period. And, using NVivo 9 software, the sourced study data in these five phases
were imported into the software and coded into Nodes which are containers that enable
the gathering of related material together so that emerging patterns and ideas can be seen.
The nodes were created and organized into themes for attacks, causal factors, conflict
parties, effects or consequences, perpetrators and targets, or victims of attack, the basis
on which a theoretical model for determining proclivity to genocide is developed using
the Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory techniques.
The discussion of the results and findings of the analysis are presented in Chapter
5, and addresses the findings in light of the study’s main research question of genocidal
inclination in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict in each of the five phases of
the study. The second research question of the extent to which religion foments and
escalates the conflict is also addressed in Chapter 5. The findings are presented in
narrative form for a better understanding of the phenomena (Yin, 1994) to ensure that the
study results convey the interpreting and meaning findings of the conflict cases
(Creswell, 2007), as derived from the consistency of categories or strong patterns (Stake,
1995) over the study’s five phases, based on the application of the genocidal proclivity
theoretical model developed in the study using the Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded
theory techniques.
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Summary
Intermittent gruesome killings have been and remain a key feature of the ethnoreligious conflict in northern Nigeria for decades with several causation factors identified,
with little or no significant emphasis on the genocidal undertone to the conflict. This
study further investigates the ethno-religious dimension to determine the plausibility of
genocidal inclinations to the continued, intermittent, and atrocious killings in northern
Nigeria employing a qualitative content analysis methodology of the conflict cases
spanning from 1966 to present using Nvivo coding and data analysis. Content analysis
methodology is ideally suited for analyzing the sensitive and intricate phenomena of
genocidal intent in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. The benefit of the
method lies in the enormous volumes of conflict cases textual data from varied textual
sources that will be collated for use as corroborating evidence for the study. Content
analysis has particularly served as an important means of proffering phenomenal
evidence in the qualitative paradigm on genocide studies, as well as dealing on sensitive
topics such as in nursing research (Elo & Kyngä, 2008). The limitations of content
analysis involve issues of the research questions being too extensive or ambiguous, as
well as the problem of researcher bias which is a generic qualitative methodological
limitation (Elo & Kyngä, 2008). These limitations have been addressed in the study using
different and multiple data sources, and triangulation of assertions and essential data
requiring validation (Golafshani, 2003).
The data analysis processes of examining, categorizing, and coding through data
evidence recombination utilizes Nvivo coding of emerging themes, categorization and
aggregation of themes into nodes for observing of emergent patterns, and themes for
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making inferences. The analysis of the data content involves an in-depth thematic
analysis, with each theme traced back to answering the research question using a generic
thematic analysis, inductive model, to reduce misconceptions in the analysis by drawing
systematically from past knowledge (Creswell, 2007). The analysis focuses primarily on
the key variables of conflict parties, conflict causation, and intentionality for the purpose
of addressing the core research question of the genocidal proclivity. Based on the
categories’ consistency and strong patterns (Stake, 1995) over the study’s five phases, a
theoretical model for determining proclivity to genocide has been developed using the
Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory techniques for building theory with a
substantive theory also developed in the study. The data analysis results are presented in
Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 outlines the discussion of the findings in the different phases of
the study addressing the research question.

Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Presentation
Introduction
Nigeria as a nation-state is faced with a myriad of complex problems involving
different variables and stakeholders, with the country having experienced economic
downturn, political upheavals, coups d’état, civil war, and a deluge of ethno-religious
conflicts. These conflicts have predominated northern Nigeria, with the Middle Belt
region, primarily Jos in Plateau state and such other cities as Kano in Kano state, Kaduna
in Kaduna state, and Maiduguri in Borno state, being the zones of conflict where mass
killings and exterminations have persistently been sporadic for decades, primarily
between Muslims and Christians or non-Muslims. Accordingly, Ahiante observes that:
The first ethno-religious crisis was said to have been recorded before the nation
got its independence. It was in 1953. Another followed in 1966, 80, 85, 91, 95,
99, 2001 and 2004. But from 1987 to date ethno-religious crises have become
common phenomena in the northern parts of Nigeria. The most offending states
being Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, Taraba and Plateau. Between 1987 and 2004
thousands of people have lost their lives and property worth billions of naira
destroyed. (2004, para. 26)
These problems have been viewed from different perspectives ranging from
economic, political, religious, cultural, and ethnic among others, with several studies
linking the prevalence of conflicts in these northern Nigeria areas to such factors as
poverty, retarded development, and political factors, as well as religious and ethnicity
factors as undergirding the waves of killings in the region. This study explores the
probability of genocidal undertone to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict.
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The study derives from the qualitative research tradition and employs a content
analysis methodology involving the analysis of available texts on the conflict cases
spanning from the 1966 pogrom in which massacres of thousands of Igbos were
massacred in the north up to present, on-going ethno-religious killings in northern
Nigeria. The content analysis processes involve categorizing, coding, and evaluation of
the textual themes for making of inferences. Through analysis of the content of the
newspaper articles which are the reported cases of the ethno-religious conflicts in
Northern Nigeria, the study focuses on causation and intentionality behind the protracted
and wanton killings to inquire on the plausibility of genocidal inclinations to the killings.
The emergent categories and nodes or coding themes from the data over the different
phases of the study have been used to develop a model for determining inclination to
genocide. Figure 1 presents a Theoretical Model for Determining the Inclination or
Proclivity to Genocide that is developed from the analysis of the study data using the
Strauss and Corbin (1990) grounded theory techniques.
Overview and Logic for Data Analysis
The grounded theory technique developed by Strauss and Corbin (1990) is an
analytical tool for examining the phenomenon being studied which is the core category or
central idea of the research with which other categories in the study are related. These
other categories are causal conditions which lead to the phenomenon; the contextual
framework in which the phenomenon developed; the intervening conditions for the
phenomenon; the strategies mapped out for the phenomenon to develop; and the
consequences or outcomes of the phenomenon. In the northern Nigeria ethno-religious
conflict, these categories have been identified as (1) causal conditions of phenomena
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relating to genocidal proclivity, which include (i) immediate or trigger factors, (ii)
underlying or root causes, and (iii) perceived threat of the “otherness,” and (iv) exclusive
ideological framing; (2) phenomena resulting from trigger factors, underlying causation,
perceived threat of the “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing; (3) context in
which ethno-religious conflict and genocidal proclivity developed; (4) intervening
conditions influencing proclivity to genocide; (5) strategies of attack foreshadowing
proclivity to genocide; and (6) consequences or effects of proclivity to genocide.
Drawing from the Strauss and Corbin (1990) analytic tool, the study has developed a sixpart grounded theoretical model for determining proclivity to genocide in the northern
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, and this is presented in Figure 1.
Research Question
Gruesome killings have remained on-going phenomena in the ethno-religious
conflict in northern Nigeria in which colossal loss of life and property has continued to
occur, albeit in a sporadic and intermittent manner. With the focus of this study being to
inquire on the proclivity towards genocide in the conflict, the research questions are
constructed specifically to determine: Are there genocidal inclinations to the ethnoreligious conflict in northern Nigeria? And furthermore, to what extent does the interplay
between ethnicity and religion help to foment and escalate the conflict in northern
Nigeria?
Data Analysis
In the analysis of the study data involving content analysis of newspaper articles
reported cases in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, the study focuses on
causation and intentionality behind the protracted and wanton killings to inquire on the
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plausibility of genocidal inclinations to the killings. The emergent categories and nodes
or coding themes from the study data are presented with the details of the coding list for
the study summary provided in Appendix B. Appendix C lists A-E contain the coding
lists for the five phases of the study delineated from 1966 to 1987; 1987 to 1996; 1996 to
2005; and 2006 to present.
Given the consistency of the emerging patterns (Stake, 1995) from the Nvivo
software coding and analysis of the study data, these emerging patterns have been used to
develop a theoretical model to explore the study’s meaning frame (Creswell, 2007) which
involves the determination of the plausibility genocidal inclination to the northern
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict over the study’s delineated five phases.
Findings
The grounded theory model for determining proclivity to genocide in the northern
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict deriving from the theoretical framework of Strauss and
Corbin (1990) and developed from this study is presented in Figure 1. This findings
section has two parts. Findings Part I presents the model for determining proclivity to
genocide covering the model’s six-part components. Part II of the Findings is the
application of study data over to the model for genocidal proclivity over the five study
phases. This part delineates the context and synopsis of the study’s five phases with an
application of the genocide proclivity model’s six-thronged components to each phase.
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Findings Part I: Presentation of Model for Determining Proclivity to Genocide
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena
Relating to Genocidal Proclivity
Four types of causal conditions which lead ultimately to genocidal proclivity
emerged from the data. These causation factors include (i) immediate or trigger factors,
(ii) underlying or root causes, (iii) perceived threat of the “otherness, and (iv) exclusive
ideological framing.
Immediate or trigger factors to the conflict consist of the various issues which
may be related or unrelated to the parties in conflict but form the basis from which the
killing spree sparks. Trigger factors identified as “catalytic” (Suganami as cited in
William, 2011, p. 6) “refer to those factors which generate actions…that represent the
conscious choices of particular actors to engage in…violence” (William, 2011, p. 6).
Such trigger factors identified in the study include: the first coup d’état of January 1966
and the killing of mainly northern army officers in the coup; reprisal mission, revenge or
counter-coup; massacres of Ibos and returning refugees; secession and self-determination
(Garrison, 1968a, 1968b); insurgency, uprising or anti-government riots; anti U.S.-led
Afghanistan air strikes (“Violent,” 2001); arrests or persecution of fundamentalist sect
members, religious extremism and violence or other fundamentalists activities; electionrelated and engineered violence; Islam degraded, desecration and/or misinterpretation of
Koran (Brooke, 1987a 1987b), the Danish Cartoon and the Miss World Publications
(Mcveigh, 2002).
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The second set of causal conditions comprises underlying or root causes to the
conflict which have become entrenched into the relational fabric of the conflict parties.
Underlying causes defined as “permissive” (Suganami as cited in William, 2011, p. 6)
“identify disposition which make organized violence more likely, [but] do not…explain
why wars [or violence] break out in some cases where these underlying factors are
present but not in others (William, 2011, p. 6). Underlying causes are the factors that
make a conflict intractable (Hauss, 2003). Such underlying causation identified in the
study include: historical factors; colonial influences, exploitation and fear of
balkanization; culture of bad governance and corruption or oppressive military rule; Al
Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian links including illegal aliens; and political
underpinnings or power struggle. This includes issues of coalition government or
federalism versus regionalism disputes (Garrison, 1966a); dynamism and fear of Ibo or
southern dominance; infiltration and politicization of religion (Onishi, 2000, 2001b);
political divisions and tensions; and political elites or Kaduna mafia perspectives (Kotch,
1987). Underlying causations also include socio-economic factors, including ethnic
groups vying for control of fertile lands, as well as political and economic power (“At
Least 21 Are Killed,” 2011). Others are indigenes and settlers issues (Polgreen, 2008),
and poverty, unemployment, lack of education, and discontent (Nossiter, 2010c).
The third set of causal factors is the perceived threat of the “otherness,” and for
the ethno-religious conflict in Northern Nigeria comprises: anti-Ibo rioting following the
first coup d’état of January 1966 and other anti-Ibo riots in succession particularly in the
first phase of the study (Garrison, 1966a, 1966c, 1966g, 1966l, 1968a); ethnic-religious
hatreds, rivalries, divisions and animosities (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967); dynamism
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and fear of Ibo or Southern dominance (Garrison, 1966a, 1967a, 1968a); North-South
split or largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south (“100 Feared Dead,” 1992;
Polgreen, 2006, 2008; Purefoy, 2010); annihilation attempts by targeting (Abdulkadir,
2012b; Bello, 2012a, 2012b; “Christmas Carnage,” 2011; Ehiabhi, 2012c; Kaita, 2011);
and/or forceful conversion of Christians to Islam (Brooke, 1987b; “Christian Groups,”
2009); and ultimatum to southern Christians living in the North to leave the region (Lobel
2012; Ohai, 2012; Orude, 2012a, 2012b).
The fourth set of causal conditions involves issues of exclusive ideological
framing. Exclusive ideology aims at selecting and justifying the extermination of a
targeted member group on the basis of their different world view, religion, or ethnicity
(Campbell, 2010, Video Series 18). For the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict,
framing of exclusive ideology primarily comprise matters revolving around issues with
religious dimensions; anti-Western or ideological differences; fundamentalism and
religious fervency; and Sharia or Islamic law institution in northern Nigeria. Ideological
framing underlie much of the excessive blood-letting which continues to occur in
northern Nigeria, particularly with the introduction of Sharia in some northern states
[presently 12 states in Nigeria have established the Sharia as their penal legal code, (ICG,
2010)]; with other Islamic law related causal factors involving, non-Muslim opposition to
Sharia, its constitutionality, and matters regarding the violation of fundamental rights of
Christians and non-Muslims in Sharia operative states (“Christian Groups,” 2009);
gender segregation matters; issues on the strict implementation of Sharia; postures of
anti-establishment or rejection of westernized institutions and ideology under Sharia
(“700 Die,” 2009; “Muslim Sect,” 2011); and moves towards imposing Sharia across
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Nigeria or establishing an Islamic state (“Boko Haram,” 2012; Brooke, 1987b; “In
Nigeria’s North,” 2011; Mojeed & Nossiter, 2012).
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors,
Underlying Causation, Perceived Threat of the
“Otherness” and Exclusive Ideological Framing
The study shows that the causal conditions—the trigger factors, underlying
causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing in varying
situations and contextual settings—resulted in varying forms and degrees of
exterminations and killings primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians, as well
as other conflict parties which more often than not are divided along ethnic and religious
lines. Such subjective phenomena as identified in the study data reveal core categories of
attacks and violence unleashed to varying target victims with emergent themes including:
assault, shoot-out, killings, arson and looting (“300 Believed Killed,” 1982; Garrison,
1966g, 1966i; Jaynes, 1981; Fisher, 2006); and blockade, embargo and civil war
(Friendly, 1967a; Garrison, 1968a; “Nigeria: Slow War,” 1967). Other emergent
phenomenal themes in the study include bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem,
massacres or barbarism (Brooke, 1987b; Ejembi, 2012; Garrison, 1966b, 1967f;
“Hundreds Flee,” 2002; Koinange, 2001; “Nigeria Quells,” 1992; “Nigerian Death Toll
Rises,” 2009; “Nigerian Muslims,” 2004; Noble, 1992a; Nossiter, 2010b, 2010d, 2010e,
2010f, 2011; Obateru & Mamah, 2004; Onishi, 2001a; Purefoy, 2010); and bombings,
suicide bombings, and coordinated gun and bomb attacks (Akau, 2012; “At Least 200
Die,” 2008; Ehiabhi, 2012a; Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1968a; Mgboh, 2012a; Ohai,
2012; Onyeose, 2012; Pedro, 2011; Tilley-Gyado, 2012). Additional emergent
phenomenal nodes also include genocide (Emerson, 1970; Friendly 1967a; Garrison,
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1968a, 1968b; “Nigerian Muslims,” 2004; Nossiter, 2010e; Okoye, 2011). Phenomenal
themes identified in the study further include political violence, coup d’état and political
assassinations (“Emergency Declared,” 2011; Garrison, 1966a, 1967h, 1968b; “Nigeria
Group Threatens,” 2011; Ohai, 2012); religious and ethnic violence (“1,000 Are Reported
Dead,” 1984; “300 Believed Killed,” 1982; Brooke, 1987b; “Deadly Rioting,” 2000;
Emerson, 1970; Jaynes, 1981; “Nigeria Quells,” 1992; Noble, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c).
The phenomenal themes also include reprisals from southern states (Onishi, 2000;
Polgreen, 2006; “Reprisal Attacks,” 2006; “Toll Rises,” 2006; “Violent,” 2001); sectarian
violence (“718 Deaths,” 1984; Ahiante, 2004; Chidiogo, 2011; Noble, 1992a, 1992c;
Ohai, 2012; Sengupta, 2004a); and spiral or escalation of violence (“‘Irate Youths’ Burn
Down,” 2006; “Muslim Mobs,” 2004; Nossiter, 2011; Sokunbi, 2012). Additionally
emergent in the study are the phenomenal themes of targeted, pre-meditated or
orchestrated killings and assaults (Abdulkadir, 2012b; “Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967;
Bello, 2012a, 2012b; “Boko Haram,” 2012; Brooke 1987b; “Christmas Carnage,” 2011;
Ehiabhi, 2012c; Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1966a, 1968a; Kotch 1987; Mshelizza, 2011;
Myers, 2006; Nossiter, 2011, 2012; Onishi, 2001a; Pedro, 2011; Sokunbi, 2012; “Suicide
Bombing,” 2012). Further included as phenomenal nodes are terrorist activities (Ahiante,
2004; Akau, 2012; Batty & Mark, 2012; “Christian Groups,” 2009; “Christmas Carnage,”
2011; “Emergency Declared,” 2011; Onah, Shiklam, & Olugbode, 2012); and threats or
fears of more attacks, protests or warnings of secession or full scale war (“Boko Haram,”
2012; “Dozens Dead,” 2004; Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1966e, 1967d, 1968a; Mshelizza,
2011; “Nigeria Muslims,” 2004; Okpi, 2012; Ola & Orude, 2012; Simmons, 2000;
“Violent,” 2001). Other phenomenal nodes that emerged from the study are those of tit-
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for-tat killings in northern states (“At Least 200 Die,” 2008; Brooke, 1987b; Garrison,
1966i, 1967f; Jaynes, 1981; Lobel, 2012; Nossiter, 2010f; Polgreen, 2006; “Religious and
Ethnic Clashes,” 2001; Sengupta, 2004a, 2004b).
Further phenomenal themes in the study include uprising, anti-government
rioting, protests or demonstrations (Brooke, 1987b; Garrison, 1966a, 1966e, 1966h;
"Hundreds Die in Religious Riots,” 1984; Kotch, 1987; Noble, 1992c; “Nigeria Quells,”
1992; Koinange, 2001; Lacey, 2002; “Miss World,” 2002; Sengupta, 2003; Fisher, 2006;
“Nigerian Police Station,” 2010; Sokunbi, 2012). Lastly, the phenomenal themes include
violent or deadly clashes, rioting or gun battles (“1,000 Are Reported Dead,” 1984; “700
Die,” 2009; “718 Deaths,” 1984; Brooke, 1987b; Chidiogo, 2010; Cowell, 1982; Dash,
1984; “Dozens Dead,” 2004; Garrison, 1966c, 1967h; Jaynes, 1981; Koinange, 2001;
“Nigeria Quells,” 1992; Noble, 1992c; Nossiter, 2009a; Ohai, 2012; Shiaondo, 2011).
The details of each of the emergent phenomenal themes in the varying settings of
the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are analyzed and discussed in the different
phases of the study. By comparing and contrasting these phenomenal nodes and
categories, two major categories involving targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated
killings and assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism
are identified as being closely associated with the proclivity to genocide.
3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious Conflict
and Genocidal Proclivity Developed
Additional emergent nodes from the study show the contexts, that is the social
space or lebensraum, which provide a geographic perspective, the framework on which
genocide or its proclivity can develop (Wood, 2001). For the ethno-religious conflict in
northern Nigeria the contextual settings identified in the study are presented in Table 1
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below. Also presented in Table 2 are contexts identified in the study with reprisal attacks
in some southern states, as well as the State of Biafra, the secession of which led to the
1967-70 civil war. Nodes emerging from the study reveal virtually all northern Nigeria
states, in addition to Abuja (the federal capital territory) as the various contexts for the
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, some cases of which have evidences of
inclinations to genocide.
The contextual locations within the various conflict settings identified in the study
are presented in Table 1 below, with reprisals in some southern states or regions
presented in Table 2.
Table 1
Contexts for the Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious Conflict
Study Phase

Context

S/N
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

Northern
Region/States
Abuja
Jabi
Zuba
Adamawa State
Yola
Jimeta
Lamurde
Mubi
Bauchi State
Bauchi
Benue State
Makurdi
Gbeji; Vaase
Zaki Ibiam
Dooga; Kpata
Lokobi; Ajimaka
Ekaae; Giza
Yogbo; Mbgawem
Gwer West LGA
Zongo Akiki
Nyijir, Tse Taki, & Agbeke in
Guma areas
Borno State
Maiduguri
Dala
Yan’tebura, Bulukuntu
Tsallake
Zajeri
Gombe State
Jigawa State
Dutse

I
1966-1976

II
1976-1987

III
1987-1996

IV
1996-2005
X

V
2006-Present
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

XX
X

X

X
X

X

XX
XX
XX
XX
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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8.

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

16.

17.
18.

19.

20.

Kaduna State
Kaduna
Kafanchan
Zaria
Zonkwa
Zango-Kataf
Kufara
Ori-Apata
Kano State
Kano
-Sabon-Gari
-Bompai
Katsina State
Katsina
Kebbi State
Kogi State
Kwara State
Ilorin
Nasarawa State
Alago
Doma Town
Eke & Giza Areas Kadarko
Tiv settlements at: Kpata,
Donga, Lokobi & Ajimaka
Niger State
Minna Angwan Kuje
Madalla
Plateau State
Jos
Bukuru
Kadyal
Kanam District
Langtang
Yelwa
Barkin Ladi
Dogon Na Hauwa Kuru
Karama Wareng
Zot and Ratsat
Sokoto State
Taraba State
Jalingo
Akwana
Yobe State
Damaturu
Gadaka
Geida
Hawan Malka
Potiskum
Zamfara State

X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
XX
X
XX
XX

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Table 2
Contexts for (i) Biafra War and (ii) Reprisals in Southern States and/or Extrajudicial
Killings**
Study Phase

Context
(i)
S/N
1.

Southern
Regions
(See Map ***)
Eastern Region or Biafra (See
map ***)

I
1966-1976

X

II
1976-1987

III
1987-1996

IV
1996-2005

V
2006-Present
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2.
(ii)
S/N
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

Mid-Western Region (See
Map ***)
Southern States

X

Abia State
Aba
Lagos State
Lagos
Niger Delta State
Odi**
Anambra State
Onitsha
Awka
Nnobi
Nnewi
Delta State
Asaba
Imo State
Akwa Ibom
Uyo

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

Note. ** Cases of Extrajudicial Killings

Additionally providing the contextual framework are the emergent nodes or codes
and categories also identified from the study data which reveal varying conflict parties in
the different phenomenal settings for the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. The
emergent conflict parties identified include: Muslim mobs/gangs, civilian mobs or sect
and Ibos; Muslim mobs or sect and security forces; Muslim sect and other Muslims or
sect; the northern-led federal government and Ibos; Muslim mobs, sect or groups and
Christians; Nigeria and Biafra in war; security agents and unidentified civilians; different
ethnic groups; northern states government and Christians; Fulani herdsmen or HausaFulani group and Christian or host communities. The details of each of the emergent
conflict parties themes in the varying settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious
conflict are analyzed and discussed in the different phases of the study. Such emergent
nodes for the conflict parties were analyzed by comparison and contrasted with the
phenomenal conflict nodes and categories and their causal conditions in order to identify
conflicts in which there is the plausibility of a conceptualized annihilating difference
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(Hinton, 2005) that give rise to exterminations involving perpetrator and victim
situations, with other conflicts which are devoid of such annihilating difference
considered as clashes or fighting between parties without an overt inclination to
genocide.
Emergent nodes and categories for varying perpetrator-groups identified in the
study using the annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties described above
include: Muslim mobs, rioters or rampaging Muslim youths; Islamic fundamentalists
groups inclusive of the Maitatsine and Boko Haram sect; Fulani herdsmen, Fulani-Hausa
group, or gunmen; and rampaging, unemployed or under-aged youths. The perpetrator
category also revealed emergent nodes for civilian mobs, unidentified attackers or
gunmen;

Christian

militia/youths;

and

security

agents,

soldiers/army/military,

Hausa/Northern troops. Details of involvement of each of these perpetrator groups in the
varying settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are analyzed and
discussed in the different phases of the study.
Emergent nodes and categories from the study also revealed the victim or target
groups, which enable the fostering of annihilating difference amidst a perpetrator group
and social space environment (Wood, 2001) to produce a well-rounded and complete
contextual setting for genocidal proclivity to flourish. Target or victim groups for the
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict include: Christians and churches, also involving
Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian villages; civilian targets or innocent citizens;
Southerners who are predominantly Christians, and especially Ibos as targets; security
agents - police officers, military and government officials; symbols of government
authority (including the United Nations offices in Abuja); civilian centers, schools and
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school children; media offices and journalists; beer parlors, hotels, banks and other
facilities (structures or institutions with Western connotations); Muslim clerics or
mainstream/orthodox Muslims; and Muslims, Hausa-Fulani herders, Muslim sect,
Northerners or mosques. The victimhood of each of these targets are also analyzed and
discussed in the different study phases.
4. Intervening Conditions Influencing
Proclivity to Genocide
The study also identified nodes and categories for intervening conditions in the
different contextual settings of the conflict in addition to the context nodes. These
intervening factors generally involve such broad conditions that influence—increase or
diminish—the tendency or proclivity to genocide. For the northern Nigeria conflict the
intervening conditions include: press censorship and manipulation or deflation and
inflation of casualty figures—this casualty information manipulation facto was used by
government parties on occasions to minimize but also sometimes scale-up reprisals or titfor-tat violence; extrajudicial killings and army involvement in policing; government
ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government; and the presence of collaborators or
bystanders—foreign collaborators leading to the internationalization of the conflict, and
local collaborators or bystanders. The details of the emergent intervening conditions
themes in the varying settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are
analyzed and discussed in the different phases of the study.
The study further reveals that additionally influencing the tendency to increase or
deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control the violence
with their implementation. Emergent nodes and categories for intervention efforts in the
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict include: aid and relief support, attempts at
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dialogue, appeals for intervention or mediation; post-war re-unification policy (for the
Nigeria Biafra War), rehabilitation efforts or calls for rebuilding of churches;
reconciliation attempts; control measures taken (such as curfews and road checks by
security agents), investigations and commissions of inquiries utilized; calls to address the
constitutionality of Sharia law and security issues; military assault or crackdown of
warring factions; mopping-up of rioters or arrests made; warnings and/or calls for action,
restraint, justice, or self-defense; and attempts to dialogue, and appeals for intervention or
mediation. The details of the emergent themes of the intervention measures in the varying
settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are analyzed and discussed in the
different phases of the study.
5. Strategies of Attack Foreshadowing
Proclivity to Genocide
Emergent nodes or codes and categories from the study reveal varying strategies
of attack which foreshadowed the tendency towards genocide within the contextual
settings and intervening conditions with the resultant phenomena as described above.
Strategies foreshadowing inclinations to genocide in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious
conflict include: organization and planning including weaponry; extermination plot
involving mass murders, and blockade and starvation (Biafra war); and ideo-ethnic
cleansing (or ideological and ethnic cleansing) involving, burning, bombing, or
destroying of churches, forceful conversion of Christians to Islam, forced migration, for
example refugees and displaced persons, and the ultimatum by Boko Haram
fundamentalists sect to southern Christians to leave the north. The strategies also include
indoctrination, manipulation, or instigation; and coordinated attacks involving shootings,
bombings, maiming, and arson, as well as drive-by or hit and run shootings and suicide
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bombings. The details of the emergent themes of the strategies of attack in the varying
settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are analyzed and discussed in the
different phases of the study.
6. Consequences or Effects of
Proclivity to Genocide
The strategies adopted by perpetrators in the ethno-religious conflict in northern
Nigeria have varying effects or consequences in the different conflict scenarios
examined. Emergent nodes and categories of the consequences identified in the study
include: death toll and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned corpses; refugees and
displaced persons, as well as persons fleeing homes or taking refuge or shelter for safety;
starvation; secession and civil war; mass graves or mass burials; churches burned,
bombed or destroyed; mosques burned or destroyed; police stations and barracks,
government buildings bombed or burned; schools bombed, burned, destroyed or closed;
Christian businesses, homes, hotels and properties destroyed; destroying, looting and
razing of properties; denial of freedom of worship and desecration of Christian religion;
and security threat, apprehension, anxiety or political and social chaos, including
infiltration of police, military, and all areas of government by perpetrator groups.
Emergent nodes for the consequences category also revealed normalcy or calm returning
after episodes of gruesome exterminations, showing an intermittency of occurrence in the
killings. The details of the emergent themes for the consequences or effects in the varying
settings of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict are analyzed and discussed in the
different phases of the study.
End of Model Summary

212
Findings Part II: Application of Study Data Phases to Model for Genocidal
Proclivity
Introduction and Context of the Study. This study on the ethno-religious
conflict in northern Nigeria spans the period 1966 up to present, with focus starting from
the 1966 pogroms against the Ibos up to on-going varied, targeted killings in the north.
This entire study period—1966 to 2013—is phased into five eras, each era covering about
a decade, drawn up on the basis of the changing geographic and structural composition of
the country with the creation of additional states in Nigeria over the period of the study.
The first phase of the study spans from 1966 to 1976, and sees Nigeria with four regions
(see Map I in Appendix A) which were operative from 1963 up to 1967 when 12 states
were created to replace the regions (see Map II in Appendix A). This first phase ends in
1976 when seven new states were created increasing the states of Nigeria to 19 in total
(see Map III in Appendix A). The second phase of the study spans from 1976 to 1987
when two additional states were created bringing the total to 21 states (see Map IV in
Appendix A). The third study phase spans from 1987 to 1996 and is inclusive of the years
1987 to 1991 when nine additional states and the Federal Capital Territory (now Abuja)
were created bringing the states of Nigeria to 30 in total (see Map V in Appendix A).
This third phase also includes the years 1991 to 1996 when additional states were created,
bringing the total to the present 36 states of Nigeria (see Map I in Appendix A). The
fourth phase of the study spans from 1996 to 2005, and the fifth phase spans from 2006 to
present, with both phases having Nigeria’s currently operative 36 states (see Map I in
Appendix A).
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Study Phase I – 1966 to 1976: Synopsis. Nigeria at independence in 1960 was a
federation with three regions—the Northern, Western, and Eastern regions with a fourth
region, the Mid-Western region, created in 1963 (see Map I in Appendix A), and in the
same year the country also became a republic. This first republic ended with Nigeria’s
first military coup of January 1966 by army officers led by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, with
intent to change the status quo of corrupt government officials, election rigging, and
nepotism in the country (Garrison, 1966d, p. 19). Nzeogwu’s inspiring words observed in
his radio broadcast were:
Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low
places that seek bribes and demand ten percent, those that seek to keep the
country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers and
VIPs of waste, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country big for
nothing before the international circle, those that have corrupted our society and
put the Nigerian calendar backward. We promise that you will no longer be
ashamed to say that you are a Nigerian. (Ojiako as cited in Falola, 1999, p. 123)
While the coup succeeded in Kaduna, it failed in its other strategic areas of Lagos,
Enugu, and Benin, with Odumegwu Ojukwu, then, the Battalion Commander in Kano,
foiling the coup in the northern axis, and Major General Aguyi Ironsi foiling it in the
Lagos axis (Falola, 1999). The Prime Minister of the federation, Sir Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa and the northern Premier Ahmadu Bello who was then the Sarduana of Sokoto
were, however, killed in the coup in addition to some northern senior officers in the army.
These killings, in addition to the fact that most of the army officers involved in the coup
were mostly of the Ibo ethnic group, gave the impression of an Ibo plan to control the
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center. Of this 1966 first coup, Enahoro had this to say of the civilian administration and
senior army officers that were killed in the coup: “All of them had one thing in common
– they were not Ibos” and for those in like positions that were not killed, “they had one
thing in common – they were Ibos” (Enahoro as cited in Mwakikagile, 2001, pp. 192193). This first coup triggered off anti-Ibo riots in May of 1966 with a resultant massacre
of 600 Ibos in the north (Garrison, 1966g).
Furthermore, events following the coup which led to further resentment as
indicated by Enahoro are that:
The opportunities of January 15 were misused in several ways by the Ironsi
regime in the months that followed…General Ironsi allowed matters to be taken
out of his hands by prominent Ibo leaders in the army, in the public service, and in
public life. Affairs in the public service and the armed forces appeared to lend
colour to the impression that the coup of January 15 was designed to install Ibos
in positions of power. Out of twenty-one promotions in the Army in April, 1966,
for example, eighteen were Ibo officers. General Ironsi drew his principal
advisers from the Ibo ethnic group. Ethnic groups tend to be chauvinistic but the
Ibos were the most militantly chauvinistic and this naturally created apprehension
in the minds of the others. (Mwakikagile, 2001, p. 193)
Contrary to this positioning, however, Siollun (2009) in his book entitled Oil,
Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture (1966-1976), observes that other
than Aguiyi-Ironsi, the only Ibo member of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) 11
members was Lt-Colonel Ojukwu, who had automatic membership, as the Eastern
region’s military governor. Siollun observes that:
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In an effort to prove that he was not heading an Igbo regime,” Aguiyi-Ironsi had
with great, even daring courage entrusted his personal security to Northern
soldiers. He posted the Principal Staff Officer Lt-Colonel Phillip Effiong out of
Supreme Headquarters in Lagos and replaced him with Major T. Y. Danjuma of
the northern Jukun ethnic group. He even appointed relatives if the January
victims to sensitive positions. On the civilian side he appointed a close relative of
the Sarduana (Hamzat Ahmadu) to be his private secretary in replacement of
Abdul Kareem Disu. His police Timothy Pam was the younger brother of LtColonel James pam (who was murdered during the January coup), and most of his
bodyguards were Northern. By surrounding himself with Northern soldiers,
Aguiyi-Ironsi sealed his own fate. (2009, p. 84)
However, only six months later the January coup was followed by a bloody
counter-coup in July of 1966 which was staged by northern army officers led by Major
Murtala Mohammed, in which Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, the then head of state, was
killed. Also killed in the coup were over 200 Ibo officers and men in the army, in
retaliation to the January killings (Garrison, 1967d). Yakubu Gowon, who was then a
lieutenant-colonel, was by compromise made the new head of state. The July counter
coup was then followed by continued bouts of targeting and massacring of Ibos in
northern Nigeria in July, September, and October 1966, with over 50,000 Ibo civilians
wantonly massacred in the fall of 1966, an episode that set off the displacement of tens of
thousands of displaced Ibo refugees (Garrison, 1968a). The perpetrators in each of these
carnages were civilian or Muslim mobs—mainly Hausas, and northern troops. In Kano,
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for instance, where soldiers mutinied to participate in the Ibo killings in 1966, it is
observed that:
The troops raided the battalion armory, broke out of the barracks and headed into
town to pick up local civilian yan daba [thugs]…to take them to locations where
they could find Igbos…Igbos trying to escape were not spared. At Kano airport,
the soldiers set upon a crowd of Igbo refugees boarding flight and killed them.
Some were dragged out of the plane cabin and shot. Igbo workers at the airport
were also hunted down and killed…The soldiers also [went to] the railway station
where Igbo civilians were waiting to board trains to escape. Many of the Igbo
would-be passengers and railway staff were shot dead….This massacre on
October 1, 1966…was possibly the worst of the mutiny. The participation of
soldiers with firearms greatly increased the kill rate. Several thousand Igbos were
killed that day alone in Kano due to the combined efforts of the 5th battalion and
civilian mobs. (Siollun, 2009, pp. 134-135)
Consequently, there were thousands of returning Ibo refugees who left the north
for their home region in Eastern Nigeria, as well as a mass exodus of about two million
Ibos residing all over the Federation who fled to the sanctuary of their home state in the
east (Garrison, 1968b). As a result of these episodes of Ibo massacres in the north and the
returning Ibo refugees to their homeland, coupled with the failure of subsequent attempts
at resolving the conflict, on May 30, 1967 the Eastern region under the leadership of
Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu seceded from the rest of the country to form a
self-declared sovereign state of Biafra (Garrison, 1968a, p. 38). This declaration was
made after unsuccessful calls by Ojukwu to have the country institute a fully regional
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rather than a federated system that would accord full autonomy of the four states or
regions, to ensure the safety of the Ibos as well as avert the perceived northern hegemony
in federal government. The regionalism versus federalism disputes fell through as did the
accord of the Aburi meeting in Ghana which was not sustained (Falola, 1999). Shortly
after Biafra declared sovereignty, the north led federal government headed by Gowon
passed a military decree on the eve of Biafra’s secession (Falola, 1999, p. 122) creating
12 states to replace the four regions then existing (see Map II in Appendix A).
Thus, intent on keeping the unity of the country, the northern-led government of
Gowon went to war with Biafra from 1967 to 1970, a war that on the onset was
anticipated to be a “police action” but which lingered for thirty months and claimed about
a million lives (Falola, 1999, p. 123). The Biafrans on their part, put up a spirited defense
of their right to survival and soverieignty, being enthused by the ordeal of the massacres
and refugee crisis they had endured and the quest to survive. Hence, the observation that
“From the average Biafran’s point of view, the war is not over an abstract question of
constitutional and terrirorial integrity. It is a fight for survival” (Garrison, 1968b, p. 87).
The war was, however, lost by Biafra, which was unable to resist a larger fighting force
in the face of food shortages, as “the federal side resorted to the strategy of starving the
enemy” (Falola, 1999, p. 123).
The preceding presents the contextual framework for the Nigeria Biafra War of
1967 to 1970, which forms part of the first phase – 1966-1976 of analysis of this study.
Applying the Genocide Proclivity Model: Phase I – 1966 to 1976. The coding
list for the emergent nodes or themes for Phase I of the study is provided in Appendix C:
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Coding List A. The application of the emergent nodes from study Phase I to the
Genocidal Proclivity Model on page 199 follows.
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena
Relating to Genocidal Proclivity:
Phase I - 1966 to 1976
As indicated above, the causal conditions have been classified into four types of
contributory factors that could lead ultimately to genocidal proclivity as emerged from
the data, namely, immediate or trigger factors, underlying or root causes, perceived threat
of the “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing. These causal factors which are
overlapping are not static, with a trigger factor in a current conflict, for instance,
sometimes becoming in time an underlying or root cause. For the varying times of the
conflict in this first phase of the study, emergent nodes for the trigger causes identified in
the study include the first coup d’état of January 1966 and the killing of mainly northern
army officers in the coup; reprisal mission, revenge or counter-coup; massacres of Ibos
and returning refugees; secession and self-determination; and insurgency, uprising, or
anti-government riots at varying times of the conflict.
For this period of the study, applying the theoretical model for identifying
proclivity to genocide, the findings reveal the initial trigger or immediate cause of the
conflict was the first coup which involved the killing of the Prime Minister (Sir Tafawa
Balewa), the Northern Premier (Sarduana of Sokoto), and many senior northern army
officers by the mostly Ibo army officers who staged the coup. The North’s perception of
the coup as an Ibo conception to rid the north of their hitherto hegemonic hold on the
central government interests buttressed the long-entertained fear of the dynamism and
fear of Ibo or Southern dominance, factors which fed on the perceived threat of the other,
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as well as served as part of the underlying causation. Investigating this emergent theme of
the North’s fear of southern dominance, the study data substantiates, for instance, that:
On the surface, the demonstrations… appeared to be directed solely against the
attempts of the military regime that came to power after a coup d’état last January
to impose central control. But the real root of the trouble is the traditional
northern fear of domination by Nigeria’s Southerners. These fears have persisted
even though the Northern Region’s 29 million conservative Moslem Hausas have
made the region Nigeria’s dominant political force. Northerners have always
outnumbered southerners at the polls. (Garrison, 1966a, p. 8).
Hence, as the first coup triggered off anti-Ibo riots and the May 1966 targeting
and killing of over 600 Ibo civilians in the north (Garrison, 1966c, para. 7), a subsequent,
additional fodder became Aguiyi Ironsi’s decree dissolving the regions and declaring a
Unitary republic which, though aimed at doing away with the regional politics then
plaguing the country, was misconstrued and seen as threatening northern interests
(Falola, 1999). This subsequent trigger set off the anti-government riots that paved way
for a bloody second coup in July 1966 (Garrison, 1968a). Additional causal conditions in
this phase of the study are the underlying or root causes to the conflict which had become
entrenched into the conflict parties’ relational framework. In this phase of the study, the
underlying conditions emergent themes include colonial influences, exploitation and fear
of balkanization; culture of bad governance and corruption or oppressive military rule;
political underpinnings or power struggle also involving coalition government or
federalism versus regionalism disputes (Garrison, 1967f, 1967g) which culminated in the
non-adoption of the Aburi accord and precipitated the secession of Biafra and the ensuing
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civil war (Emerson, 1970; Falola, 1999). Also politically, there was the factor of
politicization of religion (Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1967h), with other underlying
causation involving socio-economic issues, involving poverty, unemployment, lack of
education, and discontent, as in the wake of the 1966 anti-Ibo rioting in which civilians,
largely unemployed and illiterate Hausa mobs along with northern troops perpetrated the
atrocities against the Ibos, looting, killing, and maiming (Garrison, 1966g, 1966l, 1968b).
Further causal factors in this study phase are the perceived threat of the
“otherness,” which include dynamism and fear of Ibo or Southern dominance (Garrison,
1966h, 1968a; “Nigeria: Slow War,” 1976); and ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries,
divisions and animosities (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1966f, 1966g). Other
perceived threat of the “otherness” include anti-Ibo rioting which followed the first coup
d’état of January 1966 and successive anti-Ibo riots which occurred within this phase of
the study (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1966a, 1966c, 1966h); and the NorthSouth split or largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south (1968a). This perception
of threat being posed is intensified by ethnic, social, and religious divides in the country
which its structures defined in terms of the largely Muslim north and the predominantly
Christian south, or as in this phase of the study, the mostly Christian Ibos. For instance,
tracing the causes of the 1966 massacres of Ibos in the North, Garrison observes:
Tribal and regional rivalries have severely strained Nigerian unity in the past…
But the real root of the trouble is the traditional northern fear of domination by
Nigeria’s Southerners…The violence against the nearly one million Ibos who live
in the north may have been spontaneous. The Hausas have always looked upon
the better educated Ibos in their midst as heathen “colonizers.” (1966a, p. 8)
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The final set of causal conditions in this study phase are themes classified under
exclusive ideological framing which border primarily on ideological perspectives or
world views. These include issues with religious dimensions, anti-Western or ideological
differences, and fundamentalism and religious fervency. The role played by religious
differences in orchestrating most of the Muslim/Christian conflicts in northern Nigeria
cannot be overemphasized, and in addition to colonial factors already discussed above,
these differences have fundamentally been instrumental to the country’s North/South split
along religious lines. Garrison (1968a) acknowledges that:
Religious differences played an important role in this early North-South split.
When the British conquered the far North at the turn of the century, missionaries
were barred from the area and local rule left in the hands of the conservative
Muslim Emirs (traditional kings). While the North was isolated from the winds of
change the mission-educated Southern tribes adopted Western techniques,
accepted the possibility of change – and soon demanded it politically. (p. 37)
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors,
Underlying Causation and Exclusive
Ideological Framing: Phase I - 1966 to 1976
Phase I of the study shows that the four-fold causal conditions—the trigger factor,
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing
in different contextual settings—resulted in varying forms and degrees of exterminations
and killings, primarily between mainly Muslim northerners and troops and Ibos which are
divided along ethnic but also religious lines. Such subjective phenomena as identified in
the study data reveal core categories of attacks and violence unleashed to the Ibos as the
target victims with emergent themes including: assault, shoot-out, killings, arson and
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looting; blockade, embargo and civil war; bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem,
massacres or barbarism; bombings, coordinated gun and bomb attacks; and genocide
(Emerson, 1970; Friendly 1967a; Garrison, 1968a, 1968b). Additional emergent
phenomenal nodes also include political violence, coup d’état and political
assassinations; religious and ethnic violence; spiral or escalation of violence; targeted,
pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and assaults (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967;
Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1966a, 1968a); threats or fears of more attacks, protests or
warnings of secession or full scale war; tit-for-tat killings in northern states; uprising,
anti-government rioting, protests or demonstrations; and violent or deadly clashes, rioting
or gun battles.
By comparing and contrasting these phenomenal nodes and categories, two major
categories involving targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and assaults; and
bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism are identified as being
closely associated with the proclivity to genocide. In the September 1966 massacres of
Ibos in the north, Garrison (1966b) observes, for instance, that in Kano:
The bloodbath began on the night of September 29, when Northern troops opened
fire on Ibo refugees standing by at the airport. By dawn, Northern soldiers with
automatic weapons, and civilians with machetes had swept through the city,
burning, looting and killing. (para. 2)
The extent of the carnage perpetrated spoke of annihilating the Ibos in the then northern
region, such that even the fleeing refugees were sought out by northern troops and
civilian mobs and slaughtered. Hence, Garrison (1966b) observes:
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If there was a plan to rid the North of all Ibos, it has succeeded. More than one
million Ibos living in the North and in many other parts of the Federation have
retreated to the sanctuary of the Eastern Region. (para. 7)
Furthermore, this phase of the study which spans both prewar, the war years, and
postwar years up to 1976, also shows blockade, embargo and civil war as another major
phenomenal theme for the period. The study data reveal that the Nigerian Federal
Government, in a bid to crush the secession in the ensuing war, employed strategies of
blockade and embargo against Biafra, which turned out to be an instrument of
extermination against the Ibos by means of starvation. The blockade led to famine and
humanitarian disaster due to a widespread starvation of Ibo civilians, particularly the
Biafran children with over a thousand dying daily, subjected to the severe pangs of
hunger and malnutrition (Emerson, 1970). There was inertia in the international
community—the plausible intervening conditions that would have served to ameliorate
the situation. To the contrary, emergent themes from the study revealed that collaborators
or bystanders, particularly foreign collaborators such as Europe and the United States,
“knew of Biafra as a place somewhere in Africa where there were thousands of starving
children who did not even seem to blink or whimper as photographs recorded their
plight” (Emerson, 1970, para. 3). Hence, “it was the wasted children of Biafra, and the
way they stared, that made the civil war a deeply disturbing, if inexplicable nightmare to
many outside Africa” (Emerson, 1970, para. 4). Further affirming the countless Biafran
children’s ill-fated agony, the study data reveal that:
With every passing hour, Biafra becomes more and more a death trap…death
from malnutrition grows in a mathematical progression. Once nutrition sets in and
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the victim is deprived of protein, his energy disappears, his skin grows taut, his
hair yellow, his limbs become matchsticks…the dreaded “point of no return” in
the victim’s eyes, especially if he is a child. He stares at you blankly, without a
flicker of recognition. You extend candy, a cup of powdered milk, anything, and
the child just stares, too listless, too dehydrated even to taste. It is the irony of
death from malnutrition that in the final, fading hours one is at last completely
free from the pangs of hunger. (Garrison, 1968b, p. 29)
The deployment of starvation by the Nigerian government as a strategy for
winning the war is evident from themes from the study. The study data indicated that the
death spiral which was charted for months by a representative of the international Red
Cross in Biafra started with a record of 300 deaths a day, increasing gradually in two
months to 6,000 a day, and up to 42,000 a week by July of 1968 (Garrison, 1968b, pp. 29,
84). It was also noted that “Biafran officials and the relief administrators maintained that
child deaths had risen 50 per cent after the Red Cross flights were halted” (Emerson,
1970, para. 49). However, the data reveal that, whereas:
observers in Europe believed that the original intent behind Nigerian invasion was
purely military…many observers have concluded, as the starvation toll has
mounted that the Nigeria Government - and the British Government as well – was
willing to condone starvation as a means of winning the war and preserving the
country’s unity. (Emerson, 1970, para. 30)
Thus, the Nigerian government adopted a deliberate extermination policy against
Biafrans on the basis that “starvation is a legitimate weapon of war,” and this was even
further extended to sectors that were overran and reoccupied by the federal troops
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(Garrison, 1968b, p. 93). Hence, it is observed that “the Nigerians have banned all Red
Cross flights not only to Biafra, but to the Federally controlled Enugu and Calabar
sectors, where six months after being ‘liberated,’ an estimated one million civilians are
starving” (Garrison, 1968b, p. 93).
Furthermore, emergent from the study are the pre-war, identified major categories
of targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and assaults; and, bloodbath, carnage,
pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism as phenomenal killings perpetrated against the
Ibos in the war. Such categories in this study phase reveal themes showing killings of Ibo
civilian targets by Nigeria troops and in places overran by the Nigerian government as the
war progressed, and on occasions, as in the Mid-western region, in conjunction with
Nigerian civilian mobs. The study reveals for instance that in August of 1967, as federal
troops reoccupied the then Mid-Western state which previously had been seized by the
rebel, Biafran troops, an estimate of about 5,000 Ibo civilians were killed (“Africa: Race
Hatred,” 1967, p. 200). Again in September, as the state capital Benin was retaken by the
federal troops, the tally made of Ibo civilians killed was 989. In Warri, about 400 to 500
Ibo civilians were estimated to have been slaughtered by civilian mobs celebrating the
Nigerian soldiers’ return. It was observed in the study data that “…a main thoroughfare
in Warri, was so cluttered with dead bodies one day after the city’s liberation that cars
could not use it” (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967, p. 200). Additionally, in Sapele, where
federal advance was mostly resisted by Biafran troops, the data reveal civilian casualties
to be close to that of Warri, and along the River Niger west bank, which is an Ibospeaking predominated area, several thousand Ibo civilians were killed by troops either in
the battle, or in the mop-up operations (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1967b).
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Furthermore, findings from the study data showed that the Nigerian Air Force
using their MIGs embarked on a deliberate targeting and bombing of churches, missions,
and schools in Biafra, and after one such bombing, involving bombing of the Catholic
cathedral in Owerri, it was noted that “the Northern Region radio announced…that the
cathedral had been destroyed” (Garrison, 1968a, p. 42). Such deliberate targeting of
churches and schools led to the closure of all schools in Biafra. The data indicated that in
addition to a Shell refinery, strategic target, countless air attacks had been made against
Biafran front positions, and civilian centers totaling more than 50 had been bombed.
Included in the study data is a listing sent to the UN of some of the Biafran civilian
centers targeted and bombed by the Nigerian Air Force to support the Biafrans’ claim of
the war being “a war of genocide,” each building noted as the only one hit in its area,
including:
Methodist Hospital at Ituk Mbang, the Mary Slessor Presbyterarian Hospital at
Itu, the Lutheran Mission Hospital at Eket, the Holy Ghost Teachers’ Training
College at Umuahia, the Christ the King Elementary School at Aba, the Lutheran
High School at Uyo, Oruku Methodist Church and the Eja Memorial Hospital at
Itigidi. (Garrison, 1968a, p. 42)
Further evidential to these atrocities, in a speech by Liutenant-colonel
Chukwuemeka O. Ojukwu to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) special
conference on the nigerian Civil War, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on August, 5, 1968,
Ojukwu reports that with hostilities against Biafra commenced July 6, 1967 on four
fronts on its northern frontiers, Nigeria overran these border towns in the frist week of
fighting after which Nigerian atrocities began in these towns:
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Arson, looting, rape and all kinds of torture became the order of the day. Whole
villages were remorselesssly burnt to ashes, farms and barns completely looted,
churches aand shrines outrageously desecrated. Defenseless civilians – men,
women and children, fleeing their homes – gave accounts of their experiences of
horror and anguish. Mothers told of the wholesale massacre and torture of their
sons and of the rape and abduction of their young daughters. Children trekked
miles of bush paths in tears, wailing the death at enemy hands of mother and
father, sister and brother, aunt and uncle. (Ojukwu as cited in Mwakikagile, 2001,
p. 175)
Lastly attesting to the genocidal undertones eminent in this study phase, is an
editorial by The Times of London entitled “A Policy of Famine” also with one
subheading “A Deliberate Weapon” in which The Times observed that “All the evidence
now shows that starvation as an act of war is the effective policy of the Nigerian
Government” (The Times as cited in Jacobs, 1987, p. 193). The statement is noted to have
punctured the British Government’s propaganda line which it had been successfully
propagating for over 12 months. Furthermore, The Times in the said editorial reminded its
readership of Biafra’s one million and half already dead, recalled the facts of a Red Cross
relief aircraft that was shot down by the Nigerian foorces, the indiscriminate bombings of
civilians and hospitals in Biafra, and the successful campign for cutting off night flights
to Biafrasn airstrip, and finally, concluded:
When one puts together these piecesof evidenceone can be left in no doubt that
the Government of Nigeria, whatever intentions it may have had at the beginnig
of the war, is now prepared to use blockade and starvation, even at the cost of a
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further million deaths, rather than agree to secession. Leaving aside the massacre
of the Ibos, this has the effect of a policy of genocide.
[Arguing that British influence be used] to moderate and mitigate the evils
of this war [and]…that we should not cut off the arms supply because that might
destroy our influence…It is the argument that we should retain our influence on
events which seems now the most discredited of all…Mass starvation unites a
nation only in death. It is quite simply morally wrong to be the accessory to the
slaughter of a million people in order to protect oil supplies and anyone who does
not see that it is wrong is a moral imbecile…
If one could only see this matter for what it is, the greatest tragedy or
crime for which Britain has shared responsibility in this century, the worst since
the Irish famine, we should now devote all our diplomatic power, all the influence
that remains, all the efforts of the Government to securing effective relief in terms
of food for Biafra, at all costs and at once. (Jacobs, 1987, pp. 194-195)
3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious
Conflict and Genocidal Proclivity
Developed: Phase I - 1966 to 1976
In this period of the study, Nigeria operated a four regional structure—Northern,
Western, Eastern, and Mid-Western regions (see Map I in Appendix A)—up to 1976
when the structure was altered with the creation of seven states, giving a 12-state
structure (see Map II in Appendix A). Hence, emergent nodes for this phase of the study
provide contextual themes for the conflict, which include Eastern Region or Biafra; MidWestern Region; and Northern Region, in Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Bukuru, Maiduguri, and
Makurdi (see Tables 1 and 2 for the various contexts, respectively for the northern
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Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, and for the Biafran war and/or reprisal attacks in the
south). A number of these contexts are identified in the study as some of the notable
locations in which the phenomena of targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and
assaults; as well as, bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism took
place. The phenomena of blockade, embargo and civil war and its resultant starvation and
famine occurred in Biafra in its secessionist war of 1967 to 1970, while the war year
killings of Ibos in re-occupied zones occurred mostly in the then Mid-Western region,
notably in Benin, Asaba, Warri, Sapele, and the River Niger axis (“Africa: Race Hatred,”
1967). The air raids and targeted bombings of civilians and civilian centers—hospitals,
churches, schools, etc.—occurred in various locations in Biafra without protocols
observed (Garrison, 1968a).
In addition to the contextual framework of social space in the conflict, this study
phase also includes emergent nodes and categories showing conflict parties involving,
Muslim or civilian mobs and Ibos (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Brooke, 1987b;
Garrison, 1966b, 1966c, 1966d, 1966e, 1966h, 1968a); and the northern-led federal
government and Ibos (Garrison, 1966b, 1966g, 1967a, 1967b, 1967d). Conflict parties for
this study phase also include Nigeria and Biafra in the civil war (Friendly, 1967b;
Garrison, 1966j; “Nigeria: Slow War,” 1967); and different ethnic groups, and/or,
different ethnic groups and Ibos (Garrison, 1966b).
By analyzing such conflict-parties-nodes through comparison and contrast with
the causal conditions and conflict phenomenal nodes and categories, this study phase
identifies the plausibility of a conceptualized annihilating difference between the
different perpetrator groups and the Ibos as victims, which gave rise to the various
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extermination episodes during the period. These episodes as outlined above involve the
1966 successive massacres or pogrom of Ibos in the north; the war years annihilation of
Ibos by starvation, primarily Ibo children; the targeting and mass killings of Ibo civilians
in the re-occupied war zones; and the bombings of Ibo civilian and centers in the war, all
of which are evidential themes that portend to a proclivity to genocide.
Using the annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties as described
above, this study phase identifies emergent nodes and categories for perpetrator-groups
involving, Muslim mobs, rioters or rampaging Muslim youths; the army/military,
Hausa/Northern troops or the northern-led federal government; and civilian mobs
(“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1967b, 1968a). In the 1966 Ibo massacres in the
north, for instance, emergent themes from the study show the perpetrators of these
carnages were Muslim mobs in addition to northern or Hausa troops in the army (“Africa:
Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1966b, 1966c, 1966g, 1967a, 1967b, 1967d, 1968a). It is
also, however, observed that civilian mobs which might have included Hausa mobs, as
well as some of the other non-Hausa ethnic groups in the north, participated in the Ibo
massacres (Garrison, 1966c). Details of the involvement of the perpetrator groups in the
different conflict settings of this study phase are analyzed and discussed in the Phase I
synopsis above.
This phase of the conflict was, therefore, drawn more along ethnic rather than
religious divide, with Ibos and Biafrans at large in the civil war as the object of
victimhood or targets. Hence, additional emergent nodes and categories from this phase
also revealed the victim or target groups which enable the fostering of annihilating
difference amidst a perpetrator group, and social space environment produces a well-
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rounded and complete contextual setting for genocidal proclivity to flourish. The
identified victim or target groups in this phase are Ibos, or Ibos as Christians, and Biafran
civilians, as well as structures such as schools, churches, and other civilian centers also as
targets. Details of victimhood of the targets in the different conflict settings of this study
phase are also analyzed and discussed in the Phase I synopsis above.
4. Intervening Conditions Influencing
Proclivity to Genocide: Phase I - 1966 to 1976
In addition to the context nodes this phase of the study also identified intervening
conditions in the conflict’s various contextual settings, and these involve general or broad
conditions with capability to diminutively or incrementally influence the tendency
towards developing a proclivity to genocide. This study phase reveals intervening
conditions nodes and categories including government ineptitude, lethargy or weak
central governance, which indicates the ineffectiveness of the government in mitigating
the genocidal trend in the conflict. In the 1966 massacres of Ibos in the north, for
instance, in which the northern led Federal Government forms part of the intervening
conditions or factors capable of influencing or ameliorating the conflict, the study data
reveal that there was ineptitude of the government in intervening. As the slaughter of Ibos
occurred:
Gowon “deplored” the violence, but extended neither condolence nor
compensation to the victims. He had little choice but to keep silent; the very
soldiers who put him in power were the ones with the most Ibo blood on their
hands and they were in no mood for apologies. (Garrison, 1968a, p. 38)
Furthermore, in the mass killings of the Ibos in the reoccupied war zones in the Midwestern state, Friendly observes:
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General Gowon has not emerged as a charismatic unifying figure…Widely
admired for his honesty and sincerity, he is nonetheless criticized by diplomats
and missionaries who receive reports from battle areas for his inability to enforce
a code of conduct on his soldiers.
The code was to have protected women, children and civilian men from
any maltreatment. Its rigid enforcement was supposed to convince Ibos that they
faced not a tribal pogrom but only a restrained drive to rid them of their dissident
recessionist leaders.
The code has all but vanished except from federal propaganda. In clearing
the Mid-Western state of Biafran forces federal troops were reported to have
killed, or to have stood by while mobs killed, more than 5,000 Ibos in Benin,
Warri, Sapele, Agbor and Asaba. The explanation was that it was impossible to
discriminate between civilians and combatants. (1968, para. 14-17)
Additionally emergent from this study phase are the intervening conditions nodes
of press censorship and manipulating or deflating and inflating of casualty figures—
which in this phase of the study involves understating of toll or casualty figures by the
government to deflect publicity and approbation, whether local or international. For
instance, the Sabon Gari area of Kano where about 30,000 Ibos had lived was said to
have become a ghost town, even as other Ibo communities in the northern region became
engulfed with the slayings in the September 1966 Ibo bloodbath, but the federal
government conservatively put the region’s official toll of Ibo deaths at 7,000 in this
killing episode (Garrison, 1966b).
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Further emergent intervening conditions in this study phase involve collaborators
or bystanders which involves both local and foreign collaborators leading to the
internationalization of the conflict. Of the local bystanders, most stood in quiet
complicity to the Ibo massacres in the north, while the few who attempted to appeal to
the nation’s conscience were either jailed or ostracised. It is observed, for instance, that:
Wole Soyinka…wrote with compassion about the traumatic effects of the
September 1966 slaughter on the Ibos in the North, and argued that only a
massive outpouring of national remorse could rescue the country from moral and
political bankruptcy. But for the most part, Yorubas reacted to the Ibo
bloodletting with ostrichlike withdrawal” (Garrison, 1967, p. 34).
Furthermore, as the civil war broke out in 1967 with Soyinka’s insuccessful mediating
with the seceeded Biafrans and appeal for cease-fire, he was arrested and jailed for 22
months on accusation of conspiracy with Biafrans (Noble, 1989, para. 13).
On the foreign scene, Britain initially “announced a policy of strict neutrality with
an embargo of arms to either side” with the United States and France following suit, until
the Russians waded in to supply Nigeria with MIG’s, torpedo boats, and more than 200
“technicians” with ulterior motives of “trying to gain a foothold on a continent where past
power plays had produced an almost unbroken chain of failures” (Garrison, 1968a, p. 40).
Thus, as its vested traditional interests became threathened by Russia’s intervention,
Britian quickly scrapped its arms embargo policy and marched fully behind Nigeria.
British parliamentarian George Thomson was observed to have stated in parliament on
August 27, 1968 that:
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Nigeria is getting the bulk of her supplies (of weapons) from elsewhere. If Britain
stopped supplies, we would lose our capacity to influence the Federal Governmnt.
Russia would be only too willing to fill the gap and gain the influence we would
lose. (Legum in Thomson as cited in Nwakikagile, 2001, p. 34)
Taking its cue from Russia, Egypt also teamed to support Nigeria on which
Garrison (1968a) observed that “Sentiment was also a factor: the principal leaders in
Lagos were fellow Muslims, and the Ibos were not only Christian but had openly
identified their cause with that of Israel’s struggle to create a homeland” (p. 40). Hence,
internationally, the war had gone beyond being a “civil war,” with the great powers
moving in, taking sides, contributing arms, funding, and tactical support. The lines were
drawn along the interests of these collaborators, and as the study data reveal, none of the
foreign power involvement with either side had been done “out of any sense of altruism”
(1968a, p. 39).
Furthermore, there were intervention measures taken or explored towards
resolving the conflict in this study phase. The study data in this phase reveal, for instance,
that the internationalization of the Nigeria Biafra War stifled the chances of resolving the
conflict by dialogue and/or any other form of mediation other than militarily,
consequently the war became drawn out with a high toll and war casualties of over two
million Biafrans, especially through starvation and civilian targeted killings (Emerson,
1970; Garrison, 1967h, 1968a). Foreign involvement tilted the balance both
diplomatically and militarily against Biafra, with even the prospects for a cease-fire said
to have been dim. Thus, Ojukwu in an interview on peace prospects indicated that
“Biafra…would welcome a cease-fire and unconditional talks at any time…[But] The

235
key to peace is not in Lagos but in London. As soon as the British stop supplying Lagos
with arms, talks will begin” (Garrison, 1968a, p. 51). More so, in a parliamentary
exchange between the then British Minister of State, Foreign Affairs, Mr. Thomas, and
that of Labor, Mr. Barnes was questioned on whether the Government was allowing the
shipments of arms because it hopes to see the war end quickly, or that it might instead
drag the conflict for a long time, in which case the best line of action would be for Britain
to regain its neutrality. To which Mr. Thomas’s response was, “We want the war to come
to an end speedily, and we do not think that stopping these arms would advance the
cause” (Garrison, 1968a, p. 51). A further analysis of this development and its root causes
in the study data observe that the conflict:
…has become deeply internationalized that a peaceful solution depends on what
Washington, London and Moscow do as on the combatants themselves. What
went wrong? Why the sudden intervention from abroad?
The answer has its roots in the basic failure of Western expectations in
Nigeria. The U.S. and Britain saw in independent Nigeria the makings of the most
populous, most powerful, most democratic of all African nations. Nigeria, it was
proclaimed, would become a Western showcase, a communist-free bastion
thriving on huge injections of Western aid and Western free enterprise. (Garrison,
1968b, p. 88)
Hence, it is evident from the findings that it was immaterial to foreign collaborators such
as Britain whether or not the continued war led to the total annihilation of Ibos or
Biafrans by bombing of civilians, mop-up operations, starvation, or whatever device
possible, so long as their facade of Nigeria as a Western showcase was maintained to all.
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This study phase also reveals that additionally influencing the tendency to
increase or deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control
the violence, with their implementation. For instance, in the 1966 mutiny of soldiers
involved in the Ibo massacres in Kano, although the situation was said to have been
“beyond police control,” the northern region military governor, Lt-Colonel Katsina, was
observed to have “travelled to Kano to bravely confront the mutineers” (Siollun, 2009, p.
135). Thus, intervention efforts in this phase include aid and relief support; post-war reunification policy for the Nigeria Biafra War and rehabilitation efforts; reconciliation
attempts; control measures taken such as curfews and road checks by security agents,
investigations and commissions of inquiries set up; mopping-up of rioters or arrests
made; warnings or calls for action, restraint, justice, or self-defense; and attempts to
dialogue, appeals for intervention or mediation.
5. Strategies Foreshadowing
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase I – 1966 to 1976
This phase also reveals strategies which foreshadow the tendency towards
genocide in the conflict within the contextual settings and above intervening conditions
with the resultant phenomena as described above. The strategies in this study phase
include organization, planning, and weaponry which are very essential for achieving an
effective, coordinated outcome. For instance, on the northern Nigeria September 1966
Ibo massacres the study data note “As if by signal – most foreign observers here are
convinced that the pogrom was planned – the slayings spread to other Ibo communities in
Nigeria’s vast Northern region” (Garrison, 1966b, para. 7).
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Strategies in this phase also include nodes for weapons of attack or warfare for
exterminations, as in the September 1966 Ibo massacres in which it is observed that “By
dawn, Northern soldiers with automatic weapons, and civilians with machetes had swept
the city, burning, looting and killing” (Garrison, 1966b, para. 6). Strategies also include
extermination plot involving mass murders, as in the above referenced massacres of Ibos
in the north and the various slaughters of Ibo civilians in the war years, re-occupied MidWestern region by Nigerian troops, and further include blockade and starvation strategy
as was deployed in the Biafra war (Garrison, 1968b; Emerson, 1970), as well as the
strategy of ideo-ethnic cleansing (or ideological and ethnic cleansing), for example
burning or destroying of churches (Garrison, 1966b) or the killing of Ibos as Christians
on the basis of their ethnicity as Ibos (“Africa: Arms,” 1967; “Africa: Race Hatred,”
1967; Garrison, 1966g, 1968a). Also deployed as strategy in this phase is forced
migration of the refugees and displaced Ibos living in northern Nigeria to the sanctuary of
their home state in Eastern Nigeria or Biafra. The strategies also include coordinated
attacks involving shootings, bombings, maiming, and arson, as well as looting of Ibo
owned shops and businesses (Garrison, 1966b, 1966c, 1966k, 1966m).
6. Consequences or Effects of
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase I - 1966 to 1976
The strategies adopted by the different perpetrators have varying effects or
consequences in this study phase. Consequences identified in this phase include death toll
and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned corpses, as in the several various massacres of
Ibos discussed above; refugees and displaced Ibos from the north or Ibos fleeing to the
safety of their home state (Garrison, 1966b, 1966); starvation as has been extensively
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discussed above (Emerson, 1970; Garrison, 1968b); secession and civil war as the
resultant effect of the northern pogroms on Ibos and the refugee crisis (Garrison 1967b,
1968a); and churches burned, bombed or destroyed (Garrison, 1966b). Other
consequences identified in this study phase include Christian/Ibo businesses, homes,
hotels, and properties destroyed (Garrison, 1966k; “Nigeria: Slow War,” 1967);
destroying, as well as looting and razing of properties (Garrison, 1966b, 1966c); and
denial of freedom of worship and desecration of Christian religion, as in Ojukwu’s war
call that Biafrans “be prepared to die that our children may live,” even as he “warned that
a federal victory “would mean continued genocide for our people, bestiality,
disease…anarchy, ignorance, poverty and desecration of our religion” (Friendly, 1967a,
para. 3, 8).
Further consequences in this phase are security threat, apprehension, anxiety or
political and social chaos (Garrison, 1966e, 1966l, 1967a); and the consequences
category also reveals normalcy or calm returning after episodes of gruesome
exterminations, showing an intermittency of occurrence in the killings. For instance, after
the May/July 1966 episodes of Ibo massacres in the north, and before the even more
heinous fratricide of the Ibos in the September/October 1966 eruptions, it was observed
that “An atmosphere of peace has finally returned to this vast Northern Region in the
wake of the week-long rioting that took at least several hundred lives last month,” with
the observation also that “Most of the dead were southern Ibos, the victims of political
passions with deep roots in Nigeria’s past” (Garrison, 1966k, para. 1-2).
End of Model Application for Phase I
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Study Phase II – 1976 to 1987: Synopsis. The second study phase examines the
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict from 1976 to 1987. This phase saw Nigeria’s
creation of seven new states in 1976, which increased the number of states for the country
to 19 in total (see Map III in Appendix A), as well as the creation of two additional states
in 1987 bringing the total number of states to 21 (see Map IV in Appendix A). Politically,
this phase saw a succession of coups and regimes transiting from military to civil rule and
vice versa beginning with Lieutenant-General Murtala Mohammed who became Head of
State following a bloodless coup that overthrew General Yakubu Gowon in January
1975. Following his assassination in an unsuccessful coup in February 1976, LieutenantGeneral Olusegun Obasanjo, then his deputy, became the next Head of State.
Additionally, in this study phase, Nigeria transited from military to civil rule in
October 1979 with Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) elected into office as the President in the
Second Republic (1979-1983). Ousted in his second term in office in a palace coup in
December 1983, General Muhammadu Buhari (1983-1985) became Head of State and
Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria SMC which ended the Second
Republic. In yet another palace coup that overthrew Buhari in August 1985, General
Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1992) came to power as Head of State and President of the
Armed Forces Ruling Council of Nigeria (AFRC). The second phase of the study situates
in the atmosphere of these successive regimes and structural changes in the country.
In the years following the war, the Ibos who returned to the North had been
changed by the 1966 riots and the debilitating effects of having fought and lost the civil
war, in which processes ethnicity had functioned “as a carefully directed social and
political toxin” (Anthony, 2002, p. 235). The promotion of the Northernization policies of
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the pre-war era had aimed at limiting southerners’ ability at gaining political and
economic footholds in the north. Threatened with Ironsi’s administrative unification
policy, however, the regions political elites and power brokers’ intent on retaining control
over the region was made resoundingly clear by the anti-riots, which they succeeded in,
with the toppling of Ironsi’ government after which “the violent expulsion of Igbos from
the North completed Northerners’ assertion of control” (Anthony, 2002, p. 235).
Additionally, there was also an economic take-over and change of hands other than the
political control as “Igbo property and their niches in local economies found their way
into the hands of other Nigerians, often those of local elites” (Anthony, 2002, p. 235).
Furthermore, the creation of states enabled the preferential engagement or promotion of
each state’s own citizens as a result of which the hitherto perceived threat that
southerners or Ibos had posed in 1966 became less threatening. More so, Ibos no longer
occupied many top positions in the federal government administration then under the
headship of Gowon from the Middle Belt, nor were they notable any longer in the
parastatals, civil service, or private sector. Essentially, as Anthony (2002) observes, “The
monolithic Igbo monster that Northern leaders of the 1950s and 1960s had painted as so
fierce had, for all practical purposes, lost its teeth” (p. 235).
Since the 1970s, pressure had been mounting up, primarily, over the issue of
religion’s role in politics. With the structural changes brought about by the creation of
states in Nigeria amidst the ensuing regime changes, there was a shift in focus from the
hitherto mainly ethnic-fault divide to an intensification a religious-fault divide. To that
end religious tensions have escalated in northern Nigeria since the civil war, and have
remained high with religious issues and constituencies proving more robust than ethnic
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constituencies in the inherent political fragmentation of smaller states, and its divisions
also proving “resistant to the inhabiting effects of military rule” (Anthony, 2002, p. 234).
This second phase of the study, therefore, sees the country witnessing “another episode in
northern Nigeria's long annals of religious unrest,” with violence said to have “sputtered
in the region” with the withdrawal of the military from political life in 1979 (Cowell,
1982, para. 2). Undergirding the phenomena is the crisis posed by the pervasiveness of
religion in politics, as a result of which it is observed that “Beginning with the Shagari
administration, religious violence became one of the [nation’s] most serious crises of the
1980s and beyond” (Falola, 1999, p. 168).
One such prevalence of religious skirmishes and tensions in the north was the
May 1980 crisis in Zaria, involving extensive destruction of mainly Christian property by
some Muslims. Soon following this disturbance was a large-scale insurgency which
broke out in Kano in 1980, and spreading in the years up to 1985, engulfed a number of
major cities in the north. These insurgencies, referred to as “the Maitatsine riots” claimed
the lives of thousands, as well as caused extensive property damage (Falola, 2002, p. 168)
involving a fundamentalist Islamic sect led by one Mohammad Marwa of Cameroonian
descent, said to have previously been expelled from the area due to disruptive activities
(Jaynes, 1981). Observed as “combining Islam with sorcery” (Falola, 2002, p. 168) (see
also Falola, 1998), Marwa had by 1980 established a following of about 3,000 to 5,000 in
Kano, mostly unemployed youths (Cowell, 1982; Jaynes, 1981, para. 11), “willing to die
for their belief,” some of them migrants from neighboring villages, the urban poor, and a
number of them foreigners from Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (Falola, 2002, p. 168).
Marwa denounced materialism and proffered a compelling substitute to the secular
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government’s modernizing scheme, with his notion of a leader involving, being spiritual,
unmaterialistic, and anti-West (Falola, 2002). This December 1980 violence in Kano,
involved the loss of 4,177 lives, and stands out as the first religious upheaval with huge
death toll and property damage (Akaeze, 2009, para. 4).
Charging foreign scheming to have allegedly aimed to derail its programs by
instigating the riots, the federal government’s set-up investigation tribunal on the
violence, however, found “no credible evidence to support the accusation of foreign
instigation…Rather, religious violence was a response to internal economic and political
decay” (Falola, 2002, p. 168). Marwa was observed to have constantly confronted the
police from 1972 until 1982 when he died, as a result of his followers’ activities-incited
his preaching. The sect envisioned their riots to be a jihad and their struggles endproduct, and they were trained and prepared psychologically for war, and had also
acquired varied weaponry. The Maitatsine riots targeted security agents and the wider
populace, and aiming to checkmate the insurgencies, the government started encroaching
on religious matters which involved issuing regulations to control preachers. The
government’s antagonism only further emboldened and strengthened their resolve to
violence. Hostile to non-members, they targeted both mainstream Muslims and nonMuslims alike; they were known to harass, kidnap, rape, and kill innocent people (Falola,
1998). Thus, as Marwa, however, also espoused Islamic beliefs that were said to be
deviant from traditional Islam (Jaynes, 1981), the Maitatsine movement triggered off
violent conflicts with Islamic undertones, as his versions of religious dogmas were
viewed heretically by mainstream Muslims. Hence, the period witnessed inter-religious
clashes with other Muslim groups as a result of the sect’s “splintered brand of Islam,
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which claims some 40 million adherents” (Colwell, 1982, para. 5). Additionally, others
replicated Marwa’s example, though with different orientations and motivations, as the
worsening economic conditions drive more people into fundamentalist Islamic
organizations (Falola, 2002).
Sequel to the heightened religious fervency among other Muslim groups,
triggered by the Maitatsine uprisings, young fundamentalists in the Kano metropolis
attacked churches and alcohol serving hotels, sacking or closing them down with death
toll (presumably, of Christians) also recorded (Cowell, 1982, para. 9). Hence, other than
the Maitasine uprisings which movement was basically intra-religious with its lethal
uprisings in the region’s Muslim cities against security agents and the populace at large,
there were also significant inter-group and intra-group tensions between the Tijanniyya
and Quadriyya who were the major brotherhoods, as well as tensions between them, and
within the Muslim Brothers (Shiites) and the Izala who were the more radical or
puritanical movements (Osaghae, Suberu, & University of Oxford, 2005, p. 20).
In addition to intra-religious tensions dotting the period, inter-religiously,
relationships involving Muslim and Christian organizations moved into an era of
pronounced tension. In October 1982, eight prominent churches were set on fire by
Muslim rioters in Kano which marked, as Falola (2002) observes, “the beginning of what
would become a complicated national problem” (p. 169). The investigating tribunal
ordered by the government as further observed attributed the causation to Christians’
growing influence in an Islamic city, in addition to the influence of Iran originated radical
literature with recommendation made, thus, “that caution must be exercised in locating
churches among the Muslims” (Falola, 2002, p. 169). This development gave Christians
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the opportunity to bring to the fore, a multiplicity of “complaints of discrimination in
jobs, land allocation, and access to radio broadcasting, and the takeover of their schools”
(Falola, 2002, p. 169). Thus commenced the on-going bitter and drawn out confrontation
between Muslims and Christians which has precipitated a fear of the country being
engulfed in religious wars (Falola, 2002).
Then, also exacerbating religious tension in the period was the issue of the
Babangida administration’s registering of Nigeria in 1985 into membership of the
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), a body which unites Islamic nations on
economic and political concerns with funding committal from each member and member
borrowing privileges from the organization. Babangida is observed to have pushed the
country clandestinely into the OIC, where “previous Nigerian leaders had rejected such a
move” (Falola, 1999, pp. 187-188). A prolonged period of tension ensued as a result, as
the move was construed by Christians as a move towards turning the country to become
an Islamic state. The period, therefore, also witnessed major clashes between Muslims
and Christians which occurred primarily in the northern cities of Kano, Bauchi, ZangoKataf, and Kaduna, all of which recorded extensive damages of worship centers and high
death toll (Brooke, 1987b; Falola, 1999, p. 188).
Additionally, there have also been fights in the country’s Constituent Assembly
by Northern delegates over Sharia’s inclusion in the judicial system. The National Party
of Nigeria (NPN) is observed to have manipulated religion as a strategy in its
electioneering campaigns, vigorously seeking the support of emirs and religious leaders,
while also using political songs and religious verses (Falola, 2002). And, further
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evidencing the nation’s religious divide, as well as this politicization of religion, Osaghae
observes that:
Although religious conflicts have roots going back to the foundation of the
Nigerian state under colonial rule, and the pragmatic involvement of the state in
religious activities, religion became an explosive political issue from the time the
Sharia issue divided the Constituent Assembly in 1977/8. The Maitatsine riots and
other Muslim uprisings of the 1980s, and allegations of Muslim fundamentalist
uprisings of the 1980s, and allegations of Muslim dominance in the Buhari regime
were evidence of growing religious tension and politicization. (1998b, p. 249)
Furthermore, in March 1986 Muslims and Christians are recognized to have
engaged in a superiority contest that was sparked off in Ilorin by an Easter procession.
This was followed in March 1987 by confrontation between the two groups in
Kafanchan, a town in Southern Kaduna in which native Kajes and Christians were
accused of having destroyed some mosques, and that led to lives being lost and properties
destroyed. In a supposed reprisal attack on the same day, Muslims chanted war songs as
they marched the streets in Kaduna, Gusau, Katsina, Zaria, and Funtua razing churches
and Christian properties, once again recording extensive death toll in the disturbance
(Akaeze, 2009, para. 12-13). On the magnitude of this crisis that engulfed parts of the
north, Falola observes:
Very rapidly, the violence spread to other places, where it acquired all the
characteristics of the Kafanchan outbreak. But whereas Christians had been strong
in Kafanchan, they were to be bested in other places. Many Muslims, mostly
youth, organized in small groups to attack Christians in Kaduna, Zaria, Samaru,
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Wusasa, Kankia, Malumfashi, Katsina, and Funtua, all in Kaduna state. Their
targets included churches and residential houses, Christian-owned business and
property, and people. By the time the violence abated, 113 churches had been
burned to the ground.
The crisis ended in heavy losses to the Christians. Across the region, 152
churches (as compared to five mosques) were burned, most notably in Kafanchan,
Zaria, Kaduna, Wusasa, Funtua, and Kaduna. Christians suffered the most
damage in Zaria, where the Muslims overpowered and devastated them. (1998,
pp. 183, 185)
Applying the Genocide Proclivity Model: Phase II – 1976 to 1987. The coding
list for the emergent nodes or codes for the study Phase II are provided in Appendix C:
Coding List B. The application of the emergent nodes from study Phase II to the
Genocidal Proclivity Model on page 199 follows.
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena
Relating to Genocidal Proclivity:
Phase II - 1976 to 1987
This second phase of the study shows causal conditions which lead ultimately to
genocidal proclivity under the four causation factors outlined above as: immediate or
trigger factors; underlying or root causes; perceived threat of the “otherness,” and
exclusive ideological framing.
The study data for this phase reveal immediate or trigger factors including arrests
or persecution of sect members, religious extremism and violence or other
fundamentalists activities. For instance, the study data reveal subsequent Matatsine
conflicts as trailing from the sect’s 1980 clash in Kano with the military in which
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Muhammad Marwa (the sect’s leader) and 400 died (Cowell, 1982, para. 10). Other
trigger factors include insurgency, uprising, or anti-Government riots, as in the Maitatsine
riots or insurgencies; Islam degraded, desecration or misinterpretation of Koran which
involved the Muslim mob attacks of Christians in Kafanchan in March 1987 in which 11
people were killed and 14 churches burned as a result of uncomplimentary remarks made
by a Christian preacher on the Koran (Brooke, 1987a, para. 1-2). Also under trigger
factors for this phase was reprisal mission or revenge as in the March 1987 attack on
Christians in Zaria which was said to have been in retaliation to the Kafanchan clash
between the two groups, the aftermath of which eight Koran teachers were killed by
Christian mobs (Brooke, 1987b). Additionally, earlier confrontations of the Maitatsine
cult with security agents leading to Marwa’s son had triggered retaliatory clashes in
which about 50 policemen were killed by the sect in December 1980. Also said to have
triggered the clashes was a deadline given by the authorities for the group to leave Kano
(Jaynes, 1981). The group targeted the local authorities, and government forces deployed
to quell the uprising, ended with the annihilation of the sect, with Marwa and most of his
followers killed on December, 1980 (Jaynes, 1981).
Additionally under this study phase are underlying or root causes which include
historical factors; culture of bad governance and corruption or oppressive military rule;
and Al Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian links including illegal aliens, as in
the December 1980 Maitatsine riots in Kano, said to have been Libyan-backed (Jaynes,
1981). Further underlying causation in this study phase are nodes for political
underpinnings or power struggle, including factors of political elites or Kaduna Mafia,
which Cowell (1982) observes as “a larding of politics that cannot be ignored” with
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allegations of fanning the flames of violence being made by rival political parties (para.
12). This study phase also includes socio-economic factors involving poverty,
unemployment, lack of education, and discontent. The study data reveal, for instance, that
“severe unemployment and a general economic depression were blamed for the condition
of hordes of listless youths receptive to any call to violence” (Kotch, 1987, para. 8).
Marwa was said to have established in 1980 a following of about 3,000 to 5,000 group
members in Kano (Jaynes, 1981, para. 7) which were drawn mainly from unemployed
youths (Cowell, 1982).
Furthermore, the Maitatsine exclusive ideological framing had his followers
holding him as the true prophet and not Mohammed, while the orthodox Muslims view
the sect’s interpretation of the Koran as heretical (Cowell, 1982, para. 10). Such
perception of differences in, for instance, the Maitatsine sect’s exclusive ideological
framing vis-à-vis those of the orthodox Muslim groups creates divisions which fan and
ignite the embers of intra-religious conflict among the groups involved. The study data
further observe that:
The strands of Islam in northern Nigeria are diffuse, fractured among contentious
sects and social groups that do not have the cohesion of the Shiites of prerevolutionary Iran, or a recognized leader with the authority of Ayatollah
Khomeini. But the ferment is there. There are three major sects and within
them…are divisions between the traditionalists and those young fundamentalists
who assert that their forefathers have corrupted the faith and diluted its values.
(Cowell, 1982, para. 11)
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More so, as the study data also reveal, Marwa whose ideology denounced materialism
was said to have also espoused Islamic beliefs that were deviant from traditional Islam
(Jaynes, 1981).
Additionally this study phase shows perceived threat of the “otherness” as a third
set of causal conditions, and these include ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions
and animosities. The study data point to rivalries among the country multi-ethnic groups
as often paralleling religious rivalries, with the conflict in the north in March 1987
involving “largely Hausa and Fulani northern Moslems who attacked Yoruba and Ibo
southern Christians” (Brooke, 1987b, para. 10). Also under the perceived threat of the
“otherness,” the data further reveal the theme of annihilation attempts by targeting or
forceful conversion of Christians to Islam. For instance, following a March 1987 Muslim
and Christian clash in Kafanchan, Muslim mobs went to town in Zaria “chanting ‘Islam
Only!’ and ‘Allah is Great!’” and dousing “all of the city’s 75 or so churches” with
gasoline and burning them down, while also threatening a Christian community “Either
Wusasa will accept Islam or it will be burned to ashes,” and they razed the family stead
of Yakubu Gowon and St. Bartholomew church said to be northern Nigeria’s oldest
church (Brooke, 1987b, para. 8, 10-11).
Also in this study phase is the fourth set of causal conditions of exclusive
ideological framing including religious dimensions, anti-Western or ideological
differences. On the Maitatsine riots, for instance, the study data reveal that the cult,
enthused by their ideology of infallibility to guns, staked out against the police for four
days until their resistance was broken with a barrage of mortar by security agents. It is
further observed that:
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Many ordinary people, regarded by the cult as heretics and infidels, were cut
down and mutilated even as the police moved in. Some witnesses, from the
humble suburb of Bulumkutu where the killings took place, say, too, that the cult
members drank the blood of their fallen to renew their strength and covered
themselves with magical powders to deflect the police bullets. (Cowell, 1982,
para. 7)
Other exclusive ideological framing in this study phase include fundamentalism
and religious fervency (Cowell, 1982; Dash, 1984; Jaynes, 1981; Kotch, 1987); and
Sharia or Islamic law institution in northern Nigeria, involving the theme of imposing
Sharia across Nigeria or establishing of Islamic state (Brooke, 1987b). In the 1987
Kaduna state crisis where a gruesome pogrom was meted on Christians in several cities,
with about 75 churches in Zaria burned down, even as “mobs also burned Christianowned businesses, the homes of Christians and hotels serving beer,” it is observed that
“Moslems want to extend the Islamic legal code of Shariah from the north to the entire
nation. [And that] Christians were outraged…when Nigeria joined the Organization of
the Islamic Conference” (Jaynes, 1987, para. 11, 13). As already noted, ideological
framing underlie much of the excessive blood-letting which continues to occur in
northern Nigeria, especially with the introduction of Sharia in some northern states.
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors
Underlying Causation, Perceived Threat of the
“Otherness” and Exclusive Ideological Framing:
Phase II - 1976 to 1987
This phase of the study also shows that the causal conditions—the trigger factor,
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing
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in the different conflict situations and contextual settings—resulted in differing degrees
and forms of exterminations and killings between different Muslim groups, between
Muslims and Christians, and between different ethnic groups with conflict drawn interrelatively along ethnic as well as religious lines. This study phase phenomena as
identified in the study data reveal core categories of attacks and violence which are
unleashed to target victims with themes including assault, shoot-out, killings, arson and
looting (“300 Believed Killed,” 1982; Jaynes, 1981); bloodbath, carnage, pogrom,
mayhem, massacres or barbarism (Brooke, 1987b); religious and ethnic violence (“1,000
Are Reported Dead,” 1984; “300 Believed Killed,” 1982; Brooke, 1987b; Jaynes, 1981);
sectarian violence; and spiral or escalation of violence (“100 Nigeria Policemen,” 1982;
Brooke, 1987b; Cowell, 1982;).
Phenomenal nodes for this phase also include targeted, pre-meditated or
orchestrated killings and assaults (Brooke, 1987b; Kotch, 1987). For instance, in the
March 1987 crisis in which “Moslem rioters burned a 2,000-seat ecumenical Christian
chapel at Ahmadu Bello University” (ABU), Zaria, the ABU faculty association
chairman expressed the association’s “horror and disgust” at “the obviously premeditated
and coordinated acts of arson and assault” (Brooke, 1987b, para. 21-22). Other
phenomenal nodes are tit-for-tat killings in northern states; uprising, anti-government
rioting, protests or demonstrations (Brooke, 1987b; “Hundreds Die in Religious Riots,”
1984; Kotch, 1987); and violent or deadly clashes, rioting or gun battles (“1,000 Are
Reported Dead,” 1984; “718 Deaths,” 1984; Brooke, 1987b; Cowell, 1982; Dash, 1984;
Jaynes, 1981). By comparing and contrasting such phenomenal nodes and categories, the
two major categories of targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and assaults; and
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bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism are recognized to be
closely associated with the proclivity to genocide.
3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious
Conflict and Genocidal Proclivity
Developed: Phase II - 1976 to 1987
This study phase also shows contextual themes involving the social space or
lebensraum, the framework on which genocide or its proclivity can develop (Wood,
2001). The contextual settings identified in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict
in the study data in this second phase of the research include Northern region or states,
Adamawa state, in Yola, and Jimeta; Borno state, in Maiduguri; Gombe state; Kaduna
state, in Kaduna, Kafanchan, and Zaria; and Kano state, in Kano (see Tables 1 and 2 for
the various contexts, respectively for the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, and
for the reprisal attacks in the south).
Also providing the contextual framework are the different conflict parties in
varying phenomenal settings in this study phase including Muslim mobs or sect and
security forces (“100 Nigeria Policemen,” 1982; Cowell, 1982; Dash, 1984; Jaynes,
1981); Muslim mobs, sect or groups and Christians (“1,000 Are Reported Dead,” 1984;
“300 Believed Killed,” 1982; Brooke, 1987a; 1987b; Dash, 1984; “Hundreds Die in
Religious Riots,” 1984; “Nigerian Toll,” 1982); Muslim sect and other Muslims or sect
(“718 Deaths,” 1984; Dash, 1984; “Hundreds Die in Religious Riots,” 1984); Muslim
sect or civilian mobs or gangs and Ibos; or conflict involving different ethnic groups, for
instance, in the March 1987 attack in which Muslim mobs mainly Hausa and Fulani were
attacking southerners involving Yoruba and Ibo Christians (Brooke, 1987b, para. 10).
The conflict parties’ nodes were analyzed by comparison and contrast with the
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phenomenal conflict nodes and categories, and their causal conditions to identify
conflicts with the plausibility of a conceptualized annihilating difference (Hinton, 2002)
which give rise to exterminations involving perpetrator and victim situations. Other
conflicts devoid of such annihilating difference are considered as clashes or fighting
between parties without an overt inclination to genocide.
Additionally, varying perpetrator-groups identified in this study phase using the
annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties described above include the
Matatsine fundamentalist group involving, for instance, as Dash observes:
Battles between members of a Moslem sect and policemen, soldiers and civilian
vigilantes in northern Nigeria appear to have left as many as 1,000 people dead
and laid waste wide swaths of a state capital…
It was the third such uprising in northern Nigeria in a little more than three
years. Authorities Sunday removed at least 500 bodies from the streets of the
Gongola state capital of Yola following shootouts between members of the sect
and vigilantes opposing them…The troops were sent to Yola…to restore order
after the local police force was overwhelmed by the religious zealots.
The rioters are members of the Maitatsine sect, an offshoot of Islam, who
physically attack other Muslims whom they consider infidels. (1984, para. 1-3)
Perpetrators in this phase of the study also include Muslim mobs, rioters or
rampaging Muslim youths as revealed in the study data. For instance, a March 1987 clash
between Muslims and Christians in Kafanchan which ensued from an allegation of
misinterpretation of the Koran by a Christian pastor in an evangelist revival meeting, as
the conflict escalated and spread to Kaduna, Zaria and some other northern cities, it was
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observed that Muslim mobs wreaked a “horrible pogrom” in such cities against Christians
(Jatau as cited in Brooke, 1987, para. 7). Further remarking on the extent of carnage
perpetrated in this episode, it was noted that “Twenty years after a bloody civil war was
fought to preserve Nigeria unity, dozens or perhaps hundreds of churches were destroyed
in what the Government said were orchestrated attacks by Muslim mobs on the Christian
Minority” (Kotch, 1987, para, 2).
However, this study phase also identifies perpetrator nodes for Christian militia or
youths, involving the same March 1987 Muslim/Christian clash, on which it is observed
that
Within hours, slaps escalated to stone-throwing, beatings and the destruction of
three mosques. [And] Two days later, on March 8, a Christian mob laid siege to a
hostel for itinerant teachers of the Koran here. When the fires died down, eight
teachers lay dead, seven with their throats cut and one killed by an arrow.
(Brooke, 1987b, para. 5)
Details of the involvement of the perpetrator groups in the different conflict settings of
this study phase are analyzed and discussed in Phase II synopsis above.
This study phase also reveals target victims which enable the development of
annihilating difference amidst a perpetrator group and social space environment to
produce a complete and well-rounded contextual setting for proclivity to genocide.
Identified target or victim groups for this phase of the study include Christians and
churches, also involving Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian villages; civilian
targets; Southerners who are predominantly Christians, and especially Ibos as targets;
security agents - police officers, military and government officials; symbols of
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government authority; media offices and journalists; beer parlors, hotels, banks and other
facilities which represent structures or institutions with Western connotations; Muslim
clerics or mainstream/orthodox Muslims; and Muslims, Hausa-Fulani herders, Muslim
sect, Northerners or mosques. Details of the victimhood of the targets in the different
conflict settings of this study phase are also analyzed and discussed in Phase II synopsis
above.
4. Intervening Conditions Influencing
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase II – 1976 to 1987
This phase of the study further identified intervening conditions in the differing
contextual settings of the conflict, in addition to the context node involving such general
or broad conditions which influence by increasing or diminishing the tendency or
proclivity to genocide. Intervening conditions in this study phase include press censorship
and manipulation or deflation and inflation of casualty figures—this casualty information
manipulation factor was used by government parties on occasions to minimize but also
sometimes scale-up reprisals or tit-for-tat violence, as in the October 1982 Matasine riots
in Maiduguri in which unofficial estimate of toll is 450, with local estimate put at over
1,000, while the government official figures were, however, put the toll of civilians and
sect members that died at 133 with 16 police officers, while local estimates indicate that
100 officers were killed (Cowell, 1982, para 6). Other intervening conditions include
extrajudicial killings and army involvement in policing.
The study data reveal, for instance, that in the December 1980 Maitatsine
disturbances, following the sect’s attack on the Governor’s residence, the army deployed
to contain the group shelled their base, resulting in a massive slaughter. According to the
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study data “They were killing them like goats, like donkeys even. It was unfortunate
really, but they were given a warning” (Jaynes, 1981, para. 17). It is, thus, noted that the
death toll officially put at 1,000, was said to be at least 10,000, with some witnesses
giving a figure of about 7,000 bodies “piled on garbage trucks and buried in mass graves”
(Jaynes, 1981, para. 18). It was also observed that in the days following, prisoners were
executed summarily, with civilians totaling about 80 including children gunned down
(Jaynes, 1981).
Additional intervening conditions in this study phase include government
ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government, regarding which the study data observed
on the Maitatsine killings, for instance, that “The army…might have quelled the
disturbances more rapidly before the cult members began their massacre of civilians.
But…calling on the army could have meant a tacit concession of civilian inability to keep
Nigeria's house in order” (Cowell, 1982, para. 18). Intervening conditions in this study
phase also include the presence of collaborators or bystanders involving local
collaborators, as in the study data on the Maitatsine riots which reveal General Ibrahim
Babangida, military president at the time, as stating “We cannot stand by and allow a
group of ambitious and mindless power- seekers to push us into yet another civil war,”
with summary justice to be meted to the instigators of the riots (Kotch, 1987, para 3-4).
Gen. Babangida is said to be alluding to such fomenters of the riots as “‘group interest’
and powerful subversives,” noted in the data as “Kaduna Mafia,” or northern political
elites “whose influence has waned since Gen. Babangida seized power in 1985” (Kotch,
1987, para. 11-13). There is also an indication of foreign collaborators leading to the
internationalization of the conflict, and local collaborators or bystanders. For instance, it
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is observed in the study data on the Maitasine sect that “Despite the absence of proof,
Western diplomats in Lagos tend to believe that Libya had a hand in the troubles here, if
only in providing financial assistance to the cult” (Jaynes, 1981, para. 12).
This study phase also reveals that further influencing the tendency to increase or
deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control the violence,
with their implementation. Intervention efforts in this study phase include attempts at
dialogue, appeals for intervention or mediation; control measures taken such as curfews
and road checks by security agents, investigations and commissions of inquiries set up;
and mopping-up of rioters or arrests made.
5. Strategies Foreshadowing
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase II – 1976 to 1987
This study phase further reveals different strategies foreshadowing genocidal
tendencies within the contextual settings and intervening conditions which generated the
above described resultant phenomena. Such strategies include organization, planning, and
weaponry; and extermination plot involving mass murders or ideological and ethnic
cleansing, for instance, by burning of churches, or the forceful conversion of Christians to
Islam. For instance, in the aftermath of the Kafanchan Muslims and Christians clash in
March 1987 which was sparked off by a lady’s public slapping of a Christian pastor for
allegedly misinterpreting the Koran during a crusade, Muslim mobs invaded “all 75 or so
churches” in Zaria, doused them with gasoline, and burned them, reciting “Islam Only!”
and “Allah is Great!” while also, threatening to burn down a Christian community,
Wusasa, if it does not accept Islam (Brooke, 1987b, para. 8, 10). Furthermore, the
strategies emergent in this phase include indoctrination and manipulation or instigation,
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as in General Babangida’s alluding to “powerful subversives” that were recognized as
“the sinister men who instigated the riots in Kaduna state” in March 1987, by sponsoring
“the rabble of young and uneducated Moslems” who attacked Christians and their
property (Kotch, 1987, para. 4-5, 11).
6. Consequences or Effects of
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase II – 1976 to 1987
The strategies adopted by perpetrators in this study phase have various effects or
consequences in the different conflict settings examined. Consequences identified in this
phase include death toll and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned corpses, for instance,
the study data reveal that the Kano Maitatsine riots of 1980 had a death toll of over 1,000
people (Jaynes, 1981, para. 1, 20), and 452 toll in the Maitatsine October 1982 riots in
Maiduguri, with another 18 toll in Kaduna where the sect moved to as security agents
attempted to arrest the sect members (“Nigerian Toll,” 1982). It is further observed that
this Maiduguri uprising had about 100 police officers killed in four days fighting with the
sect (“100 Nigerian Policemen,” 1982, para. 1), with another 1,000 toll reported in Yola
in March 1984 also involving the Maitatsine riots (“1,000 Are Reported Dead,” 1984,
para. 1). Other consequences include refugees and displaced persons, and/or persons
fleeing homes or taking refuge or shelter for safety (Brooke, 1987b); mass graves or mass
burials (“1,000 are Reported Dead,” 1984; Jaynes, 1981); churches burned, bombed or
destroyed (Brooke, 1987a, 1987b; Cowell, 1982; Kotch, 1987); mosques burned or
destroyed in retaliation by Christians (Brooke, 1987b); police stations and barracks,
government buildings bombed or burned (Brooke, 1987a); Christian businesses, homes,
hotels and properties destroyed (Brooke, 1987a, 1987b; Cowell, 1982; Kotch, 1987); and
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destroying, looting and razing of properties (Brooke, 1987b; “Death Toll Put at 300,”
1984; “Hundreds Die in Religious Riots,” 1984).
Consequences also include denial of freedom of worship and desecration of
Christian religion as in the threat by Muslim mobs to the Wusasa Christians to accept
Islam or have their community burned down (Brooke 1987b). Further consequences
nodes are security threat, apprehension, anxiety or political and social chaos (Brooke,
1987b; Dash, 1984; Jaynes, 1981; Kotch, 1987); and the consequences category also
reveals normalcy or calm returning after episodes of gruesome killings, evidencing the
intermittency of the killing episodes as in the March 1984 Maitatsine riots in which it is
reported “that ‘normalcy’ had returned to the city” of Yola following a week’s fighting
between the sect and security agents, which left about 1,000 dead, and “Hundreds of
people had fled their homes, many of which were burning, and the streets of Yola were
littered with bodies” (“Hundreds Die in Religious Riots,” 1984, para. 5).
End of Model Application for Phase I
Study Phase III – 1987 to 1996: Synopsis. The third study phase spans from
1987 to 1996 and is inclusive of the years 1987 up to 1991 when nine additional states
and the Federal Capital Territory (now Abuja) were created bringing the states of Nigeria
to 30 in total (see Map V in Appendix A). This phase also includes the years 1991 up to
1996 when additional states were created, bringing the total to the present 36 states of
Nigeria (see Map I in Appendix A). The phase witnessed various regime changes in the
political sphere; as with the fall of the second republic in 1983, the country once again
entered another prolonged era of military rule. During the Babangida regime which
spanned from 1985 to 1992, there was an unsuccessful coup in April 1990 involving
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some Middle Belt Christian officers led by Major Gideon Orkar to overthrow Babangida.
In 1992 in an attempt to return to civilian rule, Babangida established two political
parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention
(NRC). Thus, Nigeria’s third Republic marks the country’s unsuccessful attempt at
restoring democracy as initiated by the Babangida government during which civilian state
governors took office in January 1992 following their elections, but a presidential
election won by Moshood K. O. Abiola on June 12, 1993 was, however, annulled by
Babangida. In August 1993 amidst pressure from the AFRC (Armed Forces Ruling
Council), Babangida was forced to step down from office, handing over to Ernest A. O.
Shonekan who assumed power as Interim Head of State. Shonekan was ousted in a palace
coup which brought Defense Minister Sani Abacha into power as Head of State, and he
established the Provisional Ruling Council of Nigeria in November 1993. In March 1995
the Abacha administration arrested Obasanjo for allegedly supporting a secret coup plot
(Falola & Heaton, 2008; Osaghae, 1998b).
This study phase witnessed a period of prolonged tension marked with religious
riots and unrest in which thousands of lives were lost with properties and buildings
destroyed, and Nigeria was on the verge of a religious war between Christians and
Muslims, as political leaders opportunely manipulated the nation’s diversity problem.
More so, economic problems caused by the failure of Babangida’s Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP), a policy aimed at revamping the down-sliding economy, intensified a
general feeling of discontent and the quest for alternative socio-political means of
survival. Recourse to religion provided the way out for the teeming masses. It is observed
that “Millions of people were driven to religion, as both Islam and Christianity
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accelerated their conversion process, drawing from angry, poor frustrated people”
(Falola, 1999, p. 187). The increased religiosity brought about a new wave of
fundamentalism in its wake, with radical organizations preaching against secularism and
military rule. Recognized to have manifested differently in both religions, Falola (1999)
observes that “Among Christians, fundamentalism took the form of evangelism that could
be reactionary and conservative in form, among Muslims, the influence of the West,
materialism, and secular governments was severely attacked” (p. 187).
Also deriving from the people’s discontent with military rule, was resurgence
among the Muslims of the Mahdi or coming Messiah ideal which would save the nation,
as well as reform Islam. Furthermore, Sheikh Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, a preacher who led the
Shi’ites (a Muslim group who were also increasing in number), began to demand for the
creation of Nigeria’s Islamic republic. The Shi’ites engaged in, and clashed severally
with the government in different northern cities including Kaduna, Zaria, Kano,
Maiduguri, Bauchi, and Katsina, and made demands for a theocratic, God-fearing led
state government (Falola, 1999).
Additionally contributing to the riotous period were mainstream religious groups
with media and government access to their leaders. For the Muslims were the Supreme
Council for Islamic Affairs (SCIA) and the Jama’tu Nasril Islam (JNI) both of which
defended Islamic interests and made politically charged demands, for instance, “replacing
Sunday with Friday as a holiday and removing the symbols of the Judeo-Christian
tradition in schools and courts” (Falola, 1999, p. 187). For the Christians, there was the
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) which was their most prominent defender, and it
called for a distancing of the government from Islam. It is also observed that these
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religious organizations began to take on the semblance of political parties, such that in
addition to making important demands, their members were on occasions also being
mobilized for protest. This inherent politicization of religion derives from the country’s
drawn-out military rule. Falola (1999) observes that “Military rule succeeded in turning
religion into a platform from which to organize politics,” and argues that “While the
politicians were afraid of being excluded from power or being put in detention, religious
leaders were relatively free of harassment” (p. 187).
In April 1991, in the semblance of the Maitatsine sect of the 1980s and the havoc
unleashed on the society was the Katsina Shi’ite sect led by one Yahaya Yakubu who
staged a bloody protest with his members in the town. Following this was the Bauchi
eruption in April 1991, which was reported as:
…the worst religious crisis the country has witnessed since 1984 when the
Maitatsine religious fanatics struck in Jimeta, Gongola State, and about 764
Nigerians were killed. For four days, Bauchi State was engulfed in the fire of
religious violence. Thousands of hoodlums, many of them teenagers, using
religious cover, went on rampage in some towns, including the state capital,
Bauchi. The tale of terror was beyond comprehension as casualty figures mounted
and scores of homes, churches, hotels and some public property were torched.
(Newswatch report as cited in Akaeze, 2009, para. 14)
The Bauchi riots while “not instigated by any particular sect” and “had no leader,”
were triggered by an incidence involving a Muslim and a Christian butcher in the Tafawa
Balewa town abattoir which engulfed different parts of Bauchi (Falola, 1998, p. 204).
The crisis had about five hundred houses razed down within twenty-four hours, with

263
fifteen hotels burned in the Bayangeri quarter in which most of the city’s hotels situate,
also with cars, houses, and a neighborhood Deeper Bible Church burned down (Falola,
1998, p. 207). At the Hospital Road, a Christian designated zone in which most of the
city’s churches were situated, the rioters burned all of the twenty churches in the area
including “St. John’s Catholic Church, the Basara Baptist Church, COCIN Church, Christ
Apostolic Church, and St. Paul’s Anglican Church” (Falola, 1998, p. 207). Only the
ECWA church close to the army barracks escaped the ravaging Muslims, even as they
“descended on all the mission houses and destroyed their property, cars, and buses,
burning it all,” with the Christian Pilgrims Board property, offices, and cars equally
destroyed (Falola, 1998, p. 207). Proceeding next to Tudun Wada Street, an area
occupied by non-natives, the rioters chanting anti-ethnic and anti-Christian slogans and
carrying gasoline and weapons moved against their targets, with the Seyawa, a Christian
minority group “selected for destruction” along with other non-native Christians in the
area (Falola, 1998, p. 207). On the enormity of venom meted on the victims, most of
which were brutally killed, many burned, stoned, or machete to death, with others
decapitated (The Bauchi Massacre as cited in Falola, 1998), and on the magnitude of this
killing episode, it is observed that:
Casualties were high. Hundreds of homes, churches, and public buildings were
burned or destroyed. While official sources initially put the death toll at eighty,
mortuary figures had it at five hundred. Thousands more

were injured and

hundreds hospitalized, Corpses littered the streets of Bauchi City, and the threat of
disease from the decomposing bodies forced health authorities to collect these
corpses and bury them in mass graves outside the city. People now callous to
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death stood by as the corpses were piled into trucks. (Death and Destruction as
cited in Falola, 1998, p. 208)
Shortly following the Bauchi incident the religious conflagration train got to
Kano, where in October 1991, the Izala sect initially presumed peaceful demonstration to
stop an evangelical crusade being organized for Reinhard Bonnke suddenly turned into a
violent Muslim-Christian clash, with high death toll and casualty figures, and loss of
enormous property (Akaeze, 2009, para. 15). The sect had earlier been denied the
permission of using the venue—the public Race Course for a foreign preacher they had
invited—and were enraged by this in addition to CAN’s “aggressive publicity” for the
crusade (Falola, 1998, p. 211). To avert probable unrest, the state government change of
venue which, while not publicized, in addition to CAN’s posters already printed
infuriated the Muslims some militant of whom reckoned they were being challenged by
the infidels (Falola, 1998). Even more infuriating was the Christians’ use of the publicaddress system to broadcast Jesus Christ as coming to redeem souls, which to Muslim
leaders was a pollution of the city, “raising the name of Jesus over that of Prophet
Muhammad” and deemed “that the minority Christian element was acting outside its
place” (Falola, 1998, p. 212). The widespread riots claimed lives and had extensive
property damage, including forty-two shops, thirty-four houses, hotels, cars, trucks, and
many public buildings, even as carnages were wrought in the non-natives’ Sabon Gari
neighborhood, and Christians and southerners fled to the police barracks and air force
base for safety, abandoning their homes (Falola, 1998). Observed as an unprecedented
crisis in the state of Kano where religious violence predominates, it is noted that “the sole
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targeting of Christians for destruction on such a massive scale was something new”
(Falola, 1998, p. 212).
Furthermore, in December 1994 Kano once again made headlines when Muslim
fundamentalists lynched an Igbo trader, “and had his head paraded on a spike on the
streets of Kano after he was accused of desecrating the Koran by inscribing some
blasphemous words against Mohammed in his shop at the Sabon Gari area of the town”
(Akaeze, 2009, para.16). A Muslim and Igbo trader fracas escalated the episode into
widespread riots in May 1995, and in the ensuing communal violence, churches, shops,
and houses were once again razed down with extensive damage and toll before order
could be restored (Falola, 1998).
It is, thus, essential to recognize the increasingly religious tonation of the northern
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. Anthony (2002) observes, for instance, that since the
1980s and 1990s, religion seems to have supplanted ethnicity as the “defining fault line”
(p. 234) of the Hausa communities and Kano’s Igbo (and by extension Igbos and other
Christian ethnic groups in the North). Ethnicity and religion are said to have, thus, long
become “intimately entangled” in “the frontier between Hausa Muslims and Igbo
Christians” which, with national discourses increasingly turning to issues of religion,
have perceptibly shifted intergroup relations in Kano (and, by extension in the entire
North) (Anthony, 2002, pp. 234-235). Relationship between both groups was observed to
have remained tense after the 1991 Reinhard Bonnke crusade crisis, as well as the
Hausa/Igbo 1995 fracas and ensuing killings, however, with violence occurring in each
case “without the explicit manipulation of ethnicity that was present in 1966” on the basis
of which each of the disturbances are seen as religious conflict which mostly unfolded
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between both ethnic groups, as a result of affiliation patterns and circumstances
(Anthony, 2002, p. 238). Thus, on the dynamics of this shift from ethno to religious bend
in the Igbo-Hausa interactions, Anthony observes that:
The centrality of Islam to Hausa identity and Kanawa’s often axiomatic
association of Christianity with Igbos has meant past grievances, some long
dormant, others lingering, were available for both sides to tap into, and almost
inevitably surfaced…While the unresolved baggage was not in and of itself
sufficient to lead to open controversy or violence, in moments of anger and
tension, it reappeared, and became part of the new moment. Fortunately, unlike
the crises of 1966, this happened without the benefit of elite agendas to focus
those issues, recruit behind them, or provide rioters with the organizational
infrastructure necessary for a massive escalation. (2002, pp. 238-239)
However, the religious crisis was not restricted to Kano as other cities including
Jos, Wase, Zangon Kataf, Funtua, Yelwa- Shendam, and Funtua also took their shares of
the upheavals, sometimes with flimsy quarrel or political difference between the
opposing faiths sparking off killing sprees which security officials would find
challenging to stop. An instance of this was a May 1992 communal feud between Katafs
indigenes and Hausas in Kaduna State, which subsequently assumed religious coloration
and later spread to other cities in the state leaving destruction and huge death toll in its
trail (Akaeze, 2009, para. 17). The Zangon-Kataf crisis which is said to be “the
culmination of an age-old conflict between two groups divided by both ethnicity and
religion,” broke out on May 14 following altercations of farmlands invasions between the
Muslim Hausas and the Christian Katafs (Falola, 1998, p. 213). By May 15, there was a
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resultant toll of eighty-five to the crisis, and by May 16, the town was destroyed
completely with its hundreds of residents killed. Intervention was delayed as the people
destroyed themselves while the government and the police did nothing for three days,
even as “Over four hundred corpses littered the streets, and most of the houses were
burned to the ground (“Massacre in Kaduna” as cited in Falola, 1998, p. 217). Most dead
sustained massive machete and dagger wounds, or were shot using poisoned bows and
arrows, on occasions shot with guns, or burned in their homes or cars, with all major
churches as well as mosques also destroyed (Falola, 1998). The Zangon-Kataf episode is,
thus, recognized to have been so destructive and bitter that the Zaria, 1987 crisis paled
comparatively to it, with every valuable in Zangon-Kataf destroyed completely even as
the violence spread to Kaduna. As news of the Zangon-Kataf got to Kaduna and other
parts of the north, Hausas in Kaduna launched massive attacks on southern Zarian
residents in Kaduna, attacking every neighborhood in which they were concentrated
(Falola, 1998, p. 218).
According to Falola (1998) “A pogrom similar to the attack on the Igbo in 1966
resulted,” and being mostly Christians, the southern Zarians “made an easy target” as
they attended church on May 17, oblivious of any plans of ambush (p. 218). Many
worshippers and church ministers were gruesomely slaughtered in various churches in
Kaduna including the Aminu Road ECWA church where many were killed, the Bardawa
Heken church, the Angwar Baptist church, the Rhema church, and the African Baptist
church, with these last two also having extensive casualties. Some worshippers fled to the
sanctuary of private homes abandoning their cars, even as roadblocks were mounted by
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the Hausas to entrap worshippers as they fled, and once again, the police just stood by,
observing the rioters (Falola, 1998).
Thus, this study phase also witnessed major clashes between Muslims and
Christians which occurred primarily in the northern cities of Kano, Bauchi, Zango-Kataf,
and Kaduna, all of which recorded extensive damages of worship centers and high death
toll (Falola, 1999, p. 188).
Applying the Genocide Proclivity Model: Phase III – 1987 to 1996. The
coding list for the emergent nodes or codes for the study Phase III are provided in
Appendix C: Coding List C. The application of the emergent nodes from study Phase III
to the Genocidal Proclivity Model on page 199 follows.
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena
Relating to Genocidal Proclivity:
Phase III – 1987 to 1996
This phase III of the study also shows the four types of causal conditions of
immediate or trigger factors, underlying or root causes, perceived threat of the
“otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing which lead ultimately to genocidal
proclivity. In this study phase, the immediate or trigger causes include insurgency,
uprising, or anti-government riots; and arrests or persecution of fundamentalist sect
members, religious extremism and violence, or other fundamentalists’ activities.
Additionally, this study phase has underlying or root causes as a second set of
causal conditions including colonial influences, as in the Zangon-Kataf May 1992 crisis
which also engulfed Kaduna, in which it is observed that “The violence here has roots at
least as far back as British rule, which ended in 1960, and is fueled by conflicts over land
ownership and religious affiliation” (Noble, 1992c, para. 16). Other underlying causes in
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this phase include, political underpinnings or power struggle involving political elites or
Kaduna mafia, as in the “powerful subversives” that President Babangida alluded to as
fomenters of trouble who instigated the May 1987 Kaduna riots in which “hundreds of
churches were destroyed” in attacks said to have been orchestrated by Muslim mobs
against the Christian minority (Kotch, 1987, para. 2, 4, 11). Further underlying causes in
this phase are socio-economic factors including ethnic groups vying for control of fertile
lands, political and economic power as in the August 1992 ethnic crisis between the Tivs
and the Jukuns with extensive death toll, on which Noble observes that:
The episode ended in the deaths of at least 30 people and the certainty of more
battles in the spreading land dispute between two Nigerian ethnic groups, the Tivs
and the Jukuns. The violence here and in another Jukun village nearby, Kente, is
typical of scores of incidents since October in this thinly populated and ruggedly
beautiful region of eastern Nigeria.
No definitive accounting of casualties has been compiled. But Western
diplomats, Nigerian journalists and other travelers through Wukari, where the
fighting has centered, as well as Nigerians with friends and relatives in the area,
say that at least 1,000 and perhaps as many as 5,000 have been killed. (1992a,
para. 6-7)
Underlying causes in this phase also include, poverty, unemployment, lack of
education, and discontent, for instance, in the May 1992 Zangon-Kataf crisis that spread
to Kaduna in which it is observed that:
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The anti-Government riots were triggered by a severe economic slump. Nigeria,
the leading oil exporter of Africa, has been devastated by low prices for oil, which
accounts for more than 95 percent of the country's export earnings.
African and Western analysts have portrayed the explosion of discontent
as the most serious threat to plans by Nigeria's military leader, Gen. Ibrahim
Babangida, to hand over power…to a civilian government. (Noble, 1992c, para.
4-5)
Also included in this phase are the third set of causal factors of the perceived
threat of the “otherness” involving, ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and
animosities, as in the Taraba state, Tiv-Jukun conflict that emanates from “historical
animosity” between the two ethnic groups, whose intermittent, but protracted clashes
have left most of the region “a war zone of charred huts” (Noble, 1992a, para. 15, 17).
Further causal factor category of the perceived threat of the “otherness” are the nodes for
North-South split or largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south; and annihilation
attempts by targeting as in the October 1991 Kano crisis, for instance, in which Muslim
Hausa mobs targeted and “attacked a Christian neighborhood, setting fire to houses, cars,
markets and a church,” with over 200 people killed and many more injured (Noble,
1992a, para. 22).
Lastly in this study phase is the fourth set of causal conditions of exclusive
ideological framing which underlie much of the excessive blood-letting that continues to
occur in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. Ideological framing factors in this
phase of the study include fundamentalism and religious fervency as in the May 1992
Zangon-Kataf crisis where it is observed that “Deadly clashes frequently erupt between
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Christian and Muslim activists in the northern states. [And] Tensions have grown as
young Africans flock to fundamentalist Islamic sects and more people from the
predominantly Christian south move to the Islamic north” (“100 Feared Dead,” 1992,
para. 9). Other ideologically framed causations in this phase involve the institution of
Sharia or Islamic law in northern Nigeria as in the 1992 Muslim militants’
demonstrations calling for the establishment of Sharia law in Katsina state, in which
some people were killed and several others injured (“2 Killed,” 1992, para. 1).
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors,
Underlying Causation, Perceived Threat of the
“Otherness” and Exclusive Ideological Framing:
Phase III – 1987 to 1996
This study phase also shows that the causal conditions—the trigger factor,
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing
in different situations and contextual settings—resulted in varying degrees and forms
exterminations and killings primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians, as well
as between other conflict parties which are mostly divided along ethnic and religious
lines. Such phenomena as identified in this study phase reveal violence and attacks
which are unleashed to different target victims, including assault, shoot-out, killings,
arson and looting; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism.
For instance, in the Zangon-Kataf crisis which engulfed other cities in Kaduna state, it is
observed that “Mortuaries overflowed with mutilated corpses” in Kaduna, with people
being slaughtered “as if they were dogs” (“Nigeria Quells,” 1992, para. 12-13). Further
phenomenal themes in this phase include religious and ethnic violence; sectarian
violence; spiral or escalation of violence; and targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated
killings and assaults. In the May 1991 Kano crisis, for instance, in which “Thousands of
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lives were lost and properties valued in millions of Naira were destroyed” (Newswatch as
cited in Ezeibe, 2009, para. 30), it is observed that “Muslims pursued their hunt for
Christians…in religious rioting,” with the observation also that “Much of the violence
was centered on Kano's Sabongari neighborhood, which has a large population of
Christians” (“At Least 8 Dead,” 1991, para. 1, 10). Other phenomenal nodes in this phase
include uprising, anti-government rioting, protests or demonstrations; and violent or
deadly clashes, rioting or gun battles. By comparing and contrasting such phenomenal
nodes, this study phase also shows the two major categories involving targeted, premeditated or orchestrated killings and assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom,
mayhem, massacres or barbarism which are identified as being closely associated with
the proclivity to genocide.
3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious
Conflict and Genocidal Proclivity
Developed: Phase III – 1987 to 1996
Additionally in this study phase are contextual nodes involving social space or
lebensraum which provides the geographic base (Wood, 2001) that enables the fostering
of genocidal inclinations. The contexts are in the northern region or states including
Bauchi state, in Bauchi; Kaduna State, in Kaduna, Zonkwa, and Zangon-Kataf; Kano
state, in Kano; Katsina state, in Katsina; Nasarawa state; and Taraba state, in Akwana
(see Tables 1 and 2 for the various contexts, respectively for the northern Nigeria ethnoreligious conflict, and for the reprisal attacks in the south).
Also providing the contextual framework are different conflict parties in the
various phenomenal settings in this study phase including Muslim mobs or sect and
security forces; Muslim mobs, sect or groups and Christians; security agents and
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unidentified civilians; different ethnic groups; and Fulani herdsmen and/or Hausa-Fulani
group and Christian or host communities. Such emergent nodes for the conflict parties
were again analyzed by comparison and contrasted with the phenomenal conflict nodes
and categories and their causal conditions to identify conflicts with the plausibility of
conceptualized annihilating difference (Hinton, 2002) that give rise to exterminations
involving perpetrator and victim situations, with other conflicts which are devoid of such
annihilating difference considered as clashes or fighting between parties without an overt
inclination to genocide.
Additionally, there are varying perpetrator-groups identified in this study phase
using the annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties described above including
Muslim

mobs,

rioters

or

rampaging

Muslim

youths;

and

security

agents,

soldiers/army/military, Hausa/Northern troops. Details of the involvement of the
perpetrator groups in the different conflict settings of this study phase are analyzed and
discussed in Phase III synopsis above.
Also included in the study data in this phase are the victim or target groups, which
enables the fostering of annihilating difference amidst a perpetrator group and social
space environment for a well-rounded and complete contextual setting for genocidal
proclivity to flourish. Identified in this phase are target victim groups including
Christians and churches involving Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian villages
as in the May 1992 Kaduna crisis in which it is observed that “Churches have been
burned and…two or three pastors were killed in churches” in Kaduna (Ogbonyomi as
cited in “100 Feared Dead,” 1992, para. 4). Target victim groups also include civilian
targets; security agents - police officers, military and government officials; and media
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offices and journalists. Details of the victimhood of the targets in the different conflict
settings of this study phase are also analyzed and discussed in Phase III synopsis above.
4. Intervening Conditions
Influencing Proclivity to
Genocide: Phase III – 1987 to 1996
In addition to the context nodes, this study phase also identified intervening
conditions in the different contextual settings of the conflict, involving such broad
conditions which influence by increasing or diminishing the proclivity to genocide.
Intervening conditions in this study phase include press censorship and manipulation or
deflation and inflation of casualty figures, which can be used by government parties on
occasions to minimize but also sometimes scale-up reprisals or tit-for-tat violence. For
instance, in the October 1991 Kano crisis in which it is observed that “The Government
said 8 people had been killed since the rioting began…but an unconfirmed report…said
300 had died” (“At Least 8 Dead,” 1991, para. 2). Other intervening conditions in this
study phase include government ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government as in the
Tiv/Jukun 1992 killings at Akwana in which it is observed that “Assaults on unarmed
civilians have inevitably stirred deep concern, but almost as disquieting is what many
here view as the Government's inability to clamp down hard on those from both sides
believed involved in the campaign of killing and terror” (Noble, 1992a, para. 18).
This study phase further reveals that additionally influencing the tendency to
increase or deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control
the violence with their implementation. Intervention efforts in this study phase include
control measures taken such as curfews and road checks by security agents as in the May
1992 crisis in Kaduna state which started in Zangon-Kataf, in which “Troops in armored
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cars and helicopters put down riots in northern Nigeria,” which was said to have in three
days “taken the lives of more than 200 Christians and Muslims” (“Nigeria Quells,” 1992,
para. 1). Other intervention nodes in this phase include investigations and commissions of
inquiries set up, mopping-up of rioters or arrests made, attempts to dialogue, appeals for
intervention or mediation, and reconciliation attempts as in the Tiv/Jukun protracted
conflict in which it is observed that:
…Nigeria's Vice President, Augustus Aikhomu, called the traditional spiritual
leaders of the two peoples to Abuja in an effort to negotiate an end to the conflict.
…a delegation of traditional rulers from the northern states, led by the
Sultan of Sokoto, the leader of Nigeria's Muslims, began its own diplomatic
initiative. The Sultan, Ibrahim Dasuki, told reporters that the conflict posed a
potential “threat to our survival as one nation.”
…the wave of killings prompted Nigeria's military Government to send
soldiers to the area. Along nearly every major thoroughfare in Wukari roadblocks
are manned by edgy soldiers and armored vehicles patrol the roads at all hours.
(Noble, 1992a, para. 12-14)
5. Strategies Foreshadowing
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase III – 1987 to 1996
The study data also reveal strategies which foreshadowed the tendency towards
genocide within the contextual settings and intervening conditions to produce the above
described resultant phenomena. Strategies deployed in this phase include organization,
planning, and weaponry, as in the August 1992 Akwana killings in which the attackers
fell on their victims at dawn, armed with “bows and arrows…machetes and spears,
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and…automatic weapons,” and firing at point-blank range, killing and wounding dozens
(Noble, 1992a, para. 1). Other strategies for this phase include extermination plot
involving mass murders as in the May 1992 pogrom of mostly Christian southern Zarian
residents in Kaduna by extremist Muslims who gruesomely slaughtered them in their
neighborhoods, as well as in various churches while they were worshipping (Falola,
1998, p. 218; Noble, 1992c). Further strategies for this phase include ideo-ethnic
cleansing (or ideological and ethnic cleansing), involving burning of churches as in the
April 1991 Tafawa Balewa crisis in Bauchi state in which all twenty churches at the
city’s Hospital Road area razed, with the ECWA church only narrowly escaping the
perpetrators’ ideological cleansing of churches by reason of its close proximity to the
army barracks (“Battle in Northern Nigeria,” 1991; Falola, 1998, p. 207).
Other strategies in this phase are forced migration, for example refugees and
displaced persons as in the Tiv/Jukun conflict in which many have been forcibly
displaced with the razing of several homes in the area (Noble, 1992a, para. 17, 19).
Strategies deployed in this phase also include indoctrination, manipulation, or instigation.
It is observed in the May 1992 Kaduna crisis, for instance, “that the military authorities
and a cabal of banned or discredited politicians, have joined to foment ethnic and
religious hostilities as the means of gaining power” (Jatau as cited in Noble 1992c, para.
12), and also “that much of the violence was the result of a sophisticated scheme by the
military authorities to derail Nigeria's transition to civilian government” (Aboubacargumi
as cited in Noble, 1992c, para. 14).
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6. Consequences or Effects of
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase III – 1987 to 1996
The strategies adopted by perpetrators in this study phase have different
consequences and effects in the different conflict settings involved. Consequences
identified in this phase include death toll and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned
corpses, as in the May 1992 Kaduna killings in which it is observed that the “Estimates of
casualties vary, but political analysts and ordinary Nigerians say that at least 500 people,
and perhaps as many as 800, have been killed and hundreds more have been hurt”
(Noble, 1992c, para. 2). Other consequences in this phase include refugees and displaced
persons, involving people fleeing homes or taking refuge or shelter for safety; and
churches burned or destroyed as in the May 1992 Kaduna crisis in which it is observed
that “several Christian churches had been razed” (“100 Feared Dead,” 1992, para. 3).
Consequences in this phase also include destroying, looting and razing of properties; and
security threat, apprehension, anxiety or political and social chaos. In the May 1992
Kaduna state killings, for instance, Noble (1992) observes that “After 10 days of bitter
fighting between Muslims and Christians in which hundreds have been killed or
wounded, Nigeria is sliding toward political and social chaos in the worst crisis its
military leaders have faced since they seized power seven years ago” (para. 1).
Additionally, this study phase also has consequences category for normalcy or
calm returning after the intermittent upsurges of the conflict and gruesome killings as in
the Kaduna may 1992 killings in which Noble observes that:
after nearly a week of violence here, Kaduna began to return to its own distinctive
normalcy. Legions of armed men patrolled the streets, though they were soldiers
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sent by the federal Government rather than the marauding gangs that recently held
sway over entire neighborhoods. Storefront traders and banks opened their
shutters, and the few foreign consulates and international relief organizations that
had been evacuated are again doing business. (1992c, para. 9)
End of Model Application for Phase III
Study Phase IV – 1996 to 2005: Synopsis. The fourth phase of the study spans
from 1996 to 2005. The present 36 state-structure was operative in this phase of the study
(see Map I in Appendix A). This phase witnessed Abacha who was in power from
November 1993 and died in office in June 1998, and Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-1999)
became the Head of State and Chairman of the Provisional Ruling Council of Nigeria.
Abubakar’s transitional government enabled the registering of political parties and
released Obasanjo from prison. Obasanjo (1999-2007) was elected President and sworn
into office in May 1999, ushering in the Fourth Republic, and he was re-elected May
2003 for a second term in office (Falola & Heaton, 2008, pp. 234-235).
All through the late 1970s up to the early 1980s Nigeria debated the issue of the
place of Sharia or Islamic law in the country’s judicial system, and as the turn of the new
century ushered in a southern Christian as the country’s president, the Sharia debate was
renewed with it (Anthony, 2002), and throughout Obasanjo’s term in office religious
tensions is known to have remained high. With the country’s return in 1999 to democratic
rule, twelve states (see Map VI in Appendix A) out of the nineteen northern states
instituted Sharia law in their penal code, involving stricter implementation forms such as
the punishing of thieves by amputation of a hand, and death sentence by stoning for the
crime of adultery, which measures have occasioned national as well as international
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controversies (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The implementation of such Sharia measures
heightened tension in northern Nigeria, with Christians criticizing its harshness and
Muslims on the other hand, arguing that crime rates have significantly reduced as a result
of the newly adopted legal codes (Harunah as cited in Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 238).
The issue of Sharia implementation in some northern states has posed a thorny quagmire
for the country. In May 2000, for instance, thousands were killed in Kaduna as nonMuslims opposing Sharia’s introduction clashed with Muslims demanding its
implementation in the state (Adekoya, 2009).
This phase of the study witnessed a recurring spate of religious uprisings
interlaced with ethnic clashes, each conflict seemingly bloodier and more ferocious than
the preceding (Adekoya, 2009). It is observed in Jos, September 2001 for instance, that a
Muslim-Christian violence that flared up after the Muslim prayers had about 915 people
killed in the riots, according to a September 2002 state government panel report on the
conflict (Adekoya, 2009, para. 9). Ethnic tensions had built up before the riots as a result
of a federal government appointment of a Muslim politician as local coordinator for its
poverty alleviation program in the state. Seen as part of the detrimental political policies
that would bar their religious freedom, Christians were disturbed that appointing a
Muslim in a community they predominated was an attempt to politically, as well as
religiously, dominate them (Minchakpu, 2001). However, the conflict sparked off as,
“…a Christian woman attempted to cross a barricaded street, which led to a scuffle
between her and a group of Muslims…The fight spread to other parts of the city, where
Christians were spontaneously attacked by Muslims” (Minchakpu, 2001, para. 10-11).
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In May 2004, a Christian militia was reported to have attacked an essentially
Muslim town of Yelwa with deaths in hundreds—put at 630 (Adekoya, 2009, para. 10;
Reuters; and Agence France-Presse as cited in “Hundreds Die in Attack on Nigerian
Village,” 2004, para. 3) involving “the latest eruption in a longstanding dispute between
herders and farmers. [Of which] The herders are Muslims from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic
group, while the farmers are ethnic Tarok Christians” (“Hundreds Die in Attack on
Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 1-2). It is, however, warned by the president of the Nigeria
Red Cross who was unable to confirm the number “that casualty figures could be inflated
by self-interested parties in a strife-torn area,” while also the police estimate for the toll
was reported at 67, even as the security agents were unable to enter Yelwa as access into
the town was blocked by the attackers (CSW, n.d., pp. 1, 6, 11; “Hundreds Die in Attack
on Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 5-6).
Countering this version of the conflict which is said to have “gained International
currency,” however, the non-Muslims in the state who view the incident differently and
are said to be exasperated that their version of the episode has not been reported widely.
To them the Yelwa attack was not an isolated incidence, but rather part of the continuing
violence which has plagued the area since 2002, as there had been earlier attacks in
February 2004 in which extremist Muslims targeted and killed Christians prior to the
May attack. Furthermore, the Yelwa attack said to have been by Christian militia, they
argue that “there is no such thing as a ‘Christian Militia,’” (CSW, n.d., p. 1). Rather, the
assailants involved in the attack were local non-Muslim farmers who had taken laws into
their hands in a retaliatory attack against the violent displacement from their lands amidst
government ineptitude in dealing with their plight (CSW, n.d., p. 12). They argued that,
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“…the term ‘Christian Militias’ was widely published by the international media, fuelling
the perception of a planned conspiracy against Muslims in Plateau State, and rendering
Christian leaders vulnerable to prosecution on false grounds” (CSW, n.d., p. 12).
Furthermore, they disputed the 630 death toll of the Yelwa attack, “stating that this
widely publicized estimate served to heighten Muslim anger, guaranteeing a violent
reaction” (CSW, n.d., p. 2).
Furthermore, on this alarming spate of violence in Plateau state, Kendal observes
the conflict as:
…escalating, taking on the dimensions of a religious war. The Muslims are
recruiting Islamic mercenaries from Chad and Niger, while the "Christian" militia
that attacked Yelwa was allegedly armed and supported by retired generals,
further escalating the violence. The state government seems to have made little
effort to stop the violence. (2004, para. 13)
Furthermore, as the reports of the Yelwa incident in which over 600 Muslims were said
to have been massacred reached Kano, which is “traditionally a hotbed of religious
tensions,” a seemingly peaceful protest led by Muslim leaders on May 11, 2004 soon
turned violent as “angry Muslims hunted for ‘nonbelievers’ whom they then killed with
machetes before burning the bodies” (Kendal, 2004, para. 21). The Muslim protesters,
carrying daggers, clubs, and sickles, were said to have searched cars for Christians and
animists, and asked that passengers to recite the Muslim prayers. Three young women,
“nonbelievers” of Islam wearing Western styled outfits were noted to have been
macheted, escaped with bleeding head injuries following some sort of intervention
(Kendal, 2004, para. 23). The toll for this Kano episode, which militants, Muslims, and
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Christians were said to have “fought bloody street battles” was estimated at about 500600, mostly Christians, killed in the two days of Muslim rioting (Adekoya, 2009, para.
10). However, putting the death toll for this Kano crisis rather at about 3,000, while
decrying “the biased reporting of sections of the international media,” it is observed that
Christians saw the Kano events as predictable “given the inaccurate reporting of the
Yelwa incident” (CSW, n.d., p. 2).
On the brutality and enormity of this May 2004 killing episode in Kano, it is
observed that:
Christians and non-indigenes were hacked and battered to death; their homes,
churches and properties were set on fire. Others are reported to have been shot
dead by policemen.
…children appear to have been targeted as…mobs descended on schools,
separated Muslim children from non-Muslims and killed the non-Muslims. Local
sources put the final death toll at over 3000, a fact the Kano State government is
at pains to deny…‘some bodies were burned in wells. Even little children were
killed. The bodies of pregnant women were ripped open and their bodies
burned’…following the violence the State Government ensured that cleaners were
on the streets by 5am, and that trucks…were being used to gather corpses for a
mass burial. (CSW, n.d., pp. 6-7)
Prior to the Yelwa killings, Zamfara state in the implementation of its “Sharia
Phase 2” program, (Kendal, 2004, para. 6) “had ordered the destruction of all churches”
in the state. It is, therefore, observed that there is the possibility of using the Yelwa
killings “to justify all manner of repression and persecution being unleashed upon an
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already besieged Christian minority,” given the ripple effect the Yelwa incidence had on
some northern states (Kendal, 2004, para. 6). In Bauchi state, for instance, security was
said to have been tightened “after leaflets were found calling on Muslims to avenge the
Yelwa killings and on Christians to leave the region,” as well as in Kaduna as tensions
ran high (Kendal, 2004, para. 6).
Furthermore, violent Muslim-Christian conflicts persisted in northern Nigeria in
the period, with the conflicts increasingly linked to events in the international scene. For
instance, in 2001 a peaceful demonstration staged by Muslims in Kano in protest of
America’s Afghanistan campaign turned into a bloody riot with an estimated toll of about
100. It is observed that “youths trooped out of poor Muslim neighborhoods, where posters of
Osama bin Laden have become hugely popular. They invaded the Christian quarter, whose

residents fought back with arms, waving T-shirts emblazoned with American flags and
shouting pro-American slogans” and, in the ensuing three-day riot about 100 people died,
according to the Red Cross (Onishi, 2001b, para. 2-3). In November 2002 also, following
violent protests which involved a death toll of over 200 in Kaduna, the Miss World
beauty pageant earlier scheduled in Abuja was relocated to London. The protests had
been ignited by an article in a Nigerian newspaper which was suggestive that the Prophet
Mohammed might have approved of the beauty pageant, probably choosing a wife
amongst the contestants (“Hundreds Flee,” 2002, para. 3), the riots indicative of the
Muslims’ frustrations “over the perceived alliance between their government and
Western, secular powers” (BBC News as cited in Falola & Heaton, 2008, pp. 238-239).
In Kaduna, over 100 people were “stabbed, bludgeoned or burned to death,” and another
500 injured (Mcveigh, 2002, para. 6). Also observed is that “At least 22 churches and
eight mosques were destroyed in the mayhem…Ten hotels were…damaged, [and] more
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than 200 people had been killed” (“Hundreds Flee,” 2002, para. 14), and hundreds fled
Kaduna even as 4,500 were left homeless (“Hundreds Flee,” 2002, para. 12).
These conflicts have been identified as stemming “from the rise of Islam as a
political force and the stunning spread of hardline Islamic law from one small Nigerian
state in 1999 to a third of the country’s 36 states today” (Onishi, 2001b, para. 3). The
stakes are observed to have remained high, as Muslims as well as Christians vie for their
greater representation and control at the state as well as federal government levels. It is
noted that Obasanjo in his eight years tenure as president was incapable of defusing these
(Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 239), and since the military power handover in 1999, about
5,000 Nigerians have died in in religious clashes according to the Red Cross (Onishi,
2001b, para. 3).
Applying the Genocide Proclivity Model: Phase IV – 1996 To 2005. The
coding list for the emergent nodes or codes for the study Phase IV are provided in
Appendix C: Coding List D. The application of the emergent nodes from study Phase IV
to the Genocidal Proclivity Model on page 199 follows.
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena
Relating to Genocidal Proclivity:
Phase IV – 1996 to 2005
Phase IV of the study also shows the four causal conditions of immediate or
trigger factors, underlying or root causes, perceived threat of the “otherness,” and
exclusive ideological framing which lead ultimately to genocidal proclivity. In this
phase, the trigger or immediate causes include insurgency, uprising or anti-government
riots; arrests or persecution of fundamentalist sect members, religious extremism, and
violence or other fundamentalist activities; Islam degraded, desecration and/or
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misinterpretation of Koran; and reprisal mission or revenge, and the massacres of Ibos
and returning refugees. For example, in Aba “after corpses of Igbo killed in the north
were brought back to Aba,” the locals started attacking the Hausas, turning from MuslimChristian battle in the North to ethnic search for anyone that might be a northerner
(Onishi, 2000, p. 22).
This phase also reveals underlying causation as a second set of causal conditions
to the conflict which include historical factors; colonial influences, exploitation and fear
of balkanization; culture of bad governance and corruption or oppressive military rule; Al
Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian Links including illegal aliens; and political
underpinnings or power struggle, involving issues of infiltration and politicization of
religion. In the Jos crisis, for instance, it is observed that:
…the Emir of Wase appears to be implicated in fomenting and financing the
violence in southern Plateau State…as the killing of non-Muslim Tarok got
underway in 2002, the Emir… refused to direct the military and police forces to
quell the violence and informed the Governor of Plateau state that all was
well….the Emir…used his position as an Islamic traditional leader to attract
mercenaries from Chad and Niger to participate in the violence in the name of
Jihad. (CSW, n.d., p. 4)
Additional underlying causal conditions in this study phase include political elites
or Kaduna mafia. This phase also showed underlying causal factors involving socioeconomic factors which include indigenes and settlers issues; and poverty,
unemployment, lack of education, and discontent. In the October 2001 Muslim protests in
Kano against the U.S.-led Afghanistan air strikes, for instance, thugs rather than religious

286
tensions were blamed for the crisis, as rioters were observed “looting stores and homes”
shortly following the protests (“Violent,” 2001, para. 11).
Furthermore, this study phase also includes a third set of causal factors of
perceived threat of the “otherness” which include ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries,
divisions and animosities; North-South split or largely Muslim north and mainly
Christian south; and annihilation attempts by targeting or forceful conversion of
Christians to Islam (Onishi, 2001a). For instance, Kendal observes that:
Islamic zeal is strong in the northern state of Kano. Kano’s governor, Ibrahim
Shekarau, was elected on a radical, hardline, pro- Sharia platform. Christians
suffer intense persecution in Kano, their schools and churches having been closed
and burned. It is compulsory for all public-school girls to wear Islamic hijab, and
as the Christian schools have been closed Christians don’t have much choice. On
the night of Shekarau’s election…pastor Chikezie (Sunday) Madumere and his
whole family were burned to death in their home in “No Man’s Land” Kano city,
by Muslim mobs celebrating Shekarau’s win. (2004, p. 17)
This study phase also includes a fourth set of causal conditions involving the
thematic category of exclusive ideological framing, comprising, religious dimensions,
anti-Western or ideological differences; fundamentalism and religious fervency; and
Sharia or Islamic law institution involving imposing Sharia across Nigeria or establishing
of an Islamic state; non-Muslim opposition to Sharia, the unconstitutionality and
violation of fundamental rights of Christians; and Sharia implementation, antiestablishment or anti-Western ideology (“Religious Strife,” 2001; Lacey, 2002; Mcveigh,
2002). Kendal observes, for instance, that:
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Kano… introduced a Mobile Court to monitor and deal with people selling and
screening foreign films or videos, and selling or playing foreign audio CDs. The
Mobile Court will be guided by Sharia law and is charged to work toward the
institutionalization of Islamic norms in all spheres of life.
…Sheik Kabo informed Kano’s Sharia Enforcement enforcers (HISBA)
that the Kano State Sharia Commission would no longer permit any area or any
person to be exempt from Sharia. He recommended that anyone who is not
willing to adhere to Sharia should leave the state. (2004, para. 18)
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors,
Underlying Causation, Perceived Threat of the
“Otherness” and Exclusive Ideological Framing:
Phase IV – 1996 to 2005
This study phase further shows that the causal conditions of trigger factors,
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing
in the different situations and contextual settings, resulted in variant degrees and forms of
killings and exterminations mainly between extremist Muslims and Christians, as well as
between different ethnic groups which are divided mainly along ethnic and religious
lines. Such subjective phenomena as identified in the study data reveal attacks and
violence unleashed to different target victims including assault, shoot-out, killings, arson
and looting; bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism (“Hundreds
Flee,” 2002; Koinange, 2001; Obateru & Mamah, 2004; Onishi, 2001a); and genocide
(“Nigerian Muslims,” 2004). Other phenomenal themes in this phase include political
violence, coup d’état and political assassinations; and religious and ethnic violence
(“Deadly Rioting,” 2000). Phenomenal themes also include reprisals from southern states
(Onishi, 2000; “Violent,” 2001); sectarian violence; and spiral or escalation of violence.
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Kendal (2004) observes, for instance, the escalating cycle of violence in Plateau state,
which crisis precipitating event for the May 2004 attack started in February 2004 with the
trampling of Tarok crops by Fulani cattle, and in retaliation the Tarok farmers were said
to have stolen and killed Fulani cattle, with crops and cattle respectively as both groups’
means of livelihood. The Fulani seeking redress for their loss of cattle, and aided by hired
Chadian and Niger Islamic mercenaries, attacked and killed 90 Tarok farmers in Yelwa
inclusive of 48 axed to death inside a church where they had sought refuge, with the
church then razed. A few days after this killing, Christians from the Gerkawa community
in a retaliatory attack, killed some 40 Muslim neighbors with cutlasses or swords, and
burned their bodies. Following this development, the army moved in to evacuate about
3,000 Muslims from Gerkawa to Yelwa, while Christians fearing further attacks fled
Yelwa (Kendal, 2004, para. 11-12).
Other phenomenal nodes in this study phase include targeted, pre-meditated or
orchestrated killings and assaults (Onishi, 2001a); terrorist activities; and threats or fears
of more attacks, protests or warnings of full scale war (“Dozens Dead,” 2004; “Nigerian
Muslims,” 2004; Simmons, 2000; “Violent,” 2001). Further phenomenal nodes that
emerged from this phase are tit-for-tat killings in northern states (“Religious and Ethnic
Clashes,” 2001; Sengupta, 2004a, 2004b). Further phenomenal nodes in this study phase
are uprising, anti-government rioting, protests or demonstrations; and violent or deadly
clashes, rioting or gun battles. By comparing and contrasting of these phenomenal nodes
and categories, two major categories involving targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated
killings and assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism
are identified as being closely associated with the proclivity to genocide.
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3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious
Conflict and Genocidal Proclivity
Developed: Phase IV – 1996 to 2005
Additionally included this study phase is the contextual framework which proffers
the geographic dimension of social space or lebensraum for genocide proclivity to foster
(Wood, 2001). These contexts are Northern region or states including Abuja; Bauchi
state; Benue state, in Gbeji, Vaase, and Zaki-Biam; Kwara state, in Ilorin; Kaduna state,
in Kaduna, Kafanchan, and Zaria; Kano state, in Kano - Sabon-Gari; Kebbi state;
Nasarawa state; Niger state; Plateau state, in Jos, Kadyal, Kanam District, Langtang, and
Yelwa; Sokoto state; Taraba state; and Zamfara state. The study data also showed
reprisals or retaliatory killings in Southern states including Abia state, in Aba; Anambra
state, in Onitsha; Lagos state, in Lagos; and Niger Delta state in Odi where there occurred
extrajudicial killings and the ethnic violence in Lagos. (See Tables 1 and 2 for the various
contexts for this phase, respectively for the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, and
for the reprisal attacks in the south).
Further providing the contextual framework in this study phase are varying
conflict parties in the different phenomenal settings for the conflict. The conflict parties
identified in this phase include Muslim mobs/gangs, civilian mobs or sect and Ibos
(“Deadly Rioting,” 2000; Onishi, 2000; Tostevin, 2000). Conflict parties for the phase
also include Muslim mobs or sect and security forces (Sengupta, 2004b); Muslim sect
and other Muslims or sect; Muslim mobs, sect or groups and Christians; security agents
and unidentified civilians; and different ethnic groups as in the Tiv/Jukun long-drawn
crisis (“Nigeria: Government Sets Up Inquiry,” 2001). Other conflict parties in this phase
are northern states government and Christians (Ahiante 2004); and Fulani herdsmen or
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Hausa-Fulani group and Christian or host communities (“At Least 30 Killed,” 2003;
“Muslim Mobs,” 2004; “Nigerian Muslims,” 2004; Sengupta, 2004b). Such conflict
parties were analyzed by comparison and contrast with the phenomenal conflict nodes
and categories and their causal conditions to identify conflicts with plausibility of a
conceptualized annihilating difference (Hinton, 2002) which lead to exterminations
involving perpetrator and victim situations, while conflicts devoid of such annihilating
difference are considered clashes or fighting between parties without overt genocidal
proclivity.
Additionally identified in this study phase are varying perpetrator-groups using
the annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties described above which include
Muslim mobs, rioters or rampaging Muslim youths (Ahiante, 2004; “Dozens Dead,”
2004; “Muslim Mobs,” 2004; Onishi, 2001b). Other perpetrator groups include Fulani
herdsmen or Fulani-Hausa group or gunmen (Sengupta, 2004b); and also emergent under
the perpetrator category are Christian militia or youths, which other than the reprisals in
the south, primarily involve the Yelwa May 2004 killing of Muslims presumably by
Christian militia. It is thus noted, however, that in this killing episode of Yelwa Muslims
said to have been done by Christian militia, that “Yelwa had already witnessed one of the
worst atrocities of the conflict in February, when Muslim militia killed almost 100
Christians, including 48 killed in a church that they later burned” (“Nigerian Muslims,”
2004, para. 24). Moreover, while also contesting the allegation of the Yelwa May 2004
killings, Christians counter that:
…the use of the term ‘Christian Militia’ implied that the Church has armed and
trained people to launch attacks on Muslims, when in reality the church has gone
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to great lengths to discourage retaliation. Local sources point out that assailants
were local non-Muslim farmers who had been violently displaced from their lands
and had waited several years in some instances for government protection and
redress. When this was not forthcoming, they took the law into their own hands
and launched the attack on Yelwa. (CSW, n.d. p. 12)
Other perpetrator groups identified in this study phase are security agents,
soldiers, the army/military, and Hausa/Northern troops, and these involve extrajudicial
killings. For instance, in the May 2004 Kano killings that were supposedly retaliatory to
the Yelwa killings of May 2 killings (“Muslim Mobs,” 2004), CAN condemned some
Muslim policemen’s brutality who were observed “to have intentionally and
indiscriminately shot and killed many Christians in Sabon Gari and other parts of the
state” (CSW, n.d., p. 7). Details of the involvement of the perpetrator groups in the
different conflict settings of this study phase are analyzed and discussed in Phase IV
synopsis above.
Additionally, this study phase reveals target victim groups which foster the
developing of annihilating difference amidst a perpetrator group and social space
environment to produce a complete and well-rounded and contextual setting for the
flourishing of a tendency to genocide (Hinton, 2002). Target or victim groups identified
in this study phase include Christians and churches (Ahiante, 2004; “Dozens Dead,”
2004; Koinange, 2001; Lacey, 2002; Mcveigh, 2002; “Muslim Mobs,” 2004; “Nigerian
Muslims,” 2004; Obateru & Mamah, 2004; “Religious Riots,” 2001; Simmons, 2000;
“Violent,” 2001); and Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian villages (Sengupta,
2004b). Target victims in this phase also include civilian targets (“13 Nigerians Die,”
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2001; “At Least 30 Killed,” 2003; “Hundreds Flee,” 2002; Mcveigh, 2002; “Nigeria:
Government Sets Up Inquiry,” 2001; Onishi, 2001a). Other target victims are Southerners
who are predominantly Christians as in the reprisals in Lagos in which Yorubas were the
primary target victims (“3rd Day,” 2002), and especially Ibos as targets (Ahiante, 2004;
“Deadly Rioting,” 2000; “Dozens Dead,” 2004; “Muslim Mobs,” 2004; Onishi, 2000;
“Religious Riots,” 2001; “Violent,” 2001).
Target victims in this phase also include security agents - police officers, military
and government officials; media offices and journalists; beer parlors, hotels, banks and
other facilities (structures or institutions with Western connotations); and Muslims,
Hausa-Fulani herders, Muslim sect, Northerners or mosques as in reprisals in southern
states (“Deadly Rioting,” 2000; Onishi, 2000) and in the November 2002 Miss World
pageant crisis in Kaduna in which it is observed, for instance, that:
One policeman and one soldier were arrested on allegations of dragging 15
Muslim men out of their homes and killing them…The victims' bodies were then
thrown into a river…
There were also reports that police officers and soldiers gunned down
more than a dozen other civilians without provocation, he said. A police
spokesman could not immediately confirm the reports. (“Hundreds Flee,” 2002,
para. 15-16)
Other target victims identified in this phase are Muslims, Hausa-Fulani herders,
Muslim sect, Northerners or mosques, involving mainly the Yelwa, May 2004 killings,
presumably by Christian militia (CSW, n.d.; “Hundreds Die in Attack on Nigerian
Village,” 2004; “Muslim Mobs,” 2004; “Nigerian Muslims,” 2004). Details of the
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victimhood of the targets in the different conflict settings of this study phase are also
analyzed and discussed in Phase IV synopsis above.
4. Intervening Conditions
Influencing Proclivity to
Genocide: Phase IV – 1996 to 2005
This study phase additionally identified intervening conditions in the different
conflict contextual settings in addition to the contexts which are factors generally
involving such broad conditions which influence by increasing or diminishing the
proclivity to genocide. Intervening conditions in this phase of the study include, press
censorship and manipulation or deflation and inflation of casualty figures, which used by
government officials on occasions to minimize or scale-up reprisals or tit-for-tat violence
tactics. For instance, the toll for the Kano May 2004 killings said to be about 500-600,
were confirmed to have been over 3000 by CAN Kano, who “also alleged that in an
effort to hide the true number of casualties, the state government had thrown the bodies
of some victims into the Challawa River and given several others a mass burial” (CAN as
cited in CSW, n.d., p. 7).
Other intervening conditions in this phase are extrajudicial killings and army
involvement in policing as in the May 2004 Kano killings. Intervening conditions in this
phase also include government ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government. For
instance, in the Jos Muslim-Christian incessant upheavals in Plateau state, it is observed
in 2004, that:
On Sunday 22 February Yamini village was completely destroyed by Fulani
herders who claimed to be chasing cattle thieves. Then on 24 February, came the
attack on Yelwa during which 41 people were killed and burnt in a church and 38
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murdered outside it. Every church in Yelwa was destroyed save one that was no
longer in use, and the Christian population fled the area as it became clear that the
state government was unable to protect them. (CSW, n.d., p. 5)
Other intervening conditions in this study phase are collaborators or bystanders
involving both local and foreign collaborators that lead to an internationalization of the
conflict. Onishi (2001b) observes, for instance, that “To Christians in Jos, Muslims are
more aggressive and are getting strong support from the Arab world. By contrast, African
Christians can no longer rely on the backing of a secular West” (para. 31). Thus, there is
an indication of foreign involvement in the persisting Muslim-Christian clashes in
Plateau state, with Christians affirming that:
…the bulk of this violence has been perpetrated by Hausa-Fulanis accompanied
by paid fighters from neighboring Republics, and whose victims have
overwhelmingly been Christians and traditional believers. They feel the constant
presence of foreigners during these attacks indicates the international dimensions
of the violence in Plateau State and northern Nigeria, linking the perpetrators of
the violence with the global Islamist movement. (CSW, n.d. p. 1)
This phase of the study also reveals that further influencing the tendency to
increase or deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control
the violence with their implementation. Intervention efforts in this study phase include
aid and relief support, rehabilitation efforts or calls for rebuilding of churches,
reconciliation attempts; control measures taken such as curfews and road checks by
security agents, investigations and commissions of inquiries set up, calls to address the
constitutionality of Sharia law and security issues, mopping-up of rioters or arrests made,
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warnings or calls for action, restraint, justice, or self-defense, and attempts to dialogue,
and appeals for intervention or mediation.
5. Strategies Foreshadowing
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase IV – 1996 to 2005
This study phase also reveals different strategies foreshadowing the tendency
towards genocide within the contextual settings and intervening conditions with the
resultant phenomena as described above including organization, planning, and weaponry;
and extermination plot involving mass murders or ideological and ethnic cleansing
involving, for instance, burning of churches, or forceful conversion of Christians to
Islam. For example, following an attack and flight of non-Muslims from Yamini village
in Plateau state, it is observed (CSW, n.d. p. 5) that:
…portraits of Osama Bin Laden were hoisted in Yelwa, and the area was declared
as part of Zamfara State in a mock celebration marking ‘the total eradication of
the infidels and all that belongs to them’…The crowd went on to attack Nshar, a
settlement of the Gomai people situated close to Yelwa. Churches, buildings and
the Yam Market were razed to the ground. This was followed by attacks on the
villages of Ajikamai, Lakushim Tumbi, Tukung, Goedo, Mangoro, and Pandam,
and official targets in Kwapjur…1,500 people were killed during this orgy of
violence (CSW, n.d. p.5).
The strategies identified in this study phase also include indoctrination,
manipulation ,or instigation. It is noted on the Plateau state conflicts, for instance, that:
The Emir’s appointee as Chairman of the Wase Local Government Area…was
accused of fuelling the violence along with his boss. Not only is he reported to
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have attempted to incite hatred during the violence in 2002 by falsely claiming to
have seen the corpses of 5000 Muslims scattered in the bush…he also initially
refused to pay for the feeding of soldiers stationed around Kadarko, the largest
remaining Christian town in Wase. [He]…commandeered a local government
vehicle and sent it…to gather mercenary reinforcement from Bashar and its
surrounding areas. (CSW, n.d. p. 4)
6. Consequences or Effects of
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase IV – 1996 - 2005
The strategies adopted by perpetrators in this study phase have different
consequences or effects in the different conflict settings examined. Consequences
identified in this phase include death toll and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned
corpses (“3rd Day,” 2002; Ahiante, 2004; “Deadly Rioting,” 2000; “Dozens Dead,”
2004; Koinange, 2001; Lacey, 2002; Mcveigh, 2002; “Miss World,” 2002; “Muslim
Mobs,” 2004; “Nigerian Leader Admits,” 2002; “Nigerian Muslims,” 2004; Obateru &
Mamah, 2004; Onishi, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; “Religious and Ethnic Clashes,” 2001;
Sengupta, 2003, 2004b). Other consequences include refugees and displaced persons, as
well as persons fleeing homes or taking refuge or shelter for safety; mass graves or mass
burials (“Nigerian Muslims,” 2004; Onishi, 2001a; Simmons, 2000; “Violent,” 2001);
churches burned, bombed or destroyed (“13 Nigerians Die,” 2001; Ahiante, 2004;
“Hundreds Flee,” 2002; Koinange, 2001; Lacey, 2002; “Miss World,” 2002; Sengupta,
2003, 2004b); and mosques burned or destroyed (“13 Nigerians Die,” 2001; “Hundreds
Flee,” 2002; Lacey, 2002; Onishi, 2000). Consequences in this phase also include
Christian businesses, homes, hotels and properties destroyed (Ahiante, 2004; “Hundreds

297
Flee,” 2002; Simmons, 2000); destroying, looting and razing of properties; and denial of
freedom of worship and desecration of Christian religion. For instance, in a press
conference by northern executives of CAN in Lagos, following the May 2004 crises in
Yelwa and Kano, it is observed that:
Today, we are not only being denied freedom of worship, but also freedom of
association. We were told at the early stage of the Sharia introduction that it will
not affect non- Muslims. We can tell you without fear of contradiction that this is
far from the truth. For example, while Churches have been demolished in some of
the Sharia states, a number of others have also been marked out for demolition in
Zamfara State. The case in Kano has been worst…. (Ahiante, 2004, para. 30)
Also in this phase are consequences for security threat, apprehension, anxiety or
political and social chaos (“Dozens Dead,” 2004; Simmons, 2000; Tostevin, 2000;
“Violent,” 2001). Consequences also revealed normalcy or calm returning after episodes
of gruesome exterminations, showing an intermittency of occurrence in the killings
(Sengupta, 2004a).
End of Model Application for Phase IV
Study Phase V – 2006 to Present: Synopsis. The fifth study phase spans from
2006 to present, with Nigeria’s present 36 states still operative (see Map I in Appendix
A). The preceding and incumbent presidents of the country over this phase of the study
include Umaru Yar’Adua who was elected and became President and Commander in
Chief of the Federal republic of Nigeria in May 2007. Yar’Adua died in office May 2010
and his Vice President Goodluck Jonathan became President from May 2010, and reelected, May 2011, Jonathan is the Nigeria’s incumbent president.
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This study phase also evidences the increasing direct links between religious
tensions in the country and outside happenings in the world, as seen in the February 2006
entire Islamic world demonstrations in response to a Danish newspaper cartoon satirizing
the Prophet Mohammed, which turned violent in Nigeria with the riots claiming dozens
of lives in Maiduguri, Bauchi, Katsina, and Onitsha (BBC News as cited in Falola &
Heaton, 2008, p. 239). On the extent of carnage that was perpetrated in the cartoon riots
in Maiduguri, it is observed that:
At least 65 Christians were killed, 57 churches were destroyed and hundreds of
Christian businesses razed to the ground when Muslims rampaged through
Maiduguri on 18 February, allegedly in protest at the publication in Denmark the
previous year of cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed. Many victims were
burnt alive, often by neighbors they had known for years. The final death toll may
be much higher than stated. After the arrival of the mutilated corpses of Igbo
victims occasioned retaliatory attacks on Muslims by Igbo youths in southern
Nigeria, the Borno State Government refused to immediately release any more
bodies for burial, fearing that such a move might provoke further violence. It
sought permission to conduct a mass burial for the remaining victims, but the
Christian community was loath to agree to this. As a result of this impasse, many
corpses remained in the local morgue instead of receiving immediate burial, and
the final death toll is still unknown. (CSW, 2008b, p. 10)
The violence began and in Maiduguri with the Danish cartoon protests and spread
with 30 churches razed to the ground and with eighteen people killed, mostly Christians
(“Toll Rises,” 2006, para. 4). It involved a week’s rioting by Muslim and Christian mobs,
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which claimed about 157 lives in Maiduguri (Adekoya, 2009, para. 8). Further on this
crisis, Fisher observes that:
Mobs of Muslim protesters swarm through Maiduguri…with machetes, sticks and
iron rods…One group threw a tire around a man, poured gas on him and set him
ablaze.
Thousands of rioters burned 15 churches in a three-hour rampage
… [and] protesters attacked and looted shops owned by minority
Christians, most of them with origins in the country's south… [And] three
children and a priest were among those killed. (2006, para. 5-7)
Additionally, in Bauchi 25 were killed as Muslims attacked Christians, as noted
by the Red Cross, with the violence said to have been fuelled by allegation of desecration
of the Koran by a Christian teacher. And, in Onitsha there were reprisals in response to
the attacks on Christians in the north, with about 30 people (mostly northern Muslims)
killed and two mosques burned, even as the violence sparked off with rumors of some
northerners having attacked and killed some children in a primary school (Polgreen,
2006; “Toll Rises,” 2006, para. 5-7, 9).
Furthermore, in November 2008, a disputed election of a local government
chairmanship position led to Muslim-Christian gang clashes in which about 400 people
were killed in Jos, Plateau state (Adekoya, 2009, para, 9). Countering this positioning on
the crisis, however, the CSW observes that:
Several international news agencies have reported that the violence was triggered
by the results of a local government election. However, sources in Jos point out
that voting passed off peacefully and the violence broke out in the early hours of
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Friday 28 November before electoral results had even been announced. Moreover,
instead of targeting political institutions, rioters armed with guns, spears,
machetes and other weapons immediately attacked Christian businesses, churches
and the homes of clergymen. A local source informed Christian Solidarity
Worldwide: “As usual they took Jos by surprise, and are now hiding behind
election results to launch and excuse their mayhem.” (CSW, 2008a, para. 2)
It is further observed in this November 2008 conflict in Jos that there was an
errant reporting of about 300 Muslims who were said to have been killed by Christians,
with the bodies deposited in a mosque. The men were noted rather to have been shot as
they launched fresh attacks in defiance to the authorities imposed night curfew, while
also staging a large-scale unsuccessful attack on police barracks. According to the CSW,
“the men died while obeying orders from a mosque in the Dilimi area, which was using
its loudspeakers to instruct all Muslims to defy the authorities, participate in the ‘jihad’,
loot properties for money and then burn them” (CSW, 2008a, para. 3). Additionally,
about 16 churches were noted burned down, with the death toll of Christians killed in the
attack put at about 100, including four or more pastors shot dead, one of the Church of
Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) and another of the Evangelical Church of West Africa
(ECWA), and two others (CSW, 2008a, para. 4).
Furthermore, in January 2010 there were sporadic clashes between Muslims and
Christians in Jos which resulted in a death toll estimate that ranged from 30 to 300 in
three days of fighting. The violence is observed to have started on “Sunday when Muslim
youths attacked a church…and they were resisted by church members” (Nossiter, 2010a,
para. 4), resulting in the macheting of several persons most of who are Christians, with
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more than 100 bodies seen in Red Cross trucks being carried to the morgue (Rev. Joel as
cited in Nossiter, 2010a, para. 6).
Moreover, in March 2010 also, in a “vicious ethnic violence” said to have been
reprisal attacks for the January 2010 crisis in Jos, about 500 people (mostly women and
children) were killed in Dogon Na Hauwa near Jos in Plateau state by Hausa-Fulani
herders (Nossiter, 2010f, para. 1). It is also observed in this killing episode that:
The dead were Christians and members of an ethnic group that had been feuding
with the Hausa-Fulani, Muslim herders whom witnesses and police officials
identified as the attackers.
Early Sunday, the attackers set upon the villagers with machetes, killing
women and children in their homes and ensnaring the men who tried to flee in
fishnets and animal traps, then massacring them, according to a Nigerian rights
group whose investigators went to the area. Some homes were set on fire.
A few miles south of the city nearly 400 of the victims were buried in a
mass grave in Dogon Na Hauwa, the village where the worst violence occurred.
Some of the bodies had been mutilated. (Nossiter, 2010f, para. 2-3, 8)
This phase is equally, also interlaced with religious upheavals primarily involving
a fundamentalist Islamic sect, the Boko Haram group whose Arabic name translated,
means Western education is forbidden or illegal (Adekoya, 2009), with goal to institute
Sharia in Nigeria (“700 die,” 2009; “Boko Haram,” 2012; “Christian Groups,” 2009;
“Emergency Declared,” 2011; “In Nigeria’s North,” 2011; Lobel, 2012; Mohammed &
Idonor, 2012; Mojeed & Nossiter, 2012; “Muslim Sect,” 2011; “Thousands Flee,” 2009;
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“Toll Rises,” 2006). In 2009 there was the Boko Haram uprising which was an
insurgency by a fundamentalist Islamic group, Boko Haram, against security forces.
In July 2009, following the arrest of some Boko Haram members, the sect staged
attacks in Bauchi in which over 50 people were killed, with more than 100 arrests made
(Adekoya, 2009, para. 2). The violence soon spread to Borno, Kano, and Yobe states,
with 5 policemen and 60 others killed, and in Potiskum, Yobe state, a Police station was
burned down (Adekoya, 2009, para. 4). In Maiduguri, Borno state, over 100 were
reported killed in the bloodbath that ensued (BBC report as cited in Adekoya, 2009, para.
5). In an encounter with the Boko Haram group following the deployment of troops to the
area, 43 of the sect members were killed in Hawan Malka in Yobe State, while the leader
of the sect, one Mohammed Yusuf who was arrested in Maiduguri, was shortly killed in
custody (Adekoya, 2009, para. 6-7). In Bauchi state, further violence led to additional
death toll of about 11 with 28 gravely wounded, as well as the razing down of churches,
mosques, and several houses (Adekoya, 2009, para. 9).
The Boko Haram has since this 2009 confrontation with security forces become
more proficient and increasingly sophisticated in its attacks, claiming responsibility or
being blamed for various attacks on different targets including security agents, symbols
of government authority including the United Nations which was bombed in August
2011, and police stations (“Deadly Christian-Muslim Clash,” 2011; “Multiple
Explosions,” 2011; “Nigeria Group Threatens,” 2011). The sect has been involved in
“numerous instances of violence…in Nigeria, including many targeting Christians,” as in
the “car bomb attack…outside a Catholic church in Jos that left six dead…And on
Christmas Day, a string of bombings struck churches in several cities” (Akau, 2012, para.
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9-11). Thus, the sect has repeatedly mounted attacks on several churches in the north
amidst worship services (Bello, 2012; Ohai, 2012; Orude, 2012a, 2012b) as in the
December 2011, Christmas day bombing of a church in Madalla (Akau, 2012; “Christmas
Carnage,” 2012). On this onslaught on Christians it is observed that:
The Boko Haram sect made good its threat to bomb churches and other places
across the nation on Christmas Day. An alleged suicide bomber smashed a bombladen vehicle into a throng of Christian faithful streaming out of St. Theresa’s
Catholic Church, Madalla, Niger State, after an early morning Christmas Day
Mass, killing no fewer than 43 persons and severely injuring over 73.
The bombing in Madalla, on the outskirts of Abuja, caused no little stir as
pictures of decapitated bodies from the incident splashed across local and
international media, putting the nation’s serious security predicament in bold
relief on the global stage. (Sokunbi, 2012, para. 1-2)
Furthermore, in January 2012 Boko Haram in a bloody attack wave in Gombe and
Mubi, Adamawa State, with the assailants firing into the crowd, killed 28 people
wounding several others in the region. The sect launched a deadly attack on a Deeper
Life Christian Church in Nassarawo, Gombe state, during the church’s prayer service,
with the assailants armed with AK47 rifles and many in number shot through the church
windows, killing six worshippers including the pastor’s wife and wounding 10 others.
This episode was shortly followed by the sect’s storming of a meeting venue of Ibos
gathered in Mubi, Adamawa state, to plan on transporting a kinsman’s body that was shot
dead by unidentified assassins and killing all the Ibo mourners at the venue (Ohai, 2012,
para. 1-2, 8). It is observed that “Both attacks came before the expiration of a three-day
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ultimatum issued by Boko Haram to southern Christians living in northern Nigeria to
pack and leave the region or face dire consequences” (Ohai, 2012, para. 6), as panic
spreads among southerners living in Mubi (Ohai, 2012) and the entire north.
This study period, thus, also evidences a continued deliberate targeting of
Christians and southerners, particularly Ibos, during episodes of violence in the northern
Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. For instance, while addressing the human rights
concerns of the individual’s entitlement to state protection against bodily harm and
violence under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) it is observed that:
A feature of the violence in northern Nigeria is the fact that people from the Igbo
tribe are targeted, whether or not they profess Christianity. The victimization of
Igbos by the Hausa Fulanis regardless of their religious creed may largely stem
from historical reasons. However, the regularity of targeted attacks on a specific
racial group and the lack of legal consequences for its perpetrators and organisers
may amount to a violation, albeit by omission, of Nigeria’s obligations under
CERD. (CSW, 2008b, p. 13)
Additionally, in March 2012, 11 people were killed and 22 injured in a bomb
attack on St. Finbarr's Catholic Church in Jos on a Sunday morning (Ehiabhi, 2012a,
para. 1), and it is noted as “the second attack on a church in less than a month after the
explosion at Church of Christ in Nigeria, COCIN which left 3 dead and 38 injured”
(Tilley-Gyado, 2012, para. 3). Moreover, in April 2012 about 25 people were killed and
13 wounded in an Easter Sunday bombing in Kaduna, on which it is observed that “dead
bodies littered the road…after a massive explosion that…shattered windows of a nearby
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church where worshipers were celebrating Easter” (Akau, 2012, para. 1). Also on Easter
Sunday morning in Kaduna, a suicide car bomber turned away from church premises to
attack Christians holding Easter services struck a busy road killing about 38 people and
injuring many others, even as it is observed that “Churches have been increasingly
targeted by violence on holy days in Nigeria” (“Suicide Bombing,” 2012, para. 7). More
so, in April 2012 also, 22 people including two professors were killed and several others
wounded in a coordinated attack of bomb blasts and gun fire on a Catholic church at the
Bayero University, Kano even as “the bombers threw bombs to draw out the worshippers
having laid siege on the churches,” such that “The worshippers who escaped the bomb
blasts rushed out of the theatre to heavy gunfire” (Bello, 2012b, p. 2-3). It is also further
observed that in April 2012, “A bomb was detonated in the Sabon-Gari area of Kano
City…on Sunday,” an area that “is mostly occupied by Christians and non-indigenes in
the ancient city,” even as “Earlier in the year, Kano City was rocked by multiple bomb
blasts which killed hundreds of people” (Ehiabhi, 2012c, para. 1, 7-8).
In June 2012, two churches were bombed in Bauchi, killing 15 people and
wounding 42 others even as “the suicide bomber forced his [explosive laden] car into a
group of worshippers” outside the churches, the “Living Faith and Harvest Field, both
located in the Yelwa Tudu area of the Bauchi metropolis” (Alli & Tsenzughul, 2012,
para. 1, 3, 19). Also in June 2012 three suicide bomb attacks were made on churches in
Kaduna state, killing 21 people and injuring about 100 others. Two of the bomb blasts
were said to have “occurred within minutes of each other and targeted churches in the
city of Zaria,” killing at least one person in addition to the bomber, and wounding 51
others, while “A third blast hit a church in the city of Kaduna about half an hour later,”
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killing 10 people and wounding 29 others (“Nigerian Church Blasts,” 2012, para. 1-3).
Again in August 2012 there was mass shooting at Deeper Life Church near Okene, Kogi
state, in which 19 people were killed including the pastor of the church, by three
unidentified gunmen (“Nigeria Church Attack,” 2012). Such gruesome exterminations
and killings have continued unabated in the north, and these “attacks, especially on
churches and Christians, have prompted the Christian Association of Nigeria to warn that
Christians would be forced to defend themselves against being made sitting ducks if the
government cannot guarantee their safety” (Onah et al., 2012, para. 10).
Applying the Genocide Proclivity Model in Phase V – 2006 to Present. The
coding list for the emergent nodes or codes for the study Phase V are provided in
Appendix C: Coding List E. The application of the emergent nodes from study Phase V
to the Genocidal Proclivity Model on page 199 follows.
1. Causal Conditions of Phenomena
Relating to Genocidal Proclivity:
Phase V – 2006 to Present
This fifth study phase also shows causal conditions which lead ultimately to
genocidal proclivity under the four identified causation factors of immediate or trigger
factors, underlying or root causes, perceived threat of the “otherness,” and exclusive
ideological framing. This phase reveals trigger or immediate causal factors including
arrests or persecution of fundamentalist sect members, religious extremism, and violence
or other fundamentalists activities; election-related and engineered violence; insurgency,
uprising, or anti-government riots; Islam degraded, desecration and/or misinterpretation
of Koran, the Danish Cartoon; and Massacres of Ibos and returning refugees, as in the
January 2012, in which Boko Haram in Mubi, Adamawa State stormed a community
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meeting of Ibos gathered to plan on transporting the body of a kinsman that was shot
dead by unidentified assassins (Ohai, 2012, para. 1-2, 8). Other emergent trigger factors
include reprisal mission or revenge. For instance, in the March 2010 killings in Dogo Na
Hauwa, Nossiter (2010d) observes that “dozens of…herdsmen descended on a
slumbering village…and slaughtered hundreds with machetes, knives and cutlasses in a
brutal act of sectarian retribution,” with about 500 people reported to have been “killed in
the early hours of [the] morning, in three different villages” (para. 3).
This study phase also includes a second set of causal conditions comprising
underlying or root causes to the conflict involving historical factors among others. For
instance, in the said Dogo Na Hauwa, Plateau state vicious killing of over 500 of a
Christian ethnic group by the Hausa-Fulani herdsmen, it is observed that:
Nigeria’s Middle Belt, a band of fertile land that straddles the largely Muslim
north and the Christian south, has always been a hotbed of ethnic and religious
violence, and Plateau State, of which Jos is the capital, has borne the brunt.
Most of the state’s original inhabitants come from tribes that are almost
entirely Christian and animist, but the farmland and grazing pasture has attracted
migrants for centuries, especially Muslim Hausa and Fulani people from the more
arid north. (Polgreen, 2008, para. 10-11)
Other underlying causal factors in this study phase include culture of bad
governance and corruption or oppressive military rule (Murray & Nossiter, 2009); and Al
Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian links including illegal aliens (“Nigeria
Group Threatens,” 2011; “Nigerian Death Toll From Boko Haram,” 2012; “Nigerian
Death Toll Rises,” 2009; Nossiter, 2010d, 2011; “Nigeria: Police Arrest,” 2012; “Scores
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Killed,” 2011; Shuaibu, 2012; Smith, 2009; “Unidentified Gunmen,” 2011). Further
underlying causation in this phase are political underpinnings or power struggle which
include issues infiltration and politicization of religion; and political divisions and
tensions (“Boko Haram,” 2012; Nossiter, 2010e; Ojo, 2012; Sokunbi, 2012; “Thousands
Flee,” 2009). Other emergent underlying causation nodes in this phase also include socioeconomic factors involving ethnic groups vying for control of fertile lands, political and
economic power; indigenes and settlers issues; and poverty, unemployment, lack of
education, and discontent (“At Least 200 Die,” 2008; “At Least 21 Are Killed,” 2011;
Murray & Nossiter, 2009).
Additionally, this phase comprises the third set of causal factors of perceived
threat of the “otherness” including ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and
animosities; and North-South split or largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south.
Polgreen (2008) observes, for instance, that “the religious divide in this nation of more
than 250 ethnic groups mirrors a geographical one, between a historically Muslim north
and a Christian and animist south, as well as deep political divisions that cross religious
lines” (para. 8). Other perception of “otherness” threat nodes are annihilation attempts by
targeting (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Chidiogo, 2012; Garrison 1968a; Mgboh, 2012a;
Nossiter, 2010f; Orude 2012) and/or forceful conversion of Christians to Islam (Ahiante,
2004; Brooke, 1987b; “Christian Groups,” 2009); and ultimatum to southern Christians
living in the North to leave the region (Ohai, 2012; Onah et al., 2012).
This study phase also shows emergent nodes and categories for the fourth set of
causal conditions of exclusive ideological framing which include issues with religious
dimensions, anti-Western or ideological differences (“Nigerian Villages,” 2010; Nossiter,
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2010c, 2011; Polgreen, 2008); and fundamentalism and religious fervency (“‘Irate
Youths’ Burn Down,” 2006; Nossiter, 2010c; Orude, 2012). Other emergent exclusive
ideological framing nodes in this phase include Sharia or Islamic law institution in
northern Nigeria, involving non-Muslim opposition to Sharia, unconstitutionality and
violation of fundamental rights of Christians and other non-Muslims in Sharia operative
states (Adekoya, 2009; Fisher, 2006; Lobel. 2012); gender segregation matters (Nossiter,
2010c); Sharia implementation, anti-establishment, or anti-Western ideology (“700 die,”
2009; “Christian Groups,” 2009; Mojeed & Nossiter, 2012; Mshelizza, 2011); and moves
towards imposing Sharia across Nigeria or establishing an Islamic state (“Boko Haram,”
2012; Lobel, 2012; Mohammed & Idonor, 2012; “Nigerian Death Toll From Boko
Haram,” 2012).
2. Phenomena Resulting From Trigger Factors,
Underlying Causation, Perceived Threat of
the “Otherness” and Exclusive Ideological
Framing: Phase V – 2006 to Present
This study phase also shows that the causal conditions—the trigger factor,
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing
in varying situations and contextual settings—resulted in different degrees and forms of
killings and exterminations primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians and
other conflict parties which are divided mostly along ethnic and religious lines. The
subjective phenomena identified from the study data in this phase reveal violence
unleashed to different target victims including, assault, shoot-out, killings, arson and
looting; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism as in the July
2009, Boko Haram crisis in Maiduguri which “led to the beheading of 11 Christians
including three Pastors and the burning of 20 churches” (Adekoya, 2009; “Christian
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Groups,” 2009, para. 2; Nossiter, 2010e). Further phenomenal nodes in this study phase
include bombings, coordinated gun and bomb attacks (Ohai, 2012; Pedro, 2011; TilleyGyado, 2012); as well as phenomenal nodes for genocide as in the July 2009 Boko
Haram onslaught on Christians in Maiduguri in which it was observed that:
“The Boko Haram sect went about wielding dangerous weapons and abducting
Christians to the enclave of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf in the name of
implementing Sharia in Nigeria. They were forcefully converted to Islam after
they were tortured.”
“Three pastors and eight other Christians who resisted the forceful
conversion were beheaded on the order of the leader of the Islamic sect. while 20
churches were burnt to ashes by the fundamentalists.” (Dogo as cited in
“Christian Groups,” 2009, para. 10-11)
Other phenomenal nodes in this phase include political violence, coup d’état and
political assassinations; religious and ethnic violence; reprisals from southern states;
sectarian violence; spiral or escalation of violence; and targeted, pre-meditated or
orchestrated killings and assaults. It is observed, for instance, that in the February 2006
Danish cartoons episode, Christians in Maiduguri were targeted even as “Protesters in
Maiduguri turned on the Christian minority, burning churches and shops, and troops…
[And] Most of the victims in Maiduguri are believed to be Christians because they were
attacked in churches...A Roman Catholic priest was among those killed” (Myers, 2006,
para. 14-15). Further phenomenal nodes in this phase include terrorist activities; and
threats or fears of more attacks, protests or warnings of full scale war (Marama, 2012;
“Sectarian Attacks Kill 15,” 2012; Sokunbi, 2012; “Violence in Northeast,” 2011).
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Phenomenal nodes in this phase also include tit-for-tat killings in northern states;
uprising, anti-government rioting, protests or demonstrations; and violent or deadly
clashes, rioting or gun battles (“700 die,” 2009; “At Least 200 Die,” 2008; “Boko
Haram,” 2012; Chidiogo, 2011; Ohai, 2012). By comparing and contrasting such
phenomenal nodes and categories, two major categories involving targeted, pre-meditated
or orchestrated killings and assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem,
massacres or barbarism are identified as being closely associated with the proclivity to
genocide.
3. Context in Which Ethno-Religious Conflict
and Genocidal Proclivity Developed:
Phase V – 2006 to Present
The study data for this phase also include the different social space or lebensraum,
which provides a geographic framework on which genocide proclivity can develop
(Wood, 2001). This involves Northern Region or States including, Abuja – Jabi, and
Zuba communities; Adamawa State, in Yola, Jimeta, Lamurde, and Mubi; Bauchi State,
in Bauchi; Benue State, in Makurdi, Dooga, Kpata, Lokobi, Ajimaka, Ekeae, Giza,
Yogbo, and Mbgawem border communities, Gwer West Local Government Area, Zongo
Akiki, Nyijir, Tse Taki, and Agbeke in Guma areas; Borno State, in Maiduguri, Dala,
Yan’tebura, Bulukuntu Tsallake, and Zajeri; Jigawa State, in Dutse; Gombe State;
Kaduna State, in Kaduna, Kafanchan, Kufara, Ori-Apata, Zaria, Zonkwa, and ZangoKataf; Kano State, in Kano, Bompai, and Sabon-Gari; Katsina State, in Katsina;
Nasarawa State, in Alago, Doma Town, Eke and Giza Areas, Kadarko, Tiv settlements at
Kpata, Donga, Lokobi, and Ajimaka; Niger State, in Minna - Angwan Kuje, and Madalla;
Plateau State, in Jos, Barkin Ladi, Bukuru, Dogon Na Hauwa, Kuru Karama, Wareng,
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Yelwa, Zot, and Ratsat; Sokoto State; Taraba State, in Jalingo; and Yobe State, in
Damaturu, Gadaka, Geidam, Hawan Malka, and Potiskum; Zamfara State. The phase also
showed contexts for Southern States where reprisals occurred including Anambra State,
in Onitsha, Awka, Nnobi, and Nnewi; Delta State, in Asaba; Imo State and Niger Delta.
(see Tables 1 and 2 for the various contexts, respectively for the northern Nigeria ethnoreligious conflict, and for the reprisal attacks in the south).
Also providing the contextual framework in this study phase are different conflict
parties in the different phenomenal settings of the conflict. These include Muslim mobs,
sect, civilian mobs or gangs and Ibos; Muslim mobs or sect and security forces; Muslim
mobs, sect or groups and Christians; security agents and unidentified civilians; different
ethnic groups; northern states government and Christians; and Fulani herdsmen or HausaFulani group and Christian or host communities. Such emergent conflict nodes were
analyzed by comparison and contrasted with the phenomenal conflict nodes and
categories and their causal conditions to identify conflicts with plausibility of a
conceptualized annihilating difference (Hinton, 2002) which lead to exterminations
involving perpetrator and victim situations, with other conflicts that are devoid of such
annihilating difference considered as clashes or fighting between parties without an overt
inclination to genocide.
Additionally, varying perpetrator-groups identified in the study using the
annihilating difference analysis of the conflict parties described above include Boko
Haram Islamic fundamentalist group (“700 die,” 2009; Abdulkadir, 2012b; Akau, 2012;
“Boko Haram,” 2012; Mgboh, 2012; Ohai, 2012; Onah et al., 2012; Orude, 2012a;
2012b); Fulani herdsmen or Fulani-Hausa group or gunmen (Ebije & Alabelewe, 2011;
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Ejembi, 2012; Iferi, 2011; Nossiter, 2010b, 2010d 2010f; Perefoy, 2010; Shiaondo,
2011); and Muslim mobs, rioters or rampaging Muslim youths (Bello, 2012; Biniyat,
2012; Chidiogo, 2011; “Deadly Christian-Muslim Clash,” 2011; Myers, 2006; Mojeed &
Nossiter, 2012; Nossiter, 2010b; Shuaibu, 2012). The perpetrator groups identified also
include rampaging or under-aged youths and arrested suspects (Connors, 2008; “Deadly
Christian-Muslim Clash,” 2011; “‘Irate Youths’ Burn Down,” 2006; “Unidentified
Gunmen,” 2011); and civilian mobs, unidentified attackers or gunmen (“At Least 200
Die,” 2008; “Attacks Kill,” 2011; Ola & Orude, 2012).
Also identified are perpetrator nodes for Christian militia or youths which are
mostly reprisal killings, as in the February 2006 Danish Cartoons reprisals in Onitsha
(Polgreen, 2006); or the August 2011 revenge attack on a Ramadan gathering in Jos for
the bomb attacks on Christmas Eve (“Deadly Christian-Muslim Clash,” 2011), and other
retaliatory killings as in the 2011 Jos reprisals (“Boko Haram,” 2012), and the February
2012 reprisal killing of two Muslims by Christian youths following the bombing of the
COCIN church in Jos in which 38 people were killed (Abdulkadir, 2012b). Further
perpetrator groups are security agents, soldiers, the army or military, Hausa or Northern
troops as in the numerous cases of extrajudicial killings, unlawful battering and
indiscriminate firing of unarmed citizens by soldiers and police (“700 die,” 2009;
Adetunji, 2011; Chidiogo, 2011; Connors, 2008; Nossiter, 2009a, 2010b; Okoye, 2011;
Tilley-Gyado 2012). Details of the involvement of the perpetrator groups in the different
conflict settings of this study phase are analyzed and discussed in Phase V synopsis
above.
Additionally, this study phase also reveals target victims groups which support the
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fostering of annihilating difference amidst a perpetrator group and social space
environment, producing a complete, well-rounded contextual setting for the flourishing of
proclivity to genocide. Target victim groups identified in this study phase include
Christians and churches, also involving Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian
villages (Myers, 2006; Purefoy, 2010; Chidiogo, 2011; Akau, 2012; Ehiabhi, 2012c;
Onah et al., 2012); civilian targets; Southerners who are predominantly Christians, and
especially Ibos as targets (“Boko Haram,” 2012; “Christian Groups,” 2009; Ebije &
Alabelewe, 2011; Ohai, 2012); security agents - police officers, military and government
officials (“700 die,” 2009; Chidiogo, 2011; Ehiabhi, 2012b; Ola & Orude, 2012);
symbols of government authority (including the United Nations offices in Abuja)
(Adekoya, 2009; Mark, 2012; “Nigerian Death Toll Rises,” 2009; “Nigerian Death Toll
From Boko Haram,” 2011; Pedro, 2011); civilian centers, schools and school children
(Akau, 2012; Nossiter, 2012; Ola & Orude, 2012; Onah et al., 2012); media offices and
journalists (Mohammed & Idonor, 2012; “Nigerian Reporter,” 2012; Onyeose, 2012);
beer parlors, hotels, banks and other facilities (structures or institutions with Western
connotations); Muslim clerics, mainstream or orthodox Muslims as in the August 2009
Boko Haram bloodbath in which over 700 were killed by including Muslim clerics
(“Nigerian Death Toll Rises,” 2009); and Muslims, Hausa-Fulani herders, Muslim sect,
Northerners or mosques as in reprisals on the post-election violence involving 800 death
toll for which “In predominately Christian communities in Kaduna State, mobs of
Christians retaliated by killing Muslims and burning their mosques and properties”
(Chidiogo, 2011, para. 7). Details of the victimhood of the targets in the different conflict
settings of this study phase are also analyzed and discussed in Phase V synopsis above.

315
4. Intervening Conditions Influencing
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase V – 2006 to Present
This phase of the study also identified intervening conditions in the different
contextual settings of the conflict in addition to the context nodes. Such intervening
factors which generally involve broad conditions that influence by increasing or
diminishing the proclivity to genocide, and identified in this phase include press
censorship and manipulation or deflation and inflation of casualty figures, which is used
by government officials on occasions to minimize or scale-up reprisals or tit-for-tat
violence; and extrajudicial killings and army involvement in policing (Adetunji, 2011;
Chidiogo, 2011; Nossiter, 2009a; Tilley-Gyado, 2012). Other intervention nodes in this
study phase include government ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government
(“Christian Groups,” 2009; Connors, 2008; Okpi, 2012; Onah et al., 2012).
Further intervention nodes in this phase are the presence of collaborators or
bystanders involving both local and foreign collaborators which internationalizes the
conflict. In the January 2012 Kano crisis involving about 185 death toll, for instance,
about 80% of the 200 attackers arrested were Chadian “mercenaries” and “There were
indications that the Chadians had been paid to participate in the recent attacks attributed
to Boko Haram,” even as the group has long been suspected by Nigerian security agents
“of smuggling arms into the country through the porous northeastern border with Chad
and Niger” (“Nigeria: Police Arrest,” 2012, para. 1-2, 5-7). Furthermore, according to a
UN regional security report, “there was evidence suggesting the Nigerian group had
Chadian members who had received training from Al-Qaeda's North Africa affiliate”
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(“Nigeria: Police Arrest,” 2012, para. 8), with warning of the group’s effort to “expand its
activities deep into Central Africa” (“Nigeria: Police Arrest,” 2012, para. 9).
This study phase further reveals that also influencing the tendency to increase or
deflate genocidal proclivity are the various intervention measures to control the violence
with their implementation. Intervention efforts in this phase include aid and relief support
(“Christian Groups,” 2009; Orude, 2012a; Shiaondo, 2011); rehabilitation efforts or calls
for rebuilding of churches; reconciliation attempts (Polgreen, 2008); control measures
taken such as curfews and road checks by security agents (Onah et al., 2012);
investigations and commissions of inquiries set up; calls to address the constitutionality
of Sharia law and security issues; military assault or crackdown; mopping-up of rioters or
arrests made; and warnings or calls for action, restraint, justice, or self-defense as in the
September 2010, Human Rights Watch call “on the Nigerian government to allow the
United Nations special adviser on the prevention of genocide, Francis Deng, to visit
Plateau,” the request for which was not answered (Okoye, 2011, para. 14). Other
intervention measures in this phase include attempts to dialogue, appeals for intervention
or mediation (Adetunji, 2011; “Christian Groups,” 2009; “Nigeria: Police Arrest,” 2012).
5. Strategies of Attack Foreshadowing
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase V – 2006 to Present
This study phase also reveals different strategies foreshadowing the tendency
towards genocide within the contextual settings and intervening conditions with the
resultant phenomena identified above. Strategies foreshadowing inclinations to genocide
in this phase include organization and planning including weaponry. For example, in the
Jos November 2008 violence it is observed that:
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There is…evidence that the…violence may have been planned in advance. So far
500 Muslim rioters have been arrested, some of whom were dressed in fake police
and military uniforms. Two hundred are now known to be citizens of the
neighboring Republic of Niger, while 300 are from the northern Nigerian states of
Kano, Katsina and Sokoto. Some of the rioters informed police that they arrived
in Jos three days prior to the violence. “They had weapons, many weapons”
…“they were ready, very ready.” (CSW, 2008b, para. 5)
Also in this phase are the strategies of extermination plot involving mass murders
or ideological and ethnic cleansing including, for example, the burning of churches, or
the forceful conversion of Christians to Islam as in the Boko Haram’s forceful conversion
to Islam of Christians they abducted and killing those who refused to convert (“Christian
Groups,” 2009). Further strategies include forced migration, for example, refugees and
displaced persons, and the ultimatum by Boko Haram fundamentalist sect to southern
Christians to leave the north (Lobel, 2012; Ohai, 2012; Onah et al., 2012; Orude, 2012a,
2012b). The strategies for this phase also include coordinated attacks involving
shootings, bombings, maiming, and arson, as well as drive-by or hit and run shootings
and suicide bombings (“Boko Haram,” 2012; “Emergency Declared,” 2011; Mohammed
& Idonor, 2012; “Nigerian Death Toll From Boko Haram,” 2012).
6. Consequences or Effects of
Proclivity to Genocide:
Phase V – 2006 to Present
The strategies adopted by perpetrators in this study phase have different
consequences or effects in the different conflict settings examined. Consequences
identified in this phase include death toll and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned
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corpses (“At Least 200 Die,” 2008; Binniyat, 2012; Chidiogo, 2011; Mgboh, 2012a,
2012b, 2012c; Myers, 2006; Okpi, 2012; Shuaibu, 2012). Other consequences include
refugees and displaced persons, as well as persons fleeing homes or taking refuge or
shelter for safety (“At Least 200 Die,” 2008; Bello, 2011b; Chidiogo, 2012; “Christian
Groups,” 2009; Ejembi, 2012; Onah et al., 2011; Polgreen, 2008). Emergent consequence
nodes also include mass graves or mass burials (Murray & Nossiter, 2009; Nossiter,
2010d, 2010e, 2010f); churches burned, bombed or destroyed (Abdulkadir, 2012b; Akau,
2012; “Boko Haram,” 2012; Chidiogo, 2011; “Christian Groups,” 2009; Ehiabhi, 2012a;
Mgboh, 2012a; Myers, 2006; Polgreen, 2008); and mosques burned or destroyed mostly
in retaliation or involving clashes between fundamentalist sect and Christians or security
agents (Chidiogo, 2011; Nossiter, 2009a; “Thousands Flee,” 2009; “Violence in
Northeast,” 2011). Further consequences in this phase include police stations and
barracks, government buildings bombed or burned; and schools bombed, burned,
destroyed or closed. For instance, on the Boko Haram attacks on schools, Nossiter
observes that:
Now it has an ominous new front: a war against schools.
Public and private schools here have been doused with gasoline at night
and set on fire. Crude homemade bombs - soda bottles filled with gasoline - have
been hurled at the bare-bones concrete classrooms…
…at least eight schools have been firebombed, apparently the work of
Boko Haram, the Islamist group waging a deadly war…The group’s very name is
a rallying cry against schools - “Boko” means “book” or “Western learning” in
the Hausa language, and “haram” is Arabic for forbidden…
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“We are Boko Haram, and we will burn the school,” the…watchman at
Aruna’s school, the Abbaganaram Primary School, recounted the arsonists saying
after they…ordered him at gunpoint to lie down, doused the school with gasoline
and set it on fire…(2012, para. 5-6, 10-11)
Additional consequences in this study phase include Christian businesses, homes,
hotels and properties destroyed; destroying, looting and razing of properties; denial of
freedom of worship and desecration of Christian religion. For instance, in a Kaduna press
conference by CAN following the Boko Haram August 2009 attacks in Maiduguri it is
observed that:
…the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in the 19 northern states and the
Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja has rejected the attempt by the northern
governors to regulate religious preaching in the north using traditional rulers,
saying that it will not be practicable.
CAN also said that it is holding the federal government and the five state
governments where violence erupted during the Boko Haram crisis which it said
led to the beheading of 11 Christians, including three Pastors and the burning of
20 churches.
[And noted that]…“the fundamental issue that motivated the Boko Haram
movement to unleash terror on innocent Nigerians is the quest for the total
implementation of sharia” in the country. (“Christian Groups,” 2009, para. 1-3)
Other consequences in this study phase are security threat, apprehension, anxiety
or political and social chaos, including infiltration of police, military and all areas of
government by perpetrator groups. Consequences category also revealed normalcy or
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calm returning after episodes of gruesome killings and exterminations, showing
intermittency of occurrence (Connors, 2008; Nossiter, 2012).
End of Model Application for Phase V
Chapter Summary
This study integrates the theoretical approach of Strauss and Corbin (1990) in
examining the plausibility of genocidal undertone to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious
conflict. Newspaper articles of cases of the ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria
were content analyzed and coded focusing on causation and intentionality to inquire on
the plausibility of genocidal inclinations to the killings. Given the consistency of the
emerging patterns (Stake, 1995) from the Nvivo software coding and analysis of the
study data, these emergent categories and nodes or coding themes have been used to
develop a theoretical model to explore the study’s meaning frame (Creswell, 2007) of
determining genocidal tendencies to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict over the
study’s delineated five phases.
The chapter presents the grounded theory model for identifying inclination or
proclivity to genocide in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict deriving from the
theoretical framework of Strauss and Corbin (1990) which is developed from this study.
The chapter further presents the application of the genocide proclivity model to each of
the delineated five phases of the study. The presentation of the study’s findings indicates
that the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict has genocidal undertones to the conflict.

Chapter 5: Discussion
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to examine the ethno-religious conflict in northern
Nigeria to determine whether there are genocidal inclinations to the conflict with a view
to identify adversarial implications, and utilizing the evidence to conceptualize findings
from which a new theory and a theoretical model for determining proclivity to genocide
emerged, with recommendations that would be of relevance to conflict analysis and
resolution scholars and practitioners. This chapter utilizes the data analysis presented in
Chapter 4 through the application of the theoretical model called the Model for
Determining Proclivity to Genocide developed by the author. The analytical technique
used to derive the theory is the Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) grounded theory approach to
theory development. The chapter explores some key concepts in discussing the findings,
focusing on the theory of dolus specialis or specific intent in genocide (Campbell, 2012;
Jones, 2006) to present a narrative of the findings and intentionality to address the study’s
main research question of genocidal inclination in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious
conflict in each of the five phases of the study. The second research question of
determining the extent to which religion foments and escalates the conflict is also
addressed. The study identifies five findings from the data analysis which align with the
study’s two research questions which are discussed in this chapter, and recommendations
are proffered with a conclusion to the study. Implications of the study and areas for future
study are also discussed.
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Substantive Theory of Proclivity to Genocide
A substantive theory which is rather particularistic in form (Glaser, 2007) is
developed from the study’s specific inquiry area of genocidal inclination or proclivity in
the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. The theory derives from the analytical
technique of Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) grounded theory approach which essentially
involves “a central phenomenon, causal conditions, strategies, conditions and context,
and consequences” (Creswell, 1998, p. 58). The core category or central idea relates with
the other categories of causal conditions which lead to the phenomenon, its contextual
framework, intervening conditions, strategies deployed for the phenomenon, and its
consequences.
In the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict the grounded theory model
developed in the study is applied to determine the core phenomenon of genocidal
proclivity, which is evidenced as occurring in interplay of its six-part components. As
identified in the conflict, the first of these components is causal conditions for genocidal
proclivity involving: (i) immediate or trigger factors which are catalytic in form and
which ignite the killings—for example, the first coup d’état and killing of mainly
northern army officers; massacres of Ibos and returning refugees; secession and selfdetermination (as in the Biafra war); insurgency, uprising or anti-government riots;
Islamist fundamentalist activities; as well as issues of Islam desecration/misinterpretation
of Koran, and fatwa declared publications such as the Danish Cartoon and Miss World
publications, etc.; (ii) underlying or root causes which are entrenched into the conflict
fabric, including historical and colonial influences on the region, culture of bad
governance and political underpinnings, and socio-economic factors of poverty;
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unemployment; and lack of education, etc.; (iii) perceived threat of the “otherness” which
include ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and animosities; annihilation attempts
by targeting or forceful conversion of Christians to Islam, ultimatum to southern
Christians living in the North to leave; anti-Ibo rioting; dynamism and fear of Ibo or
southern dominance; and North-South split or largely Muslim North and mainly Christian
South, etc.; and (iv) exclusive ideological framing including factors of

religious

dimensions, anti-Western or ideological differences; fundamentalism and religious
fervency; and Sharia law institution, implementation, and moves to impose Sharia across
Nigeria and establish an Islamic state etc.
The second component which is the phenomena of genocidal orchestration
emanates in interplay of identified causal factors and includes targeted, pre-meditated or
orchestrated killings and assaults; and carnage, pogrom, massacres, bloodbath, barbarism
or mayhem. The third component of the contextual framework in which ethno-religious
conflict and genocidal proclivity developed, comprises the social space, or lebensraum
(Wood, 2001); conceptualized annihilating difference; and identified perpetrator. The
fourth component involves intervening conditions influencing or mitigating proclivity to
genocide, and includes government ineptitude, lethargy or weak central government;
press censorship and manipulation, deflation/inflation of casualty figures to escalate or
abet killings/reprisals; extrajudicial killings and army involvement in policing; and
collaborators or bystanders which could be local or international with a consequent
internationalization of the conflict, etc. The fifth component involves the strategies of
attack foreshadowing proclivity to genocide in the conflict, and includes organization,
planning, and weaponry; indoctrination, manipulation, or instigation; extermination plot
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involving blockade and starvation, and mass murders; coordinated attacks of shootings,
bombings, maiming, looting, and arson; ideo-ethnic cleansing involving razing, bombing,
or destroying of churches; targeting of Christians or forceful conversion of Christians to
Islam; forced migrations; and ultimatum to southern Christians to leave the North, etc.
The sixth component details the consequences or effects of proclivity to genocide
identified in the conflict including sequential or complete victim annihilation; death toll
and casualties, mutilated bodies or burned corpses; mass graves and mass burials;
refugees and displaced persons; starvation; churches burned, bombed or destroyed;
infringing human rights; and normalcy returns, etc.
In applying this theoretical framework with findings focused on intentionality to
address the main research question of genocidal inclination to the northern Nigeria ethnoreligious conflict in each of the study’s five phases, the study evidences a continuing, but
intermittent perpetration of violence over the period. More so, the study evidences a
constancy of the perpetrator groups primarily as Muslim groups against targeted groups
which are mainly Christians or non-Muslims groups, on the basis of exclusionary
religious ideology that is intentionally genocidal.
The study’s substantive theory posits that there is genocidal proclivity to the
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict resulting from causal factors which trigger and
underlie the phenomena amidst a perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive
ideological framing. Such perceived threat of “otherness” is evidenced through ethnicreligious hatreds and animosities through annihilation attempts by targeting or forceful
conversion of Christians to Islam, and/or ultimatum to southern Christians living in the
North to leave the region. The theory posits that the intent to annihilate is framed by
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exclusive ideological positioning on issues of religious dimensions, anti-Western, antiestablishment, or ideological differences, fundamentalism and religious fervency, and
Sharia’s institution and implementation amidst moves towards imposing Sharia across
Nigeria and establishing an Islamic state. The theory argues that such exclusive
ideological framing leads to violations of fundamental rights of Christians (mostly
southerners) and other non-Muslim minority ethnic groups in the region, particularly the
Sharia operative states, are being deprived of their right to existence through intermittent
wanton killings. The theory also presents that the genocidal underpinning to the conflict
has been episodic in nature, and intermittent in occurrence, as a result of which it has
remained unacknowledged for decades, thus, presenting latency for recognition and a
delusion as to what is going on in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict.
Genocidal Inclination and Specific Intent
Establishing genocidal inclination to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict
is a core issue in addressing the central research question of the plausibility of genocidal
inclinations to the northern Nigeria conflict which is: Are there genocidal inclinations to
the ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria? Genocidal inclination borders on
intentionality with the intent of the perpetrator group fundamentally defining genocide
(Jones, 2006). It is recognized that “acts of destruction” which cause “total or partial
destruction of a group” as in a revolution or conquest, for instance, are legally construed
as intentional and hence, genocide, irrespective of the goal or motive where such acts
were intentionally pursued (Gellately & Kiernan as cited in Jones, 2006, p. 21). Thus, as
stated previously, actions are considered intentional where perpetrated with the
reasonable expectation or knowledge of a resultant partial or whole destruction of a

326
human group, notwithstanding their claimed objective (Jones, 2006, p. 21). And, as per
the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a person is deemed to have
intent vis-à-vis conduct where that consequence is meant by that person to occur, or he or
she “is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events” (Greenawalt as cited in
Jones, 2006, p. 21).
Intent can be established as in the Rwandan International Criminal Tribunal’s
1998 Akayesu judgment that “the offender is culpable because he knew or should have
known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group” (Schabas as
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 21).
Genocide intent is observed as combining the notion of specific intent, and
constructive intent (Jones, 2006), with specific intent inferred “where actions with
predictable results are taken over an extended period of time, and the consequences of
these actions regularly confirm their outcome” (Reisman & Norchi quoted by Fein as
cited in Jones, 2006, p. 21), with constructive intent involving cases where “the
perpetrators did not intend to harm others but should have realized or known that the
behavior made the harm likely… [And] clearly results in the destruction of that group of
people, even if that result is neither intended nor desired” (Alvarez as cited in Jones,
2006, p. 22). The notion of specific intent to destroy a racial group is fundamental to
genocide (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 11; 2012).
Genocide Two Phased Manifestations
According to Campbell (2010, Video Series 25), Lemkin’s two Phases of
Genocide first involve the destruction of the oppressed group’s national patterns. This
entails destruction of the targeted group’s cultural practices, their religious beliefs, moral

327
foundation, economic practices, and psychological wellbeing, all of which constitute their
social institutions and collectively constitute their national pattern. In essence, all things,
criteria or signifiers which identify the population as such are aimed at by the oppressors,
in attempt to destroy the oppressed group’s identity. Thus, the first phase is the
destruction of the targeted group members, and the attempt to destroy their national
pattern which is synonymous with their identity.
The second phase of genocide is to replace that national pattern through
imposition, i.e. to impose the national pattern of the oppressor where the national pattern
of the targeted group once existed. Thus, while in the first phase there is the attempt by
the oppressor to destroy the national pattern of the group, in the second phase there is the
imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. Hence, there is destruction and
imposition of national patterns (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25).
Genocide, thus, essentially involves the destruction of a national group and their
patterns of identity and a sort of imposition of the oppressor’s own patterns of identity.
Hence, there is the imposition of national pattern, for instance, in occupied territories.
And, while some national pattern imposition forms are extremely hostile and may result
in occupying other people’s property, forcing them off their land, exterminations,
biological destruction, and destruction of human groups, etc., other forms of imposition
of the oppressor’s national pattern may not be so hostile, as such imposition basically
arises from the notion of “enforced assimilation” (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25), and
entails assimilation which is forced but rather, depicted as ‘opportunity’ (Lemkin as cited
in Campbell, 2010, Video Series 30).
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Core Research Question
From the preceding chapter, data analysis which is elaborated further in this
chapter through the discussions of two research questions of the study, the core of which
addresses whether there are genocidal inclinations to the ethno-religious conflict in
northern Nigeria, it is concluded that there are genocidal inclinations to the conflict.
Study Phase I - 1966 to 1976: Discussion. Genocidally undertoned killings have
intermittently been going on in northern Nigeria since the 1960s beginning with the May
to October 1966 massacres of Ibos who are predominantly Christians in northern Nigeria
by Muslim mobs and northern troops. Osaghae (1998b) notes, for instance, that the July
1966 “counter-coup resonated in the Northern region in the form of renewed genocidal
killings of Igbos and Easterners” (p. 61). The Ibo massacres in the north was followed
through in the ensuing 3-year Biafra Nigeria War in which millions of Biafrans lost their
lives through the Nigeria government policy of embargo and starvation (Emerson, 1970;
Garrison, 1968b), also through killing of Ibo civilians in the enemy recovered territories
of the war by Nigerian troops, and through the deliberate targeting and bombing of
civilian centers during the war. Thus, Osaghae observes that:
The war was presented as a genocidal one waged by the Muslims of Northern
Nigeria who had declared a jihad exterminate the Igbos from the face of the earth
(the massacres of Igbos in the North, as well as the strategies of economic
blockade and starvation pursued throughout the war, seemed to lend credence to
this). (1998, p. 66)
Thus, genocidal episodes are seen manifesting through the first phase of the study
delineated from 1966 to 1976, though with some few years respite after the war.
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Study Phase II – 1976 to 1987: Discussion. Following a brief lull after the war
in the 1970s, the genocidal episodes sparked off once again with the Maitatsine riots of
the 1980s in which thousands of lives, this time Christians as well as mainstream
Muslims who were considered heretics by the sect; the sect members and security agents
were equally killed in the process of trying to subdue the sect. This second phase of the
study spanning from 1976 to 1987, thus, saw religious extremism and violence or other
fundamentalists’ activities, insurgency, uprising, or anti-Government riots, as in the
Maitatsine riots or insurgencies. For instance, in episodes involving accusations of
desecration of Islam or misinterpreted Koran in which Christians and Muslim mobs
clashed in Kafanchan in March 1987 with people killed and churches burned, the
aftermath on which eight Koran teachers killed by Christian mobs, Muslim mobs in a
supposed reprisal attack on Christians, burned all the churches in Zaria, about 75 in
number and threatened to forcefully impose Islam on a Christian community in Wusasa,
Zaria (Brooke, 1987b). This phase, thus, evidences exclusionary ideological framing
involving ideo-ethnic cleansing or ideological and ethnic cleansing of burning of
churches, as well as attempts at forceful conversion of Christians to Islam (Brooke,
1987b). Exclusionary ideology frames genocide orchestration, which is evidentially
present in its two-sub-set, as here again, there is the destruction of the ideology of the
targeted group and the attempt at imposition of the ideology of the perpetrator group
(Lemkin as cited in Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25). Thus, in this study phase also,
genocidal inclinations are evidenced behind the exterminations, mass killings, forced
migration and other core ethnic or ideological purgative tools of genocide.
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The target victims or victim groups for this phase of the study include Christians

and churches, also involving Christian neighborhoods or mostly Christian villages;
civilian targets; Southerners who are predominantly Christians, and especially Ibos as
targets; security agents - police officers, military and government officials; symbols of
government authority; and media offices and journalists; beer parlors, hotels, banks and
other facilities which represent structures or institutions with Western connotations,
involving the destruction of the national patterns of the targeted group, and imposition of
the oppressed groups national patterns (Lemkin as cited in Campbell, 2010, Video Series
25). Victims identified in this phase, however, also include Muslim clerics or
mainstream/orthodox Muslims who were targeted by Islamic fundamentalists for
nurturing opposing ideology to the Maitasine sect (Dash, 1984). It however, also includes
Muslims, Hausa-Fulani herders, Muslim sect, Northerners or mosques, whose exception
of victimhood derive from reprisals from Christians as in the March 1987, Kafanchan
Koran misinterpretation clash (Brooke, 1987b; Kotch, 1987), and/or counter attacks by
security agents, as in the December 1980 Maitasine clash in which the authorities sought
to annihilate the cult (Jaynes, 1981).
Study Phase III – 1987 to 1996: Discussion. The third phase of the study from
1987 to 1996 witnessed insurgencies, uprising or anti-government riots, as well as
religious extremism and fundamentalism with the Babangida’s administration’s
registering of Nigeria in 1985 into the OIC which exacerbated religious tension in the
period as Christians saw it as a “move to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state” (Brooke,
1987b; Falola, 1999, p. 188). There was also extensive display of fundamentalism and
religious fervency with Islamic militants calling for the institution of Sharia or Islamic
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law in northern Nigeria, an ideological framing that underlies much of the excessive
blood-letting which continues to occur in northern Nigeria. It was, therefore, a period of
prolonged tension marked with religious riots and unrest in which thousands of lives
were lost, properties and buildings destroyed, and the country at the verge of a religious
war between Christians and Muslims, with political leaders opportunely manipulating the
nation’s diversity problem. More so, in some northern states, there were also socioeconomic factors of ethnic groups contesting for control of fertile lands, political, and
economic power, with poverty, unemployment, and educational lack amidst the downsliding economy intensifying a general feeling of discontent and a quest for alternative
socio-political means of survival. The discontent led to the recourse to religion which
provided the way out for the masses, resulting in a new wave of fundamentalism due to
the increased religiosity. And, further fanning the embers of the conflict were ethnicreligious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and animosities with most northern cities, other than
the Middle Belt zone, delineated in terms of Muslim majority and Christian minority, and
nationally, on the basis of the North-South split of largely Muslim north and mainly
Christian south.
This phase, thus, also witnessed annihilation attempts by targeting and
exterminations or mass killings as in the April 1991 Tafawa Balewa riots in which the
Christian ethnic minority “the Seyawa group, were selected for destruction,” as were
many other Christian non-natives in Bauchi (Falola, 1998, p. 207). Here again,
exclusionary ideology, destruction of oppressed group and their ideology, and the
imposition of the ideology of the perpetrator group came to the fore (Lemkin as cited in
Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25). Thus, such phenomena identified in this phase
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involving violence and attacks unleashed to different target victims include targeted, premeditated or orchestrated killings and assaults, and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom,
mayhem, massacres or barbarism which are identified as being associated with the
proclivity to genocide.
Study Phase IV – 1996 to 2005: Discussion. The fourth study phase spanning
from 1996 to 2005 also witnesses insurgencies, uprising or anti-government riots, as well
as religious extremism and fundamentalism for varying causal factors including the
desecration of Islam or misinterpretation of Koran, with recurring spate of religious
uprisings interlaced with ethnic clashes, each of which presented as bloodier and more
ferocious than the previous (Adekoya, 2009). In essence, the period saw an escalating
cycle of violence, notably in Plateau, Kano, Bauchi, and some other northern states,
mostly with attacks and counter attacks between ethno-religious groups, each episode
taking on a religious tonation with a resultant polarization in the conflict and, more often
than not, with extremist Muslims hunting down and killing Christians in different parts of
the region, on occasions aided by Islamic mercenaries from neighboring states. An
instance of this was the February 2004 episode between Tarok Christian farmers and
Muslim Hausa-Fulani herders, the redressing of which the Hausa-Fulani herders, aided
by hired Chadian and Niger Islamic mercenaries, attacked and killed 90 Tarok farmers in
Yelwa with 48 axed to death inside a church where they had sought refuge and with the
church razed. In retaliation, Christians from the Gerkawa community attacked and killed
some 40 Muslim neighbors with cutlasses or swords, and burned their bodies. In response
to this development, the army moved in and evacuated about 3,000 Muslims from
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Gerkawa to Yelwa, while Christians fled Yelwa in fear of further attacks (Kendal, 2004,
para. 11-12).
There was, however, the May 2004 killings in Yelwa, an essentially Muslim
town, which presented as a notable exception to such frequent incidences of Muslims
killing Christians, and it was reportedly carried out by a Christian militia with toll of
about 630 (Adekoya, 2009, para. 10; “Hundreds Die in Attack on Nigerian Village,”
2004, para. 3), and which, once again, was an eruption in a long-drawn dispute between
Muslim Hausa-Fulani herders and Tarok Christian farmers in the area (“Hundreds Die in
Attack on Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 1-2). Also, there was a likely inflation of the
casualty figures “by self-interested parties,” as the death toll estimate by the police had
been put at 67 rather than 630 (CSW, n.d., pp. 1, 6, 11; “Hundreds Die in Attack on
Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 5-6). It was further refuted that the idea of “Christian
militia” as assailants in the episode did not exist (CSW, n.d., p. 1), but rather, it was the
local non-Muslim farmers’ retaliatory attack against violent displacement from their
lands amidst government ineptitude in dealing with their plight (CSW, n.d., p. 12).
The phase also witnesses the Sharia implementation program, the launching of
which started with the Zamfara state government’s ordering of “the destruction of all
churches” in the state (Kendal, 2004, para. 6). There was exclusive ideological framing
during the period involving issues with religious dimensions, fundamentalism, and
religious fervency, and Islamic law institutionalization with aims to impose Sharia across
Nigeria and to establish an Islamic state (Simmons, 2000). Such exclusive ideological
framing with the institution of Sharia exacerbated conflict in the period as non-Muslims
in opposition, contended the constitutionality of Sharia amidst glaring evidences of
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violation of the fundamental rights of Christians in implementing Sharia’s antiestablishment or anti-Western ideals (“Religious Riots,” 2001; “Violent,” 2001). For
instance, in April 2004 Kano state introduced a Sharia guided mobile court for
institutionalizing Islamic norms in every sphere of life, with the Sharia Enforcement
agency (HISBA) informed that the state’s Sharia Commission would no longer permit the
exemption of any person or area from Sharia, with recommendation “that anyone who is
not willing to adhere to Sharia should leave the state” (Anthony as cited in Kendal, 2004,
para. 19). Thus, once again in this study phase, is the wanton destruction of the national
patterns of the targeted group and imposition of the oppressed group’s national patterns
(Lemkin as cited in Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25).
Furthermore, the period witnessed persistent violent Muslim-Christian clashes in
the region with events in the international scene increasingly exacerbating the conflict, as
in the Kano Muslims bloody riot in October 2001 in protestation of America’s
Afghanistan campaign with a high death toll (Koinange, 2001; “Violent,” 2001). Other
such crises in the period include the November 2002 Kaduna violent protests that had
over 200 toll, and churches burned in the World beauty pageant riots which was ignited
by a supposedly blasphemous newspaper article that made suggestive aspersions on
prophet Mohammed (“Hundreds Flee,” 2002, para. 3). It is observed that these riots are
indicative of the Muslims’ frustrations over their perception of alliance being forged by
the government and the secular Western powers (BBC News as cited in Falola & Heaton,
2008). Thus, such conflicts have emanated from Islam’s political rise as a force (Falola &
Heaton, 2008), as well as from Sharia’s hardline spread from Zamfara state in 1999 to the
present 36 states (Onishi, 2001b). According to Onishi (2001b) about 5,000 Nigerians
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were said to have lost their lives in religious clashes between 1999 when the military
handed power up to 2001 (para. 3), such killings of which manifested, more often than
not, with extremist Muslims targeting and killing Christians and other non-Muslims
(“Deadly Rioting,” 2000; Koinange, 2001; Onishi, 2000).
The period, however, also saw reprisals in the south, for instance, in Aba where
the locals attacked the Hausas following the killings of Igbos in the north as their corpses
were brought to Aba (Onishi, 2000). Thus, the findings in this study period also evidence
the identified two major categories of phenomenal attacks involving, targeted, premeditated or orchestrated killings and assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom,
mayhem, massacres or barbarism are identified as being closely associated with the
proclivity to genocide.
Study Phase V – 2006 to Present: Discussion. The study fifth Phase from 2006
to present also evidences increasing killings from Muslim fundamentalism with religious
tensions in the country being impacted directly by outside world events (Falola &
Heaton, 2008, p. 239). The Danish newspaper cartoons in February 2006, for example,
saw a week-long violent riots in northern Nigeria which claimed 157 lives in Maiduguri
alone (Adekoya, 2009, para. 8) with mostly Christians killed and 30 churches razed
(“Toll Rises,” 2006, para. 4), even as more dozens of lives were lost in other places such
as Bauchi, Katsina, and Onitsha (BBC News as cited in Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 239).
As extremist Muslims attacked Christians in Bauchi, 25 were killed with the violence
fuelled by allegation of Koran desecration by a Christian teacher, and in reprisals in
Onitsha in the south, responding to the attacks on Christians in the north, 30 mostly
northern Muslims were killed and two mosques burned (“Toll Rises,” 2006, para. 5-7, 9).
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This phase also witnessed the killing of about 400 people in Jos, Plateau state
over an election dispute involving Muslim-Christian gang clashes in November 2008
(Adekoya, 2009, para, 9). It is observed, however, that in this mayhem launched by
armed rioters, churches, Christian businesses, and homes of clergymen were attacked
using the electoral results as excuse (Adekoya, 2009, para. 2). It is further observed that
this episode is a wrong media reporting of 300 Muslims being killed by Christians, as the
men were shot by security agents when they acted in defiance to an imposed curfew,
rather obeying a “jihad” participation order from the Dilimi area mosque calling all
Muslims to loot and burn properties, which ended with about 16 churches being razed
and 100 Christians killed in the crisis including four or more pastors (CSW, 2008a, para.
3-4). More so, the phase witnessed in March 2010, the killing of over 500 mostly women
and children in an attack by Muslim Fulani machete-wielding hordes on Dogon Na
Hauwa, a Christian village (“500 Dead,” 2010). This episode which was a Sunday, over
three-hour orgy, had the victims atrociously entrapped in fishing nets and animal traps
and hacked to death as they attempted to flee from their attackers, with the razing of the
sleeping victims’ straw-thatched mud huts in the wee hours of the morning by the
Muslim Fulani assailants first preceding the killing rampage (“500 Dead,” 2010, para. 2,
4, 9).
This last study phase is also equally interlaced with religious upheavals, uprisings,
and insurgencies mainly involving the Boko Haram Islamic fundamentalist group which
seeks to institutionalize Sharia in Nigeria based on an ideological positioning and an
Arabic translated name that connotes a forbidding or non-acceptance of Western
education (Adekoya, 2009). The sect staged attacks in different parts of northern Nigeria
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beginning with the July 2009 Bauchi attack against security forces who sought to contain
them in which lives were lost even as the violence spread to Borno, Kano, and Yobe
states with more lives lost, including some of the sect members and with police stations
burned down (Adekoya, 2009). An ensuing bloodbath in Maiduguri, Borno state saw
over 100 people dead (BBC as cited in Adekoya, 2009, para. 5), with the sect’s leader
arrested and killed in custody (Adekoya, 2009), and in further violence in Bauchi state,
churches, mosques, and several houses were razed down with more death toll (Adekoya,
2009). This study period saw the Boko Haram Islamic fundamentalist sect, since this
2009 uprising, becoming more proficient and progressively more sophisticated in
confrontation with security forces and attacks on different targets including security
agents, symbols of government authority including the United Nations which was
bombed in August 2011 and police stations (“Deadly Christian-Muslim Clash,” 2011),
Christians and churches (Akau, 2012; Chidiogo, 2011; Ehiabhi, 2012a; Onah et al., 2012;
Purefoy, 2010), civilian targets and schools. It is observed, for instance that “Boko
Haram, whose name means ‘Western education is forbidden’ in the local Hausa language,
has focused its attacks mainly on government and police sites in the north, and has also
threatened to kill any Christians living there” (Mojeed & Nossiter, 2012, para. 17).
The Boko Haram sect has, in particular in this study phase, repeatedly mounted
attacks on churches including the 20 churches burned down in five northern states in the
July 2009 crisis (“Christian Groups,” 2009), and the December 2011 “Christmas
day…string of bombings [which] struck churches in several cities” (Akau, 2011, para.
11; “Christmas Carnage,” 2011), notably the Christmas day bombing of the Madalla
church which had a death toll of 43 persons and 27 others wounded (Olokor, 2011).
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There have subsequently been several such bombings and attacks on churches, for
example, the January 2012 Boko Haram invasion of a church service of the Deeper Life
Christian Church, Nassarawo, Gombe state, killing six and wounding 10 others (Ohai,
2012); the February 2012 bombing of the Church of Christ in Nigeria church (COCIN)
headquarters in Jos, killing 3 and wounding 38 others (Abdulkadir, 2012a); the March
2012 bombing of Finbarr’s Catholic Church, Jos killing 11 and wounding 22 others
(Ehiabhi, 2012a); the Easter Sunday bombing in Kaduna, targeting Christians killing 25
people (Akau, 2012); the April 2012 bombing of St. Stephen’s Catholic church in Bayero
University, killing 15 including two professors (Mgboh, 2012a); and the August 2012
mass shooting at the Deeper Life Church, Okene, Kogi state, said to have been by
unidentified gunmen, killing 19 people including the church pastor (“Nigeria Church
Attack,” 2012).
Informing the apparent targeting and killing of Christians and razing and/or
bombing of churches in the region, is the specific intent to cleanse the north of nonMuslims or infidels, and through exclusivity of ideology of destruction of the target
victims ideology to be followed by imposition of the ideology of the perpetrator group
(Campbell, 2010, Video Series 25), which is equally being played out through
exterminations and mass killings. For instance, it is observed in the January 2012 Boko
Haram attacks on a Christian worship service in Maidiguri in which about 15 people
died, that the attacks occurred after the sect “promised to kill Christians living in
Nigeria’s largely Muslim north” (“Sectarian Attacks Kill 15,” 2012, para. 2).
Also trailing the motivation to the killings through the identified causal factors
that trigger or underlie the phenomena amidst a perceived “otherness” threat reflected
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through ethnic-religious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and animosities, a North-South split
or largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south, which manifests the country’s
religious divide (Polgreen, 2008), as well as through annihilation attempts by targeting or
forceful conversion of Christians to Islam, and ultimatum to southern Christians living in
the North to leave the region. While this intent to annihilate is framed from an exclusive
ideological positioning on issues with religious dimensions, anti-Western or ideological
differences, fundamentalism and religious fervency, and Sharia’s institution and
implementation, it leads to violations of fundamental rights of Christians and other nonMuslims in the region particularly the Sharia operative states, as well as to gender
segregation abuses. Such violations of which are further intensified with a bellicose
undermining of non-Muslims’ opposition and contentions of Sharia’s unconstitutionality,
amidst moves towards imposing Sharia across Nigeria or establishing an Islamic state.
These covert and all-inclusive factors of religious extremism and fundamentalism
in manifestations are often, rather, explained away by other wide-ranging causations.
Such diverse factors for this study phase include election-related and engineered
violence, insurgency, uprising or anti-government riots, degradation of Islam or
misinterpretation and desecration of Koran, and massacres of Ibos and returning refugees.
Also included are reprisal or revenge mission, an instance of which is the Dogon Na
Hauwa slaughter of hundreds by Muslim Fulani herdsmen who descended on a sleeping
village, macheting and butchering over 500 human lives in a brutal retributory sectarian
violence staged against three mostly Christian villages (Nossiter, 2010d, para. 3). Hence,
this study phase also identified causal conditions resulting in different degrees and forms
of killings and exterminations primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians and
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other conflict parties which are divided mostly along ethnic and religious lines, with
violence unleashed to different target victims in attacks identified among others, in the
two major categories involving targeted, pre-meditated or orchestrated killings and
assaults; and bloodbath, carnage, pogrom, mayhem, massacres or barbarism are identified
as being closely associated with the proclivity to genocide.
Summary. Looking at all these, it is evident that latent genocide is creeping into
Nigeria. Rwanda had a similar situation where the latent nature of the genocide was
completely missed by the international community. This is a global concern, such
instances of which abound as in the genocide in Armenia (Baum, 2008; Levene, 2005b;
Rae, 2002), in Lebanon in Pakistan (Falola, 1998), in the German genocide killing the
Jews (Baum, 2008; Gellately & Kiernan, 2003; Hinton, 2002; Levene, 2005b), in
Cambodia where Pol Port aimed to kill off all its educated people (Baum, 2008; Gellately
& Kiernan, 2003; Heidenrich, 2001), in the former Yugoslavia’s ethnic cleansing - in
Bosnia and Kosovo (Falola, 1998; Rae, 2002), and in Rwanda (Baum, 2008; Gellately &
Kiernan, 2003; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008). This latent genocide will destroy the nation
and impose Islam as a control mechanism to keep people in bondage which, if Nigeria
enters into, will be a replay of the recent Darfurian genocide in Sudan (Sternberg, &
Sternberg, 2008). Thus, Adebayo evidentially observes:
The culture of wanton, genocidal violence orchestrated to push a political agenda
is an established practice in the North. From the 1953 Kano riots, when the
Fulani-led Northern People's Congress set hoodlums to murder Southerners in
Kano to make it clear that the "North" was not yet ready for independence in
1957, to the massacre of Igbos after the Nzeogwu coup in 1966 to create mayhem
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and seize power back to the April 2011 mass killings that accompanied the
presidential election, the Fulani-controlled Muslim North has always used
organized mass violence that targets members of specific religious and ethnic
groups to further its political objectives - a sort of scorched earth war practice.
(2012, para. 4)
Thus, there is a latent episodic genocide to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious
conflict, a problem where mostly Christians and indeed southerners and other nonMuslim minority ethnic groups in northern Nigeria are being deprived of their right to
existence through wanton killings and blatant violations of their fundamental human
rights particularly in Sharia operative states. Ultimately the idea is to create an Islamic
state. This is a global issue which, if left unchecked, will lead to a manifest open
genocide either on the part of the north through a continued attack and killing of
Christians and southerners in northern Nigeria while also encroaching southwards, or the
southerners who would have had enough, may launch a retaliatory offensive to stage off
the continued wanton exterminations. If the extremist Muslims succeed would it be that
Nigeria will end? The global community needs to start addressing this latent genocide to
avert Rwanda type genocide in Nigeria.
Conclusion. The study has examined the parties to the conflict in the different
phases of the conflict, and determined its ethno-religious undertones, mainly between
ethnic groups along the Muslim and Christian divide. The mechanism that has been
employed as revealed in the strategies adopted in the conflict, as well as investigating the
conditions that have led to the conflict. The idea has been to focus on specific intent by
examining the motivational factors underlying the killings. Thus, despite the fact that it
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does not fulfill the generally outlined notion of genocide, it still satisfies the parameters
of genocide on the basis of the specific intent of the perpetrators to the killings. The
question, thus, is how is it still genocide? While it is recognized that genocide has
nothing to do with numbers, the intermittent killings have on occasions involved mass
killings with evidences of mass burials and mass graves identified in the conflict.
However, proof of genocide is not by numbers but by intentionality, i.e. “dolus specialis”
which is the specific intent to exterminate a people group based on their ethnicity or
religion (Campbell, 2012, p. 1; Jones, 2006, p. 21). In the northern Nigeria ethnoreligious conflict, there is the specific intent to eliminate Christians and other nonMuslim groups on the basis of religion or ethnicity. And, although the perpetrator groups
may and do change from time to time, the underlying motivational factors have remained
the same—the intent to eliminate Christians and non-Muslim groups based on an
exclusive ideological framing. This genocidal undertone to the conflict has, thus, pitted
perpetrator group(s) mostly, Islamic fundamentalist sect(s) such as the Maitasine and the
Boko Haram sects, and on occasions Muslim Hausa/Fulani mobs in the north, against
varied targeted groups, specifically northern Christians and southerners as the Ibos and
Yoruba, as well as other minority non-Muslim ethnic groups in the north.
Thus, beginning with the 1966 pogrom by northern mobs and troops against the
Ibos (Osaghae, 1998b), which was also institutionally carried out by the Nigerian
government against Biafrans as seen in the one million Biafrans that died of starvation
(Garrison, 1968b), and the deliberate targeting and killing of Biafran civilians during the
war (“Africa: Race Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1967b), genocidal episodes have continued
unabated in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict up to present (Adebayo, 2012).
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Furthermore, the region has continued to witness the scourging of churches through
bomb attacks and arson, as are evidential in the Boko Haram on-going scourges of
churches in the north, as well as the killings and extermination of Christians and other
non-Muslim groups in the region. There has, thus, historically and systematically been
the organizing and killing by perpetrator groups which are mainly Islamic, against victim
groups that are Christians or non-Muslims, on the basis of A targeting B with the intent at
eliminating B because of their religion and on occasions because of their ethnicity. This
is genocide as defined by the United Nations 1948 Genocide Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC) (Heidenrich, 2001;
Hinton, 2002; Jones, 2006).
It is, therefore, argued that there are anti-Christian sentiments which are evidential
from the motivating factors underlying the killings. Examples of these motivating factors
abound, for instance, in the abuses of Islamic Sharia on Christians in northern Nigeria.
The appeal of Sharia lends credence to an exclusionary ideology among extremist
Muslims that is framed by the ideal to set themselves apart from others by means of an
“othering” process, the basis on which genocide can be distinguished (Hinton, 2002, p.
6). In this process, as Hinton observes:
the boundaries of an imagined community are reshaped in such a manner that a
previously “included” group…is ideologically recast (almost always in
dehumanizing rhetoric) as being outside the community, as a threatening and
dangerous “other”—whether racial, political, ethnic, religious, economic, and so
on—that must be annihilated. (2002, p. 6)
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It is thus, submitted that, in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, extremist
Muslims are seen as wanting to be separate and distinct from others, and on the basis of
exclusionary tendencies and Sharia implementation ideals and practices, Christians are
being discriminated against, targeted, and exterminated in northern Nigeria, notably by
perpetrator, mostly Muslim groups and Islamic fundamentalists (Kendal, 2004). As a
result of the primarily religious tonation to the conflict, in addition to the Sharia operative
states, the Middle Belt, particularly Jos in Plateau state which straddles the mostly
Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south, has continued to witness escalated
killings and attacks. For instance, following the 2004 upsurge of assaults on Christians in
the state, it is observed that:
Genuine followers of Jesus Christ are paying a heavy price for this ethnic and
religious conflict. Obed Minchakpu reported for Compass Direct on 2 April that
the violence in Plateau in late March had resulted in the deaths of 8 pastors and
1,500 Christian believers, and the destruction of 173 churches. Reverend Dr.
Alexander Mamdip Lar, President of the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN),
reports concerning the Plateau crisis (2 May), “We [COCIN] lost two ordained
ministers in Jos and Rim [and] 117 of our churches were destroyed, while six
pastors, one ordained minister and hundreds of members were killed in Wase,
thus completely obliterating the church there.” As he says, the Church in Plateau
is “under siege.” (Kendal, 2004, para. 26)
However, there are a few instances that might be seen as being in objection to the
author’s argument that might present as exclusions to this identified pattern of extremist
Muslims killing Christians in the region. One such notable exception to the study’s
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identified pattern of Muslim group(s) targeting Christians or non-Muslim group(s) for
extermination in the Yelwa massacres of May 2004 where it is reported that Christian
militia attacked an essentially Muslim town of Yelwa killing 630 people (Adekoya, 2009,
Para. 10; Reuters; and Agence France-Presse as cited in “Hundreds Die in Attack on
Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 3).
On this episode, however, it is observed that the casualty figures were in
contestation, with the police estimate put at 67 death toll, and there was warning that the
figures were “inflated by self-interested parties” (Ijewere as cited in “Hundreds Die in
Attack on Nigerian Village,” 2004, para. 5-6), even also as “Christians and other nonMuslims insist the death toll is actually 67 or thereabouts and hotly dispute the widely
publicized death toll of 630” (CSW, n.d., p. 6). Furthermore, there is also contestation by
Christians of the media report of a Christian militia perpetrating the killings on grounds
that “there is no such thing as a ‘Christian Militia’” (CSW, n.d., p. 1). It is noted, thus, on
the contrary, that the assailants were local, non-Muslim Tarok farmers who, seeking
reprieve, had embarked on a retaliatory attack against the violent displacement from their
lands by Fulani herders amidst government ineptitude in dealing with their plight (CSW,
n.d., p. 12). Of paramount importance, however, is that reprisal attacks for this Yelwa
episode in May 2004 in Kano resulted in about 500-600 deaths (put at over 3000 by CAN
Kano) even as the state government, aiming to disguise the true number of casualties,
gave mass burials to several of the victims, with some thrown into the Challawa River
(Cited CAN in CSW, n.d., p. 7). More so, local witnesses narrated of truckloads of dead
bodies being evacuated, with some of the corpses disposed of by burning them in wells,
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even as the state government ensured that they were hastily gathered off the streets for
mass burial (“The Madness of Kano” as cited in CSW, n.d.).
Furthermore, it is not every Muslim that endorses or supports the violence being
perpetrated against Christians in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, as in the
February 2006 cartoon riots in Maiduguri, Borno state, in which it is observed that:
Sources report that a week before the riots rumors were circulating of imminent
violence against Christians. Agitators said to be from the Hausa Fulani tribe, who
are not indigenous to Borno, were reported to have accused the Kanuri and Shuwa
Muslims, who are indigenous to the area, of having been ‘too quiet’ in
comparison to Muslims elsewhere who are engaged in a ‘jihad’ against
Christianity. Local Christians state that they ignored these rumors, choosing
instead to rest on Borno’s self-proclaimed reputation as ‘The Home of Peace’…
The violence was organized and systematic…The violence targeted
churches, Christians and especially clergymen. The assailants, who were
predominantly Hausa Fulani, were said to hail from Kano, Katsina and Sokoto.
CSW also heard several reports of indigenous Shuwa and Kanuri Muslims hiding
and defending Christians from their attackers. (CSW, 2008b, p. 10)
The study, therefore, mostly demonstrates a constancy of the perpetrator groups
as extremist Muslims and the targeted group mainly as non-Muslims or Christians. The
periodic nature of the phenomena in the sense that it has been sporadic and episodic has
presented latency to the genocidal undertone of the conflict. There is, thus, proof of
genocidal inclination to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, based on the
determination of specific intent or ‘dolus specialis’ to destroy Christians on account of
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their religious beliefs (Campbell, 2012; Jones, 2006), with the attempt at imposition of
the Sharia as the perpetrators’ ideology (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 18, 25).
Islamization and the institution of Sharia in the region constitute the ideological
motivation among the myriad of causal factors to the conflict.
However, because of the intermittency in the nature of the genocide being
perpetuated in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, there has been covertness or
latency in recognition of this episodic genocide, and it has remained a feature of the
conflict for decades. This intermittency and episodic nature of the conflict continues to
present a delusion that what is going on in the region is based on a subterfuge
presentation of the conflict.
Captured in a schematic form below, Figure 2 summarizes the conceptions of the
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. This illustrates the vicious circle of attacks and
reprisals or counter attacks nature of the conflict which, however, has a covert genocidal
undertone that continues to be latent and elusive even to the international community.

Figure 3. Schematic Model of the Northern Nigeria Ethno-Religious Conflict.
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Research Question II
To what extent does the interplay between ethnicity and religion help to foment
and escalate the conflict in northern Nigeria?
Most studies on the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict have taken various
perspectives, linking the conflict to a mirage of causes but such multiplicity of causation
to the conflict are inexorably and intricately concomitant with the role and factoration of
religion to the killings. Where, for instance, ethnicity is identified as the conflict’s
underlying causation (Osaghae, 1998a), it can be argued that, while ethnocentricity may
partially explain the ethno-based dimension to the killings in the north, it does not explain
why the perpetrators identify themselves in terms of religion, and kill their victims based
on religious identifications. Furthermore, where political factors are seen as orchestrating
the conflict (Ukiwo, 2003), the conflict parties in the intermittent killings in the north can
be seen, once again, defining themselves on the basis of religion rather than on the basis
of the political parties to which they belong, with political motivation also failing to lend
credence on why such monstrous killings are not, in turn, experienced in other parts of
the country. Thus, to address this second research question of religious undertone to the
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict calls for a closer examination of the identified
causal and motivational factors to the conflict. Presented in Table D1 under Appendix D
of the study are some over 50 cases of the religious crises in northern Nigeria from 1980
to 2009 (Newswatch as cited in Ezeibe, 2009, para. 30). Reviewing the table listing, it is
observed, for instance:
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…that most of these conflicts destroyed properties of non Muslims mainly
suggesting that these conflicts want change of property relations between
Christians and Muslims where they occurred. Religious conflict became rampant
during civilian rule of Obasanjo. Between July 1999 and September 2004 Nigeria
recorded 33 different conflicts. (Ezeibe, 2009, para. 31)
Thus, evidentially, an analysis of the study data has shown causal trigger factors,
underlying causation, perceived threat of “otherness,” and exclusive ideological framing
in different situations and contextual settings, resulting in varying degrees and forms
exterminations and killings primarily between extremist Muslims and Christians, as well
as between other conflict parties, but which are mostly divided along ethnic, but also
primarily on religious lines, instances of which abound in the study. It is observed in the
investigation of the November 2008, Jos crisis by Human Rights Watch (HRW), for
instance, that:
Witnesses described…how mobs of Muslim youth beat, burned, or bludgeoned to
death Christians, in some cases specifically targeting pastors and church officials.
One witness from the Yoruba ethnic group said five of his relatives…were among
12 Christians burned alive by a mob of Muslims. Other witnesses described how
hundreds of Muslim youth besieged and burned churches and homes belonging to
Christian families. Church officials reported that seven Christian pastors and
church leaders were killed in the violence and that 46 churches were burned.
Local community leaders told Human Rights Watch that Muslim mobs burned
133 houses in a predominately Christian area of the Ali Kazaure neighborhood.
(2009, p. 5)
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Hence, beginning with the 1966 massacres of Ibos in the north, for instance,
which, while fundamentally presenting as ethno-based killings, essentially has religious
tonation to the killings with the Ibo victim group basically defined as Christians their
targeting and extermination of which was by the mostly Muslim mobs and northern
troops (Garrison, 1966c). Further are the Maitatsine religious riots of the 1980s, with over
4,000 people killed in Kano in 1980, the October 1982 Maiduguri uprising by the sect,
with police unofficial toll of 450 deaths, but put at over 1,000 by the locals, while
Government official estimate was put at 133 deaths including cult members, civilians,
and policemen, although local estimate of officers killed was put at 100 (“100 Nigeria
Policemen,” 1982; Cowell, 1982, para. 6; Dash, 1984). The riots culminated with the
fanatic March 1984 Jimeta, (then) Gongola state uprising in which about 1000 people
were killed (Dash, 1984). Furthermore, in 1985 was the Babangida attempt at enrolling
the country into the OIC, for which “Christians were outraged,” even as the period once
again saw escalated tensions with the observation that “Moslems want to extend the
Islamic legal code of Sharia from the north to the entire nation” (Brooke, 1987b, para.
13). It is, thus, evident that Islamic ideological framing underlie much of the excessive
blood-letting which continues to occur in northern Nigeria, particularly with the
introduction of Sharia in some northern states.
On the characterization of the religious violence in the northern Nigeria ethnoreligious conflict, it is observed that in:
[t]he heartland of Islam and such traditional cities as Kano and Katsina…violence
has taken three forms - first, reformists, as in the case of the Shiites in Katsina or
the Maitatsine, fighting the state; second, anti-Christian; and third, directed
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against immigrant Christian settlers, as in Kano. Future conflicts are certain,
especially between Muslims and immigrants. [In] Central Nigeria, and cities and
towns on the fringes of Hausaland (usually marginalized “pagan” communities in
the emirates of the nineteenth century) where violence is both religious and
communal, involving confrontations between hegemonic religion (Islam) and
ethnicity (Hausa-Fulani) and minority groups defined by ethnicity (Kataf) and
minority religion (Christianity). The attempts to assert minority rights, using
Christianity as a source of identity, will provoke an Islamic reaction and ensure
the continuity of conflict. (Falola, 1998, p. 280)
Moreover, further towing the argument of religious underpinnings to the conflict,
the evidential instances are replete as in the Kafanchan March 1987 Christian-Muslim
confrontation. Here again, the triggering event, which supposedly was an erroneous
interpretation of the Koran, had an eruption of crisis, the aftermath in which Muslim
mobs burned all the churches in Zaria, about 75 in number, and threatened to destroy the

Wusasa Christian community, if not accepting of Islam (Brooke, 1987a; 1987b). And, as
the crisis spread to other cities in the state, a total of 152 churches burned in the region,
primarily “in Kafanchan, Zaria, Kaduna, Wusasa, Funtua, and Kaduna” relative to five
mosques burned (Falola, 1998, p. 185). Additionally, the April 1991 Bauchi state
eruption was recognized to have engulfed the state in a religious violence frenzy even as
thousands of mainly teenage hoodlums under the cover of religion went on rampage in
several cities including Bauchi, with casualty figures mounting, as churches, homes,
hotels, and a number of public properties were razed (Newswatch as cited in Akaeze,
2009, para. 14).
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Furthermore, there is the instance of the October 1991 Kano killings, where the
Izala sect initially presumed peaceful demonstration to stop an evangelical crusade being
organized for Reinhard Bonnke suddenly turned into a violent Muslim-Christian clash,
with high death toll and casualty figures and loss of enormous property (Akaeze, 2009,
para. 15). There was also the beheading of an Ibo trader in December 1994 in Kano with
the head paraded on a spike on the streets of Kano after he was accused of Koran
desecration (Akaeze, 2009, para.16). More so, the study identifies religious riots and
upheavals in several other northern cities including Kano, Jos, Wase, Zangon Kataf,
Funtua, Yelwa-Shendam, and Funtua with genocidal killings sometimes with flimsy
issues or political difference between opposing faiths sparking off killing orgies as in the
communal feud between the Christian, Katafs indigenes, and the Muslim, Hausas in
Kaduna State, which assumed religious coloration and spread to other cities in the state
(Akaeze, 2009), with about 500 to 800 people killed in the crisis (Noble, 1992c, para. 2).
Thus, as Kendal (2004) observes “Nigeria has seen some radical and devastating
retaliatory attacks and rioting by northern Muslims in response to trivial ‘Christian’
infractions” on occasions, involving accusations of desecration of Islam, the Koran, or
the prophet Mohammad (para. 2). An instance of this is the November 2002 Miss World
publication which Muslims saw as disparaging prophet Muhammad, the bloody riot of
which “left 200 dead, 1,000 injured, 11,000 homeless and 20 churches destroyed”
(Kendal, 2004, para. 2). More so, revenge attacks by the Christian minority groups where
they occur are on occasions presented in overwhelming proportions of even more
extensive exterminations by Christians, as in the May 2004 Yelwa disputed killings of 67
as against 630 people by “Christian Militia” (CSW, n.d. p. 1). The insidious and
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escalatory effects of such amplification of casualties on violence-prone hordes and
Islamic fundamentalists cannot be overstated. For instance, it is observed that:
Even before the Yelwa massacre, Zamfara state had ordered the destruction of all
churches in accordance with its implementation of “Sharia Phase 2.” It is possible
that the Yelwa massacre will be used to justify all manner of repression and
persecution being unleashed upon an already besieged Christian minority.
Security has been tightened in the northern city of Bauchi after leaflets were
found calling on Muslims to avenge the Yelwa killings and on Christians to leave
the region. Security has also been increased in Kaduna as tensions are running
high. (Kendal, 2004, para. 6)
It is, thus, recognized that rioting and killings have become a regular feature of
northern Nigeria life, and these ensure a state of perpetual, fear-induced submission for
the Christian minority in the region (Kendal, 2004).
Summary of Findings
Findings #1: A North-South Split along a Religious, Muslim-Christian
Divide. An analysis of the study data reveals a north south split in Nigeria along a
religious fault line of a largely Muslim north with a sizable Christian minority and a
predominantly Christian south, each region containing some animist minority. This
divide is entrenched and further exacerbated by the country’s multi-ethnic factor and
rooted in its history of colonial amalgamation of diverse ethnic groups of different sociocultural, socio-religious backgrounds into one nation (Aguwa, 1997). It is observed, for
instance, that “the religious divide in this nation of more than 250 ethnic groups mirrors a
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geographical one, between a historically Muslim north and a Christian and animist south,
as well as deep political divisions that cross religious lines” (Polgreen, 2008, para. 8).
There is, thus, an in-group out-group, majority/minority dichotomy based on
religious categorization in the country. This dichotomy is evidentially manifest in
northern states, particularly in the Sharia operative states where Muslims are in the
majority with a government legitimacy that is also Muslim, while Christians are in the
minority in such states where the conflict is most intense as in Bauchi, Kano, Kaduna,
and Taraba (Ahiante, 2004, para. 26), as well as in Adamawa, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa,
Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara (Chidiogo, 2011, para. 3). It is further
recognized that the Middle Belt region which “straddles the largely Muslim north and the
Christian south, has always been a hotbed of ethnic and religious violence, and Plateau
State, of which Jos is the capital, has borne the brunt” (Polgreen, 2008, para. 10).
Such finding in the context of the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict
supports the social identity theory and validates the notion of in-group favoritism and
discriminatory feelings against members of the out-group, with both Muslims and
Christians projecting negative feelings towards each other. More so, the northern Nigeria
ethno-religious conflict resonates negatively nationwide with the conflict being further
fed and fuelled by such “longstanding mistrust and stereotypes for example, that the
‘Christian south’ is pro-West and that the ‘Muslim north’ is backward and conservative”
(Falola, 1998, p. 280). There is, therefore, polarization and religious divide between
Christians and Muslims as opposing groups in the region, and by extension in the
country.
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This finding has far-reaching implications for the conflict in the sense that
tensions involving northern indigenes tend to polarize along Muslim-Christian fault line
other than on cases of intra-conflicts between different Muslim sects, while also
additionally polarizing along Muslim north and Christian south lines where both northern
as well as southern Christians are involved, on occasions, with the Christian Ibos as
prime targets. Polarization, thus, accounts for the conflict causation factor of perceived
threat of the “otherness” as identified in the study data which manifests in ethnicreligious hatreds, rivalries, divisions and animosities, as well as a North-South split or
largely Muslim north and mainly Christian south, as the data analysis reveal.
Findings #2: The Almajiri System in Northern Nigeria. The system of the
almajirai (plural) known as “catechumens” is practiced in northern Nigeria, and used by
“Islamic preachers and leaders…for recruitment,” involving an established Islamic
practice whereby young Muslim boys are attached to Qur’anic teachers with whom they
learn Arabic and the Koran, and about Islam (Falola, 1998, p. 148). Such almajirai, some
of very tender ages, leave their homes sometimes to distant places to learn with the
system observed as allowing “for indoctrination into particular beliefs and loyalty to a
leader, who became a father figure” (Falola, 1998, p. 148). For instance, Marwa who led
the Maitatsine sect had many of these almajiri (singular) boys, many of age ranges of 10
to 14, and had a large following which he had to take care of, providing free houses in
which they squatted, with their needs being rather small in view of their panhandling. The
almajirai, in turn, were by law permitted to beg on the roads, at street corners, and in the
mosques, keeping part proceeds of alms collected, and surrendering some portion to their
leader (Falola, 1998). The tradition is said to be fraught with corruption and abuse as
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“many preachers exploited young children for money” (Falola, 1998, p. 148), imposing
weekly levies on almajirai with parents who could pay, while others are sent to beg for
alms on the streets and to bring back part proceeds to their preacher-guardians (Falola,
1998). It is thus, observed that:
With urbanization, more and more children are sent to schools far from their
families, and millions of Almajiri children are required to beg for alms
(almajiranchi) to pay for their upkeep. While this system is ostensibly designed to
prepare them for some of the hardships they may encounter later in life, in a
context of urbanization and increasing poverty, it is open to abuse and may foster
criminality. In cities like Kano and Kaduna, many of the alms-begging street
children have graduated into Yandaba, adolescent groups that once served to
socialize teenagers into adulthood but have now, in many cases, transformed into
gangs. In 2005, the National Council for the Welfare of the Destitute estimated
there were 7 million Almajirai children in northern Nigeria, mostly in the far
northern states. (ICG, 2010, p. 10)
Essentially, the almajiri system forms the bedrock of the northern Nigeria ethnoreligious conflict as it provides a ready supply of fundamentalists and Muslim mobs that
resort to violence and suicide bombing attacks at the flimsiest opportunity. Such violence
and mayhem are often played out either by looting for economic reasons as occasioned
by their sprawling poverty levels and deprivation, or through elite mobilization of the
almajiri masses to occasion riots, wanton killings and destruction in the north, for
political agendas. As the study data reveal, significantly contributory to the conflict are
the underlying socio-economic factors of poverty and unemployment. The almajirai in
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the north, facing a lack of education and means to gainful employment, plod the streets
and are prone to violence and looting at the slightest opportunity even without
provocation, as in the “Maitatsine's followers, whose ranks have been swollen by the
ready support of the youthful unemployed” (Cowell, 1982, para. 11). The negating
impact of this almajiri factor to the conflict cannot be overstated. For instance, following
the March 1984 Maitatsine riots in which over 1,000 people were killed in Yola including
some members of the sect, Dash (1984) observes that:
What has worried Nigerian officials since 1980 is the ability of the sect to
replenish its membership from the daily drove of peasant youths flocking to the
northern cities and the government's inability to predict where the next outbreak
of violence will occur. (para. 5)
Furthermore, in the March 1987 Kaduna state crisis that was sparked off by the
alleged misinterpretation of Koran in a Kafanchan Christian crusade, which spread to
several cities in the state with over 152 churches razed in Kaduna, Kafanchan, Funtua,
Wusasa, and Zaria (Falola, 1998, p. 185) notably, where the city’s entire 75 churches
were burned down, the violence was attributed to “small boys with strong minds who
have been affected by all these Iranian ideas that have come into the country” (Brooke,
1987b, para. 23). It is also observed in this episode of killings that “About 1,000 people
were detained for rioting. [And] Visits to police headquarters in Zaria and in Kaduna
found hundreds of boys from 8 to 16 years old squatting in the shade awaiting disposition
of their cases” (Brooke, 1987b, para. 24).
More so, the almajiri factor in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict is
even more compounded by “The presence of Chadian and other ‘jihadis’ from

358
neighboring countries [which] has been a constant feature during outbreaks of communal
violence in several northern and central states since 2000” (CSW, 2008b, p. 10). This
foreign jihadist involvement intensifies the suicidal underpinnings of the perpetrators,
while plausibly also adding an Al Qaeda dimension to the conflict (Jaynes, 1981;
Mshelizza, 2011; Nossiter, 2010d; Shuaibu, 2012). The almajiri system, thus, serves as
fodder to the inferno of killings in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, by
readily providing violence prone Muslim mobs and fundamentalists which has continued
to sustain and escalate the conflict.
Findings

#3:

Government

Culpability,

Complicity/Ineptitude

and

Extrajudicial Killings. The playing out of genocidal inclinations to the northern Nigeria
ethno-religious conflict do not occur in a vacuum, but rather within a context and ambit
of the states(s) and governmental forces in which the exterminations and killings take
place. Where not directly the genocide orchestrator as in this northern Nigeria conflict, a
state’s intervening positioning may either help to abet or escalate conflict through acts of
complicity or omissions as extrajudicial killings, government ineptitude, and press
censorship or manipulation. Thus, it is acknowledged that “genocide was generally,
although perhaps not exclusively, committed under the direction or…with the benign
complicity of the State where it took place” (Schabbas, 2000, p. 1). The involvement
and/or seeming ineptitude of various state governments in which wanton killings have
been and are still being carried out in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict tend to
support this argument. For instance, in the 1966 Igbo massacres in the north, the
perpetrators in the carnages were civilian or Muslim mobs—mainly Hausas, and northern
troops—as in Kano where soldiers mutinied to participate in the Ibo killings. Siollun
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(2009) observes that the October 1, 1966 massacre was possibly “the worst of the
mutiny,” even as “The participation of soldiers with firearms greatly increased the kill
rate, and “Several thousand Igbos were killed that day alone in Kano due to the combined
efforts of the 5th battalion and civilian mobs” (p. 135). More so, on this 1966 Igbo
massacres and the ensuing Biafra war which “was presented as a genocidal one waged by
the Muslims of Northern Nigeria who had declared a jihad exterminate the Igbos from
the face of the earth,” Osaghae (1998b) recognizes “the massacres of Igbos in the North,
as well as the strategies of economic blockade and starvation pursued throughout the
war” as lending credence to the conflict’s genocidal underpinnings Osaghae (1998b, p.
66).
The study also found several incidences of extrajudicial killings in the course of
the intermittent northern Nigeria killings, which “are unlawful and deliberate killings
carried out by order of a government or with its complicity or acquiescence,” with
unlawful killings involving extrajudicial executions in addition to such other killings
which result from “excessive use of force by law enforcement officials,” all such killings
of which are said to violate a country’s constitutionally guaranteed “right to life”
(Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 3). It is observed that “The Nigeria Police Force (NPF)
is responsible for hundreds of extrajudicial executions, other unlawful killings and
enforced disappearances every year,” most cases of which remain “uninvestigated and
unpunished,” with the victims’ families having “no recourse to justice or redress,” while
public anger at the country’s high incidence is exploited by the police for justifying their
actions (Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 1). In the October 2001 extrajudicial killings in
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Zaki Biam following the death of 19 soldiers in the Tiv/Jukun crisis, it is observed, for
instance, that:
On 22 October army officers went to the area around the town of Zaki Biam in
Benue State, close to the Taraba State border in central Nigeria, where 19 soldiers
had been killed two weeks earlier. They were seeking those responsible and to
recover stolen weapons. Soldiers had been based in the area to quell
intercommunal violence between the Tiv and Jukun ethnic communities. Over the
next few days, more than 130 civilians – women and children among them – were
deliberately shot dead or killed as a result of indiscriminate shelling, apparently in
reprisal for the killing of the soldiers. Men in several villages in the area were
reportedly assembled before being summarily shot. (Amnesty International, 2002,
para. 7)
The study, thus, identifies other perpetrator groups as security agents, soldiers, the
army/military, and Hausa/Northern troops, many of which involve extrajudicial killings,
as in the May 2004 Kano killings which occurred in retaliation to the Yelwa killings of
May 2, 2004 killings, in which CAN noted that some Muslim policemen in brutality,
“intentionally and indiscriminately shot and killed many Christians in Sabon Gari and
other parts of the state” (CSW, n.d. p. 7). Furthermore, in the November 2009 sectarian
clash between Muslims and Christians in Jos, Plateau state, Human Rights Watch also
reports that:
…deadly clashes between Muslim and Christian mobs and the excessive use of
force by security forces left hundreds dead in Jos, Plateau State. [Also] Muslim
and Christian authorities… collectively documented the deaths of more than 700
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people in the two days of violence. In responding to the inter-communal violence,
the Nigerian police and military were implicated in more than 130 arbitrary
killings, mostly of young Muslim men from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. The
vast majority of the killings by the police and military came…the same day that
Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang issued a “shoot-on-sight” order to security
forces. (2009, p. 1)
Furthermore, in the May 2011 post-election rioting in which about 800 people
were killed in the 12 northern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa,
Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara, it is observed that:
Human Rights Watch estimates that in Kaduna State, at least 180 people, and
possibly more, were killed in the cities of Kaduna and Zaria and their surrounding
suburbs. There were cases of unlawful battering of citizens by the police and army
officials in response to riots and sectarian violence. Such cases were reported in
Kaduna, Bauchi, and Gombe. In Zaria and Kaduna, police and soldiers allegedly
killed eight residents…
Human Rights Watch documented eight cases of alleged unlawful killing
of unarmed residents by the police and soldiers in the cities of Zaria and Kaduna,
and received credible reports of more than a dozen other incidents. (Chidiogo,
2011, para. 10, 13)
There is, therefore, culpability, complicity, and/or government ineptitude in
several northern states with the attendant exacerbating effect such positioning has on the
conflict. In the May 2004 retaliatory attacks for the Yelwa killings, it is observed, for
instance, that:
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A total of 1,400 Christians were murdered by Muslims in Kano within two days
while thousands of others were displaced following the looting and destruction of
their homes and property…. nobody has been prosecuted for these killings, which
were premeditated….the Governor Ibrahim Shekarau of Kano State had fore
knowledge of the planned massacre of Christians in his state and gave his
approval…The deed is done and those terrorists responsible for these killings are
walking the street as freemen. (CAN as cited in Ahiante, 2004, para. 36)
Evidences of government ineptitude abound in the northern Nigeria ethnoreligious conflict as the study findings reveal. More so, such ineptitude of government is
further compounded by the lack of accountability or prosecution of perpetrators of the
on-going heinous killings in the region, while the victims, who are mostly “Christians,
rarely, if ever receive compensation for losses sustained during violence” (CSW, 2008b,
p.13). It is thus, acknowledged that:
In northern Nigeria perpetrators and organizers of religious violence are rarely, if
ever, brought to justice. This lack of accountability has created a climate of
impunity that encourages the continuation of such violence. In addition, the fact
that violence erupts regularly and continues unchecked and its perpetrators are
never brought to justice in turn causes a buildup of resentment of a kind that
eventually fosters retaliation. (CSW, 2008b, p. 13)
Findings #4: Problems of Indigenous/Settler Delineations. The findings in the
study also reveal the problems of indigene and settler delineation as also compounding,
sustaining, and exacerbating the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict. For instance,
in Jos, Plateau state which is in central Nigeria where “1,000 people died in religious
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riots in 2001, and in 2004 hundreds more were killed in a nearby city of Yelwa,” it is
observed that “Most of the state’s original inhabitants come from tribes that are almost
entirely Christian and animist, but the farmland and grazing pasture has attracted
migrants for centuries, especially Muslim Hausa and Fulani people from the more arid
north” (Polgreen, 2008, para. 11). The indigene/settler problem in northern Nigeria,
particularly in Jos as well as in Taraba state between the Jukuns and the Tivs (Noble,
1992a), has occasioned episodes of attacks and counter-attacks as a result of which the
conflict has become entrenched and deep-rooted. It is, thus, observed that in addition to
religious and political divide in the country, “there are conflicts over land and political
power, which are often intertwined as a result of traditional customs that hold the rights
of indigenous people over those of migrants from other parts of the country [with]
religion…almost always a proxy for those grievances” (Polgreen, 2008, para. 8).
Hence, in the investigation of the November 2008 crisis in which over 700 people
were killed in two days of inter-communal violence between Hausa-Fulani Muslims and
Christians in Jos, Plateau state, for instance, it is recognized that:
among the root causes of much of the inter-communal violence in Nigeria are
government policies that discriminate against “non-indigenes”- people who
cannot trace their ancestry to the original inhabitants of an area - essentially
relegating millions of Nigerians to the status of second-class citizens. State and
local governments throughout Nigeria have enacted policies that deny those
designated as nonindigenes access to some of the most important avenues of
socio-economic mobility…As poverty and unemployment have both become
more widespread and severe in Nigeria, competition for scarce opportunities to
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secure government jobs, education, and political patronage has intensified
dramatically. Religious, political, and ethnic disputes often serve as mere proxies
for the severe economic pressures that lie beneath the surface. (Human Rights
Watch, 2009, p. 3)
Findings #5: The International Media Dimension. The escalatory influence of
media reportage on the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict with particular emphasis
on some international media cannot be overemphasized. For instance, in the May 2004
Yelwa killings which was said to have been carried out by Christian militia, it is observed
that “…the term ‘Christian Militias’ was widely published by the international media,
fuelling the perception of a planned conspiracy against Muslims in Plateau State, and
rendering Christian leaders vulnerable to prosecution on false grounds” (CSW, n.d., p.
12). Furthermore, on the attack’s reported death toll of 630 said to have been in dispute, it
is noted “that this widely publicized estimate served to heighten Muslim anger,
guaranteeing a violent reaction” (CSW, n.d., p. 2). Thus, as reports of the Yelwa incident
of over 600 Muslims massacred reached Kano, a notable religious tension hotbed, there
was an orgy of killings of Christians by Muslims in a seeming reprisal on the Yelwa
incidence as irate Muslims hunted “nonbelievers,” killed, and burned them (Kendal,
2004, para. 21). The toll for this Kano episode was estimated at about 500-600, mostly
Christians killed in two days of Muslim rioting (Adekoya, 2009, para. 10). It is, however,
observed that the death toll estimate for this Kano incidence is put at about 3,000 by
Christians, who also decry the reporting bias of some international media on the episode
(CSW, n.d., p. 2).
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Additionally, in the November 2007 killing of about 400 people in Jos, Plateau
state, over an election dispute involving Muslim-Christian gang clashes (Adekoya, 2009,
para. 9), the CSW, arguing on Christians’ resentment of the international media’s
inaccurate and biased events reporting, observed that even as the voting ended peacefully,
violence started before the results were announced, with armed rioters attacking
churches, Christian businesses, and homes of clergymen, launching a mayhem using the
electoral results as excuse (CSW, 2008a, para. 2). Moreover, in this November 2007, Jos
conflict it is argued that there was a wrong reporting of about 300 Muslims who were
said to have been killed by Christians, with their bodies deposited in a mosque. The men
were noted rather to have been shot as they launched fresh attacks in defiance to the
authorities imposed night curfew, while also staging a large-scale unsuccessful attack on
police barracks. Thus, it is observed that “the men died while obeying orders from a
mosque in the Dilimi area, which was using its loudspeakers to instruct all Muslims to
defy the authorities, participate in the ‘jihad’, loot properties for money and then burn
them” (CSW, 2008a, para. 3). Additionally, about 16 churches were noted burned down,
with the death toll of Christians killed in the attack put at about 100, including four or
more pastors shot dead, one of Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), another of the
Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA), and two others (CSW, 2008a, para. 4).
Conclusion. The study has examined the northern Nigeria conflict focusing on
the parties in the different phases of the conflict, and determined its ethno-religious
undertones as mainly between ethnic groups along a Muslim/Christian divide. The
mechanism that has been employed as revealed in the strategies adopted in the conflict,
as well as investigating the conditions that have led to the conflict, have also been
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examined. The idea has been to focus on specific intent by examining the motivational
factors underlying the killings, and while the conflict may not fulfill the generally
outlined notion of genocide, it still satisfies the parameters of genocide on the basis of the
specific intent of the perpetrators to the killings. While genocide also has nothing to do
with numbers, the intermittent killings have on occasions involved mass killings with
evidences of mass burials and mass graves identified in the conflict. However, proof of
genocide is not by numbers but by intentionality or the specific intent to exterminate a
people group based on their ethnicity or religion (Campbell, 2012; Jones, 2006). In the
northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, there is the specific intent to eliminate
Christians and other non-Muslim groups on the basis of religion or ethnicity. And,
although the perpetrator groups may and do change from time to time, the underlying
motivational factors have remained the same—the intent to eliminate Christians and nonMuslim groups based on an exclusive ideological framing.
Thus, beginning with the 1966 pogrom by northern mobs and troops against the
Ibos (Osaghae, 1998b), which was also institutionally carried out by the Nigerian
government against Biafrans as in the starvation to death of over one million and the
deliberate targeting and killing of Biafran civilians during the war (“Africa: Race
Hatred,” 1967; Garrison, 1967b, 1968b), and up to the present, genocidal episodes have
continued unabated in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict (Adebayo, 2012).
Furthermore, the northern region has continued to witness the scourging of churches
through bomb attacks and arson, as are evident in the Boko Haram on-going scourges of
churches in the north, as well as the killings and extermination of Christians and other
non-Muslim groups in the region. It is, thus, evident from the study that there are anti-
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Christian sentiments which derive from the motivating factors underlying the killings.
Examples of these motivating factors abound, for instance, in the abuses of Islamic
Sharia on Christians in northern Nigeria. The appeal of Sharia lends credence to an
exclusionary ideology among extremist Muslims that is framed by the ideal to set
themselves apart from others by means of an “othering” process, the basis on which
genocide can be distinguished (Hinton, 2002, p. 6).
It is, thus, submitted that in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict,
extremist Muslims are seen as wanting to be separate and distinct from others, and on the
basis of exclusionary tendencies and Sharia implementation ideals and practices,
Christians and other non-Muslim groups are being discriminated against, targeted, and
exterminated in northern Nigeria, notably by perpetrators that are mostly Muslim groups
and/or Islamic fundamentalists (Kendal, 2004). As a result of the primarily religious
tonation to the conflict, the Middle Belt particularly Jos in Plateau state which straddles
the mostly Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south, as well as the Sharia
operative states, notably, Bauchi, Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Taraba, and Yobe has continued
to witness escalated killings and attacks on Christians. In essence, there has historically
and systematically been the organizing and killing by perpetrator groups which are
mainly Islamic, against victim groups that are Christians or non-Muslims, on the basis of
A targeting B with the intent at eliminating B because of their religion and on occasions
because of their ethnicity. This is genocide as defined by the United Nations 1948
Genocide Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(UNGC) (Heidenrich, 2001; Hinton, 2002; Jones, 2006).
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The genocidal undertone to the conflict has pitted perpetrator group(s) mostly,
Hausa/Fulani Muslims, as well as Islamic fundamentalist sect(s) including Maitasine and
Boko Haram sects, against varied targeted groups, specifically northern Christians and
southerners as the Ibos and Yoruba, as well as the Tivs and other minority non-Muslim
ethnic groups in the north. On the basis of this determination of specific intent to destroy
Christians on account of their religious beliefs or ethnicity, there is, thus, proof of
genocidal inclination to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict (Campbell, 2012;
Jones, 2006). Furthermore, there is the attempt at imposition of the Sharia as the
perpetrators’ ideology following the destruction of the targeted Christian group’s
ideology (Campbell, 2010, Video Series 18, 25). Islamization and the institution of
Sharia in the region, thus, constitute the ideological motivation among the myriad of
causal factors to the conflict.
While there are few exclusions to the study’s identified pattern of Muslim
group(s) targeting Christians or non-Muslim group(s) for extermination, as in the Yelwa
massacres of May 2004 by Christian militia, which episode the casualty figures and
reported perpetrator group were in contestation by Christians, on grounds of the nonexistence of a ‘Christian Militia’ in the region (CSW, n.d., p. 1), most other such episodes
are more often than not, mainly retaliatory or revenge attacks by Christians groups in the
region, as well as sometimes reprisal attacks on Hausa/Fulani Muslims in some southern
states.
While also, it is not every Muslim that endorses or supports the violence being
perpetrated against Christians in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, the study
mostly, however, demonstrates a constancy of the perpetrator groups as extremist
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Muslims and the targeted group as non-Muslims or Christians. Thus, there is an episodic
genocide to the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, a problem where Christians and
indeed southerners and other non-Muslim minority ethnic groups in northern Nigeria are
being deprived of their right to existence through wanton killings and blatant violations
of their fundamental human rights particularly in Sharia operative states. Ultimately, the
idea is to create an Islamic state. The periodic nature of the phenomena in the sense that it
has been sporadic and episodic has presented latency to the genocidal undertone of the
conflict.
Hence, because of the intermittency in the nature of the genocide being
perpetuated in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict, there has been covertness or
latency in recognition of this episodic genocide, and it has remained a feature of the
conflict for decades. This intermittency and episodic nature of the conflict continues to
present a delusion that what is going on in the region is based on a subterfuge
presentation of the conflict. This is a global issue which if left unchecked, will lead to a
manifest open genocide either on the part of the north as they continue to attack and kill
off Christians and southerners in northern Nigeria while also encroaching southwards, or
the southerners who would have had enough may launch a retaliatory offensive to stage
off the continued wanton exterminations of Christians and southerners alike. Would
Nigeria cease to exist if the extremist Muslims succeed? The global community needs to
start thinking of how to address this latent genocide to avert Rwanda type genocide in
Nigeria.
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Recommendations for Conflict Resolution
The northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict is entrenched and protracted
involving two powerful groups with two powerful positions maintained between these
two groups, with a myriad of complex underlying causal factors that are historical, sociopolitical, socio-economic, and socio-cultural, all of which are played out in a religious
framework. Although there have been the introduction of collaborative efforts in some
areas in attempt at conflict resolution, the conflict has continued unabated as a result of
the two powerful positioning of these two groups. In Jos, Plateau state, for instance,
following the 2001 riots, interfaith commissions were set up with aims at relationship
building between the different faiths, as well as ethnic groups, with the undoing of its
years of community bridge-building continuously being threatened by further eruptions
of violence, as seen in the November 2008 crisis in the area (Polgreen, 2009).
Thus, any attempt at conflict resolution would be one that aims at dislodging the
entrenched underlying and delineating factors which feed on non-acceptance and
intolerance between the two groups. There is the need for tolerance and acceptance in
diversity in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, as well as multi-religious society such as
Nigeria, and the north particularly, for such dislodgement of entrenched divisive
perception of differences to be achieved. Tolerance and acceptance in diversity is an ideal
that can be fostered through dialogue and collaboration between the two groups as
represented by their national bodies such as the Jama’tu Nasril Islam (JNI) for the
Muslims and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) for Christians.
Furthermore, there is the need to address intercommunal violence which causes
are rooted in the settler/non-indigene discriminatory practices as exist in Kaduna, Plateau,
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Taraba, and such other applicable states through legislation by the national government
with coverage nationwide. There is also the need to curb the widespread phenomenon of
extrajudicial killings by security forces through close investigations of such allegations
with due prosecution of the involved security officers.
Most essentially, there is the need to adopt genocide prevention and intervention
measures in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict in any attempt to curb the
genocidal manifestations to the conflict. The adoption of such measures would be
preemptive, notwithstanding the fact that genocide recognition presupposes a tenacity of
primordial underlying factors which negate the tenets of universal human rights and
democratic principles, in addition to its tendency of being conceptualized in the ambit of
the Nazi Holocaust’s emotive power (Schabas, 2000). Also, even more crucial is the fact
that the varied Genocide Convention implementation approaches has limited its impact,
with the international community’s obligation for preventing and punishing genocide
contradictorily resulting in Western authorities’ unwillingness to evoke the term. To
which end, the Genocide Convention’s not-so-wide ratification by states following its
1948 adoption is said to be “not in the existence of doubt about the universal
condemnation of genocide” but in certain states’ unease with the treaty’s onerous
obligations of prosecution and/or extradition of individuals, including heads of states
(Schabbas, 2000, p. 3). However, with genocide continuing to be the international
community’s prerogative for human rights prevention and punishment, a clarion call for
intervention is being made on the global community to address the latent episodic
genocide in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict to avert Rwanda and Sudan type
genocide in Nigeria.

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Implications
Validity and Reliability
While it is recognized that validity elements in content analysis are universal to
any qualitative research design, additional reporting of its process is essential, given that
its results are the categories’ described contents and meaning frames (Elo & Kyngä,
2008). Thus, the study’s categories are conceptualized in essence, and grounded
empirically (Dey, 1993) with the study data analyzed into categorical simple forms that
reliably reflect the phenomena being studied (Kyngä & Vanhanen as cited in Elo &
Kyngä, 2008). The credibility of the study’s findings is, thus, also evidenced by its
categories’ effectiveness in covering the data, as well as the use of valid and reliable data
sourcing for making defensible inferences (Weber as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008).
Moreover, links were demonstrated between the data and the results to increase the
study’s reliability, with maps, tables, and appendices for a greater understanding of “the
process and procedures of the inquiry” (Elo & Kyngä, 2008, p. 112). Trustworthiness has
been increased for the study by triangulation and authentic citations, with information on
the data sourcing or the kinds of data categories originally formulated also provided
(Patton as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008). The use of the Nvivo software program enabled
the study’s ordered and manageable content analysis and also facilitated new analytic
levels (Elo & Kyngä, 2008).
Implications of the Study
Nigeria is “a ‘regional giant’ whose internal religious politics could affect
neighboring states in the West African region” (Chalk, 2004, p. 414). The prevalence of
this conflict has been in northern Nigeria, where it has persisted for decades between

373
Muslims and Christians (Ibrahim, 1989, 1991; Osaghae, 1998b) primarily in the Middle
Belt region, notably Jos, Plateau, and such other northern states as Kano, Bauchi,
Kaduna, Katsina, and Borno, notably, Maiduguri, Yobe, and Adamawa state (Falola,
1998; Falola & Heaton, 2008). Furthermore, the conflict has continued to manifest in
sporadic genocidal killings and exterminations, primarily of Christians in these northern
states (Falola, 1998). Nationally, the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict has
exacerbated the polarization in the country with socio-political, socio-economic, and
socio-religious relationships being defined in terms of the mainly Muslim north, and the
largely Christian south, and the Christian/Muslim evenly balanced Middle Belt or central
region straddling across the north and the south, constituting the battle grounds for
Islam’s jihadist encroachment southwards. The implication of this encroachment cannot
be gainsaid, considering the fact that since the institution of Sharia by its twelve operative
northern states from 1999, over 50,000 lives have been lost (CSW, n.d.). It is, indeed,
recognized that “For many non-Muslims in northern and central Nigeria daily life
consists of a veneer of normality that barely conceals an underlying reality of chronic
discrimination and tension which periodically erupts into deadly, but organized,
violence” (CSW, n.d. para. 1).
Further intensifying the nation’s polarization are the policies of “Northernization”
in the regional era, and “Islamization” in the contemporary period which has consistently
been pursued by the predominantly Muslim north since Nigeria’s independence in 1960.
These policies align with Sudan’s exclusive “Arabization” and “Islamization” policies
which Adar (2001) identifies (p. 86). The implication of Islamization for non-Muslims is
their subjugation to Muslim rule, as was the case in the Islamic conquest of the early
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centuries in which the jihad or holy war served under Islamic jurisdiction, as territory
conquering and controlling means, while contemporarily Muslim leaders use jihad as
propaganda and mobilization tool in the face of external or internal threats (Adar, 2001).
Thus, Islamization is being used by the northern leadership and elites “as a religiopolitical tool” for promoting unity and a means of survival, and thus, “becomes an
important rallying point or mobilization tool for the north and the south” as was identified
in Sudan (Adar, 2001, p. 105). Islamization policy prohibits conflict resolution, and has
indeed been a serious impediment to the forging of religious tolerance and coexistence
between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria, and by extension between the north
and the south, with Christians obviously not accepting of “its implied religious and
political superiority and domination” (Adar, 2001, p. 105). While not applicable to all
Muslims at large, Islamization particularly to Muslim fundamentalists carries with it the
traits of exclusionary ideology involving the destruction of the ideology of the targeted
group, and the imposition of the perpetrator group’s ideology (Campbell, 2010, Video
Series 25).
Thus, the country’s ethno-religious divide inhibits the establishment of a national
identity, given the exclusionism of Islamization and Sharia positioning, with the
north/south divergent perspectives preventing its formation as in southern Sudan which is
observed as persistently rejecting the Islamization policy “because it is exclusionary and
inherently discriminatory” (Adar, 2001, p. 105). Islamization policy, where pursued
whether or not formally institutionalized, negates the essence of national identity in a
pluralistic nation such as Nigeria, and according to Adar (2001) “the policy is a fallacy”
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to the extent “that it renders the process of unity of the north and the south nugatory” (p.
105).
Globally, the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict has its implications. The
genocidal undertone to the conflict is a global issue that needs to be addressed by the
international community. This will lead to a manifest open genocide either on the part of
the north as they continue to attack and kill off Christians and southerners in northern
Nigeria while also encroaching southwards or the southerners who have had enough may
launch their own offensives. Ultimately, the idea is to create an Islamic state. If extremist
Muslims succeed would it be that Nigeria will end? The international community should,
thus, take to heart what is happening in northern Nigeria in the wanton extermination of
Christians and non-Muslims which has been episodic and, thus, latent in manifestation,
and intervene. Genocide, involving the targeted destruction of the other on the basis of
their religion and on occasions on the basis of their ethnicity, is occurring, the
intervention for which is stipulated in the Genocide Convention guiding the conduct of
nations. It is of paramount importance that the global community begins to address this
latent episodic genocide to avert South Sudan or Rwanda type genocide in Nigeria.
Limitations to the Study
The limitations of content analysis methodology used in the study involve the
analytical limitation of available and/or accessible archival materials, and the larger
structural context within which the interactions take place (Druckman, 2005). The
criticisms may, however, apply to the methodology’s specific applications, rather than to
a general analytical approach of process or text. This study involves textual rather than
process analysis of content, and focus will be given to the limitation which relates to
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textual analysis. The problem of materials limitation restricting the analysis is recognized
as a sampling rather than a methodological problem, with the observation that even
“small unrepresentative texts or data sets can have dire implications for inference,
whether the research consists of surveys, cases, or textual material” (Druckman, 2005, p.
260). Thus, the comprehensiveness of any analysis underlies its adequacy, and content
analysis research designs vary on such criterion. Data sourcing from various databases
and newspaper websites helped to address the problem of materials limitation and data
sampling was stratified based on relevance.
Furthermore, content analysis study results may exhibit signs of incomplete
process analysis, where the data has not been abstracted by the researcher, or there is the
inclusion of so many different things in one category (Dey as cited in Elo & Kyngä,
2008). Additionally, the abundance of categories may be indicative of inadequate data
categorizing, with the results including categories that are not cancelled out by each
other, while the process of abstraction is still going on. Where also saturation is
incomplete, there may be difficulty in linking the data items to one another (Patton as
cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008), with study results that are seemingly simple being
indicative of incomplete analysis (Weber as cited in Elo & Kyngä, 2008). Such coding,
categorizing, and abstracting limitations were addressed by the use of the Nvivo software
which organizes and analyzes unstructured data for coding categorizing and data
evidence recombination for meaning making, by enabling the researcher to remain close
to source data at every stage of the study.
Lastly, the limitations of content analysis also involve issues of the research
questions being too extensive or ambiguous, as well as the problem of researcher bias
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which is a generic qualitative methodological limitation (Elo & Kyngä, 2008). These
limitations have been addressed in the study using different and multiple data sources,
and triangulation of assertions and essential data requiring validation (Golafshani, 2003).
The problem of researcher bias has been addressed by bracketing.
Contributions of the Study
The findings from this study may lend credence to the conception of genocidal
intent and its covertness in situations of genocidal intermittency. The findings will be of
relevance in the academic sphere, the Nigerian community, and the international arena.
The study will broaden knowledge and contribute new perspectives to the conflict
analysis and resolution field on alternative strategies to improve ethno-religious
relationships and ensure a peaceful coexistence among different ethnic and religious
groups. The study will also provide a better understanding of the underlying factors
contributing to the continuing violent conflicts between Muslims and Christians in
northern Nigeria. The findings will help determine how to proffer recommendations for
policy formulations that will serve to eliminate the problem of religious intolerance in
northern Nigeria. The study will additionally create further awareness on the need for
national/international intervention on the sporadic killings in northern Nigeria, to avert
further conflict escalation, and possibly avert another South Sudan or Rwandan type
genocide in Nigeria.
Directions for Future Study
Further studies are required to determine nuances in the northern Nigeria ethnoreligious conflict between Sharia operative states and non-Sharia operative states in the
region. Additionally, there is the need for further investigations on the extent to which
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government involvement, ineptitude, and/or extrajudicial killings significantly impact the
ethno-religious conflict in northern Nigeria.
Reflections on the Completed Study
This study contributes significant theoretical insights in understanding and
identifying the inclinations to genocide in the northern Nigeria ethno-religious conflict.
While not exhaustive in itself, with additional investigation required on the nuances of
the genocidal undertones to the conflict, the study, however, presents an element of
urgency for intervention in the conflict to prevent further escalation and stem the
genocidal killings in northern Nigeria. The contributions of the study and its limitations,
in essence, provide the setting for future research efforts.
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Appendix A: Maps of Nigeria
Map I: Nigerian Administrative Borders: Regions in 1966 and States
in 2010 to Present

Figure A1. Map I: Nigerian Administrative Borders: Regions in 1966 and States in 2010
to Present (ICG, 2010, p. 29).
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Map II: Twelve States of Nigeria: 1967 to1976

Figure A2. Map II: Twelve States of Nigeria: 1967 to 1976 (“Nigeria States 1967-1076,”
2010).
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Map III: Nineteen States of Nigeria: 1976 to 1987

Figure A3. Map III: Nineteen States of Nigeria: 1976 to 1987 (“Nigeria States 1976-1976,”
2010).
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Map IV: Twenty One States of Nigeria: 1987 to1991

Figure A4. Map IV: Twenty One States of Nigeria: 1987 to 1991 (“Nigeria states 19871991,” 2007).
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Map V: Thirty States of Nigeria: 1991 to 1996

Figure A5. Map V: Thirty States of Nigeria: 1991 to 1996 (“Nigeria 1991-1996,” 2007).
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Map VI: Sharia Operative States in Northern Nigeria: 1999 to Present

Figure A6. Map VI: Sharia Operative States in Northern Nigeria: 1999 to Present (“NGSharia,” 2006).

Appendix B: Coding List Summary
Summary of Study Nodes or Coding Themes
Attacks

















Assault, Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting
Blockade, Embargo and Civil War
Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism
Bombings, Coordinated Gun and Bomb Attacks
Genocide
Political Violence, Coup D’état and Political Assassinations
Religious and Ethnic Violence
Reprisals from Southern States
Sectarian Violence
Spiral or Escalation of Violence
Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults
Terrorist Activities
Threats or Fears of More Attacks, Protests or Warnings of Secession or Full Scale
War
Tit-For-Tat Killings in Northern States
Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations
Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles

Causal Factors
 Immediate Causes
 First Coup D’état and Killing of Northern Army Officers
 Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots
 Election-related Violence
 Islam Degraded, Desecration or Misinterpretation of Koran, Danish Cartoon or
Miss World Publication
 Massacres of Ibos and Returning Refugees
 Secession and Self-Determination
 Reprisal Mission, Revenge or Counter-Coup
 Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or
Other Fundamentalists Activities







Remote or Underlying Causes
Historical Influences
Culture of Bad Governance and Corruption or Oppressive Military Rule
Colonial Influences, Exploitation and Fear of Balkanization
Al Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian Links or Anti U.S.-led
Afghanistan Air Strikes
Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle
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 Coalition Government or Federalism versus Regionalism Disputes
 Dynamism and Fear of Ibo or Southern Dominance
 Infiltration and Politicization of Religion
 Political Divisions and Tensions
 Political Elites or Kaduna Mafia
Socio-Economic Issues
 Socio-Economic Issues
 Ethnic Groups Vying for Control of Fertile Lands, Political and Economic
Power
 Indigenous Settlers and Migrants Issues
 Poverty, Unemployment, Lack of Education, and Discontent
Perceived Threat of the “Otherness”
Anti-Ibo Rioting
Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities
Dynamism and Fear of Ibo or Southern Dominance
North-South Split or Largely Muslim North and Mainly Christian South
Annihilation Attempts by Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam
Ultimatum to Southern Christians living in the North to leave

Exclusive Ideological Framing
Religious Dimensions, Anti-Western or Ideological Differences
Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency
Sharia or Islamic Law
 Gender Segregation
 Imposing Sharia Across Nigeria or Establishing of Islamic State
 Non-Muslim Opposition to Sharia, Unconstitutionality and Violation of
Fundamental Rights of Christians
 Strict Implementation of Sharia, Anti-Establishment or Rejection of
Westernized Institutions and Ideology
Conflict Parties
 Muslim Sect or Civilian Mobs or Gangs and Ibos
 Muslim Mobs or Sect and Security Forces
 Muslim Sect and Other Muslims or Sect
 The Northern-led Federal Government and Ibos
 Muslim Mobs, Sect or Groups and Christians
 Nigeria Biafra War
 Security Agents and Unidentified Civilians
 Different Ethnic Groups
 Northern States Government and Christians
 Fulani Herdsmen or Hausa-Fulani Group and Christian or Host Communities
Conflict Perceptions
 Marginalization and Discrimination
 Narratives and Experiences
 Views and Contentions
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Context
 Eastern Region or Biafra
 Mid-Western Region or State
 North Eastern Region
 Middle Belt or Central Region
 Northern Region or States
 Abuja
 Adamawa State
o Lamurde
o Jimeta
o Mubi
o Yola
o Jabi
o Zuba
 Bauchi State
o Bauchi
 Benue State
o Zongo Akiki, Nyijir, Tse Taki, and Agbeke in Guma areas
o Vaase
o Dooga, Kpata, Lokobi, Ajimaka, Ekeae, Giza, Yogbo and
Mbgawem border communities in Benue State
o Gbeji
o Gwer West Local Government Area
o Zaki-Biam
o Makurdi
 Borno State
o Yan’tebura, Bulukuntu Tsallake
o Zajeri
o Dala
o Maiduguri
 Gombe State
 Jigawa State
 Ilorin, Kwara State
 Taraba State
o Jalingo
 Plateau State
o Kuru Karama
o Zot and Ratsat
o Kadyal, Kanam District
o Langtang
o Barkin Ladi
o Wareng
o Bukuru
o Dogon Na Hauwa
o Yelwa
o Jos
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 Kaduna State
o Ori-Apata
o Kufara
o Zonkwa and Zango-Kataf
o Kafanchan
o Zaria
o Kaduna
 Kano or Kano State
o Bompai
o Sabon-Gari
 Katsina State
 Nasarawa State
o Kadarko
o Alago
o Tiv settlements at Kpata, Donga, Lokobi and Ajimaka
o Doma Town
o Eke and Giza Areas
o Akwana
 Niger State
o Angwan Kuje, Minna
o Madalla
 Sokoto State
 Yobe State
o Hawan Malka
o Geidam
o Gadaka
o Potiskum
o Damaturu
 Zamfara State
Southern States
 Aba, Abia State
 Anambra State
 Asaba, Delta State
 Eastern Region or Biafra
 Imo State
 Lagos, Lagos State
 Niger Delta State
 South-Eastern

Effects
 Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed
 Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed
 Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses
 Denial of Freedom of Worship and Desecration of Christian Religion
 Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties
 Mass Grave and Mass Burial
 Mosques Burned or Destroyed

428




Normalcy Returns or Resume Schooling
Police Stations and Barracks, Government Buildings Bombed or Burned
Refugees and Displaced Persons
 Fled Homes or Took Refuge
 Schools Bombed, Burned, Destroyed or Closed
 Secession and Civil War
 Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos
 Infiltration of Police, Military and all areas of Government
 Starvation
Intervening Factors
 Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures
 Extrajudicial Killings and Army Involvement in Policing
 Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government
 Collaborators or Bystanders
 Foreign or Internationalization of Conflict
 Local
Intervention Efforts
 Aid and Relief Support
 Attempts at Dialogue, Appeals for Intervention or Mediation
 Control Measures Taken, Investigations and Commissions of Inquiry
 Calls to Address the Constitutionality of Sharia Law and Security Issues
 Military Assault or Crackdown
 Mopping-up of Rioters or Arrests Made
 Warnings or Calls for Action, Restraint, Justice, or Self-Defense
 Post-War Re-unification Policy, Rehabilitation Efforts or Calls for Rebuilding of
Churches
 Reconciliation Attempts
Memorable Quotes
Perpetrator Groups
 Rampaging, Unemployed or Under-aged Youths
 Christian Militia or Youths
 Fulani Herdsmen or Fulani-Hausa Group or Gunmen
 Civilian Mobs, Unidentified Attackers or Gunmen
 Security Agents, Soldiers, The Army, Military, Hausa or Northern Troops
 Muslim Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths
 Islamic Fundamentalists or Sect
 Boko Haram
 Matatsine Sect
Population or Religious Demographics
Strategies of Attack
 Organization and Planning Including Weaponry
 Extermination Plot
 Forced Migration
 Mass Murders
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 Blockade and Starvation
 Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing
 Co-ordinated Attacks - Shootings, Bombings, Maiming, Arson
 Drive-By or Hit and Run Shootings
Targets or Victims of Attack
 Beer Parlors, Hotels, Banks and Other Facilities
 Christians and Churches
 Christian Neighborhoods or Mostly Christian Villages
 Civilian Centers, Schools and School Children
 Civilian Targets or Innocent Citizens
 Media Offices and Journalists
 Muslim Clerics or Mainstream or Orthodox Muslims
 Muslims, Hausa-Fulani Herders, Muslim Sect, Northerners or Mosques
 Security Agents - Police Officers, Military and Government Officials
 Southerners
 Symbols of Government Authority
 Ibos as targets

Appendix C: Coding Lists A to E for the Five Study Phases in the Northern Nigeria
Ethno-Religious Conflict
Coding List A
Summary of Nodes for Study Phase I – 1966 to 1976
Study Phase I spanning 1966 to 1976 is inclusive of the Nigeria-Biafra 1967 to 1970 war
years.
Attacks
- Assault, Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting
- Blockade, Embargo and Civil War
- Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism
- Bombings, Coordinated Gun and Bomb Attacks
- Genocide
- Political Violence, Coup D’état and Political Assassinations
- Religious and Ethnic Violence
- Spiral or Escalation of Violence
- Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults
- Threats or Fears of More Attacks, Protests or Warnings of Secession or Full Scale
War
- Tit-For-Tat Killings in Northern States
- Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations
- Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles
Causal Factors
Immediate Causes:
- Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or
Other Fundamentalists Activities
- Election-related Violence
- First Coup D’état and Killing of Northern Army Officers.
- Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots
- Massacres of Ibos and Returning Refugees
- Reprisal Mission, Revenge or Counter-Coup
- Secession and Self-Determination
- Annihilation Attempts of Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam
Perceived Threat of the Otherness:
- Anti-Ibo Rioting
- Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities
- Dynamism and Fear of Ibo or Southern Dominance
- North-South Split or Largely Muslim North and Mainly Christian South
Remote or Underlying Causes:
- Colonial Influences, Exploitation and Fear of Balkanization
- Culture of Bad Governance and Corruption or Oppressive Military Rule
- Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle:
- Coalition Government or Federalism versus Regionalism Disputes
- Infiltration and Politicization of Religion
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-

Socio-Economic Issues:
Poverty, Unemployment, Lack of Education, and Discontent
Exclusive Ideological Framing
- Religious Dimensions, Anti-Western or Ideological Differences
- Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency
Anti-Establishment or Rejection of Westernized Institutions and Ideology
Conflict Parties
- Different Ethnic Groups
- Muslim Mobs, Sect, Civilian Mobs or Gangs and Ibos
- The Northern-led Federal Government and Ibos
Context
Eastern Region or Biafra
Mid-Western State
Northern Region or States:
- Benue State/Makurdi
- Borno State/Maiduguri
- Kaduna State/Kaduna
- Kano State/Kano
- Plateau State/Jos; Bukuru
Effects
- Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed
- Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed
- Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses
- Denial of Freedom of Worship and Desecration of Christian Religion
- Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties
- Refugees and Displaced Persons/ Fled Homes or Took Refuge
- Secession and Civil War
- Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos
- Starvation
- Normalcy or Calm Returns
Intervening Factors
- Collaborators or Bystanders:
Foreign or Internationalization of conflict
Local
- Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government
- Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures
Intervention Efforts
- Aid and Relief Support
- Attempts at Dialogue, Appeals for Intervention or Mediation
- Control Measures Taken, Investigations and Commissions of Inquiry
Mopping-up of Rioters or Arrests Made
Warnings or Calls for Action, Restraint, Justice, or Self-Defense
- Post-War Re-unification Policy, Rehabilitation Efforts or Calls for Rebuilding of
Churches
- Reconciliation Attempts
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Perpetrator Groups
- Civilian Mobs, Unidentified Attackers or Gunmen
- Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths
- Security Agents, Soldiers, The Army, Military, Hausa or Northern Troops
Strategies
- Organization, Planning, and Weaponry
- Co-ordinated Attacks - Shootings, Bombings, Maiming, Arson
- Extermination Plot:
Blockade and Starvation
- Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing
Targets or Victims of Attack
- Christians and Churches
- Civilian Centers, Schools and School Children
- Civilian Targets or Innocent Citizens
- Media Offices and Journalists
- Southerners/Ibos or Easterners as targets
- Targets or Victims of Attack\Symbols of Government Authority
Coding List B
Summary of Nodes for Study Phase II – 1976 to 1987
Attacks
- Assault, Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting
- Blockade, Embargo and Civil War
- Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism
- Religious and Ethnic Violence
- Sectarian Violence
- Spiral or Escalation of Violence
- Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults
- Tit-For-Tat Killings in Northern States
- Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations
- Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles
Causal Factors
Immediate Causes:
- Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or
Other Fundamentalists Activities
- Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots
- Islam Degraded, Desecration or Misinterpretation of Koran, Danish Cartoon or
Miss World Publication
- Reprisal Mission, Revenge or Counter-Coup
Perceived Threat of the Otherness:
- Annihilation Attempts of Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam
- Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities
Remote or Underlying Causes:
- Al Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian Links or Anti U.S.-led
Afghanistan Air Strikes
- Culture of Bad Governance and Corruption or Oppressive Military Rule
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-

Historical Factors
Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle:
Political Elites or Kaduna Mafia
- Socio-Economic Issues:
Poverty, Unemployment, Lack of Education, and Discontent
Exclusive Ideological Framing
- Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency
- Sharia or Islamic Law:
Imposing Sharia across Nigeria or Establishing of Islamic State
Conflict Parties
- Muslim Mobs or Sect and Security Forces
- Muslim Mobs, Sect or Groups and Christians
- Muslim Sect and Other Muslims or Sect
- Muslim Mobs, Sect, Civilian Mobs or Gangs and Ibos
- The Northern-led Federal Government and Ibos
Context
- Northern Region or States
- Adamawa State/Jimeta; Yola
- Borno State/Maiduguri
- Gombe State
- Kaduna State/Kaduna; Kafanchan; Zaria
- Kano State/Kano
Effects
- Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed
- Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed
- Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses
- Denial of Freedom of Worship and Desecration of Christian Religion
- Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties
- Mass Grave and Mass Burial
- Mosques Burned or Destroyed
- Police Stations and Barracks, Government Buildings Bombed or Burned
- Refugees and Displaced Persons/Fled Homes or Took Refuge
- Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos
- Normalcy or Calm Returns
Intervening Factors
- Collaborators or Bystanders/Foreign or Internationalization of conflict
- Extrajudicial Killings and Army Involvement in Policing
- Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government
- Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures
Intervention Efforts
- Attempts at Dialogue, Appeals for Intervention or Mediation
- Control Measures Taken, Investigations and Commissions of Inquiry
Mopping-up of Rioters or Arrests Made
Perpetrator Groups
- Christian Militia or Youths
- Islamic Fundamentalists or Sect:
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Matatsine Sect
- Muslim Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths
Strategies
- Organization, Planning, and Weaponry
- Extermination Plot:
Mass Murders
- Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing :
Targeting of Christians or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam
- Indoctrination and Manipulation or Instigation
Targets or Victims of Attack:
- Beer Parlors, Hotels, Banks and Other Facilities
- Christians and Churches
- Christian Neighborhoods or Mostly Christian Villages
- Civilian Targets or Innocent Citizens
- Media Offices and Journalists
- Muslim Clerics or Mainstream or Orthodox Muslims
- Muslims, Hausa-Fulani Herders, Muslim Sect, Northerners or Mosques
- Security Agents - Police Officers, Military and Government Officials
- Southerners/Ibos or Easterners as targets
Coding List C
Summary of Nodes for Study Phase III – 1987 to 1996
Attacks
- Assault, Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting
- Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism
- Religious and Ethnic Violence
- Sectarian Violence
- Spiral or Escalation of Violence
- Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults
- Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations
- Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles
Causal Factors
Immediate Causes
- Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or
Other Fundamentalists Activities
- Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots
Perceived Threat of the Otherness
- Annihilation Attempts of Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam
- Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities
- North-South Split or Largely Muslim North and Mainly Christian South
Remote or Underlying Causes
- Colonial Influences, Exploitation and Fear of Balkanization
- Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle
- Socio-Economic Issues
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Exclusive Ideological Framing
- Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency
- Sharia or Islamic Law
Conflict Parties
- Different Ethnic Groups
- Fulani Herdsmen or Hausa-Fulani Group and Christian or Host Communities
- Muslim Mobs or Sect and Security Forces
- Muslim Mobs, Sect or Groups and Christians
- Security Agents and Unidentified Civilians
Context
Northern Region or States:
- Bauchi State/Bauchi
- Kaduna State
- Kaduna State/Kaduna
- Kaduna State/Zonkwa and Zango-Kataf
- Kano or Kano State
- Katsina or Katsina State
- Nasarawa State
- Taraba State/Akwana
Effects:
- Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed
- Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed
- Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses
- Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties
- Refugees and Displaced Persons
- Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos
- Normalcy or Calm Returns
Intervening Factors
- Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government
- Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures
Intervention Efforts
- Attempts at Dialogue, Appeals for Intervention or Mediation
- Control Measures Taken, Investigations and Commissions of Inquiry
Mopping-up of Rioters or Arrests Made
- Reconciliation Attempts
Perpetrator Groups
- Muslim Mobs, Rioters, Islamic Fundamentalists, Sect, or Suicide Bombers
Muslim Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths
- Security Agents, Soldiers, The Army, Military, Hausa or Northern Troops
Strategies
- Organization, Planning, and Weaponry
- Extermination Plot
Forced Migration or Displacement
Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing
Mass Murder
- Indoctrination and Manipulation or Instigation
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Targets or Victims of Attack
- Christians and Churches
Christian Neighborhoods or Mostly Christian Villages
- Civilian Targets
- Media Offices and Journalists
- Security Agents - Police Officers, Military and Government Officials
Coding List D
Summary of Nodes for Study Phase IV – 1996 to 2005
Attacks
- Assault, Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting
- Blockade, Embargo and Civil War
- Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism
- Genocide
- Political Violence, Coup D’état and Political Assassinations
- Religious and Ethnic Violence
- Reprisals from Southern States
- Sectarian Violence
- Spiral or Escalation of Violence
- Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults
- Terrorist Activities
- Threats or Fears of More Attacks, Protests or Warnings of Secession or Full Scale
War
- Tit-For-Tat Killings in Northern States
- Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations
- Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles
Causal Factors
Immediate Causes
- Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or
Other Fundamentalists Activities
- Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots
- Islam Degraded, Desecration or Misinterpretation of Koran, Danish Cartoon or
Miss World Publication
- Massacres of Ibos and Returning Refugees
- Reprisal Mission, Revenge or Counter-Coup
Perceived Threat of the Otherness:
- Annihilation Attempts of Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam
- Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities
- North-South Split or Largely Muslim North and Mainly Christian South
Remote or Underlying Causes:
- Al Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian Links or Anti U.S.-led
Afghanistan Air Strikes
- Colonial Influences, Exploitation and Fear of Balkanization
- Culture of Bad Governance and Corruption or Oppressive Military Rule
- Historical Influences
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-

Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle
Infiltration and Politicization of Religion
- Political Elites or Kaduna Mafia
- Socio-Economic Issues
Indigenous Settlers and Migrants Issues
- Poverty, Unemployment, Lack of Education, and Discontent
Exclusive Ideological Framing
- Religious Dimensions, Anti-Western or Ideological Differences
- Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency
- Sharia or Islamic Law
Gender Segregation
Imposing Sharia across Nigeria or Establishing of Islamic State
Non-Muslim Opposition to Sharia, Unconstitutionality and Violation of
Fundamental Rights of Christians
Non-Muslim Opposition to Sharia, Unconstitutionality and Violation of
Fundamental Rights of Christians
Imposing Sharia across Nigeria or Establishing of Islamic State
Sharia Implementation, Anti-Establishment or Anti-Western Ideology
Conflict Parties
- Different Ethnic Groups
- Fulani Herdsmen or Hausa-Fulani Group and Christian or Host Communities
- Muslim Mobs or Sect and Security Forces
- Muslim Mobs, Sect or Groups and Christians
- Muslim Sect and Other Muslims or Sect
- Muslim Mobs, Sect, Civilian Mobs or Gangs and Ibos
- Northern States Government and Christians
- Security Agents and Unidentified Civilians
Context
Northern Region or States
- Abuja
- Bauchi State
- Benue State/Gbeji; Vaase; Zaki-Biam
- Kwara State/Ilorin
- Kaduna State/Kaduna; Kafanchan; Zaria
- Kano State/Kano; Sabon-Gari
- Kebbi State
- Nasarawa State
- Niger State
- Plateau State/Jos; Kadyal, Kanam District; Langtang; Yelwa
- Sokoto State
- Taraba State
- Zamfara State
Southern States:
- Abia State/Aba
- Lagos State/Lagos
- Niger Delta State/Odi
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Effects
- Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed
- Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed
- Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses
- Denial of Freedom of Worship and Desecration of Christian Religion
- Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties
- Mass Grave and Mass Burial
- Mosques Burned or Destroyed
- Refugees and Displaced Persons
- Refugees and Displaced Persons/Fled Homes or Took Refuge
- Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos
- Normalcy Returns or Resume Schooling
Intervening Factors
- Collaborators or Bystanders/Foreign or Internationalization of conflict; Local
- Extrajudicial Killings and Army Involvement in Policing
- Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government
- Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures
Perpetrator Groups
- Christian Militia or Youths
- Fulani Herdsmen or Fulani-Hausa Group or Gunmen
- Muslim Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths
- Security Agents, Soldiers, The Army, Military, Hausa or Northern Troops
Strategies
- Organization, Planning, and Weaponry
- Extermination Plot
Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing
Mass Murders
Indoctrination and Manipulation or Instigation
Targets or Victims of Attack
- Beer Parlors, Hotels, Banks and Other Facilities
- Christians and Churches
- Christians and Churches\Christian Neighborhoods or Mostly Christian Villages
- Civilian Centers, Schools and School Children
- Civilian Targets
- Media Offices and Journalists
- Muslims, Hausa-Fulani Herders, Muslim Sect, Northerners or Mosques
- Security Agents - Police Officers, Military and Government Officials
- Southerners
- Ibos or Easterners as Targets
Coding List E
Summary of Nodes for Study Phase V – 2006 to Present
Attacks
- Shoot-out, Killings, Arson and Looting
- Blockade, Embargo and Civil War
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-

Bloodbath, Carnage, Pogrom, Mayhem, Massacres or Barbarism
Bombings, Coordinated Gun and Bomb Attacks
Genocide
Political Violence, Coup D’état and Political Assassinations
Religious and Ethnic Violence
Reprisals from Southern States
Sectarian Violence
Spiral or Escalation of Violence
Targeted, Pre-meditated or Orchestrated Killings and Assaults
Terrorist Activities
Threats or Fears of More Attacks, Protests or Warnings of Secession or Full Scale
War
- Tit-For-Tat Killings in Northern States
- Uprising, Anti-Government Rioting, Protests or Demonstrations
- Violent or Deadly Clashes, Rioting or Gun Battles
Causal Factors
Immediate Causes:
- Arrests or Persecution of Sect Members, Religious Extremism and Violence or
Other Fundamentalists Activities
- Election-related Violence
- Insurgency, Uprising or Anti-Government Riots
- Islam Degraded, Desecration or Misinterpretation of Koran, Danish Cartoon or
Miss World Publication
- Massacres of Ibos and Returning Refugees
- Reprisal Mission, Revenge or Counter-Coup
- Secession and Self-Determination
Perceived Threat of the Otherness:
- Annihilation Attempts of Targeting or Forceful Conversion of Christians to Islam
- Ethnic-Religious Hatreds, Rivalries, Divisions and Animosities
- North-South Split or Largely Muslim North and Mainly Christian South
- Ultimatum to Southern Christians living in the North to leave
Remote or Underlying Causes
- Al Qaeda, Afghanistan's Taliban, Libyan, Iranian Links or Anti U.S.-led
Afghanistan Air Strikes
- Culture of Bad Governance and Corruption or Oppressive Military Rule
- Historical Influences
- Political Underpinnings or Power Struggle
- Infiltration and Politicization of Religion
- Political Divisions and Tensions
- Socio-Economic Issues
Ethnic Groups Vying for Control of Fertile Lands, Political and Economic Power
Indigenous Settlers and Migrants Issues
Poverty, Unemployment, Lack of Education, and Discontent
Exclusive Ideological Framing
- Religious Dimensions, Anti-Western or Ideological Differences
- Fundamentalism and Religious Fervency
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-

Sharia or Islamic Law
Gender Segregation
Imposing Sharia across Nigeria or Establishing of Islamic State
Non-Muslim Opposition to Sharia, Unconstitutionality and Violation of
Fundamental Rights of Christians
Strict Implementation of Sharia, Anti-Establishment or Rejection of Westernized
Institutions and Ideology
Conflict Parties
- Different Ethnic Groups
- Fulani Herdsmen or Hausa-Fulani Group and Christian or Host Communities
- Muslim Mobs or Sect and Security Forces
- Muslim Mobs, Sect or Groups and Christians
- Muslim Mobs, Sect, Civilian Mobs or Gangs and Ibos
- Northern States Government and Christians
- Security Agents and Unidentified Civilians
Context
Middle Belt or Central Region
North Eastern Region
Northern Region or States:
- Abuja/Jabi; Zuba
- Adamawa State
- Adamawa State/Yola; Jimeta; Lamurde; Mubi
- Bauchi State/Bauchi
- Benue State/Makurdi; Dooga, Kpata, Lokobi, Ajimaka, Ekeae, Giza, Yogbo and
Mbgawem border communities; Gwer West Local Government Area; Zongo
Akiki, Nyijir, Tse Taki, and Agbeke in Guma areas
- Borno State/Maiduguri; Dala; Yan’tebura, Bulukuntu Tsallake; Zajeri
- Jigawa State/Dutse
- Gombe State
- Kaduna State/Kaduna; Kafanchan; Kufara; Ori-Apata; Zaria; Zonkwa and ZangoKataf
- Kano State/Kano; Bompai; Sabon-Gari
- Katsina State/Katsina
- Nasarawa State; Alago; Doma Town; Eke and Giza Areas; Kadarko; Tiv
settlements at Kpata, Donga, Lokobi and Ajimaka
- Niger State/Minna - Angwan Kuje; Madalla
- Plateau State/Jos; Barkin Ladi; Bukuru; Dogon Na Hauwa; Kuru Karama;
Wareng; Yelwa; Zot and Ratsat
- Sokoto State
- Taraba State/Jalingo
- Yobe State/Damaturu; Gadaka; Geidam; Hawan Malka; Potiskum
- Zamfara State
Southern States
- Anambra State/Awka; Nnobi; Nnewi; Onitsha
- Delta State/Asaba
- Imo State
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- Niger Delta
Effects
- Christian Businesses, Homes, Hotels and Properties Destroyed
- Churches Burned, Bombed or Destroyed
- Death Toll and Casualties, Mutilated Bodies or Burned Corpses
- Denial of Freedom of Worship and Desecration of Christian Religion
- Destroying, Looting and Razing of Properties
- Mass Grave and Mass Burial
- Mosques Burned or Destroyed
- Police Stations and Barracks, Government Buildings Bombed or Burned
- Refugees and Displaced Persons/Fled Homes or Took Refuge
- Schools Bombed, Burned, Destroyed or Closed
- Security Threat, Apprehension, Anxiety or Political and Social Chaos
Infiltration of Police, Military and all areas of Government
- Normalcy or Calm Returns
Intervening Factors
- Collaborators or Bystanders/Foreign or Internationalization of conflict; Local
- Extrajudicial Killings and Army Involvement in Policing
- Government Ineptitude, Lethargy or Weak Central Government
- Press Censorship and Manipulation or Deflation and Inflation of Casualty Figures
Intervention Efforts
- Aid and Relief Support
- Attempts at Dialogue, Appeals for Intervention or Mediation
- Control Measures Taken, Investigations and Commissions of Inquiry
- Calls to Address the Constitutionality of Sharia Law and Security Issues
Military Assault or Crackdown
Mopping-up of Rioters or Arrests Made
Warnings or Calls for Action, Restraint, Justice, or Self-Defense
- Post-War Re-unification Policy, Rehabilitation Efforts or Calls for Rebuilding of
Churches
- Reconciliation Attempts
Perpetrator Groups
- Christian Militia or Youths
- Civilian Mobs, Unidentified Attackers or Gunmen
- Islamic Fundamentalists or Sect:
Boko Haram
- Fulani Herdsmen or Fulani-Hausa Group or Gunmen
- Muslim Mobs, Rioters or Rampaging Muslim Youths
- Rampaging or Under-aged Youths
- Security Agents, Soldiers, The Army, Military, Hausa or Northern Troops
Strategies
- Organization, Planning, and Weaponry
- Co-ordinated Attacks - Shootings, Bombings, Maiming, Arson
Drive-By or Hit and Run Shootings
- Extermination Plot
Blockade and Starvation
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Forced Migration
Ideo-Ethnic Cleansing
Mass Murders
- Indoctrination/Manipulation or Instigation
Targets or Victims of Attack
- Beer Parlors, Hotels, Banks and Other Facilities
- Christians and Churches
- Christians and Churches/Christian Neighborhoods or Mostly Christian Villages
- Civilian Centers, Schools and School Children
- Civilian Targets
- Media Offices and Journalists
- Muslim Clerics or Mainstream or Orthodox Muslims
- Muslims, Hausa-Fulani Herders, Muslim Sect, Northerners or Mosques
- Security Agents - Police Officers, Military and Government Officials
- Southerners/Ibos or Easterners as Targets
- Symbols of Government Authority
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Appendix D: Selected Cases of Religious Crises
Table D1
Selected Cases of Religious Crises in Northern Nigeria from 1980 to 2009
S/N
1.
2.

Date
Thursday, May
01, 1980
December, 1829m 1980

3.

October 29-30,
1982

4.

October 29-30,
1982
February 27March 5, 1984
April 26-28,
1985

5.
6.

Location
Zaria (Kaduna
State)
Yan-Awaki Ward
in Kano (Kano
State)
Bullumkutu,
Maiduguri (Borno
State)
Kano (Kano State)

Principal Actors
Disturbances in Zaria during which property
belonging to mainly Christians were destroyed
Riots by Maitatsine Sects. 118 people died.
Extensive damage to property

Dobeli Ward,

Maitatsine Sect. 568 died. Wanton destruction of
property
Maitatsine Sect. 105 died. Wanton destruction of
property

Pantami Ward,
Combe (Bauchi
State)
Ilorin (Kwara
State)
Kafanchan
(Kaduna State)

7.

March, 1986

8.

March, 1987

9.

March 1987

10.

February. 1988

11.

April, 1991

12.

April, 1991

Tafawa Balewa
(Bauchi State)

13.

October, 1991

Kano (Kano State)

14.

May, 1992

Zangon Kataf,
(Kaduna state)

Katsina, Funtua,
Zaria, Gusau and
Kaduna (Kaduna
State)
Kaduna, Kaduna
Polytechnic
(Kaduna State)
Katsina (Katsina
State)

Kala-Kato and Maitatisine sects. 118 people died.
Extensive damage to property.
Muslim demonstrators burnt down churches

Muslims and Christians clashed during a Christian
procession at Easter
Class between Muslims and Christians at the
College of Education, Kafanchan. Loss of some
lives and the burning of some mosques by
Christians and natives Kajes.
Wave of religious riots in which Muslims burnt
downs numerous church building s, and damaged
properties belonging to Christians. Many lives were
lost.
Religious riots, ostensibly among students,
destroyed the foundation walls of the Christian
chapel
Religious violence spear headed by Malam Yahaya
Yakubu, leader of the fundamentalist Shiite sect in
Katsina. It was protest over a blasphemous
publication Fidi Times. Several lives were lost and
property destroyed.
Started as a quarrel between a Fulani man and a
Sayawa meat seller in Tafawa Balewa. Escalated
into full blown violence and later took the
colouring of a religious war in Bauchi. Several
lives were lost and property valued over hundreds
of million naira was destroyed.
A peaceful procession initiated by the Izala sect to
halt Rev. Reinhard Bonnke from having a crusade
in Kano later degenerated into a very violent and
bloody religious confrontation. Thousands of lives
were lost and properties valued in millions of Naira
were destroyed.
A communal feud between the Katafs and the
Hausas later took the dimension of inter-religious
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15.

January, 1993

Funtua, (Katsina
State)

16.

December,
1994

Kano (Kano State)

17.

May, 1995

Kano (Kano State)

18.

Thursday, July
22, 1999

Kano Reprisal
Killing

19.

February 28,
2000

Kaduna Mayhem
(Kaduna State)

20.

Friday, April
14, 2000

Agyragu Crisis
(Nasarawa State)

21.

July 2000

22.

September 8,
2000

Tsagari Crisis
(Kwara)
Kaltungo religious
(Combe State)

23.

October 17,
2000

OPC-Hausa/Fulani
(Kwara)

24.

Saturday,
October 27,
2000
Saturday,
December 02,
2000
Thursday,
June, 28,2001

Minna reprisal
(Niger)

27.

Friday,
September 07,
2001

Jos crisis

28.

October 12,
2001

Kano Riot

29.

Monday,
October, 29,

Tiv-Jukun/Fulani
Conflict

25.

26.

Hadejia Crisis
(Jigawa)
Azara crisis
(Nasarawa)

ware between Muslims and Christians in other
major cities of Kaduna State. Several lives were
lost and properties were destroyed
The Kalakato religious sect assaulted the village
head and burnt down the police vehicle. Lives and
property were also lost
Communal violence triggered oil by the beheading
of a Christian who had allegedly desecrated the
Quoran.
Communal violence triggered off by quarrel
between Hausa and Ibo led to the burning of
houses, churches and shops and killing of innocent
people.
Hausa/Fulani youth took vengeance on the killing
of their Kith and Kin in Sagamu. Their target was
the Yoruba community.
Kaduna city exploded in violence as Muslim and
Christian extremists and other hoodlums clashed
over the proposal to introduced Sharia.
Communal clash that started with a protest again
the location of Local Government Headquarters.
The militant youth group started the riot and later
took to the streets, killing and destroying.
Clash between Tsagari and Share communities of
Kwara State which claimed several lives
A religious violence that was sparked off by the
presence of the states Sharia implementation
committee.
A faceoff between the militant members of OPC
and Hausa/Funlani community over supremacy of
Emirate system in the state.
Violent ethnic crisis erupted after the OPC assaults
in Kwara and Lagos States.
A sectarian disturbance that was caused by a debate
between Muslim and Christians in Hadeja (Jigawa).
There was wanton destruction of worship places
An ethnic conflict between the Tiv and the Azara
indigences. It started with gruesome killing of an
Azara traditional leader, and later spread to the Tiv
village, with the Tiv community on the defense.
A violent ethnic/religious crisis between the
Muslim/Hausa Fulani and Christian/Indigences.
The subject of discovered between the Jasawa
Development Association and Plateau Youth
council was over political appointment in Jos
North.
A peaceful anti-American protest over the bombing
of Afghanistan turned violent, taking ethnic and
religious dimension, it
degenerated
into
uncontrollable violence which claimed lives and
damaged properties and places of worship.
An ethnic clash between Tivs and Jukun/Fulani
which was an extension of the May 2001 clash and
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2003

30.

Friday,
November 02,
2001

Gwantu crisis

31.

Sunday,
December 30,
2001

Vwag crisis

32.

January 18,
2002

Awe crisis

33.

May 2, 2000

Jos Mayhem

34.

May 2, 2002

Fulani-Irigwe crisis

35.

Saturday, June
01, 2002

Yelwa-Shendam
Mayhem (Plateau)

36.

Monday, July
01, 2002
Tuesday, July
01, 2003

Wase (Plateau)

Thursday,
January 1,
2004
Thursday,
January 1,
2004

Ganye, Adamawa

40.

Sunday;
February 1,
2004

Wase/Kanam
(Plateau)

41.

Saturday,
February 1,
2004
Saturday,
April 3, 2004
Sunday; April
11, 2004

Wase/Kanam
(Plateau)

Monday, April
26, 2004

Bakin Chiyawa
Plateau

37.

38.

39.

42.
43.

44.

Edo/Kogi

Yobe

Makarfi, Kaduna
Lantang South,
Plateau

could be linked to the protracted dispute between
both sides. Newswatch reported that 16 soldiers
were killed which later led to the gruesome revenge
on the Tivs, by the Nigerian Army.
A clash that started on a political ground (over the
relocation of LG Headquarters) later took on ethnoreligious dimension in which places of worship
were destroyed
A violent communal conflict in Vwang district
between the indigenes and non-indigenes exploded
in the backdrop of the September 7 Jos crisis. It
started when an illegal group of 40 men attacked
the district Head of vwang. It also had religious
colouring.
A renewed communal clash between two
indigenous communities in Awe Local Government
of Nasarawa State. The cause was not certain but
two people were killed and several others injured.
Another mayhem that followed PDP congress but
later took an ethno-religious colour
An ethnic clash between the Hausa/Fulani and the
Irigwe indigences in Basa, Plateau which was said
to be a reprisal attack.
A religious-cum ethnic fracas between the native
people (predominantly Christians) and Hausa
settlers (predominantly Muslims). This violence
extended to about four Local Government councils
in Southern Plateau.
The Yelwa-Shendam riots spilled over to Wase
Communal clashes between border communities in
Edo and Kogi States Ekepedo and Ogori over ladn
ownerships.
Clash between Fulani herdsmen and farmers over
grazing lands.
Militant Islamic group operating under the name of
Muhajiran launched a Taliban-like attack on police.
Men of the Nigerian Army killed five and arrested
several others.
Violent clash between Mavo and Taroh
communities, which claimed II lives. Suspected
Taroh youth were alleged to have raided Mavo
villages.
Communal clash over land ownership between
Minda and Kparev groups. Several lives were lost.
Religious protest in Makarfi twon over the
desecration of the Quran by a Christian teenager.
Continued clashes that led to the sacking of Taroh
villages in Lantang South LGC by suspected
Hausa-Fulani insurgents.
Renewed hostilities launched by suspected
displaced Fulani herdsmen. The conflict was
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45.

Saturday, May
1, 2004

Yelwa Shendam,
Plateau State

46.

Wednesday,
May 12, 2004

Kano

47.

Saturday, June
8, 2008

Konshisha Gwer,
Benue

48.

Tuesday, June
8, 2004

Numan, Adamawa

49.

Tuesday,
August 3,
2004

Quanpam, Plateau

50.

Monday,
September 27,
2004

Limankara, Borno

believed to be spill over of the ethno religious crisis
that has been bedevil ling southern Plateau Local
Government of Langtang South and North, Wase,
Kanam and Shendam.
A fresh ethno religious mayhem that claimed over
650 lives and over 250 women abducted by
suspected Taroh militia.
Kano may hem following the Yelwa Shendam
ethno religious crisis in Plateau. Non-Muslims were
attacked in reprisal of the Plateau crisis. Over 200
lives were lost and the traditional ruler of the area
deposed.
Boundary
disputes
between
neighbouring
Konshisha and Gwer communities. Thirteen lives
were lost.
Ethno-religious crisis in Numan over the
contruction of a mosques minaret over the Humma
Bachamas palace. Over 50 people were feared
killed and the traditional ruler of the area deposed.
Fresh outbreak of violence in Lankaka village.
Suspected armed milita from neighbouring state
allegedly stormed the village community killing
two and razing twenty houses.
A self-styled Taliban group hiding on the Goza
hills and Madara mountains on the north-eastern
border with Cameroon raid police station killing
officers and stealing ammunition.

Source: Newswatch Magazine November 2, 2009 (as cited in Ezeibe, n.d., para. 29).

